Against Resumption of US Nuclear Weapons Testing
Despite proposals by Donald Trump and other policy advocates to restart explosive nuclear testing after a 32-year moratorium, substantial evidence indicates that such action would undermine U.S. national security interests, trigger global proliferation, harm public health, damage international credibility, and provide negligible technical benefits. Through analysis of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, nonproliferation architecture, verification capabilities, health consequences, and strategic implications, this paper demonstrates that maintaining the testing moratorium serves American interests far more effectively than resumption. The analysis concludes that the United States possesses adequate scientific capabilities to maintain its nuclear deterrent without testing, and that breaking the moratorium would precipitate a cascade of negative consequences that would diminish rather than enhance national security.
I. Introduction
Since conducting its final nuclear test explosion in September 1992, the United States has maintained a voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapons testing.1 This policy has been sustained across six presidential administrations, supported by consistent annual assessments from the directors of the national weapons laboratories confirming that explosive testing remains scientifically unnecessary. However, recent proposals have emerged advocating for a resumption of nuclear testing, arguing that such action would strengthen American deterrence and technological superiority.2
This paper systematically examines the arguments against resuming nuclear weapons testing, analyzing the issue through multiple critical lenses: the scientific adequacy of current stockpile stewardship programs, the strategic implications for global proliferation and regional stability, the devastating health and environmental consequences, the erosion of international treaties and diplomatic standing, the substantial economic costs, and the verification and transparency advantages of the current regime. The analysis demonstrates that resumption of testing would constitute a strategic error of significant magnitude, undermining decades of nonproliferation progress while providing marginal if any technical benefits.
II. Scientific and Technical Sufficiency of the Stockpile Stewardship Program
A. The Evolution and Capabilities of Science-Based Assessment
Following the implementation of the testing moratorium in 1992, the United States established the Stockpile Stewardship Program to maintain confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear arsenal without recourse to explosive testing.3 This program represents a fundamental shift from an empirical, test-based approach to a science-based methodology that employs advanced computational modeling, subcritical experiments, and comprehensive surveillance protocols. The SSP is administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration through three principal laboratories: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories.
The program's technical foundations rest on several pillars. Advanced Simulation and Computing capabilities provide unprecedented computational power, with systems such as El Capitan, installed at Lawrence Livermore in 2024 and representing the fastest supercomputer ever reported, enabling detailed three-dimensional simulations of nuclear weapon physics at resolutions impossible during the testing era.4 These simulations capture the complex interplay of materials under extreme conditions—temperatures exceeding millions of degrees, pressures greater than those at the Earth's core, and time scales measured in nanoseconds—that characterize nuclear detonations. The computational models are continuously validated and refined through comparison with historical test data from the more than 1,000 nuclear tests conducted before 1992.
B. Subcritical Experiments and Non-Nuclear Testing
Complementing computational simulation, the SSP employs sophisticated experimental facilities that probe weapon physics without producing nuclear yields. Subcritical experiments at the Nevada National Security Site utilize high explosives and small quantities of special nuclear materials to examine plutonium behavior under conditions approaching but not reaching criticality. These experiments, which do not produce self-sustaining nuclear reactions, provide crucial data about material properties and weapon component behavior.5
The National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore and the Z Pulsed Power Facility at Sandia National Laboratories represent major experimental capabilities developed specifically for stockpile stewardship. NIF uses powerful laser systems to create conditions relevant to nuclear weapon secondaries, while the Z machine employs electromagnetic pulses to generate extreme pressures and temperatures. These facilities enable investigation of fundamental physics questions relevant to weapon performance without conducting nuclear explosions.
C. Annual Assessment Process and Laboratory Certification
The cornerstone of the SSP's credibility is the Annual Assessment process, wherein the directors of the three national laboratories evaluate the condition of each weapon system in the stockpile and certify to the Secretaries of Energy and Defense—and ultimately to the President—whether the stockpile remains safe and reliable.6 This process integrates data from surveillance activities, computational simulations, and experimental results to provide a comprehensive evaluation of weapon status.
For thirty-two consecutive years, laboratory directors have consistently certified that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable, and that resumption of nuclear testing is not necessary.7 This remarkable record, spanning both Democratic and Republican administrations, represents a consensus judgment of the nation's foremost nuclear weapons scientists. The directors assess that current scientific understanding of nuclear weapon physics exceeds that achieved during the testing era, as modern computational and experimental capabilities enable interrogation of weapon behavior with precision and detail impossible through full-scale testing alone.
