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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)


Pukguksong-1 SLBM

The KN-X-?, SLBM  Solid Propellant Prototype Flight Test Program of the DPRK

©By C. P. Vick, 2015/2016

Senior Technical & Space Policy Analyst

Globalsecurity.org

4-24/26/ 5-20-2016  

The DPRK NK-X-15 SLBM

This above enlarged image from the original DPRK post flight KCNA photo released shows the first stage solid motor propulsion of the KN-X-?, SLBM that utilizes two stages flown over a 500 kilometer range to inside the Japanese Air Defense Zone (ADIZ) to an estimated altitude of between 1,007.10 - 1,130.88 kilometers suggesting a much longer range performance than displayed in this highly successful experiment flight test operation of August 24, 2016. The addition of 8 fixed grate drag stabilizers deployed after clearing the submarine silo tube is the most prominent new design change to this missile system also seen on the HS-10 once clear of the submarine silo. Clearly visible are the four steering vanes mounting points that extend those blades into the flame jet to vector the vehicle in the right attitude control direction requirements.

Note:It would appear that the so called “KN-11” designation utilized by the South Korean Ministries of Defense of the DPRK, SLBM testing applies to both the liquid propellant and solid propellant versions. That is exceptionally confusing coming from the Ministry of Defense and Intelligence agency. It would appear that the liquid propellant SLBM program is in fact terminated with the success in the accelerated solid propellant SLBM program development based on foreign missile technology transfer.

Two- Staged Solid Motor Pukgukong KN-X-? SLBM Development Suggested Events

Designation Test Event Date of Test

Results

1. KN-X-? 1 st. Flight Test 12-25-2015

Ejection Failure

2. KN-X-? Shipyard Ejection Test 03-16-2016

Success

3. KN-X-? 2 nd. Flight Test 04-23-2016 partial Success/Failure
4. KN-X-? 3 rd. Flight Test 07-9-2016

Failure

5. KN-X-? 4 th. Flight Test 08-24-2016

Success*

6. KN-X-? Full range Test?

Pending?

 
7. KN-X-? Full range Test?

Pending?

 

* range 500 kilometers altitude on the order of 1,007.10 - 1,130.88 kilometers

The DPRK Naval Strategic Rocket Forces successfully concluded a highly successful experiment flight test of its solid propellant two stage PukgukongSLBM on August 24, 2016 at about 5:30 A.M. South Korean time according to the South Korean, Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was launched from the submerged diesel-electric powered modified Gulf-II class rebuilt single 2,000 tons, Sinpo-class 67 meter long submarine names “Gorae” (Whale) by the DPRK by it solid hot gas launch ejection system and was ignited once it was exposed to the atmosphere above the (East Sea) Sea of Japan. It was flight tested from outside the DPRK Wonsan, port city of Sinpo, South Hamygong Province from its east coastal range in the direction of the Sea of Japan, Japan’s EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) waters where it impact inside the Japanese Air Defense Zone (ADIZ) providing no warning of the impending launch or its impact zones. The missile flew along a near vertical high ballistic trajectory traveling about 500 kilometer down range according to the South Korean ministry of defense. Presumably it flew upwards of greater than 1,000 kilometers though no official figures have been released to date. All of the previous four experimental flight test of the Pukgukong solid propellant SLBM have failed to complete their flight test. So it has taken five tests to perfect this system that must now demonstrate repeated success and a series of full range of 2,200 kilometers flights before becoming operational in mid-2018 along with its highly refined 600-650 kilogram nuclear warhead.

This KN-X-?, missile system is also apparently planned to be deployed in the DPRK on land based railroad cars that are reported as being produced for this kind of systems at a rate of some six railway-mounted launcher vehicles per month since May 2016. This is even as this R&DTE operation advances for early systems shakedown deployment a classic Soviet development procedure. Rail mobile missile born systems offer no strategic advantage verses road mobile systems that are more difficult to track.

The DPRK NK-X-15 SLBM

The image is from the North Korean KCTV screengrab.

The two separate cable tunnels run along the top of this SLBM confirm the fact that the missile utilizes two separate solid motors stages one for sea level launch and one for altitude vacuum operations. That is in addition to the standard 600-650 kilogram nuclear warhead prototype for the flight test that included a high speed ballistic re-entry performance all successfully demonstrated on August 24, 2016. Knowing the DPRK railroad standard bogie gauge size as being 1.435 meters gives a suggested SLBM body diameter close to around 1.39 - 1.42 meters based on perspective reverse graphic analysis very close to the known Gulf-II launch tube canister diameter of approximately 1.40 meters definitely greater than 1.10 meters in diameter and less than 1.5 meters suggested diameter dimension. That means that the solid motor’s heritage matches the Pakistani, Chinese (PRC) heritage diameter of 1.4 meters being utilized by the DPRK.

