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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On August 11, 1995, announcing his decision to seek a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), President Clinton stated:

_ "I consider the maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile to be a supreme national interest of the United States."

_ "I am assured by the Secretary of Energy and the Directors of our nuclear weapons laboratories that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear deterrent through a science-based stockpile stewardship program without nuclear testing. I directed the implementation of such a program almost two years ago."

_ "The nuclear weapons in the United States arsenal are safe and reliable, and I am determined that our stockpile stewardship program will ensure they remain so in the absence of nuclear testing."

_ "While I am optimistic that the stockpile stewardship program will be successful, as President I cannot dismiss the possibility, however unlikely, that the program will fall short of its objectives. Therefore, in addition to the new annual certification procedure for the nuclear weapons stockpile, I am also establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States can enter into a CTBT."

One of the safeguards which condition U.S. entry into a CTBT is:

_ "The conduct of a science-based stockpile stewardship program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile, including the conduct of a broad range of effective and continuing experimental programs."

(From Fact Sheet released by Office of the Press Secretary along with text of President Clinton's announcement)

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) proposes to provide enhanced high-resolution radiography capability for the purpose of performing hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments in support of the Department's historical mission and near-term stewardship of the nuclear weapons stockpile. This environmental impact statement (EIS) analyzes the environmental consequences of alternative ways to accomplish the proposed action. The DOE's preferred alternative for accomplishing the proposed action would be to complete and operate the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico and implement an enhanced approach to containing test materials in steel vessels, phased in over 10 years. In May 1995, DOE issued the draft EIS for review and invited comments from the State of New Mexico, affected American Indian tribes, county governments, other Federal agencies, and the general public. DOE has issued this final EIS to document the environmental consequences associated with the proposed action and alternatives and to respond to comments received on the draft EIS.

PURPOSE AND NEED

DOE is responsible for ensuring that U.S. nuclear weapons remain safe, secure, and reliable. The DOE program that responds to Presidential and Congressional direction to ensure confidence in the nuclear weapons stockpile is called the Stockpile Stewardship and Management (SS&M) Program (DOE 1995). This is an ongoing program that has evolved over time and whose goals are redirected from two former DOE programs: weapons research, development, and testing and stockpile support. Today's SS&M Program has moved away from DOE's past reliance on direct observations of nuclear tests toward ensuring weapons safety and reliability through a more challenging "science-based" approach to develop a greater scientific understanding of nuclear weapons phenomena and better predictive models of performance.

Historically, hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments have been a requirement to support the DOE's (and its predecessor agencies') mission; they remain essential elements of the SS&M Program and assist in the understanding and evaluation of nuclear weapons performance. Dynamic experiments are used to gain information on the physical properties and dynamic behavior of materials used in nuclear weapons, including changes due to aging. Hydrodynamic tests are used to obtain diagnostic information on the behavior of a nuclear weapons primary (using simulant materials for the fissile materials in an actual weapon) and to evaluate the effects of aging on the nuclear weapons remaining in the greatly reduced stockpile. The information that comes from these types of tests and experiments cannot be obtained in any other way.

DOE's existing capability to obtain diagnostic information was designed and implemented at a time when the Agency could rely on direct observations of the results of underground nuclear tests to provide definitive answers to questions regarding nuclear weapons performance. Without the ability to verify weapons performance through nuclear tests, some remaining diagnostic tools are inadequate by themselves to provide sufficient information. Accordingly, as the Nation moves away from nuclear testing DOE must enhance its capability to use other tools to predict weapons safety, performance, and reliability. In particular, DOE must enhance its capability to perform hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments to assess the condition and behavior of nuclear weapons primaries.

Although the current U.S. stockpile is considered to be safe and reliable, the existing weapons are aging beyond their initial design lifetimes and, by the turn of the century, the average age of the stockpile will be older than at any time in the past. To ensure continued confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, DOE needs to improve its radiographic hydrodynamic testing capability as soon as possible. Uncertainty in the behavior of the aging weapons in the enduring stockpile will continue to increase with the passage of time because existing testing techniques, by themselves, are not adequate to assess the safety, performance, and reliability of the weapons primaries. Should DOE need to repair or replace any age-affected components, retrofit existing weapons, or apply new technologies to existing weapons, existing techniques are not adequate to assure weapons safety and reliability. In an era without nuclear testing DOE believes that it is probable that the existing weapons will require these types of repairs or retrofits in the foreseeable future. DOE has determined that no other currently available advanced techniques exist that could provide a level of information regarding nuclear weapons primaries comparable to that which could be obtained from enhanced radiographic hydrodynamic testing.