D. Life Extension Programs and Manufacturing Capabilities
The SSP includes comprehensive Life Extension Programs that refurbish aging weapons using only components based on previously tested designs, thereby minimizing the need for nuclear testing while extending operational lifespans. The program has successfully completed multiple LEPs, demonstrating the ability to remanufacture critical components, including plutonium pits, to exacting specifications. In 2024, the NNSA certified the first newly manufactured pit produced under modern processes, representing a significant milestone toward the goal of producing 80 pits annually by 2030.8
Enhanced surveillance programs continuously monitor weapon components for signs of aging or degradation. Weapons are periodically disassembled at specialized facilities where components undergo both non-destructive examination using advanced radiographic and imaging techniques and destructive testing to characterize material properties and aging effects. This comprehensive surveillance provides early warning of any potential issues that might affect weapon reliability.
E. Comparative Advantage in Maintaining Testing Moratorium
A critical strategic consideration is that the United States derives greater benefit from the testing moratorium than any potential adversary. Having conducted over 1,000 nuclear tests, American weapons laboratories possess an unparalleled database of empirical test data that informs and validates computational models.9 The SSP, with its multi-billion-dollar annual budget and world-leading scientific infrastructure, provides high confidence in stockpile status that other nations cannot match without extensive testing programs.
Resumption of testing would primarily benefit states with less developed arsenals or those seeking to develop advanced thermonuclear weapons. Countries that have conducted fewer tests or possess less sophisticated stockpile maintenance capabilities would gain more from renewed testing than the United States, effectively narrowing the technological gap that currently favors American deterrent capabilities. This asymmetric advantage constitutes a powerful argument for maintaining the moratorium—the United States has more to lose than to gain from a return to testing.
III. Strategic and Proliferation Consequences
A. Cascade Effect on Global Nuclear Testing
The most immediate and predictable consequence of American resumption of nuclear testing would be reciprocal testing by other nuclear-armed states. Russia and China would almost certainly respond with their own testing programs, citing American actions as justification.10 Indeed, Russia has already signaled this intention—in October 2023, President Vladimir Putin revoked Russia's 2000 ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, explicitly citing the United States' failure to ratify the treaty as justification for this decision.11
The strategic calculus that currently restrains nuclear testing by major powers would collapse. China, which last conducted a nuclear test in 1996, has been expanding its nuclear arsenal and would likely seize upon American testing as an opportunity to validate new weapon designs without international opprobrium. The breakdown of the de facto global testing moratorium would eliminate the political costs currently associated with testing, effectively providing a green light for weapons development activities that are presently constrained by international norms.
B. Regional Proliferation Dynamics
The destabilizing effects would extend beyond the major nuclear powers. In South Asia, the triangular nuclear relationship among China, India, and Pakistan would face severe strain. Chinese testing would likely prompt India to resume testing to demonstrate technological parity and maintain credible deterrence against Beijing.12 Any Indian test would almost certainly compel Pakistan to follow suit, given the adversarial relationship and ongoing border tensions between these neighbors. This action-reaction dynamic in an already precarious region burdened by crisis-driven escalations and near-misses would substantially increase the risk of nuclear conflict.
In Northeast Asia, American testing would create intense pressure on U.S. allies Japan and South Korea to reconsider their non-nuclear status. Both nations possess the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons rapidly but have historically relied on extended American deterrence. A perception that U.S. testing signaled diminished commitment to existing security arrangements—or alternatively, that regional security threats required enhanced deterrent capabilities—could fuel domestic political movements favoring indigenous nuclear programs. South Korea has already witnessed growing public and political support for nuclear weapons acquisition; resumed testing would add momentum to such sentiments.13
C. Middle East Implications
The Middle East presents particularly acute proliferation risks. Iran could exploit the breakdown of the testing norm to justify acceleration of its nuclear program, arguing that global testing resumption necessitates a credible deterrent capability.14 With the technical capacity to produce weapon-grade uranium for a testable device in less than one week, Tehran could rapidly capitalize on an environment where testing had regained international acceptance. The resulting destabilization of regional security dynamics could prompt additional states to pursue nuclear capabilities, potentially including Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or Egypt.
D. Threshold States and Latent Nuclear Powers
The resumption of testing by established nuclear powers would send a dangerous signal to threshold states and latent nuclear powers that the path to nuclear weapons status remains viable and potentially acceptable. Countries that have previously constrained their programs or remained non-nuclear due to international pressure and normative prohibitions might reassess their strategic calculus. The message conveyed by renewed testing—that nuclear weapons retain military and political utility, and that international restrictions are negotiable—would undermine decades of nonproliferation diplomacy.