Issues unresolved: There are still some questions of whether this missile is utilizing a 1.10 meter diameter two stage solid motors or the larger [ 1.4 ] meter diameter solid motors that would thus impact its real range performance. That is a difference between a tactical MRBM-medium range missile equivalent to the DPRK No-dong-A1 verses an IRBM similar to the Soviet era SS-N-6 SLBM. Ultimately the 600-650 kilogram warhead size known from the Hwasong-10 / Mirim / Musudan / No-dong-B makes it clear it is in the larger 1.4 meter diameters as does also the Gulf-II class redesigned 2,000 tons, Sinpo-class submarine double launch tube conning tower design. That is not a Yankee-1 class submarine built to accommodate a 1.5 meter diameter SS-N-6 missile but it does provide the test platform for the two missile designs tested. That redesigned rebuilt submarine tower is clearly larger than the normal Gulf-II conning tower with two missile silos. Although only one of the two launch tubes has been utilized for each flight test operation there are in fact two tube canisters available on this sub test platform. ThePukgukong SLBM is expected to become fully operational in mid-2018. The more advanced multiple missile tube version of a newer Sinpo class DPRK submarine is some years from being fully perfected even as it is being developed with construction in the early stages.

NOTE: It would appear that the prepackaged liquid propulsion single stage SLBM derived design development similar to the Soviet era SS-N-6, KN-X-? SLBM has been terminated because of multiple failures like those experienced in the No-dong-B / Hwasong-10 / Mirim / Musudan flight test program. The SS-N-6, KN-X-? SLBM derived design is believed to not be 1.5 meters in diameter but only 1.4 meters in diameter making it longer than the Soviet era SS-N-6 design but still having its 2,500 kilometer range intend yet to be successfully flight demonstrated. Those liquid propellant KN-X-?,SLBM flight test attempts became an exercise in defining what the failure technical issues were benefiting the No-dong-B / Hwasong-10 / Mirim / Musudan flight test program leading to its success Hwasong-10 development conclusion. That program must now repeat the flights and demonstrate two full range flights to make it operational also.

The official DPRK statement on this successful flight is somewhat revealing as noted below in its government structures and the flight demonstration details as well as the origin of the rapid developed technology:

“Pyongyang, August 25 (KCNA) -- A test-fire of strategic submarine-launched ballistic missile was successfully conducted under the guidance of supreme commander of the Korean People's Army (KPA) Kim Jong Un, chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK.

    At the observation post he was briefed on the plan for the test-fire.

    As soon as he issued an order to start the test-fire, the strategic submarine submerged up to a depth for firing the ballistic missile and rapidly launched the ballistic missile.

    The test-fire which was conducted under a high-angle fire system (high ballistic vertical probe trajectory cpv) in the maximum launching depth reconfirmed the stability of the underwater ballistic launching system, the starting character of the high power solid fuel engine (motors cpv) and phased flying kinetic feature after coming up to the surface of the water. It proved that the core technical indexes of the ballistic missile including the reliability of the phased heat separation and the control (parameters cpv) and guidance system and the working accuracy of the warhead in the re-entry section perfectly met all requirements for operation.

    The SLBM test-fire was successfully carried out without any adverse impact on neighboring countries.

    Watching the trajectory of the ballistic missile Pukguksong, he said with pleasure that it was a great manifestation and demonstration of the tremendous power and inexhaustible muscle of the DPRK and he felt enormous energy was welling out.

     He appreciated the test-fire as the greatest success and victory and highly praised the officials, scientists and technicians in the field of national (defense) science and munitions factories for having perfectly acquired the technology of SLBM in a short span of timeand extended special thanks to them in the name of the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission of the WPK and the supreme commander of the KPA.

