Soviet / Russian Gravity Bombs
In the 1950s, the United States became concerned with the possibility of the clandestine introduction by the Soviet Union of weapons of mass destruction into the US prior to the initiation of hostilities. These concerns did not disipate until the advent of overkill in the mid-1960s.
On 28 June 1955 the Director of Central Intelligence issued Special National Intellitence Estimate 11-9-55 "Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Under Diplomatic Immunity". This SNIE concluded "The USSR is capable of producing nuclear weapons which could be introduced into the US either as complete assemblies or as com- ponent parts or subassemblies. Such weapons could range from one kiloton to one megaton in yield, and in the present state of the art could be designed `to break down into com- ponents weighing from a few pounds up to approximately 25 pounds in the case of small- yield weapons and up to approximately 200 pounds in the case of large-yield weapons....
"Diplomatic immunity" as used herein refers to an accompanied shipment not limited in size or weight, which is covered by a diplomatic seal....
"Soviet military planners are unlikely to consider that nuclear weapons could be clandestinely introduced and put into position on a scale large enough to obviate the need for an all-out attack by other means. The success of a clandestine nuclear attack on such a scale would depend not only .upon the initial introduction of substantial numbers of nuclear weapons, but also upon subsequent operations which would be much more difficult to organize and keep secret. To achieve its objectives, the USSR would have to organize a complex clandestine operation involving the storage of weapons components, transportation of assembled weapons or component parts over considerable distances, emplacement of weapons, and accurate timing and coordination of attacks at the target sites. A clandestine operation of this magnitude would involve grave risks of premature disclosure because of: (a) the large numbers of targets to be attacked; (b) the distances of such targets from Soviet installations having diplomatic immunity; (c) the amount of time the devices would have to be held secretly prior to use; and (d) the numbers of persons involved in the operation.
"We believe, therefore, that in order to ob- tain the optimum -combination of weight and surprise, the USSR would probably place chief reliance on nuclear attack by aircraft, at least until the aircraft delivery system is replaced by intercontinental missiles. It would probably consider clandestine employment only as an auxiliary method to attack certain selected targets. which (a) is sufficiently important to warrant incurring the risks involved, (b) could be accomplished by clandestine means more easily or more certainly than by other means, and (c) could be accomplished with minimum risk....
"The USSR could minimize the risk of premature disclosure by limiting the clandestine operation to placement of nuclear weapons at Soviet diplomatic establishments in Washington and New York. In this way it could virtually insure successful attack on two major targets without using a large number of personnel and without incurring the risks involved in transporting nuclear weapons to areas which do not enjoy diplomatic immunities. On the other hand, the USSR could attack New York and Washington by air and therefore would not have to rely on clandestine attack. In addition, even a very limited clandestine effort would still not entirely eliminate the possibility of disclosure as a result of unpredictable events.
"Although the possibility of limited Soviet use of this method of clandestine attack can by no means be excluded, we believe that, since the adverse consequences of premature disclosure would remain and since the chances of detection could not be entirely eliminated, the chances are now slightly better than even that the USSR would not undertake even this more restricted operation.
The Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, believed that this paragraph should read as follows: "It is impossible to predict whether the USSR would or would not attempt to utilize the diplomatic pouch to clandestinely introduce nu- clear weapons into the US. However, since the USSR is capable of producing nuclear weapons for introduction by this method, a risk will continue to exist DELETED. The Director of Naval Intelligence concurs in general with the views of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and would stress that the danger would rise in direct proportion to the ease with which nuclear weapons could be introduced into the US without risk of detection."
On 13 March 1963 the Director of Central Intelligence and the US Intelligence Board issued National Intellitence Estimate 11-7-63 "The Clandestine Introduction of Weapons of Mass Destruction into the US". This NIE concluded "We have no evidence of Soviet plans or intentions regarding the clandestine introduction of weapons of mass destruc-tion. The Soviets are, however, capable of introducing suchweapons into the US. Because clandestine production of biological and chemical agents in the US is both feasible and less risky than their clandestine introduction, we conclude that the Soviets probably would consider only nuclear weapons for clandestine introduction.