E. Competitive Arms Racing
Beyond the immediate proliferation effects, resumed testing would reinvigorate competitive arms racing among existing nuclear powers. The Trump administration's explicit threats in 2020 to spend Russia and China "into oblivion" in a nuclear arms race if they did not accede to U.S. arms control proposals illustrates this dynamic.15 However, such competition did not soften Chinese or Russian behavior—China has accelerated its nuclear expansion, and Russia withdrew its CTBT ratification. Testing would intensify this competition, potentially leading to new weapon types, higher alert levels, and increased resources devoted to nuclear forces, all of which would decrease rather than enhance strategic stability.
IV. Health and Environmental Consequences
A. Historical Legacy of Nuclear Testing
The historical record of nuclear testing in the United States provides compelling evidence of the severe health and environmental consequences associated with this activity. Between 1951 and 1992, the Nevada Test Site conducted over 900 nuclear tests, including approximately 100 atmospheric detonations.16 The radioactive fallout from these tests, particularly during the atmospheric testing period from 1951 to 1962, exposed hundreds of thousands of Americans to harmful levels of radiation.
A 1997 report by the National Cancer Institute documented that nuclear tests at the Nevada Test Site released significant quantities of radioactive iodine-131, with particularly high releases during 1952, 1953, 1955, and 1957.17 The report estimated these tests could cause between 10,000 and 75,000 additional thyroid cancer cases. Subsequent analyses have estimated approximately 22,000 excess cancer cases and 2,000 deaths from leukemia directly attributable to radiation exposure from Nevada testing. Additional studies in the early 2000s by the National Cancer Institute and Centers for Disease Control estimated that fallout could have led to around 11,000 excess deaths nationwide.
B. Downwinders and Geographic Impact
Communities living downwind of the Nevada Test Site—predominantly in Nevada, Utah, and Arizona—experienced the most severe health impacts. These "downwinders" were exposed to radioactive particles carried by prevailing winds, which contaminated water sources, agricultural land, and livestock.18 Radioactive isotopes entered the food chain through contaminated milk, meat, and produce, with iodine-131 concentrating in the thyroid gland and causing elevated rates of thyroid cancer and other endocrine disorders.
The geographic scope of contamination extended far beyond the immediate vicinity of the test site. Radioactive particles were detected across large portions of the continental United States, with fallout documented as far as the East Coast. Areas up to 100 miles from ground zero experienced visible mushroom clouds and significant radioactive deposition. The Environmental Protection Agency has noted that significant radiation dangers from fallout typically occur within 20 miles downwind from detonation sites, though concerns persist about iodine exposure affecting more distant communities.
C. Specific Health Effects and Temporal Patterns
The health consequences of radiation exposure from nuclear testing manifest across multiple disease categories and temporal scales. Thyroid cancer represents one of the most prevalent impacts, as the thyroid gland readily absorbs radioactive iodine-131. This isotope decays to produce radiation that damages thyroid tissue, substantially increasing cancer risk. Children were particularly vulnerable due to their developing bodies and higher metabolic rates, which caused them to absorb proportionally greater radiation doses.19
Leukemia emerged as another prominent radiation-induced illness, with particularly strong epidemiological linkages to nuclear testing. The latency period for leukemia is relatively short—typically manifesting within a decade of exposure—whereas solid tumors such as thyroid, breast, and lung cancers often required decades to develop. This temporal pattern meant that health impacts appeared gradually, with cancer rates in affected communities remaining elevated for generations after testing ceased.
Beyond malignancies, downwinders experienced other radiation-induced health problems including immune system dysfunction, increased susceptibility to infections, cardiovascular disease, and chronic respiratory conditions such as pulmonary fibrosis. Pregnant women exposed to high radiation doses faced elevated risks of fetal malformations and developmental abnormalities. Evidence suggests potential transgenerational effects, with children and grandchildren of exposed individuals reporting elevated rates of genetic abnormalities and childhood cancers, though research into these intergenerational impacts continues.
D. Disproportionate Impact on Indigenous Populations
Native American communities suffered particularly severe and often overlooked consequences from nuclear testing. The Nevada Test Site is located on Western Shoshone lands known as Newe Sogobia, and fallout patterns heavily impacted reservations including Duckwater and other Native settlements.20 Initial dose reconstruction efforts by the Off-Site Radiation Exposure Review Project significantly underestimated exposure levels for Native American populations because these assessments made erroneous assumptions about dietary patterns and lifestyle.
