Soviet ICBM Silos
The construction and activation of silo launchers cost as much as the missiles installed in them.
American intelligence seldom actually saw Soviet missiles. Almost all imagery related to Soviet missiles was of their launch silos. Soviet missiles, some real and others not so real, were dragged through Red Square during the 1960s, but otherwise they were seemingly almost never seen. At the factory they were under a roof, and once deployed they were underground. And the trip from factory to deployement was brief and infrequent, and normally the missile was in a cannister that hid the missile itself from prying Western eyes.
Telementry was rather informative on some aspects of missile performance, but at least in the early years, some puzzles remained. Human intelligence seemingly provided a few glimpses of aspects of strategic missile programs, but these seemed brief and fragmentary. In retrospect, American human intelligence seems more concerned with spy-versus-spy than with providing positive strategic intelligence.
Denied access to imagery of actual missiles, American intelligence became quite focused on silos. Actually, this is quite sensible, since information on the silos provided critical insight as to the silos contents. American intelligence could measure and count the number of Type IIID silos housing the UR-100K / SS-11. even if the precise configuration of the missile remained a matter of confusion, the fact that this system was largerly a counter-value rather that counter-force weapon was fairly clear.
The first missile systems, both in the USSR and abroad, were located on the surface, on specially equipped launch tables. This arrangement was extremely unsuccessful for a number of reasons: low resistance to the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion, low protection from acts of sabotage groups, and the influence of the atmosphere did not add life to the products. The solution of the problem was obvious - it is necessary to hide the missiles under the ground. As soon as there was information about the creation of underground underground installations in the USA, the Union immediately began testing and testing such a starting position.
In a narrow circle Khrushchev liked to tell how he, the former miner, had a "mine" idea. He also returns to this topic in his memoirs: "I had an idea to put a rocket in the mine ... It would be in a closed state, with a roof, it alone improves, keeps (rocket) in any weather ... For destruction ( mine) it would take only a direct hit, and this is unlikely."
The rocket designers were given the task of creating silo launchers. The first "new settlers" of the silo were strategic medium-range missiles R-12 and R-14. Soon, the mine "propiska" received intercontinental ballistic missiles R-16 Chief Designer M. Yangel and R-9A Chief Designer S. Korolev.
In September 1958, Chief Marshal of Artillery MI Nedelin, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for Special Weapons and Reactive Engineering, faced scientists and designers with the task of deploying strategic ballistic missiles in service with the Soviet Army to silo launchers. From the very beginning it was intended not only to store the missiles under the ground, but also to ensure the possibility of their underground launch. And in the early 1960s in the USSR, work was begun on the design and construction of silo launch ["mine start-up" complexes - ShPU [shahtnye puskovye ustanovki - Mine starting Installation].
Mine launchers (silos) for a single launch for ICBMs are the main elements of stationary missile systems. The silo is a combination of the main mine structure and auxiliary structures mounted permanently in the ground, testing and starting equipment, technological equipment, technical systems and other technical means that provides: long-term storage of a solid-fuel or filled liquid rocket; protection of the missile, equipment, systems and other technical means from the damaging factors of modern weapons and the adverse effects of the environment (atmospheric precipitation, dust, low and high temperatures, air humidity, groundwater, etc., etc.); conditions for remote and local monitoring of technical condition, maintenance, preparation and launch of the missile.
When designing the first silos were named "Dvina", "Desna", "Sheksna" and "Chusovaya", for which the developers affectionately nicknamed their "little rivers". These names are consonant with the numerical designation of ballistic missiles: R-12U - Dvina, R-14U - Chusovaya, R-16U - Sheksna, R-9A - Desna. A metal beaker of 16 mm steel with a diameter of 3 meters was placed in the concrete trunk, into which the rocket dropped. The space between the metal cup and the concrete well served to drain the gases of the launch rocket.
Each of these complexes had, depending on the type of rocket 2, 3 or 4 silos, as well as storage for fuel, underground hangars and other necessary pribluda. Next to each complex was a military town for 700-800 people, providing security and operation of the facility. This arrangement was called the "group start" and made an indelible impression on the opponents and allies. According to legend, the French President Charles de Gaulle, having looked at Baikonur, the group launch of the R-16 decided on France's non-alignment with NATO, while the leader of Cuba, Fidel Castro, visited the object on Valdai (the Apocalypse Canyon) to believe in the all-destroying power of socialism.
In 1960 Myasishchevskoe OKB-23 merged with Chelomey's company that was gaining strength. During this period V.M. Baryshev is appointed Deputy General Designer, and in 1963 - Chief of the established Branch No. 2, which was entrusted with the development of ground-based missile systems. The backbone of the team was made up of specialists from the Meisischevsky complex of ground equipment, reinforced by engineers of the Design Bureau Dmitry Tomashevich and Alexander Nadiradze. These bureaus were on the same territory as Branch No. 2. To unite representatives of different enterprises and schools is not a simple task.