The DPRK stated that it acquired these technologies in its recent announcement probably during the previous five year plan as an accelerated program for infrastructure development and program development start. …” officials, scientists and technicians in the field of national (defense) science and munitions factories for having perfectly acquired the technology of SLBM in a short span of time” has immense implication to the real story. I do not agree that they have copied the PRC JL-1 SLBM as the design details are different but the technology is similar

NOTE: Pakistan acquired the similar Chinese based solid propellant technology program from the PRC China with its identical design features and then in turn it was apparently quickly acquired by the DPRK from either Pakistan which is circumstantially suspected or perhaps direct from China in a strategic geopolitical move for its Quid pro quo ally. This helped the DPRK’s solid motor development effort almost cutting out one full Five Year Plan in addition to it accelerated flight testing effort. Normally this kind of effort takes three full Five Year Plans unless foreign technology is acquired to accelerate the effort.

Previously the DPRK had displayed a perfected 1.10 meter diameter large solid motor but this new 1.4 meter diameter solid motor has huge strategic implications for not merely Sea Based but also Land Based strategic ballistic missiles. The 1.10 meter diameter solid motor may be a part of the rail mobile missile system in the office within this 2016-2020 Five Year Plan.

Solid Motor Foreign Technology Transfer to the DPRK Implicated

Those DPRK solid motors have many of the design characteristic of solid propellant ballistic missile technology of the PRC China that then went from China to Pakistan and Iran ultimately coming to the North Koreans. The most direct technology transfers came both from China and Pakistan with additions from Iran via their joint Science and Technology Transfer Cooperation Agreement. Started during the latter part of the Kim Jung-il regime it has now been accelerated by the Kim Jung-un regime since late in 2011. The DPRK was able to very rapidly accelerate its identifiable Chinese/Pakistani/Iranian based classes of solid motors technology program from that successful multi-faceted technology transfer endeavor. It only required technology duplication reverse engineering and materials duplication, processes or viable substitutions of filament wound casings with steel casings materials changes and change out from vacuum thrust nozzles for sea level nozzles or altitude nozzles as required for the specific applications all readily available. Utilizing available infrastructure factory conversions as well as land readily available for the engineering testing infrastructure also accelerated the effort. Where the tooling and manufacturing infrastructure came from is another issue to consider. Examples are the Pakistani Shaheen-1, Chinese DF-11,DF-11A, 0.88 meter diameter solid motors, and DF-15,DF-15A, 1-1.10 meter diameter solid motor and the Shaheen-II, Chinese M-18, 1.4 meter diameter solid motor based on Chinese provided technology assistance as well as the Chinese based Spa-B-140 series and L-SpaB-140A, 1.4 meter diameter series of space solid motors and the Iranian 1.25 meter diameter solid motors utilized on the two stage Sejjil and its vane steering housing designs. Certainly some technology education from the Russian could be implicated through the Iranian solid motor efforts.

Deception is the game always by the DPRK and PRC as a way of life.

The free world countries cannot ignore the DPRK, Iranian financed technology transfer agreements and Pakistani technology transfer agreements as well as the PRC real policies that are not friendly to the West that they are now aggressively following in the South Pacific as more of the near abroad allies buffer zone effort. No country can ignore the Iranian DPRK technology transfer agreements and its financing of DPRK missile and nuclear weapons development for the two of them otherwise it would not be happening as it is in the DPRK.

If the DPRK get it the Iranians will get it especially if they finance it. Iran is known to be working on a 5,000 kilometer range solid propellant LRICBM and so the DPRK may benefit equally. It is believed to fit the 1.4 meter diameter solid motor dimension as well as the Shaheen-II two stage planform with two added upper stages to give the suggested range with a 600-650 kilogram warhead. It is known that there are those in Pakistan that do not have the West’s wellbeing as they are very hostile and unfriendly as a policy thus the technology transfer circumstantial issues implied.

This was a solid propellant demonstration not the liquid propellant Musudan IRBM system now pushed aside but not cancelled with the implications that it was a relative successful technology demonstration constitutes new missile KN-X-15? It utilizes the basic KN-11, SS-N-6 airframe dimensions plan-form as the bases of the rapid development technology demonstration design. It was not the liquid propellant KN-11 based SLBM with a 650 kg warhead mass which is a copy of the Soviet era Serb, Zyb, R-25, RSM-27, SS-N-6 SLBM. North Korea has not abandoned the KN-11 liquid propellant IRBM, SLBM only pushed it aside to address its engine hard start issues because it offers a higher performance than the Solid motor variant. This was made clear with the recent static test firing success of the KN-14 clustered of two identical engines as used in the KN-11. The longer the delay in the liquid propellant SLBM flight testing since 2015 suggest a program shelving for the immediate present with its future in question.