Critically, the ORERP failed to account for hunting as a major food source for Native communities. Game animals concentrated radioactive iodine in their thyroid glands, and consumption of these animals resulted in substantially higher radiation doses than models based solely on beef and cow milk consumption would predict. This oversight led to systematic underestimation of radiation exposure and inadequate compensation for affected Native American communities. More accurate dose reconstructions incorporating traditional food sources and feeding patterns reveal significantly higher exposure levels than initially acknowledged.
E. Ongoing Environmental Contamination
The environmental legacy of past nuclear testing persists decades after the last test. The Nevada National Security Site contains some of the most radioactive land areas in the world, with extensive underground contamination from the more than 800 underground tests conducted between 1957 and 1992.21 These tests vaporized subterranean chambers creating cavities filled with radioactive debris. Radioactive isotopes including cesium-137 and plutonium remain present in soil and groundwater, continuing to pose contamination risks.
Underground aquifers beneath the test site were irradiated by numerous underground explosions, creating long-term groundwater contamination concerns. While radioactivity levels decline over time through natural decay processes, long-lived isotopes such as plutonium-239, with a half-life of 24,000 years, will remain hazardous for millennia. The potential for leakage of contaminated groundwater into water supplies used by surrounding communities represents an enduring environmental threat.
F. Impossibility of Containing Underground Tests
Proponents of resumed testing sometimes argue that modern underground testing techniques could avoid the public health consequences of atmospheric testing. However, this assertion overlooks the demonstrated risks of underground tests. Even carefully conducted underground detonations pose substantial hazards through two primary mechanisms: venting and groundwater contamination.22
Venting occurs when explosive force breaches containment barriers, releasing radioactive gases and particles into the atmosphere. Historical experience demonstrates that venting incidents occurred with considerable frequency during the underground testing era, despite precautions. Additionally, underground explosions inevitably contaminate the surrounding rock matrix and groundwater, creating persistent contamination that can migrate through geological formations over decades or centuries. Given the Nevada Test Site's location above significant aquifer systems that supply water to Las Vegas and surrounding communities, any resumed underground testing would create unacceptable long-term contamination risks.
G. Compensation and Recognition Failures
The federal government's response to downwinder health impacts, while eventually acknowledging some responsibility through the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990, has proven inadequate in several respects.23 RECA provides compensation to certain individuals who developed specified cancers after living in designated areas during testing periods. However, eligibility criteria remain restrictive, excluding many affected individuals and communities. Geographic boundaries limit coverage to specific counties in Nevada, Utah, and Arizona, despite evidence of widespread fallout extending far beyond these areas.
Moreover, compensation has been limited to first-generation downwinders, with second and third generations who suffer health effects systematically excluded from the program despite mounting evidence of transgenerational impacts. The time lag between exposure and disease onset meant that many downwinders died before receiving benefits. Current litigation efforts by subsequent generations seeking recognition and compensation continue, highlighting the enduring nature of nuclear testing's health legacy.
H. Global Environmental Justice Implications
The health and environmental consequences of American nuclear testing mirror patterns observed internationally. In the Marshall Islands, where the United States conducted 67 nuclear tests between 1946 and 1958, communities continue experiencing elevated cancer rates, environmental contamination, and displacement from ancestral lands seven decades later.24 The Castle Bravo test of 1954, with a yield 1,000 times that of the Hiroshima bomb, produced fallout that contaminated inhabited atolls and exposed populations to severe radiation doses.
The Runit Dome on Enewetak Atoll, a massive concrete cap containing 100,000 cubic yards of radioactive soil, represents a visible monument to the nuclear legacy. This structure, which required removal and burial of contaminated topsoil from multiple islands, faces ongoing challenges from rising sea levels and structural degradation, threatening to release radioactive materials into the Pacific Ocean. The international dimension of testing impacts—with effects extending beyond national borders to affect Pacific Islander communities—adds another layer to the case against resumption.
V. Erosion of International Treaties and Diplomatic Standing
A. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1996, represents the culmination of five decades of international efforts to halt nuclear testing.25 The treaty bans all nuclear test explosions in all environments for both military and civilian purposes, establishing a comprehensive prohibition on activities that would advance nuclear weapon development. Though not yet in force due to failure of certain states to ratify, the CTBT has established a powerful international norm against testing, with only one state—North Korea—conducting tests in the 21st century, and even Pyongyang has observed a moratorium since 2017.