"We believe that the Soviets almost certainly would not contemplate the use of clandestinely delivered nuclear weapons except as a supplement to other weapons in the context of general war. We have estimated elsewhere that the Soviets do not plan deliberately to initiate such a war. Although they might see certain advantages in the clandestine use of nuclear weapons if they decided deliberately to initiate an attack in aperiod of low tension, they probably would not wish to prejudice the element of surprise on which this course of action relies. In the case of pre-emptive attack, introduction concurrent with a decision to preempt would be very difficult. Introduction on a contingent basis would run the risk of discovery and this risk would multiply with the number of weapons and the length of time that they were in the US....
" Although a wide variety of US targets would be vulnerable to clandestine nuclear attack, we believe that the Soviets probably would focus on the feasibility of attacking targets for which their missile systems are inappropriate because of a requirement for extreme accuracy or the desire to deny warning time. Targets in this category might be key command and control facilities and possibly some manned alert forces. We believe that the Soviets would consider that only a small number of US targets could be attacked with greater advantage by clandestinely placed nuclear weapons than by nuclear weapons delivered by other means. But in view of the growing number and dispersal of US delivery vehicles, the Soviets probably recognize that it would be impracticable for them to mount a clandestine nuclear attack on a sufficient number of them to reduce substantially the weight of a US strike."
But the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the Director of the National Security Agency, felt that "as long as the Soviets have the capability for clandestine nuclear attack against selected important targets in the US, with minimal risk, there is not enough evidence to make the judgment that such an attack is unlikely."
RYa-6 (“ nuclear satchel six”)
In the USSR, from 1967 to 1993 there were special small-sized nuclear mines RA41, RA47, RA97 and RA115. In addition, the so-called "nuclear packs" RYa-6 weighing 25 kilograms and with a capacity of up to a kiloton were in service. And to combat enemy saboteurs in 1972, special platoons of reconnaissance and destruction of nuclear landmines were organized in the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact. The personnel knew the structure of American ammunition and had the equipment to search for and neutralize them.
Archival documents show that such a formidable weapon as a small atomic bomb, which is designed to be carried by one person, actually existed during the Cold War years - and designers from both the USA and the USSR were engaged in its development.
"Nuclear knapsack" was the name of a small-sized sabotage ammunition, which was carried by one (light option) or two (heavy option) special forces soldiers. It was a transport and packaging container with a nuclear charge, an automation unit with a code blocking panel, a power supply, a radio and clock devices, and other necessary devices. In the USSR, sabotage portable nuclear explosive devices (NEDs) were mass-produced in 1967–1993. There were about 250 of them produced.
An American journalist and former Soviet citizen (former Colonel of the Engineering Troops of the Soviet Army) M. Steinberg writes: “The weight of the RYA-6 is about 25 kg. It has a thermonuclear charge, in which the transuranium elements thorium and californium are used. The charge power varies from 0.2 to 1 kiloton of TNT. To understand what one kiloton is, imagine a train of 25 wagons, each loaded with 40 tons of TNT. The explosion of a backpack bomb of maximum power in terms of blasting effect is equivalent to the detonation of such an echelon and will wipe out the largest industrial facility or a medium-sized city from the face of the earth ...
Due to its small dimensions, it is relatively easy to carry, install and camouflage at a dam, airport, nuclear power plant or other vital facility. A nuclear bomb is activated either by a delayed-action fuse or remote control equipment at a distance of up to 40 km. It is equipped with several systems of protection against unauthorized access: vibration, optical, acoustic and electromagnetic. So it is almost impossible to remove it from the installation site or neutralize it.”