The three greased snubber sleeves that that surround the missile are jettisoned by line explosives once clear of the submarine silo is seen in the debris and solid explosive fragments emanation from the missile in the initial stage of launch from the DPRK submarine. Certainly the Solid propellant SLBM is preferred over the packaged pre-fueled liquid propellant SLBM design because of the operational simplicity.

This KN-X-?, missile system has replaced the original storable liquid propellant SS-N-6 derived SLBM missile system tested in 2015 to repeated ejection and launch failures.

The above left image shows the staging low altitude of the first stage of this experimental flight test SLBM as it flew over it 500 kilometer range to a very high altitude of perhaps over 1,007.10 kilometers. The above right DPRK released image of the August 28, 2016 launch shows it high near vertical ballistic trajectory climbing perhaps over 1,007.10 kilometer over it 500 kilometer range ballistic demonstration.

In this KCNA released image we see the Pukgukong SLBM’s three greased sleeve snubbers that are jettisoned during the early launch operation along with the base support lockdown platform surrounding the hot gas launch cartage at the base of the SLBM. The front nose breakable plastic cap tan colored is attached to the front of the SLBM’s. All of these parts as seen as debris from the launch process splashing into the surrounding sea water.

The DPRK again on July 9, 2016 at 11:30 A.M. South Korean time suffered another in flight failure of the KN-X-15 aka ( KN-11) (Pukkukong-1, North-Star-1) class solid propellant two stage, SLBM that uses foreign acquired solid propellant technology. It was successfully ejection from its Sinpo-class submarine from the East Sea (Sea of Japan) coastal waters near Sinpo, South Hamygong Province for it planned high ballistic vertical probe flight profile of on the order of 300 or more kilometers down range to its impact point along its coastal range. Once it cleared the water’s surface it ignited climbing up to an altitude of 10 kilometers (6.214 statute miles) the approximate Maximum dynamic pressure zone known as Max-Q exploding duplicating previous failures of the KN-X-15 aka ( KN-11). This was apparently the third full flight test of the KN-X-? solid propellant SLBM.

This image released of the April 23, 2016 partially successful launch of the DPRK, SLBM prototypes solid propellant KN-X-(15?) [This reflects the next in line number after KN-14 of the known South Korean Ministry of Defense own DPRK missile designations], missile from the Sea of Japan near the port city of Sinpo South Hamgyong Province. It apparently was the second flight test of the solid propellant version of this SLBM missile prototype that failed on December 25, 2015. Ground based Sinpo ship yard test site launch canister successful ejection test was apparently conducted back on March 16, 2016.

It was successfully ejected from the 2,000 tonne, Sinpo-class submarine by it “Solid hot Gas Launch” system and ignited once exposed to the atmosphere above sea level. The new prototype solid propellant missile should fall short of the liquid propellant KN-11, known 2,500 kilometer performance with its new 1.5 meter diameter solid motor. That range performance due to the known lower performing solid motor which may be something under 2,200 kilometers range capability.

Previously the DPRK had displayed a perfected 1-1.10 meter diameter large solid motor but this new 1.4-1.5 meter diameter solid motor has huge strategic implications for not merely Sea Based but also Land Based strategic ballistic missiles.

Solid Motor Foreign Technology Transfer to the DPRK Implicated

Those DPRK solid motors have many of the design characteristic of solid propellant ballistic missile technology of the PRC China that then went from China to Pakistan and Iran ultimately coming to the North Koreans. The most direct technology transfers came both from China and Pakistan with additions from Iran via their joint Science and Technology Transfer Cooperation Agreement. The DPRK was able to very rapidly accelerate its identifiable Chinese/Pakistani/Iranian based classes of solid motors program from that successful multi-faceted technology transfer endeavor. It only required technology duplication reverse engineering and materials duplication, processes or viable substitutions of filament wound casings with steel casings materials changes and change out from vacuum thrust nozzles for sea level nozzles or altitude nozzles as required for the specific applications all readily available. Examples are the Pakistani Shaheen-1, Chinese DF-11,DF-11A, 0.88 meter diameter solid motors, and DF-15,DF-15A, 1-1.10 meter diameter solid motor and the Shaheen-II, Chinese M-18 1.4 meter diameter solid motor based on Chinese provided technology assistance as well as the Chinese based Spa-B-140 series and L-SpaB-140A, 1.4 meter diameter series of space solid motors and the Iranian 1.25 meter diameter solid motors utilized on the two stage Sejjil and its vane steering housing designs. Certainly some technology education from the Russian could be implicated through the Iranian solid motor efforts.