The United States signed the CTBT in 1996 as the first signatory nation, but the Senate rejected ratification in 1999 following minimal committee consideration. Nevertheless, successive administrations have maintained the voluntary testing moratorium and continued to support the treaty's verification infrastructure. American resumption of testing would represent an explicit violation of the treaty's object and purpose, as signatories are legally obligated under international law not to take actions that would defeat a treaty's objectives prior to ratification.
B. Nonproliferation Treaty Linkages
The CTBT is intrinsically connected to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime. The NPT's 1995 indefinite extension was explicitly conditioned on progress toward a comprehensive test ban, with the commitment to conclude negotiations on the CTBT stated as a central element of the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted at that conference.26 The preamble to the NPT itself references the determination to seek an end to nuclear testing as an essential step toward nuclear disarmament.
This linkage means that American testing resumption would undermine the NPT's fundamental bargain: non-nuclear weapon states forgo nuclear weapons in exchange for nuclear weapon states' commitment to pursue disarmament and share peaceful nuclear technology. The overwhelming majority of nations have chosen to remain non-nuclear under this framework. Testing resumption would signal to these states that nuclear weapon states are not honoring their disarmament obligations, potentially eroding the nonproliferation consensus that has prevented widespread nuclear weapons acquisition. The 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document specifically called on nuclear weapon states to ratify the CTBT "with all expediency," underscoring the international community's view of testing prohibition as essential to the nonproliferation regime.27
C. International Condemnation and Isolation
The international community has expressed overwhelming support for the testing moratorium and entry into force of the CTBT. United Nations General Assembly resolutions promoting the treaty pass annually with near-unanimous support—recent votes recorded 175 nations in favor, with only the United States opposed and three abstentions.28 This remarkable consensus reflects global recognition of testing prohibition as a critical element of international security architecture.
American resumption of testing would place the United States in defiance of international opinion and isolated from traditional allies. European allies, Asian partners, and states across the developing world have consistently advocated for maintaining the moratorium and achieving CTBT entry into force. Testing would strain these relationships and diminish American diplomatic influence on nonproliferation and arms control issues. The Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Nihon Hidankyo, a Japanese atomic bomb survivors' organization, in 2024 underscored international commitment to nuclear disarmament; their immediate condemnation of any testing proposal illustrates the global opposition the United States would face.29
D. Credibility and Leadership Consequences
The United States has historically exercised leadership on arms control and nonproliferation issues, playing central roles in negotiating the NPT, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and numerous bilateral arms reduction agreements with Russia. This leadership has been predicated on American credibility—a perception that the United States honors its commitments and pursues policies that enhance global security rather than narrow national advantage. Resumption of testing would severely damage this credibility.
States would question American reliability on other arms control commitments and nonproliferation initiatives. The capacity to mobilize international coalitions to address proliferation challenges—such as coordinating responses to North Korean or Iranian nuclear activities—depends on perceptions of American good faith and consistency. Testing would undermine this capacity, making it more difficult to build consensus for nonproliferation measures or sanctions against violators. The loss of moral authority to criticize other states' nuclear activities would represent a strategic self-infliction of significant magnitude.
E. Verification Regime Implications
The CTBT established the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and its International Monitoring System, a global network of 337 monitoring stations employing seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide detection technologies to identify nuclear explosions anywhere on Earth.30 Though the treaty has not entered into force, this verification infrastructure is over 90 percent complete and operational, providing transparency and confidence that nuclear testing is not occurring clandestinely.
The United States has continued supporting the CTBTO and contributing to the IMS despite not ratifying the treaty, recognizing the system's value for monitoring compliance and deterring testing. American testing would undermine this verification regime by signaling that monitoring capabilities are insufficient to maintain compliance, potentially encouraging other states to test or to reduce their support for the verification infrastructure. The resulting degradation of global monitoring capabilities would decrease transparency and increase the risk of clandestine testing by proliferators.
VI. Economic and Opportunity Costs
A. Direct Costs of Testing Infrastructure
Resumption of nuclear testing would require substantial financial investment to restore testing readiness at the Nevada National Security Site. Current estimates suggest that shortening the readiness timeline from the current two-to-three-year preparation period to the six-to-ten-month window contemplated during the previous administration would require significant infrastructure development and personnel training.31 Proposals for "immediate test readiness" articulated in policy documents would demand even greater resource commitments.
