Soviet Nuclear Doctrine - Western Views
During the Cold War, some analysts perceived a Soviet nuclear war-fighting and war-winning strategy, while others presented evidence that the heart of Soviet national security policy was the prevention of nuclear war. Perhaps even more than capabilities and behavior, changing Soviet doctrine on nuclear war itself generated this dispute.
As of 1973, CIA assessed that the main objectives underlying Soviet strategic policy may be described in broad terras as similar to those of a decade ago: to protect the security of the homeland, to deter nuclear war but to wage war successfully should deterrence fail, to project, an image of military strength commensurate with the position of a great world power, and to support foreign policy aims if only by checking strategic forces of potential opponents.
The pattern of development, deployment, and operation of the strategic forces suggested to CIA how the Soviets viewed the utility of these forces. Deterrence was seen as a key objective. The major effort had been on programs which assured the ability of these forces to absorb a US strike and still return a devastating blow. The Soviets nevertheless planned for the possibility that deterrence may fail, although they did not contemplate launching a sudden first strike on the US or expect one on themselves. Their strategic buildup over the 1960s showed that they were unwilling to remain in a position of marked strategic inferiority relative to the US.
The ultimate objectives and intentions underlying Soviet strategic arms programs continued to be a subject of uncertainty in the West, given a dynamic strategic environment characterized by continuing competitionon both sides, each attempting to prevent the other from achieving a measurable advantage, and in the absence of arms control agreements sufficiently comprehensive to restrain that competition. Soviet spokesmen have often stated in recentyears that the USSR's basic aim is to maintain acondition of "equal security" in relation to the us.This concept is not capable of precise definition.
There was a growing body of evidence that Soviet decisions on force goals involved a complex interplay of many factors beyond rational and objective considerations of strategic needs. The political leadership had the final say on those matters it considers, but it operated in the presence of other influences, including competing policy positions, special interest groups, Kremlin politics, bureaucratic pressures, and technological and economic constraints. Decisions were worked out on an incremental basis, and choices were susceptible to change from one year to the next.
It was possible for Western analysts to circumscribe in a rough way the range of choices available in the light of major factors that the Soviets must take into account in planning for the future of their strategic forces. These factors included the provisions of strategic arms limitation agreements and the manner in which these agreements altered or appeared to alter the strategic, political, and economic conditions confronting the USSR; the leadership's sense of stability or change in its strategic relationship with the US, including interaction in research and development, the pace and scope of technological change; economic capabilities; and the Chinese military threat.
CIA assessed that there was good evidence that the Soviets did not consider a sudden first strike to be a workable strategy. The Soviets had not deployed counterforce weapons in sufficient numbers to make a first-strike damage limiting strategy feasible. At the same time, the Soviets evidently did not anticipate a sudden first strike by the US. Their propaganda continued to cite the threatof a US surprise attack, but the observed day-to-day readiness posture of their strategic forces indicated that the Soviets did not, in fact, expect such an attack.
Excluding a sudden first-strike strategy, the Soviet leadership had considered three strategic options: preemption, launch-on-warning, and retaliation. Preemption was often presented in Soviet military writings as a desirable strategic option, but these discussions failed to address such factors as the US early warning systems and massive retaliatory capabilities. Given the immense risks involved, the Soviets probably would not attempt to translate this theoretical concept into a practical option. Launch-on-warning evidently has been consideredas a strategic option, but it was rarely mentioned by the Soviets. The concept may be seen as havinga certain psychological value in reinforcing deterrence, but as a policy it would present command and control problems.
The Soviet Leadership was assessed as unlikely to delegate the authority to launch a nuclear attack or to accept the unpredictable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch inherent in such a policy. None of the Soviet statements about pre-emption and launch-on-warning came from the upper levels of the civilian leadership. The Soviet strategic buildup over the past decade made retaliation a thoroughly credible doctrine.
Both counterforce and countervalue targets were seen as incorporated in Soviet planning. The basic targets were identified as missile launch sites, nuclear weapons production and storage facilities, other military installations, systems for controlling and supporting strategic forces, and military-industrial and administrative centers. Explicit references to the destruction of enemy population, per se, were notably omitted from available Soviet listings of strategic targets. The list obviously implied, however, the direct targeting of major American cities and therefore massive civilian fatalities.
CIA did not have good evidence on how the Soviets viewed the possibility of an intercontinental exchange between the US and the USSR if theater nuclear warfare erupted in Europe. The Soviets would presumably prefer to avoid a level of combat that would involve massive strikes on their own country. Their willingness to escalate to global nuclear warfare might depend largely on what they expected the US response would be to events in Europe. In view of the modification of their doctrine on escalation, Soviet planners may have become more willing to consider decoupling a war in Europe from a direct US-USSR intercontinental confrontation.
The objectives underlying Soviet military policies were described by CIA as: to protect the security of the homeland, to deter nuclear war but to wage war successfully should deterrence fail, to maintain hegemony over Eastern Europe, and to foster an image of strength in support of a strong foreign policy aimed at expanding Soviet influence. The military policies that supported these objectives, however, shifted markedly.
The Soviets stated explicitly that they will not accept less than "equal security." Whether they believed that their political goals in the world required a great deal more than that was uncertain. They considered deterrence the key objectivefor their strategic forces. The major efforthas been on programs which assure the abilityof these forces to absorb a US strike andstill be able to return a devastating blow. They plan for the possibility that deterrencemight fail, but they do not contemplate launch- ing a sudden first strike on the US, nor dothey expect one on themselves. They have notacquired forces with the necessary combinationof accuracy, yield, and numbers to be effectivein this role, and there is good evidence thatthey do not maintain their strategic forcesin a state of constant alert.