This was a solid propellant demonstration not the liquid propellant Musudan IRBM system now pushed aside but not cancelled with the implications that it was a relative successful technology demonstration constitutes new missile KN-X-15 It utilizes the basic KN-11/SS-N-6 airframe dimensions plan-form as the bases of the rapid development technology demonstration design. It was not the KN-11 based SLBM with a 650 kg warhead mass which is a copy of the Soviet era Serb, Zyb, R-25, RSM-27, SS-N-6 SLBM. North Korea has not abandoned the KN-11 liquid propellant IRBM, SLBM only pushed it aside to address its engine hard start issues because it offers a higher performance than the Solid motor variant. This was made clear with the recent static test firing success of the KN-14 clustered of two identical engines as used in the KN-11.

KN-X-15 IRBM Solid Propellant Ballistic Missile

Close study of the launch imagery of the KN-X-15? has revealed it is a two stage, SLBM with a 2,200 kilometer range performance carrying a known 600-650 kilogram standardized warhead. The DPRK, two stage solid propellant motors SLBM, KN-X-15 still in R &D development but subsequent derivation designs are in the near future R&DTE expectations. Its height is about 9.525 meters and has a diameter of 1.5 meters matching the liquid propellant KN-11 SLBM design diameter and height of its two silo launch tubes installed on the Sinpo-class submarine. The 1.4 or more probable 1.5 meter diameter solid motors appear to in part be housed inside a basic 1.5 meter diameter two stage airframe design.

The DPRK NK-X-15 SLBM

Close study of the launch imagery has revealed it is a two stage, SLBM with a 2.200 kilometer range performance carrying a 600-650 kilogram warhead. The DPRK, two stage solid propellant motors SLBM, KN-X-15 still in R &D development. It height is about 9.525 meters and has a diameter of 1.5 meters matching the liquid propellant KN-11 SLBM design diameter and height of its two silo launch tubes installed on the Sinpo-class submarine.

The launch should have had its first stage travel some 300 kilometer or more horizontally down range according to South Korean Defense Ministry personnel as do most ballistic missile first stages but this launch was more vertical in a sounding rocket type ballistic profile that was not intended to fly full range thus the 30 kilometer range performance in part observed. That 30 kilometer range performance horizontally over a 300 kilometer projected coast range says nothing about it burn time much less its altitude attained. South Korean government sources stated that it blew up after traveling 30 kilometers and split up into two or three pieces without booster separation.

However the DPRK is known to now practice destroying the first stage of its rockets once the forward payload or stages have separated as seen in the most recent Unha-3 launch success. That could also indicate the second stage blew up at fire in the whole ignition breaking up the launch vehicle. This makes it a two stage solid motor arrangement not a single solid motor launch vehicle as identified in close up flight imagery. The second stage failed badly never separating from the first stage.

There was a DPRK tracking observation ship stationed near the expected impact point that had a limit of about 300-330 kilometers from the launch area outside Sinpo DPRK. That DPRK east coastal range from Kittaeryong DPRK does allow for 300-800 kilometer missile performance demonstrations over its coastal waters and international waters of the sea of Japan. Recent history has seen that limited to about 400-500 kilometers or less. Whether the missile flew its full potential performance burn time or was cut off by blowing the end burn ports dropping the pressure and temperature in the solid motor to terminate the thrust burn early remains unanswered. How high this warhead flew before it returned is unknown. Whether the warhead was immediately separated and test detonated or allowed to fly to its maximum altitude height or return close to the East Sea surface before and then as planned detonation remains unknown because of the apparent staging failure interpretation.

It was apparently detonated at some altitude and did not demonstrating a full range or full burn performance in a near vertical high ballistic flight with and definite warhead separation followed by detonation of the nuclear trigger at some altitude though the range observed before the suggested explosion was 30 kilometers (18-19 miles). The range demonstrated was well short of the expected eventual performance of less than 2,200 kilometers with a 650 kilogram warhead mass as previously noted.

