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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)


611 AB ZULU V

The development of the first Soviet ballistic missile submarine started with a governmental order for the adaptation of a diesel-powered submarine of the 611 Zulu class to be equipped with the D-1 launching system and two R-11FM missiles. This new submarine designated as B-611 was developed by OKB-16. The technical design of the submarine was completed by the end of 1954.

Decree of the Government of the USSR dated 26 January 1954 in this sense, very interesting. It provided for the modernization of production diesel Soviet submarine project 611 (NATO classification "Zulu") in order to install a missile complex D-1, and secondly, the development of new design diesel submarine missile project 629 ("Golf"). The design work on both projects by Leningrad TSKB-16 (Chief Designer N.N. Isanin) and build factories 402, since the mid 1960s. Sevmashpredpriâtie (Molotovsk, 1957-Severodvinsk) and 199, later-Amur shipbuilding plant (ASP, Komsomolsk-na-Amure).

The world's first underwater B-611 was launched in September of 1955 from a D-1 launcher with two R-11FM SLBMs. The world's first launch of a ballistic missile submarine was made on 21 September 1955.

Unlike its predecessors, the B-611 submarine had an additional missile compartment with two firing tubes which passed through the strong hull. To accommodate the new launching complex the structure of armament was changed. The spare torpedos, mines and artillery armament were removed and at the expense of removing one of four groups of storage compartments additional launching devices for missile firings were installed.

To fire the missile the submarine had to surface, the cover of the launching tube was opened and the missile was raised to the edge of the tube. The missile was fastened with the help of two racks, which were removed at liftoff. The pre-launch preparation were conducted underwater and lasted two hours. When submerged it took five minutes to launch the first missile and another five minutes to launch the second one. The launch could be carried out at a speed of up to 12 knots.

The B-611 submarine was assembled in Severodvinsk and some parts of the submarine were delivered from Leningrad. The construction of the first Soviet ballistic missile submarine was completed in September 1955 and received the tactical designation "B-62". The B-62 was Project 611A [ZULU IV] with a single R-11FM (Scud) missile. Some sources quote B-67 as the original Project 611A, however only B-62 fits the known construction dates. The other submarines were Project 611AB ZULU V with two such missiles.

In September 1955 the first ballistic missile was launched from the first B-611 submarine "B-62". On September 16, 1955, at 17 hours 32 minutes, the submarine under the command of Captain 3rd rank Fyodor Kozlov launched the R-11FM ballistic missile in the White Sea. The missile flew over two hundred kilometers and destroyed a designated ground target within the limits of the tactical and technical assignment, as official reports said. Flight test supervisor Sergei Korolev, an outstanding designer of rocket and space systems, was satisfied with the results of the world's first ballistic missile launch from the submarine. The military and political leadership of our country immediately appreciated the advantages of the new weapon system. The Soviet Union got a chance to covertly deploy nuclear missiles near the shores of the United States of America, the main adversary of the USSR during the cold war. In case of transition of a conflict situation to the hot war, the missiles could deliver strikes at the US territory.

The world's first B-67 missile submarine was converted at Plant #402 (currently, the Sevmashpredpiyatiye Enterprise) from the series-produced Project 611 large diesel-electric submarine (NATO designation Zulu ) to Project V-611 Volna , which had been developed at the TsKB-16 Design Bureau (currently, the Malachite Marine Engineering Design Bureau) under the supervision of Nikolai Issanin. However, it was not a mere conversion, but a radical modernization. As the submarine carried two ballistic missiles with a weight of five tons each, as well as their prelaunch preparation and control systems, a serious revision of the sub design was required. Following the B-67, the USSR built or converted five more submarines according to the improved Project AV-611.

They were the first in the naval component of the strategic nuclear triad of the Soviet Union. Soon ballistic missiles began to be deployed at nuclear-powered submarines that even today remain one of the main components of the strategic nuclear strike forces of Russia, the USA and China. They are the sole component of nuclear strike forces in France and Great Britain. Since the mid-1960s, the role and significance of diesel-electric submarines decreased. Some countries, for example the USA, ceased to build them. These submarines acquired auxiliary roles because they lacked a long submerged endurance capability and could not deliver strikes at shore targets as this function totally shifted to nuclear-powered subs. Today, however, the view on the employment of nonnuclear subs (NNS) is revalued owing to the following reasons.

New technologies associated with ship energetics, armament, combat control assets and low noisiness gave the second wind to the NNS development. Besides, the cost of building, operation and salvage of nuclear-powered subs, despite all retention efforts, continues to grow and amounts to billions of dollars. Even the US Navy with its huge budget is compelled to reduce nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) purchases.

Between 1956 and 1958 further testing of the D-1 launch system was carried out and in 1959 the "B-62" submarine was converted to carry out the first underwater missile firing. From 1956 on the B-611 submarines were equipped with five new diesel-powered engines and received the new designation AV-611. The first AV-611 submarines served in the Northern fleet. The four submarines that were re-equipped in Severodvinsk were commissioned in 1957 and served in the 40th brigade of the Northern Fleet while the AV-611 re-equipped at Komsomolsk-na-Amur served in the Pacific Fleet.

After an improved launch system was developed, the original launch systems D-1 was removed from operational status in 1967. In the second half of the 1960s the AV-611 submarines were equipped with hydroacoustic devices and improved navigation and communication systems.

The short-lived project 611, as they were removed, the missile-carrying submarine service as early as 1967, it was difficult to expect a from essentially pilot project-its aim was not to create a new class, and understanding of key strategic areas for further work, which is the priority. Exploitation of project 611 identified the main limitations. These included:

  • the apparent failure of the old-style boats for fundamentally different combat tasks (the essence of project 611 was technical adaptation of mass-produced submarines in the role of the media of ballistic missiles). To accommodate SLBMs and their launch with PL were removed spare torpedoes and mines, almost all artillery armament, dismantling of the batteries and yet fully functional adaptation could not be achieved;
  • lesser range missiles R-FM, in nuclear warheads not many 160 km. This, combined with relatively long freeboard launch time (about 15 min) to an unacceptable limits increased the likelihood of early detection and destruction of submarines by the navy and Coast Guard strike;
  • low speed (not more than sixteen and a half knots surfaced and twelve and a half, underwater), greatly reduced the effectiveness of bridge continuous anti-submarine defence tools (TPS);
  • small aquatic resource (not more than 8 hours in stationary and 1.5 mode on battery-powered). In this sense, all PL of this era were, in fact, not underwater vessels. However, if traditional combat submarine fleet that deficiency was only serious (though fairly inevitable) tactical and technical restriction, for the new role of the submarine as a strategic nuclear units in very adverse circumstance, often totally unacceptable from an operational point of view;
  • insufficient in terms of military planners, impact strength of each boat as a combat naval unit.

Despite the limitations of their value in a purely operational sense, their role in the formation of the personnel of Soviet missile submarine officers, military service and combat patrol, the coastal missile submarine fleet remained in service until the end of the 1980s.



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