"Nuclear knapsacks" were intended for the destruction of especially important objects, military or economic infrastructure, etc. by special forces sabotage and reconnaissance groups. Delivery of such groups could be carried out by air (with parachute landing, including in light diving equipment) and, in particular , submarines and reconnaissance ships disguised as harmless auxiliary vessels, having on board torpedo-shaped double carriers of Siren-type combat swimmers, equipped with a capacious cargo container.
In principle, Soviet reconnaissance divers (combat swimmers) could also be placed on board ships of the merchant and fishing fleet visiting foreign ports. It is believed that the "nuclear backpacks" were stored in the warehouses of the GUMO (the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, responsible for all nuclear weapons), their number was strictly checked, and later all these devices were also destroyed. The last of them - the Russian RA115 - were disarmed in 1998.
http://russian-bazaar.com/ru/content/5060.htm">“SuitcaseChick” for bin-laden Mark Steinberg
Portable Nuclear Weapons
Portable nuclear weapons, which can be placed in a suitcase or backpack, are familiar to the average person only from science fiction novels. The Armed Forces of the USSR were ready to use nuclear mines to cover the border with China during the long period of very unfriendly relations between Moscow and Beijing. In the event of a war between the PRC and its northern neighbor, real hordes would pour into its territory, consisting of formations of the People's Liberation Army of China and the militia. Only the latter significantly outnumbered all fully mobilized Soviet divisions. That is why, on the borders separating the USSR from the Celestial Empire, in addition to the many tanks dug into the ground , it was allegedly planned to resort to the installation of nuclear mines. Each of them was capable, according to the information of an American journalist and former Soviet officer Mark Steinberg, to turn a section of the border zone 10 kilometers long into a radioactive barrier.Sappers are known to engage in mining and demining, dealing with anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, unexploded bombs, shells and other extremely dangerous contraptions. and in the Soviet army there were secret sapper units for special purposes, created to eliminate nuclear landmines. It is believed that they were stored in the warehouses of GUMO (the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense in charge of all nuclear weapons), their number was strictly checked.
Whether one of them was actually called RYA-6 (“sixth nuclear satchel”), as Mark Steinberg claimed in the Russian-language American magazine Vestnik Online, is unknown. It is known from open official (but unofficial) sources that in the USSR sabotage portable nuclear explosive devices (NEDs) were mass-produced in 1967-1993. Approximately 250 of them were issued. In special-purpose units and subunits of the GRU, including marine ones (“Ochakovskaya” 17th separate special-purpose brigade of the Black Sea Fleet, which after the collapse of the USSR went to Ukraine, and special-purpose naval reconnaissance points of all fleets and the Caspian flotilla) , personnel were trained with their weight and size models. Themselves such nuclear weapons (RA41, RA47, RA97, RA115 and its modification for combat swimmers RA115-01) were concentrated in a special arsenal of the 12th Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.
The presence of such units was explained by the fact that during the years of the Cold War, American troops in Europe placed nuclear explosive devices in special wells. They were supposed to work after the start of hostilities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the way of the Soviet tank armies breaking through to the English Channel (a terrible dream of the Pentagon at that time!). Approaches to nuclear landmines could be covered by conventional minefields.
Meanwhile, civilians in the same West Germany, for example, lived and did not know that there was a well with American atomic weapons nearby. Similar concrete shafts up to 6 meters deep could be found under bridges, at road intersections, right on highways and at other strategically important points. They usually arranged in groups. Moreover, the banal-looking metal covers made nuclear wells practically indistinguishable from ordinary sewer manholes.
These American land mines included M31, M59, T-4, XM113, M167, M172 and M175 with a TNT equivalent of 0.5 to 70 kilotons, united under the common abbreviation ADM - Atomic Demolition Munition ("atomic explosive munition"). They were rather heavy devices weighing from 159 to 770 kilograms. The first and heaviest of the land mines, the M59, was adopted by the US Army back in 1953. For the installation of nuclear bombs, the United States troops in Europe had special sapper units, for example, the 567th engineering company.