In addition to weapons work, DOE uses its radiographic testing facilities to support many other science missions and needs to maintain or improve its radiographic testing capability for this purpose. Hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments are important tools for evaluating conventional munitions; for studying hydrodynamics, materials physics, and high-speed impact phenomena; and for assessing and developing techniques for disabling weapons produced by outside interests.

Along with other stockpile stewardship responsibilities, DOE has assigned a hydrodynamic testing mission to its two nuclear weapons physics laboratories, LANL and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The Pulsed High Energy Radiation Machine Emitting X-Rays (PHERMEX) is the existing radiographic hydrodynamic testing facility at LANL and the Flash X-Ray (FXR) is the existing radiographic hydrodynamic testing facility at Site 300 at LLNL.

PHERMEX has been in continuous operation since 1963. In addition to major, full-scale hydrodynamic tests, PHERMEX is used for smaller types of experiments, such as high-explosive tests or tests requiring static radiographs. Although PHERMEX was state of the art in the 1950s when it was designed, it is no longer adequate. It cannot provide the degree of resolution, intensity, rapid time sequencing, or three-dimensional views that are needed to provide answers to current questions regarding weapons condition or performance. Even if this type of diagnostic information were not needed, PHERMEX might not remain a viable test facility over an extended time because of anticipated increasing difficulty in maintaining the facility.

FXR has been in continuous operation since 1983; it is DOE's most advanced radiographic hydrodynamic testing facility. Although FXR uses linear induction accelerator technology for high-speed radiography, it cannot provide the degree of resolution, intensity, or three-dimensional views needed to address current questions. Additionally, DOE does not perform dynamic experiments with plutonium at LLNL because the necessary infrastructure is not in place. Neither PHERMEX nor FXR is adequate to provide the enhanced radiographic hydrodynamic testing capability that DOE now needs in the absence of nuclear weapons testing.

The Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility is proposed by DOE to acquire enhanced radiographic hydrodynamic testing capability. The DARHT Facility would consist of a new accelerator building with two accelerator halls, a firing point, and the associated support and diagnostic facilities. The firing point would be at the juncture of the x-ray beams produced by two electron beam accelerators oriented at right angles to each other to provide dual-axis, line-of-site radiographs. Construction of the DARHT Facility is about 34 percent complete, having been started under earlier environmental documentation. Construction is currently stopped under a U.S. District Court preliminary injunction issued on January 27, 1995, pending completion of this EIS and issuance of the Record of Decision.

DOE plans two other National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) reviews regarding proposed actions at LANL related to the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility EIS _ the LANL Sitewide Environmental Impact Statement (SWEIS) and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS).

PROPOSED ACTION AND ALTERNATIVES

DOE is proposing to provide enhanced high-resolution radiographic capability to perform hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments in support of the Department's historical mission and near-term stewardship of the nuclear weapons stockpile. This EIS analyzes the following alternatives:

_ No Action Alternative: DOE would continue to use PHERMEX at LANL and the FXR at LLNL in support of its stockpile stewardship mission. Construction of the DARHT Facility would not be completed although the building would be completed for other uses. In the future, DOE may perform some dynamic experiments with plutonium; these would be conducted in double-walled containment vessels.

_ DARHT Baseline Alternative: DOE would complete and operate the DARHT Facility and phase out operations at PHERMEX. DOE may delay operation of the second axis of DARHT until the accele-rator equipment in the first axis is tested and proven. In the future, DOE may perform some dynamic experiments with plutonium; these would be conducted in double-walled containment vessels.

_ Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative: Construction of the DARHT Facility would not be completed although the building would be completed and put to other uses. Major upgrades would be constructed at PHERMEX, and the high-resolution radiographic technology planned for DARHT would be installed at PHERMEX, including a second accelerator for two-axis imaging. In the future, DOE may perform some dynamic experiments with plutonium; these would be conducted in double-walled containment vessels.