In CIA's examination of Soviet concepts of inter-continental nuclear war, one of the critical questions was how the Soviets envisioned the start of such a war, and another was how they would use their strategic attack forces in the war. CIA found good evidence that the Soviets did not consider a sudden first strike to be a workable strategy. Over the years Soviet party and government officials consistently maintained that the USSR would never be the first to launch a nuclear attack and that its strategic attack forces would be used only in retaliation. At SALT, Soviet spokesmen asserted that the Soviet Union did not have a first-strike capability, and they proposed an agreement that neither side would initiate the use of nuclear weapons.
These statements might be discounted were it not for the physical evidence that by the mid-1970s the Soviets had not deployed counterforce weapons in sufficient numbers to make a first-strike strategy feasible. Only one weapon system, the SS-9 ICBM, had an accuracy and warhead yield sufficient to give it a high probability of knocking out US ICBMs. Further growth in this force was constrained by the stategic arms limitation agreements. The SS-9 force was not large enough to be decisive against the US Minuteman force, even in a surprise first strike. The other ICBMs and the submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the Soviet strategic arsenal did not have the necessary combination of accuracy and yield to be highly effective against hardened targets, and the 140 heavy bombers had little chance of catching any of the US attack force on the ground.
At the same time, CIA believed the Soviets did not anticipate a sudden first strike by the US. Although their propaganda continued to cite the threat of a US surprise attack, the observed day-to-day readiness postures of their strategic offensive and defensive forces indicated that the Soviets did not, in fact, expect such an attack to occur. None of the Soviet heavy bomber force, for example, was regularly onalert, and these bombers were clustered at five home bases. Similarly, about two-thirds of the Y-class missile submarines were normally in port at just two bases. At the ABM complexes around Moscow, only 30 to 40 of the 64 launchers were loaded. And at the soft ICBM sites, missiles were seldom observed on the pads. The Soviets would not maintain this kind of low - and highly vulnerable - readiness posture if they had real fears about a surprise attack by the US.
It was not known in the West what kind of evidence the Kremlin leadership would think solid enough to warrant a preemptive attack. Agent sources reported that the Soviets claimed they were confident their intelligence network would provide strategic warning of a US surprise attack. In view of the retaliatory capabilities of the US and USSR, however, it was difficult for CIA to envision circumstances under which the political leaders would feel so confident of their opponent's motives and intentions that they would initiate general nuclear warfare.
It was difficult for CIA to judge how seriously the launch-on-warning option was considered at the top decisionmaking level. As a concept with which to confront the US, it may be seen to have a certain psychological value in reinforcing deterrence. As a genuine policy, it would present command and control problems.
To CIA, all the evidence on military decision making in the Kremlin pointed to the pre-eminence of the civilian party leadership and its firm control over nuclear weaponry. Furthermore, Soviet statements at SALT and elsewhere had shown that the possibility of accidental nuclear war was clearly a source of serious concern for Soviet leaders. For CIA, it would be out of character for the Soviet leadership to delegate the authority to launch a nuclear attack or to accept the unpredictable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch inherent in a launch-on-warning policy.
There were numerous references over the years to indicate that the primary mission ofSoviet strategic attack forces remained the traditional one of destroying the enemy's warmaking capability. Most of the evidence on Soviet targeting of strategic forces indicated that both counterforce and counter-value targets were incorporated in the planning. The Soviets consistently identified the basic targetsof their strategic attack forces as missile launchsites, nuclear weapons production and storage facilities, other military installations, and military-industrial and administrative centers. The importance of attackingthe enemy's systems for controlling and supporting strategic forces was also frequently stressed. Explicit references to the destruction of enemy population, per se, were notably omitted from Soviet listings of strategic targets. Attacks upon US military industry, as well as political and administrative centers, however, would obviously involve the direct targeting of major American cities and result in massive civilian fatalities.
CIA saw that one question about Soviet targeting that was largely unanswerable was the degree of flexibility the Soviets would have in planning and executing a strike. That some flexibility existed was indícated by the observed ability to fire ICBMs on different azimuths and to different ranges. There were also clear indications that the Soviets devoted considerable effort to the problem of controlling and coordinating their strategic attack forces and, once they are brought to peak readiness, minimizing the reaction time of those forces. The Soviets had a highly developed communications system, though how quickly the Soviets could change from one target to another was unknown.
In January 1977, General Secretary L.I.Brezhnev delivered an address in the city of Tula whose impact on Soviet doctrine and capabilities continued until the end of the Cold War. By rejecting the possibility of a means of defense against nuclear weapons, or a damage-limiting capacity in nuclear War, Brezhnev closed the door on a debate that had lasted for over a decade in Soviet military thought. Since Tula, the Soviet politico-military leadership presented a consensus on the reality of "Mutual Assured-Destruction" in present-day conditions.
The significance of Tula divided Western Sovietology. But by the mid-1980s Western analysts were presenting more and more evidence that changes in Soviet strategy, operational art, and force developments did in fact indicate a Soviet shift away from nuclear options and toward an independent conventional war option. The Defense intelligence Agency published a report in early 1983 that highlighted "weapons modernization and changes in force structure evident in the Soviet air, ground, and missile forces" that clearly enhanced Soviet capabilities to execute "the complex, high speed conventional operations which are being discussed with ever-increasing frequency by Soviet/ Warsaw Pact military leaders." According to Phillip Petersen and John Hines, the Soviets had already done a great deal "to expand and adjust the structure of their armed forces to accommodate operational concepts that support the conventional offensive." The extent of these structural changes strongly suggests that "this latest phase in the evolution of Soviet strategy is already quite mature."
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