The task of organizing the unit to develop a ground launch complex inside the OKB-52 in the early 1960s looked somewhat strange. At all Soviet test ranges ["landfills"], the design of ground equipment of launching complexes was handled by Vladimir Barmin's Design Bureau, a recognized master of his craft. However, VN. Chelomey strived for complete autonomy and independence from his other design bureaus. The reason for this is that at the junction of the "launch" and the "rocket" there is a technological gap that should not have been dependent on other engineering enterprises. The entire process of preparing the rocket for launch, according to Vladimir Nikolaevich, was to be carried out by one KB.
Vladimir Barmin offered his parameters for a silo-launcher, which did not suit Chelomey. Therefore, after quarreling with Barmin, Vladimir Nikolaevich instructed, and in a rather tough form, to work on a silo with Baryshev. This work began with a complex of ground-based equipment for the UR-200 universal strategic missile (8K81), which includes an automated system for supplying the product with a self-propelled cart to the installer, installing the rocket on the launch pad, automatically docking the pneumatic, electrical and fueling communications, and refueling the missile components of fuel. The UR-200 missile was not adopted, but the design solutions implemented during its development formed the basis for the creation of subsequent generations of rocket and space systems, in particular, to the most powerful Proton.
This work was followed by no less important projects - the most complicated universal transport-launch container (TPK), silo launchers and combat launch complexes for increased security for UR-100 missiles and their modifications.
On early silos (R-14, R-16, R-9), the rocket was inside the so-called "starting cup", which in turn, was standing in the trunk of the silo. The flow of gases during start-up passed between the walls of the cup/glass and the barrel of the silo. The barrel of the silo was usually lined with metal - for water proofing. In later silos, counted for missiles using the TPK (transport and launch canister), the TPK with the missile was directly in the silo's trunk, there were no other launching glasses. The barrel of the silo was also lined with metal. In later silos the "glass / cup" was often a layer of metal - but it really had the shape of a cup or glass.
The rocket was ampulized (isolated from the external environment) in a special transport-launch container (TPK) filled with inert gas. In the TPK, it was transported, stored in a silo launcher during the entire service life in constant readiness for launching and started from it. The use of membrane valves separating fuel tanks with aggressive components from rocket engines allowed to keep the rocket constantly refueled for several years. Monitoring the technical condition of the missiles of a single combat missile system, as well as pre-launch preparation and launching, were conducted remotely by commands from the command post of the regiment.
Chelomey thought that increasing the degree of protection of existing launchers was unrealistic. The proposal TsNIIIMash regarding the need to increase the degree of protection of the existing mine launching rigs UR-100 missiles Vladimir Nikolayevich considered unrealistic and optional. He gave a detailed justification for the fact that this can not be done without having built the mine anew in a new or old place. And there is no direct need to try to do anything. Increasing the survivability of missile systems Chelomei proposed to achieve in another way, creating missile defense of the position areas of the missile forces. According to the colorful graphs and tables given by Vladimir Nikolayevich, it looked cheaper and more efficient than the hardening of the mines. To practically demonstrate the feasibility of their proposals, Yangel and NII-88 developed an updated version of the R-36 missile with multiple warheads and a fundamentally high-protection silo launcher with a so-called “mortar launch.” With the mortar start, modification of the silo was required (the gas bell-cutter disappeared at the bottom, the gratings on the top cut off, the belt of depreciation of the other structure appeared), but the main part of the rocket container underwent major modifications. To launch a rocket, originally intended for a "hot" launch, the container was essentially designed anew. Now it was able to withstand the pressure developed by the PAD (gunpowder pressure accumulator) and ensured the sealing of the gap between its walls and the rocket.
The creation of a reinforced silo launcher for the UR-100N missile system received the Lenin Prize from former opponents of improving the security of launch facilities, including the Grechko defense minister.
The threat of a disarming first strike using high-precision weapons became one of the main reasons for the shift of the "center of gravity" of the Strategic Missile Forces to mobile systems and the growth of the share of the Navy in the nuclear triad. Mobile complexes, capable of quickly dispersing, have become a much more difficult target.
The US Intelligence Community used the National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale (NIIRS) to quantify the interpretability or usefulness of imagery. The NIIRS was developed to provide an objective standard for image quality, since the term image quality can mean different things imagery analysts and engineers. Rating Level 4 would enable detection of an open missile silo door. Rating Level 7 would enable detection of details of the silo door hinging mechanism on Type III-F, III-G, and III-H launch silos and Type III-X launch control silos.
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