The direct costs would encompass multiple elements: excavation and preparation of test shafts and tunnels, installation of diagnostic equipment, development of containment systems, deployment of security measures, establishment of command and control facilities, and recruitment and training of specialized personnel. Additional expenses would include environmental monitoring systems, emergency response capabilities, and compensation programs for affected workers and communities. Conservative estimates suggest these preparatory investments would total several billion dollars before conducting the first test.
B. Stockpile Stewardship Program Investments
The existing Stockpile Stewardship Program already represents a major federal investment, with annual expenditures exceeding four billion dollars.32 This funding supports advanced computational facilities, experimental capabilities, manufacturing infrastructure, and scientific personnel across the nuclear weapons complex. The broader nuclear weapons modernization program, encompassing stockpile stewardship, delivery system upgrades, and supporting infrastructure, has been estimated by the Congressional Budget Office to require approximately 494 billion dollars over three decades.
Testing resumption would not eliminate the need for these stockpile stewardship investments. The scientific understanding and experimental capabilities developed through the SSP remain essential regardless of whether explosive testing occurs. Testing would thus represent an additional cost layer rather than a substitute for existing programs, requiring parallel maintenance of both testing and stewardship capabilities. This dual-track approach would substantially increase total costs without proportional security benefits.
C. Opportunity Costs and Alternative Investments
The resources devoted to restoring testing capabilities represent opportunity costs—foregone investments in alternative approaches to enhancing national security. The same financial commitments could fund improvements to intelligence capabilities, conventional military capabilities, cybersecurity infrastructure, or diplomatic engagement that might provide greater marginal security benefits than testing. Within the nuclear enterprise specifically, resources could enhance plutonium pit production, improve weapons transportation security, or accelerate life extension programs for aging systems.
The scientific and engineering talent required for testing programs represents another opportunity cost. The nuclear weapons laboratories employ many of the nation's most capable physicists, engineers, and computational scientists. Diverting these personnel toward testing preparation would reduce capacity for other research and development activities, including work on advanced energy technologies, fundamental physics research, and national security applications beyond nuclear weapons. This reallocation would decrease the overall return on investment in human capital.
D. Economic Impacts on Nevada and Surrounding States
Testing resumption would generate significant economic disruption in Nevada and adjacent states. The Nevada Test Site's proximity to Las Vegas—approximately 65 miles northwest of the city—means that testing activities would occur near major population centers and economic infrastructure. While underground testing would avoid the dramatic visible effects of atmospheric detonations, the psychological and economic impacts on the regional economy could prove substantial.
Tourism, which constitutes a major component of Nevada's economy, could suffer as visitors avoid perceived radiation risks. Real estate values in potentially affected areas would likely decline as residents and investors reassessed exposure risks. Agricultural activities in downwind areas could face market consequences even if actual contamination remained minimal, as consumers might avoid products from the region. These economic disruptions would impose costs on communities and businesses that extend well beyond the direct federal expenditures on testing programs.
E. Compensation and Liability Expenses
Historical experience demonstrates that nuclear testing generates long-term compensation obligations. The Radiation Exposure Compensation Act has distributed nearly 300 million dollars to downwinders, atomic veterans, and uranium miners, yet this represents only partial compensation for a limited subset of affected individuals.33 Litigation by excluded categories of claimants continues, and proposals to expand RECA eligibility and compensation levels remain under consideration.
Resumed testing would generate new cohorts of exposed individuals requiring health monitoring and compensation. Modern testing would occur under heightened scrutiny with improved epidemiological methods for attributing health effects to radiation exposure, potentially creating larger liability pools than past testing. Legal challenges, medical monitoring programs, and compensation payments could accumulate to billions of dollars over subsequent decades, representing a substantial long-term fiscal commitment beyond the immediate testing costs.
VII. Verification, Transparency, and Strategic Stability Benefits of the Moratorium
A. Current Monitoring Capabilities
The global nuclear test monitoring system developed through the CTBTO provides unprecedented transparency regarding nuclear testing activities worldwide. The International Monitoring System employs multiple complementary detection methods: seismic monitoring stations detect underground explosions, hydroacoustic sensors identify underwater detonations, infrasound arrays detect atmospheric explosions, and radionuclide monitoring stations sample air for radioactive particles that would indicate nuclear testing.34 This multi-layered approach enables detection of nuclear explosions down to very low yields, substantially below militarily significant thresholds.
The system's effectiveness was demonstrated through detection of all North Korean nuclear tests, including relatively low-yield explosions. When North Korea conducted its second nuclear test in May 2009, IMS seismic stations immediately confirmed the detonation despite having only three-quarters of the monitoring network operational at that time. Subsequent noble gas detection corroborated the seismic findings, providing definitive confirmation of nuclear testing. This detection capability provides confidence that clandestine testing by potential proliferators would be identified and could prompt international responses.