The military of the United Kingdom also tried to keep up with the overseas allies, and here it was not without a uniform curiosity associated with chickens (such a pun). The nuclear bomb, called Blue Peacock - "Blue Peacock", looked like a hefty steel cylinder, in which a 10 kiloton plutonium charge and conventional explosives were placed. "Peacock" was created in the late 50s on the basis of the first British nuclear bomb Blue Danube ("Blue Danube"). The land mine weighed more than seven tons, and the generals from foggy Albion set out to bury a dozen of these "birds" near important objects in Germany and all with the same goal - to blow them up in the event of a Soviet offensive.
In 1958, the British Secretary of Defense canceled the Blue Peacock program, considering that the safety of such a landmine was insufficient and threatened with serious political complications in the event of radiation incidents on the territory of a NATO ally. And in the 80s, much more advanced American nuclear land mines were decommissioned and taken out of Europe.
The charges were to be installed at points strategically important for the advancement of the advancing troops - on major highways, under bridges (in special concrete wells), etc. It was assumed that when all the charges were detonated, a zone of radioactive contamination and difficult obstacles would be created, which would delay the advance of the Soviet troops for two or three days.
However, there is also an opinion that in reality no land mines were installed in these structures, they were empty and atomic munitions should have been lowered there only if there was a real threat of a military conflict between the West and the East - in a "special period in the administrative order" according to the terminology adopted in the Soviet Union. army.
Platoons of reconnaissance and destruction of enemy nuclear landmines appeared in the state of engineering and sapper battalions of Soviet tank divisions stationed on the territory of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact in 1972. The personnel of these units knew the structure of nuclear "infernal machines" and had the necessary equipment to search for and neutralize them. The sappers were absolutely forbidden to make a mistake here.
It was about the loss of such devices that the world community started talking after the collapse of the USSR. On the one hand, these were just rumors that were replicated by not entirely honest Western media. On the other hand, in a short time, these rumors suddenly began to be supported by official statements by representatives of the Russian authorities.
Journalists "unearthed" information that at least two nuclear backpacks were bought by Chechen representatives in Lithuania - in November 1991 and in January 1992. This information is indirectly confirmed by official letters from US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to President Bill Clinton, which say that Dzhokhar Dudayev, having entered into negotiations with the Americans in 1993, stated that he had nuclear weapons.
The head of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, Colonel-General Igor Valynkin, in 2001, shed light on how things really are. Valykin said that absolutely all nuclear weapons are under strict control. Not a single copy had gone missing. Well, all attempts to penetrate or even somehow reconnoiter the security system of objects with nuclear weapons by the separatists were stopped harshly and immediately.
In 1987, Soviet saboteurs set up three nuclear explosive devices on US soil. Trip to Montana The secret special operation carried out by the special forces of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR is still shrouded in a veil of secrecy. There are few sources for her. First of all, this is an article by an American expatriate military observer, Mark Steinberg. Another source is the book of the publicist Maxim Kalashnikov "The Altar of Victory". Alexander Shirokorad also retells this story in the book “Atomic Ram of the 20th Century”. The authors note that some of the details are omitted in the interests of the participants in the special operation. Only the general outline of events is reported.
In January 1987, three groups of special forces were formed in the GRU to be sent to the United States of America. Each of the groups was given knapsack "nuclear land mines" - portable nuclear charges with a capacity of 5-20 kilotons. The purpose of the saboteurs was mines for launching ballistic missiles "Minuteman-2" and "Minuteman-3". The power of the explosion of nuclear land mines made it possible to overturn the missiles to the ground at the time of the launch of the Minutemen.
At the naval base in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, groups of special forces boarded diesel-electric submarines of the Varshavyanka type. Silent submarines crossed the northern part of the Pacific Ocean, remaining unnoticed. One of the groups, numbering nine people, safely reached Juan da Fuca Bay in Washington state. The participants of the operation reached the coast in an inflatable boat, “slipping” past the US Coast Guard. Carrying forged documents in the name of emigrants from Eastern Europe, the saboteurs rented a minibus. In America, they tried not to attract much attention, posing as broken tourists with kayaks.