_ Enhanced Containment Alternative: Three options are considered under this alternative: 1) the Vessel Containment Option, 2) the Building Containment Option, and 3) the Phased Containment Option (preferred alternative). This alternative is similar to the DARHT Baseline Alternative except that most or all tests would be conducted in a containment vessel or containment structure. All tests would be contained if a containment structure were used. In the future, DOE may perform some dynamic experiments with plutonium; these would be conducted in double-walled containment vessels.

_ Plutonium Exclusion Alternative: This alternative is similar to the DARHT Baseline Alternative except that plutonium would not be used in any of the experiments at DARHT. In the future, DOE may perform some dynamic experiments with plutonium. Those involving radiography would be conducted at PHERMEX and would be conducted in double-walled containment vessels.

_ Single Axis Alternative: This alternative is similar to the DARHT Baseline Alternative except that only one accelerator hall at DARHT would be completed and operated for hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments. The other hall would be completed for other uses. In the future, DOE may perform some dynamic experiments with plutonium; these would be conducted in double-walled containment vessels.

AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT

LANL occupies an area of approximately 28,000 ac (11,300 ha) on the Pajarito Plateau, in Los Alamos County in north central New Mexico. The alternatives analyzed (including no action) would all occur within Area III of Technical Area 15 situated in the south central portion of LANL, an area that has been dedicated to high explosives testing for over 50 years. The PHERMEX site and the DARHT site are about 1/2 mi apart and are ecologically similar, set in a ponderosa pine plant community. The only discriminators between the two sites are resources that are point-specific, such as specific archeological sites or specific existing facilities.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

The analyses in this EIS indicate that there would be very little difference in the environmental impacts among the alternatives analyzed. The major discriminator among alternatives would be potential impacts from depleted uranium contamination to soils and surface waters, which would be substantially less under the Enhanced Containment Alternative, and commitments of construction materials, which would be substantially greater under the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative. Also, there is a projected increase in the estimated worker dose from radioactive materials under all options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative. This is a result of a potential increase in worker exposure to radiation as a result of vessel or building cleanout operations. Potential impacts from the use of plutonium would be essentially identical under all alternatives, with an extremely unlikely or incredible accident having consequences of up to 12 latent cancer fatalities in the exposed population. All tests using plutonium would be conducted using double-walled steel containment vessels. Likewise, impacts from the three options examined under the Enhanced Containment Alternative are similar to one another and often similar to the other alternatives. The Phased Containment (preferred alternative) and Vessel Containment options contain elements of both of the uncontained alternatives and elements of the Building Containment Option (representing full containment). Typically, the Phased Containment and Vessel Containment options have impacts that are more like the Building Containment Option than the uncontained alternatives. In general, the impacts from accidents involving single-walled containment vessels would be higher than those for uncontained tests, because the releases are more concentrated and are closer to the ground. Table S-1 presents a comparison of the environmental consequences for all alternatives analyzed in this EIS based on the assessments contained in chapter 5 of this EIS. The table provides direct comparisons of expected consequences for each environmental factor for the alternatives.

REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

DOE has obtained operating permits for PHERMEX. The DARHT Facility (DARHT Baseline Alternative) has received septic tank permits, and cooling tower blowdown has been incorporated into the LANL Sitewide National Pollutant Discharge Elimination system permit. DOE has also received approval to construct from the Environmental Protection Agency under 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart A, regarding emissions of radionuclides from DOE facilities. Nonradioactive air emissions from DARHT would be covered by a LANL sitewide operating permit to be submitted to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) in late 1995. Emission of toxic air pollutants may require a permit from NMED. This is currently being evaluated. Permit modifications may be needed depending on the course of action selected in the Record of Decision.

DOE has consulted Federal, State, and Tribal agencies regarding wildlife habitat, threatened and endangered species, cultural resources protection, and other laws pertaining to Native American traditional use of land and resources. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service concurred with DOE that the construction and operation of DARHT would not be likely to adversely affect the Mexican spotted owl, a federally listed threatened species. DOE has committed to take appropriate mitigation measures to minimize impacts to cultural and natural resources; no adverse effects to cultural resources are expected.

Table S-1._Summary of the Potential Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives

Table S-1._Summary of the Potential Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives _ Continued

Table S-1._Summary of the Potential Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives _ Continued

Table S-1._Summary of the Potential Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives _ Continued

Table S-1._Summary of the Potential Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives _ Continued