B. Strategic Stability Through Transparency
The testing moratorium contributes to strategic stability by creating transparency regarding nuclear weapon development activities. States observe each other's restraint from testing, building confidence that nuclear arsenals are not being significantly enhanced or modified. This transparency reduces uncertainty about adversaries' capabilities and intentions, decreasing the risk of worst-case assessments that might drive arms racing or crisis instability.
The absence of testing constrains qualitative improvements to nuclear arsenals. While computational simulation and subcritical experiments enable maintenance of existing weapon types, they provide less confidence for novel designs or significant modifications. This constraint applies to all nuclear weapon states, effectively capping the rate of technological advancement and limiting the development of destabilizing new capabilities such as low-yield tactical weapons or enhanced radiation devices. The moratorium thus serves as a de facto limitation on nuclear weapon modernization that benefits all parties by reducing competitive pressures.
C. Confidence-Building Measures and Communication Channels
The CTBT verification regime includes provisions for confidence-building measures designed to enhance transparency and reduce suspicion of treaty violations. These measures enable states to share information about non-nuclear chemical explosions, provide advance notification of such activities, and maintain dialogue through CTBTO channels. While the treaty has not entered into force, the preparatory commission has implemented elements of this framework, creating communication mechanisms that can help clarify ambiguous events and prevent misinterpretation.
These confidence-building processes complement bilateral verification arrangements such as data exchanges under U.S.-Russian arms control treaties. The multi-layered verification infrastructure—combining national technical means, bilateral arrangements, and multilateral monitoring through the IMS—provides robust assurance regarding compliance with testing moratoria. Disruption of this architecture through resumed testing would eliminate these transparency benefits and increase strategic uncertainty.
D. On-Site Inspection Capabilities
The CTBT includes provisions for on-site inspections when monitoring data suggests possible nuclear testing. These inspections would employ specialized equipment to examine potential test sites, collect samples, and assess whether nuclear explosions have occurred. The CTBTO regularly conducts exercises to maintain inspection readiness and refine procedures, most recently completing a major exercise in 2019 utilizing updated facilities in Austria.35
The on-site inspection regime represents a significant deterrent against clandestine testing. States contemplating violations must consider the risk of detection not only through remote monitoring but also through intrusive on-site examinations that would reveal even carefully concealed tests. This layered verification approach—remote monitoring followed by on-site inspection if needed—provides high confidence in compliance while respecting sovereignty concerns. Abandonment of the testing moratorium would forfeit these verification benefits and decrease confidence regarding other states' nuclear activities.
E. Prevention of Technological Surprise
The testing moratorium reduces the risk of technological breakthroughs that could destabilize strategic relationships. Without testing, states cannot confidently deploy radically new weapon designs that might provide decisive advantages. This constraint ensures that nuclear arsenals evolve incrementally through modifications to proven designs rather than through revolutionary advances that could undermine deterrence stability.
Historical examples illustrate this concern. The development of thermonuclear weapons required extensive testing to validate staged radiation implosion designs that enabled dramatically increased yields. Similarly, development of enhanced radiation weapons, neutron bombs, and low-yield options all required testing programs. The moratorium prevents such qualitative breakthroughs by denying the empirical validation necessary for confident deployment of novel weapon types. This protection against technological surprise contributes significantly to predictability and stability in strategic relationships.
VIII. Alternative Approaches to Addressing Stockpile Concerns
A. Enhanced Stockpile Stewardship Capabilities
For those who remain concerned about stockpile reliability despite three decades of successful certification without testing, the appropriate response involves strengthening existing stewardship capabilities rather than resuming testing. Several approaches could enhance confidence in stockpile status while maintaining the testing moratorium. Continued investment in computational capabilities, including development of exascale computing systems that exceed current capabilities by orders of magnitude, would enable even more detailed simulation of weapon physics and materials behavior.36
Expansion of experimental facilities represents another avenue for enhanced stewardship. Additional subcritical experiments, improved diagnostic capabilities at existing facilities, and development of new experimental platforms could provide data to refine computational models and investigate specific aging or reliability questions. These investments would strengthen the scientific foundation for stockpile certification without the negative consequences of explosive testing.