The purely military aspect of the adventure is doubtful. You can’t “mine” all missile silos, and besides, the enemy still had nuclear submarines. In the event of the discovery of "land mines", the international scandal could reach prohibitive proportions. It would be even worse if one of the bombs accidentally exploded. After the collapse of the USSR, in 1993, the Russians confessed their deeds to "dear Western partners." According to the coordinates reported by Moscow, the Americans managed to find only two nuclear land mines. One of the devices supposedly disappeared without a trace.
https://russian7.ru/post/samaya-derzkaya-operaciya-gru-kak-sovets/">The most daring GRU operation: how Soviet saboteurs planted nuclear mines in the USA https://lost-fortresses.livejournal.com/409389.html">nuclear mines
RA115
Based on the characteristics of the nuclear filling, it is appropriate to assume that the charges themselves most likely were not long-term storage due to the natural radiochemical degradation of californium and required periodic refreshment. Apparently, the charges were still not thermonuclear, but nuclear with thermonuclear boosting (using a deuterium-tritium unit to increase the efficiency of using fissile material).
"Nuclear backpacks" were intended for the destruction of especially important objects, military or economic infrastructure, etc. by special forces sabotage and reconnaissance groups. The groups could be delivered by air (with parachute landing, including in light diving equipment) and, for example, by submarines and reconnaissance ships disguised as harmless auxiliary vessels, having on board torpedo-shaped double carriers of combat swimmers of the "Siren" type, equipped with a capacious cargo container. In principle, Soviet reconnaissance divers (combat swimmers) could also be placed on board ships of the merchant and fishing fleet visiting foreign ports.
According to published information, by the beginning of 1994, 150 nuclear explosive devices of the RA115 series remained at the disposal of the RF Armed Forces, all previous samples had been eliminated by that time. The same fate, in accordance with the obligations undertaken by Russia, befell RA115 four years later. The Americans did the same with their subversive nuclear explosive devices a little earlier.
Alexander Lebed, being the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, that after the collapse of the USSR, dozens of RA-115 warheads disappeared from the warehouses. In 1992, while commander of the Russian 14th Army, General Lebed, acting largely on his own and without serious material support or help from Moscow, single-handedly quelled a civil war in the Trans-Dneister and brought peace to Moldova. Such an accomplishment would be enough to crown the career of a lifetime. However, just 3 years later, in 1995, Aleksandr Lebed's achievements in Moldova and his outspoken criticism of government incompetence and corruption made him one of the most popular figures in Russia.
General Lebed resigned from the military in 1995 to run for President, where he played perhaps a pivotal role in history. Many scholars credit Aleksandr Lebed's political support of Boris Yeltsin's bid for reelection in a close race against the Communist candidate, Gennadiy Zyuganov, with preserving Yeltsin's Presidency and, indeed, with saving Russian democracy.
In May 1997, Curt Weldon, (chairman of the Committee on National Security, Military Research and Development Subcommittee), Ranking Member Pickett and six other Members of Congress were in congressional delegation to Russia. They met with General Lebed and were told that when he was Secretary of the Security Council an audit of Russia's nuclear stockpile indicated an apparent inability to account for all of the suitcase-sized nuclear weapons. The story did not surface in America until 2 months after the visit when ''60 Minutes'' found out about the conversation and, in fact, did an interview and reported both General Lebed's comments and Weldon's comments.
On October 2, 1997, in a hearing before this same subcommittee, Dr. Alexei Yablokov, an internationally respected scientist and former member of the Russian Security Council, supported General Lebed's allegations that Russia had, in fact, manufactured small nuclear weapons, as we had, and that these might, in fact be missing. Academician Alexei Yablokov, President Boris Yeltsin's adviser on ecology, even named the exact number of missing ammunition. He stated that out of all the 132 units of such weapons available according to the documents, 84 pieces were missing. There were rumors that the weapons ended up in the hands of Chechen fighters or even fighters of Osama bin Laden.
