For the production for the ground forces, the Defense Industry Organization (DIO) devoted major resources within the framework of research and development on armored fighting vehicles (AFV and APC). For transport and support of troops, the "Boragh" APC was developed. Built by the Shahid Kolahdooz Industrial Complex division of the DIO, it was similar to Russian BMP-1 or its Chinese equivalent manufactured by NORINCO (referred to as the WZ-501), of which it improved certain characteristics.
The possible existence of a nuclear-related facility at this site was first reported on 8 July 2003, by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the political wing of the People's Mujahedeen, an organization listed by the US State Department as a terrorist organization.
Located about 14 kilometers west of Tehran, the plant was repotedly concealed within a large military complex. NIMA's only rendering of this name was Kolah Duz, but the name of the facility was also transliterated as Kolahdouz, Kolahdooz, or Kolahdoz.
According to the NCRI, the facility at Kolahdouz was dedicated to uranium enrichment. Centrifuge equipment located there was repotedly meant to operate as a supplement to the uranium enrichment site in Natanz, and with the experience gained there to be ultimately used at the larger facility at Natanz.
One facility was located near the Kolahdouz complex, where a number of large warehouses and workshops for building tanks, armored personnel carriers and delicate mechanical parts were also located. It was reported to be located at kilometer 14 of the Terhan-Karaj Highway, Shahriar exit, Kolahdouz complex.
This complex was already affiliated with the DIO. The section that was related to the nuclear program was said to be located near the riverbank, and was hidden among other warehouses in a way that would not draw attention. This indicated that not only the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) was involved in the nuclear weapons program, but also the Ministry of Defense (MODAFL) was also involved in the nuclear weapons program.
The site covered about 4,000 square meters (nearly 40,000 square feet) in all area, 50 meters (150 ft) by 80 meters (260 ft). The centrifuge equipment installed there would act as a pilot facility. Reports indicated that Iran had obtained the needed material and they intended to do the testing of the centrifuge equipment to enrich uranium.
The site included the clean (vacuum) environment in which the centrifuge equipment could best operate. This would eventually act as a supplement to the uranium enrichment site in Natanz. At this pilot facility, uranium would be enriched, the process would be perfected, and the experience would be used for the main uranium enrichment facility in Natanz.
The information about this site was top secret and the Iranian government had hidden this site among a number of buildings and workshops of the Kolahdouz Industrial Complex. This site was said to be under the direct supervision of Dr. Ghaffarian, the head of the DIO. The head of the DIO was Dr. Ghaffarian. The head of the Special Industry was Revolutionary Guards Brigadier General Gharmanesh and the head of the Kolahdouz complex was Revolutionary Guards Brigadier General Janad Rabbani.
Those working there were under very strict rules of information security. As a result the experts there were exposed to information only related to their own work. None of the employees were allowed to reveal any information as to the nature, location, and subject of their work with anybody outside the complex.
In late May 2003, Morteza Ostad Ali Mukhmalbaff, the head of the Intelligence Security of the DIO, and Brigadier General Mohammad Beig Mohammad Lou, Deputy Coordinator of the DIO (involved in the enrichment of uranium), hid a number of containers related to the pilot facility at the Kolahdouz facility in a warehouse about 2,000 square meters (20,000 square feet) with dimensions of 80 meters (260 feet) by 25 meters (80 feet). These containers were sealed and there had been a great emphasis that no one should know of the existence of these containers. The warehouse was surrounded by an auto junkyard, having other warehouses filled with wrecked cars. The warehouse was located at Martyred Kazemi complex of the DIO, next to the Kolahdouz complex.
A technical team of the International Atomic Energy Agency visited Iran from 4 to 12 October 2003 in order to carry out activities related to the verification of Iran's activities in the areas of uranium conversion and laser and gas centrifuge enrichment. Following up on recent open source reports of enrichment activities being undertaken at the industrial complex in Kolahdouz in western Tehran, the team was permitted on 5 October 2003 to visit three locations that the IAEA had identified as corresponding to those mentioned in the reports. While no work was seen at those locations that could be linked to uranium enrichment, environmental samples were taken.
The IAEA reported in November 2004 that the enviornmental samples had not suggested any nuclear activity at the Kolahdouz site. The IAEA brought up the Kolahdouz facility again in a May 2008 report saying that although the Agency did not detect any nuclear activities at Kolahdouz or Parchin, the role of military related institutes, such as the Physics Research Center (PHRC), the Institute of Applied Physics (IAP) and the Education Research Institute (ERI), and their staff, needed to be better understood, also in view of the fact that substantial parts of the centrifuge components were manufactured in the workshops of the Defence Industries Organization. The Agency also needed to understand fully the reasons for the involvement of military related institutions in procurement for the nuclear programme.
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