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Aerial Decoys

Anti-aircraft warfare generally involves the launching of rockets or guided missiles that target an aircraft. A guided missile includes a guidance mechanism which directs the missile to lock on to and track a moving target during the missile trajectory (i.e., homing). For example, an infrared homing guided missile, also known as a heat seeking missile, detects the infrared radiation emitted by the target (e.g., the exhaust expelled from the jet engines) to provide guidance. Another type of guidance mechanism is based on radar, in which the missile or a radar ground station transmits radio waves toward the target, and then the missile detects the return signal reflected by the target.

A targeted aircraft may deploy a decoy device to contend with an oncoming guided missile, causing the missile to target the decoy rather than the aircraft. The decoy detects the radar signal transmitted toward the aircraft, and then transmits a decoy signal having the appropriate signal parameters to deceive the missile into identifying the decoy as the intended target (i.e., the aircraft). The missile proceeds to target the decoy, which is eventually destroyed by the missile, while avoiding damage to the aircraft. Such a decoy must contain substantial processing power and capabilities, which adds weight as well as cost, and additional wasted resources once the decoy is destroyed.

To penetrate enemy territory, a bomber must fly at low altitudes and utilize electronic counter measures (ECM) to reduce the effectiveness of radar detection and tracking. To offset bomber vulnerability, a number of defense sysems have been proposed. Decoy options can be added to cause the threat aircraft to abandon the bomber in favor of pursuit of the decoy missile.

In World War II as never before, the fortunes of airpower would play an important role in the theater military strategy. Radar early warning would strip attacking aircraft of the element of surprise and set in motion a grueling duel between attackers and defenders. Radar begat countermeasures almost immediately.

Two electronic armadas were part of the cast for the Normandy landings on June 6, 1944. Taxable consisted of a formation of eight Lancaster bombers flying in a pattern dispensing chaff to make the Germans think a large invasion force was headed toward Cap d’Antifer. The Lancasters were equipped with “Moonshine” transponders that picked up German radar impulses and amplified them to depict a larger force. Below the aircraft, a flotilla of boats towed naval barrage balloons equipped with radar reflectors designed to make them look like large warships and troop transports. The Glimmer force made mock runs against Dunkirk and Boulogne and used jamming to conceal the true size of the force.

World War II also marked clear trends that would continue to alter the duel between attackers and defenders. Th eUSAF developed two categories of cruise missiles during the 1950s: air-to-surface missiles and decoys.

In early 1954, a blue ribbon panel, The Strategic Missile Evaluation Committee, found important aspects of all three American long-range missile programs (Snark, Navaho, and Atlas) unsatisfactory. The committee concluded that, in general, the missiles' CEPs were outdated and their bases were vulnerable. The panel went on to recommend that USAF employ a variety of means to assist heavy bombers: area decoys, local decoys, and ECM (electronics countermeasures).

The decoys were designed to appear on enemy radar the same as the SAC bombers, and thus to confuse, dilute, and degrade enemy air defenses. Those responsible for the naming of the decoy missiles must have been hunters to have come up with the names they did : Buck Duck, Bull Goose, and Green Quail. Actually, these names all reference deception, but are strangely obscure terms.

The most successful of the decoy missiles proved to be the McDonnell Quail most successful because it not owy becane operational, but it saved SAC for more than ten years. Improvements in enemy radar rendered the Quail less effective. In a 1972 test, radar controllers correctly identified the B-52s 21 out of 23 times. By then, USAF recognized that the Quail was no longer a credible decoy.

In the United States, small engines for the cruise missiles can be traced back to Sam Williams, who worked on Navy turbojets and gas turbines for Chrysler and, in 1954, organized the Williams Research Company. His first engine, the WR-2, ran in 1962 with 70 pounds of thrust and powered the Canadian AN-USD-501 reconnaissance drone and the US MQM-74 target drone. At this same time, USAF was considering a 2,000 nm Mach .85 SCUD (Subsonic Cruise Unarmed Decoy), or SCAM (Subsonic Cruise Attack Missile), but responses from major engine manufacturers as to the feasibility of these missiles ranged from skeptical to pessimistic.

The development of a number of different technologies at about the same time made a small, very accurate, lowflying, long-range missile possibie. Decreases in the size and weight of both guidance and engines, along with markedly enhanced capabilities, were key developments. Finally, the miniaturization of nuclear warheads made the cruise missile a very potent war machine.

In the early 1960s, USAF believed that successful bomber operations entailed the use of low-level tactics, ECM (Elecironic Countermeasures), defense suppression, and decoys. Toward the end of the decade, the Air Force sought a replacement for the Quail, which a 1967 Strategic Air Command (SAC) study considered obsolete because it had limited range at low altitudes and because of its size could be carried only in limited numbers. Improvements in Soviet radar, the impending Soviet deployment of AWACS and advanced interceptors, the cancellation of the B-70, the Vietnam experience, and the appearance of new technology were also factors in the Air Force push for a new decoy.

In 1966 and 1967, Air Force contractors (The Institute for Defense Analysis and RAND) and the Defense Science Board Task Force studied the situation and suggested possible successors to the Quail. Two concepts put forth were a more advanced decoy (SCUD) and an armed version (SCAM), later known as the Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy [SCAD].