During Weldon's December 1997 trip to Moscow, in a 1-hour meeting with Defense Minister Sergeyev, he admitted that, in fact, Russia did have such man-portable nuclear weapons. And he assured me that they were taking steps to destroy them by the year 2000.
On 19 March 1998, Lebed testified Military Research and Development Subcommittee : "As a consequence on what I said about the portable nuclear devices, so the consequence was that I was summoned to the General Procurator's Office. And I was charged with the gentle charge of leaking a State secret. So, I asked them a question: Does Russia have portable nuclear devices? The firm answer was ''no.'' In that case, I asked, why am I here? What secret have I leaked? And everybody there felt very awkward. But, frankly speaking, I am not so much concerned with those nuclear devices themselves. For purely technical reasons, they are losing their capacity very fast....
"I am not aware of any purchases of nuclear warheads or nuclear charges. The rest I heard was on sale. So it is senseless to give a list or assortment of weapon systems being sold. Everything is on sale. With licenses and without. Directly and through third countries. When you are hungry, you can sell anything. And some people can't produce anything but tanks. What should they do?"
In fact, the RA-115s were all destroyed by 1998. The last to be destroyed were precisely those same RA-115s that Lebed spoke about the loss of. So the story of the "missing nuclear weapon" is just a fiction. If at least one charge fell "into the wrong hands", then the world would all have known about it long ago.
Although the available information speaks of the refusal of both sides from weapons of the SADM category and does not record their presence in other states, in reality, things could be different. For example, at parades in Pyongyang, they like to carry in trucks North Korean special forces soldiers with "nuclear packs" defiantly decorated with a sign of radioactivity. Of course, the creation of such NEDs requires breakthrough achievements in the miniaturization of nuclear charges, so for the time being these are probably only models.
This plan from the very beginning was adventurous and doomed to failure. The destruction of even all ground-based US nuclear missiles did not solve anything, because in this case the Americans still had warheads on strategic bombers carrying cruise missiles and on submarines. And it is simply impossible to mine absolutely all launch mines in the USA. Therefore, the military of the USSR tried to protest - but the political leadership demanded that the order be carried out.
A rather fantastic article by Mark Steinberg (“In 1987, saboteurs of the GRU of the USSR planted three atomic mines in the United States”)
This nuclear suitcase that is carried for the President, which is with him all the time, it has another function. Now it is the symbol of power; whereas, in the past Russian monarchs would be depicted with a crown, with a scepter, and an orb. Now this device replaces that all.
by that time, the four-year expiration date of the charge had already expired. The "stuffing" in the GRU backpack bomb is too unstable, which is why they need to be re-equipped every few years. Therefore, the missing land mine will never explode.
Of all the nuclear artillery ammunition in the USSR, the 152-millimeter 3BV3 projectile, which was put into service in 1981, became the smallest. The famous Soviet nuclear physicist with a "speaking" surname Evgeny Zababakhin became the scientific director of the project. His group managed to create a munition that is unique in terms of power and weight and size characteristics, which can withstand the overload of an artillery shot without destruction and loss of efficiency.
It was developed in the contours of a regular high-explosive fragmentation projectile for the D-20, ML-20 guns, self-propelled howitzers 2S3 "Akatsiya", 2S5 "Hyacinth-S", towed by "Hyacinth-B". Thus, all Soviet artillery of 152 mm caliber could arrange a nuclear "hello" for a potential enemy. Special fine-tuning of guns for firing special ammunition was not required.
3BV3 weighed 53 kilograms, had a length of 774 mm and a diameter of 152.4 mm. The power of the nuclear charge was 2.5 kilotons of TNT, and the range of the aimed shot was about 17.4 kilometers. It is easy to imagine what kind of destruction an artillery battalion armed with such shells could inflict with a single salvo. However, in the early 1990s, artillery nuclear munitions were eliminated by both the USSR and the United States.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