B. Accelerated Life Extension and Replacement Programs
Concerns about aging weapons can be addressed through accelerated life extension programs that systematically refurbish weapon systems using modern manufacturing techniques and materials. The Reliable Replacement Warhead concept, which would redesign weapon components to enhance manufacturability and reliability while using only previously tested nuclear designs, offers one approach to extending stockpile life without testing.37 Though politically controversial, RRW represents an example of how technical concerns can be addressed through design and manufacturing improvements rather than testing.
Acceleration of plutonium pit production provides another element of stockpile sustainment. The goal of producing 80 pits annually by 2030 would enable replacement of components of uncertain quality, reducing reliance on aging pits from the Cold War era. Combined with enhanced surveillance and predictive modeling of pit aging, increased production capacity would address concerns about plutonium components without requiring nuclear tests.
C. International Engagement and Transparency Measures
For concerns related to adversary capabilities or potential surprise developments, diplomatic engagement and enhanced monitoring provide more effective responses than testing. Strengthening the CTBT verification regime through full funding and technical cooperation would improve detection capabilities and reduce uncertainty about others' activities. Promoting universal adherence to the treaty through diplomatic efforts and incentives would formalize testing prohibitions and create additional barriers to testing resumption by potential proliferators.
Transparency measures such as data exchanges, facility visits, and technical consultations could address specific concerns about adversary programs without triggering the negative consequences of American testing. Building confidence through verification and dialogue serves American interests more effectively than actions that would provoke reciprocal testing and arms racing.
D. Renewed Ratification Efforts
Rather than contemplate testing resumption, American policy should focus on achieving Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The bipartisan Shalikashvili report of 2001 addressed many concerns that led to the Senate's 1999 rejection, documenting improvements in stockpile stewardship capabilities and verification technologies that strengthened the case for ratification.38 Two decades of additional progress in these areas have further enhanced the treaty's verifiability and the confidence in stockpile maintenance without testing.
American ratification would strengthen the nonproliferation regime, enhance diplomatic leverage to address proliferation challenges, and formalize the testing prohibition that has been observed voluntarily for three decades. It would demonstrate leadership on arms control and build momentum for other states to ratify, potentially enabling treaty entry into force. These benefits far exceed anything that could be achieved through testing resumption.
IX. Conclusion
The comprehensive analysis presented in this paper demonstrates that resumption of nuclear weapons testing by the United States would constitute a profound strategic error. The arguments against testing span multiple domains—scientific, strategic, health, environmental, diplomatic, and economic—and converge on a consistent conclusion: maintaining the testing moratorium serves American national security interests far more effectively than resumption.
From a technical perspective, the Stockpile Stewardship Program has successfully maintained confidence in the nuclear arsenal for thirty-two years, with laboratory directors consistently certifying that testing remains unnecessary. The United States possesses superior computational and experimental capabilities that provide higher confidence in stockpile status than testing could offer, and resumption would primarily benefit adversaries with less sophisticated stewardship programs.
Strategically, American testing would trigger a cascade of reciprocal testing by Russia, China, and potentially other nuclear-armed states, accelerating arms racing and increasing proliferation risks. Regional instabilities in South Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East would intensify as states responded to the breakdown of testing norms. The United States would find itself isolated internationally, having squandered diplomatic capital and moral authority on nonproliferation issues.
The health and environmental consequences of renewed testing, even if conducted underground, would impose severe costs on downwind communities and create long-term contamination legacies. Historical experience demonstrates the devastating impacts of testing on human health and the impossibility of fully containing radioactive releases. Modern testing would generate new cohorts of exposed populations requiring health monitoring and compensation extending across generations.
Diplomatically, testing would violate obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and damage American credibility on arms control. The international community's overwhelming opposition to testing resumption would leave the United States isolated and diminish its capacity to lead nonproliferation initiatives. The verification and transparency benefits provided by the current moratorium and monitoring regime would be lost, increasing strategic uncertainty and instability.
Economically, testing would require substantial investments in infrastructure and personnel while generating significant opportunity costs. Resources devoted to testing preparation could be more effectively allocated to stockpile stewardship enhancements, intelligence capabilities, or conventional military modernization that would provide greater marginal security benefits. Long-term compensation and liability costs would accumulate for decades.
The conclusion is inescapable: the United States should reject proposals for testing resumption and instead maintain and strengthen the policies that have successfully preserved the nuclear deterrent for three decades without explosive testing. The testing moratorium represents an enduring achievement in arms control that has prevented proliferation, constrained arms racing, and protected public health while enabling maintenance of a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear arsenal. Far from being a sign of weakness, maintaining this moratorium demonstrates the strategic wisdom and scientific capability that genuinely enhance American security.