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1945-1955 - Post-War Developments: General

Civil defense in the Soviet Union played a key role in defense measures after the 1920's, but the destruction suffered during World War II and the advent of weapons of mass destruction prompted a new emphasis on Civil Defense shortly after the war. Reconstruction and other problems surrounding immediate postwar recovery took priority until 1948; thereafter, and especially after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, new civil defense programs and policies emerged.

Immediately after the war, interest in civil defense declined, primarily because of the precedence given to reconstructing the nation's social, economic, and military complex. However, around 1948, reports were filtered to the West from returning German POWs of a shelter construction program in all new buildings. In 1949, basic radio communications designed to improve defense command and control was ordered. A call, in 1950, for "tens of thousands" of instructors preceded the formation of DOSAAF in 1951. This organization, a paramilitary group cooperating with the Army, Navy, and Air Force, replaced OSOAVIAKHIM and became the principal civil defense training group. In the next two years, as DOSAAF took on more responsibilities, mandatory study circles began, followed by a 20-hour compulsory civil defense training program for all members, then numbering approximately 16 to 20 million.

Civil defense received a big boost during this period when, in October 1952, the 19th Party Congress decided to develop an all-out defense of the Soviet Union. The XIXth Party Congress, meeting in 1952, called for "all out" defense measures, to include civil defense. In 1953, an antiaircraft general, Nikolay F. Gritchin, was made DOSAAF chairman, indicating the growing importance of this group in relation to the military, and air defense in particular.

Although the Soviets were aware of the existence of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II, little or no mention was made of these in public literature until 1954, nine years after Hiroshima and five years after the U.S.S.R. exploded its first atomic bomb. The turning point in civil defense thinking occurred at this time when civil defense literature publicly announced a growing concerning with nuclear and bacteriological weapons. This awareness precipitated changes in policy and eventual debate in the late 1950's over the effectiveness of civil defense programs, shelters, evacuation and dispersal procedures, and various other aspects of the existing system. More immediate results involved, in 1955, the assignment of Colonel General of Aviation O. Tolstikov, a First Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs, as head of Civil Defense and the onset of a 10-hour compulsory training program for the adult population.

It would seem that, as the Soviets were recovering from World War II damage and beginning their strenuous drive to gain technological and military parity with the West, they also found time to reassess and begin improvements on other internal programs. Civil defense acquired renewed attention by 1948 and paralleled the growth of air defense in the Soviet Union. Beginning with lessons learned from World War II, including the effects of German air attack on their homeland and the accounts by returning Soviet military of U.S. bomber damage in Germany, Soviet leaders realized the need for a stronger, more organized civil defense program. Not only did they realize that the ability to protect their military/economic/ social complex would be a more difficult mission with the development of new weapons technology, but perception of immediate threats such as the proliferation of the United States' Strategic Air Command, the establishment of NATO in 1949, and the Korean conflict of 1950-1953 (when it was possible to actually witness and assess the new aircraft technology developed since the war) reinforced the Soviet's early views concerning adequate defense.

The following changes within the Soviet Union after 1950 had a profound effect on defense posture:

• Development of strategic weapons of mass destruction;
• Increasing vulnerability due to urbanization and industrialization;
• Polarization of the global struggle into an East/West power bloc;
• Cold War intensification;
• The feeling that civil defense can contribute to the overall military posture of the Soviet Union.

Thus, it could be claimed that the Soviet civil defense program was a result of mere common sense, of the recognition of the need to protect not only the military-industrial segment of the society but also to maintain the morale of the population, now considered a prime factor in effective recovery from mass attack.

Of course, the success of such a vast institution relies heavily on popular support. Considerable apathy was reported, and one sources mentioned that "pressure is being applied by the Communist party and other groups" to promote membership and participation.166 The advent of a compulsory training program in 1955 probably came as a result of little success with "voluntarism." Therefore, again it must be that the program at least looked "good on paper," but to the extent it was successful is not known. By 1955, with the acknowledgement of nuclear weapons, civil defense appeared to be more heavily endorsed by "those who can make a difference"; also, the impressive leadership status of such organizations as DOSAAF, and Tolstikov's appointment as Chief of Civil Defense in 1955 implied a trend toward greater integration with the military and air defense components.

A quote from a 1953 article states: "Today, the Soviet Union is reasonably well prepared in civil defense matters to cope with air attack." The key words here seem to be "air attack," because Soviet civil defense preparations were certainly keyed to a World War II-type of aerial threat through 1958. Even the publicized awareness in 1954 of a nuclear threat did not immediately change civil defense thinking, although it precipitated greater military/political concern with civil defense and the eventual transition of the system from a civilian-administrated / city-oriented program to a military-directed / nationwide institution.