In all probability the implications are that the KN-X-15 flew its attempted vertical probe ballistic flight profile with in the DPRK’s east coastal territorial waters ballistic missile range releasing the warhead for a brutal high stress re-entry run through the denser atmosphere from a height of something on the order of less than 80-100 kilometers (less than 50-60 miles) roughly three times the range displayed of 30 kilometers allowing the re-entry warhead test nuclear proximity fusing system to be detonated at an very low altitude just above the sea surface that were all suggested to be successful. The added kick after the warhead was separated clearly from the launch vehicle that stages were destroyed intentionally creating a deception for what was actually taking place. This is not the first time the DPRK has carried out such deception operations in missile testing.

However we have to be careful of the DPRK deception practices repeatedly observed in the last few months of 2016 and this flight is no exception to that rule.

The new KN-X-15, ballistic missile was launched from its maximum relatively shallow underwater depth, and that its "solid hot gas launch" ejection mechanism and high performance rocket motor using solid propellant worked without issues, along with its flight controls and warhead separation systems that remain questionable.

“ The test-fire was aimed to confirm the stability of the underwater ballistic launching system in the maximum depth of waters, flying kinetic feature under the vertical flight system of the ballistic missile powered by the newly developed high power solid fuel engine (motor CPV) , the reliability of the phased heat separation and the working accuracy of nuclear detonating device of warhead at the preset altitude.”

http://www.kcna.kp/kcna.user.special.getArticlePage.kcmsf;jsessionid=E4A71A29FC0CCA8F66655C26388BA118. http://www.kcna.kp/kcna.user.home.retrieveHomeInfoList.kcmsf?lang=eng.

The DPRK could operationally deploy this SLBM system within 3-4 years according to the South Korean defense ministry. The numbers of actual missiles deployed as well as the noisy submarines range and targeting capability would be necessity be limited to the immediate DPRK region.

It has become apparent that the DPRK is competing liquid and solid propellant systems faced off to one another with the liquids losing out fast for strategic ballistic missile systems immediate development State requirement.

Notes:

1 - No-dong-B is a provisional designation created by John Pike. The No-dong-B is derived from the Soviet-era SS-N-6 SLBM.

2 - NKSL-1 is an unofficial designation created by Charles Vick.

The NKSL-1 is a Taep'odong-1 missile with a third stage and satellite added.

3 - NKSL-X-2 & NKSL-X-3 is an unofficial designation created by Charles Vick.

NKSL-X-2 is a Taep'o dong-2 & Taep'o-dong-3 missile with a third stage and satellite added.

4 -* The Korean Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA), http://www.kida.re.kr/eng/ latest suggested numbers of May 2013* Includes 100 short range Scud types mix, 50 No-dong-A's and 50 No-dong-B's or a total of about 200 semi-mobile Transport Erector Launcher (TEL) mounted launchers. This was also reported by the Department of Defense to the U. S. Senate on May 2, 2013. How many remain in storage as replacements for those stationed on TEL’s are assumed to be higher. The total missile available in 2008 was estimated at greater than 800 while in 2010 it was estimated at 1,000. In 2013 it is estimated at 1,050 available missiles with 200 transport erectors launchers.

5 - KN-06 -Mobile surface to air system called Pongae-5 SAM. KN-04, KN-05, KN-07 and KN-09, uncertain which system it is applied.

6 - [KN-designations are derived from the South Korean military and intelligence community’s missile designation system of its Ministry of Defense. Thus the “KN-X-15”?, means the North Korean-Experimental missile system with a number designation and the next number that is apparently applicable in this incompletely understood numeric designation system. Some DPRK North Korean older phased out missile system do not carry the KN designations.

The older NK- and or NKSL- system is a public derived similar system from the “Cold War” North Korean Satellite Launch System with numeric designations similar to that utilized to define Soviet era satellite launch systems such as the SL-4 Soyuz booster by the US intelligence community.]

5 - KN-06 -Mobile surface to air system called Pongae-5 SAM. KN-04, KN-05, KN-07 and KN-09, uncertain which system it is applied.

6 - [KN-designations are derived from the South Korean military and intelligence community’s missile designation system of its Ministry of Defense. Thus the “KN-X-15”?, means the North Korean-Experimental missile system with a number designation and the next number that is apparently applicable in this incompletely understood numeric designation system. Some DPRK North Korean older phased out missile system do not carry the KN designations.

The older NK- and or NKSL- system is a public derived similar system from the “Cold War” North Korean Satellite Launch System with numeric designations similar to that utilized to define Soviet era satellite launch systems such as the SL-4 Soyuz booster by the US intelligence community.]



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