CHAPTER 5
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
This chapter describes the potential environmental impacts associated with the various alternatives: _ No Action Alternative (status quo) _ DARHT Baseline Alternative [complete and operate the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility] _ Upgrade Alternative [upgrade the Pulsed High Energy Radiation Machine Emitting X-Rays (PHERMEX) Facility to DARHT capabilities] _ Enhanced Containment Alternative (operate the DARHT Facility with containment options) _ Vessel Containment Option _ Building Containment Option _ Phased Containment Option (preferred alternative) _ Plutonium Exclusion Alternative (no experiments with plutonium at the DARHT Facility) _ Single Axis Alternative (operate only one axis of the DARHT Facility). |
This chapter describes the potential environmental impacts, or changes, which would be expected to occur over the next 30 years if any of the alternatives analyzed in this EIS were implemented. Environmental impacts are described in terms of the various aspects of the affected environment which would be expected to change over time. The environmental impacts expected from the No Action Alternative are those associated with maintaining the status quo. The impacts from the No Action Alternative are discussed first to provide a basis of comparison for the impacts expected from the other alternatives. The environmental impacts that would be expected if any other alternative were to be implemented are described as a comparison to the impacts of No Action _ whether the impacts would be the same or different. The discussion in this chapter is augmented by the classified supplement for this EIS.
Aspects of the environment which would not be expected to be affected (changed) as a result of implementing any of the six alternatives analyzed are not discussed in this EIS. In most cases, impacts among the six alternatives are similar, and are cross-referenced but not repeated in detail. The analyses in this EIS indicate that there would be very little difference in the environmental impacts among the alternatives analyzed. The major discriminators among alternatives would be: 1) potential impacts from depleted uranium contamination to soils, which would be substantially less under the Enhanced Containment Alternative, and 2) commitments of construction materials, which would be substantially greater under the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative. A summary table of impacts is provided at the end of chapter 3 (table 3-3). The table provides direct comparisons of expected consequences for each environmental factor across the alternatives.
The evaluation of potential environmental impacts addresses those of the new Phased Containment Option, included under the Enhanced Containment Alternative. Other alternatives and options previously evaluated in the draft EIS encompass and bound potential impacts from the Phased Containment Option. The Phased Containment Option is identical to the Vessel Containment Option for most (20 years) of the 30-year planned operation period for DARHT.
Sums and products of numbers in the chapter may not appear consistent because of rounding. Unless otherwise stated, the word dose refers to the effective dose equivalent.
5.1 NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE
This section presents the expected environmental consequences associated with the No Action Alternative.
5.1.1 Land Resources
5.1.1.1 Land Use
Continued dedication of about 11 ac (4 ha) in Technical Area (TA) 15 of the 28,000-ac (11,300-ha) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) site for use of the PHERMEX Facility and 8 ac (3 ha) previously disturbed for DARHT construction would be consistent with current and past land uses at LANL and would have no reasonably foreseeable impact on established local land-use patterns.
5.1.1.2 Visual Resources
The PHERMEX Facility is an unobtrusive facility located in an isolated piñon/ponderosa pine forest area and is not accessible or readily visible from offsite; therefore, its continued use would have no impact on visual resources.
5.1.1.3 Regional Recreation
Although a variety of recreational opportunities are offered in the vicinity of LANL, only those individuals in areas relatively near TA-15 might be negatively impacted on occasion by noise associated with uncontained test firings at the PHERMEX site. Otherwise, no impacts on regional recreation would be expected.
5.1.2 Air Quality and Noise
Impacts on nonradiological air quality and the potential for noise impacts associated with the No Action Alternative of continued operation of PHERMEX are discussed in this section.
5.1.2.1 Air Quality
Air quality impacts in this section are presented for the maximally impacted point of unrestricted public access. These impacts were determined using methods described in appendix C, Air Quality and Noise.
5.1.2.1.1 Construction
Under the No Action Alternative, construction of the DARHT Facility would not be completed for its intended use. However, the structure would be completed in some fashion for other uses. It was assumed that any alternate construction activities would be less extensive and have no more than one-half of the potential air quality impacts of those for the DARHT Baseline Alternative. Air quality impacts from construction under the DARHT Baseline Alternative are presented in section 5.2.2.1.1. Construction impacts of the alternatives on air quality are compared in table 3-3.
5.1.2.1.2 Operations
Pollutant emissions are primarily from hydrodynamic testing, in particular, the detonation of high-explosive materials and suspension of associated test materials. High explosives would emit NO2 and particulate matter (all of the aerosolized material is assumed to be respirable, i.e., classed as PM10). The explosives used in testing do not contain sulfur compounds; however, minor amounts of SO2 would be released from diesel-powered forklifts or other equipment used in setting up the tests. Estimates of air quality impacts from operations are provided in table 5-1. The standards for NO2 and SO2 are adjusted for elevation, based on the New Mexico Air Pollution Control Bureau Dispersion Modeling Guidelines. This adjustment provides an extra measure of conservatism.
Table 5-1._Impacts on Air Quality from Operations under
the No Action Alternative
Pollutant |
Averaging Time |
Concentration at Maximally Impacted Point of Unrestricted Public Access (_g/m3) |
Percent of Regulatory Limita |
|
NO2 |
Annual 24-h |
0.004 2 |
0.06 1.4 |
PM10 |
Annual 24-h |
0.01 3.3 |
0.02 2.2 |
SO2 |
Annual 24-h 3-h |
2 x 10-4 0.006 0.03 |
0.0005 0.003 0.003 |
Beryllium |
30 days |
5 x 10-6 |
0.00005 |
Heavy Metalsb |
30 days |
5 x 10-4 |
0.005 |
Lead |
Calendar Quarter |
2 x 10-5 |
0.001 |
|
a Uses the applicable regulatory limit shown in Table 4.3. b Sum of the air concentration of uranium and lead. Note: Applies to all alternatives except the Enhanced Containment Alternative. Includes impacts from hydrodynamic testing and boiler emissions. NO2 and PM10 are from hydrodynamic testing and boiler emissions. SO2 is from boiler emissions. Beryllium, heavy metals, and lead are from hydrodynamic testing. | |||
The annual usage of depleted uranium, lead, and beryllium are shown in table 3-4 and were assumed to be 1,540 lb (700 kg), 30 lb (15 kg), and 20 lb (10 kg), respectively. Twenty-five percent of this inventory was assumed to be released during the 30-day averaging time for beryllium and heavy metals, and 50 percent was assumed released during the calendar quarter averaging time for lead. Analysis assumptions are shown in appendix C, table C1-8. Concentrations of beryllium and heavy metals are regulated by the New Mexico Ambient Air Quality Standards, and concentrations of lead are regulated under the National Ambient Air Quality Standard. Average concentrations of these metals and the fraction of the applicable standards are shown in table 5-1. The ambient air concentrations for uranium, lead, and beryllium are for the maximally exposed individual (MEI) located 0.9 mi (1.5 km) southwest of the site. Impacts on ambient air from testing operations are considered minor. See table 4-3 for a listing of the nonradiological ambient air quality standards.
Increases in the annual concentrations of NO2 and PM10 over ambient would be small; concentrations of these pollutants would remain well within the applicable standards. Maximum offsite 24-h PM10 concentration would be on the order of the average ambient air concentration of PM10, but the combination of the two (PHERMEX-related concentration plus ambient air concentration) would be less than five percent of the most stringent air quality standard.
Although the accelerator is pulsed about 25,000 times per year, the duration of the pulse is about 200 nsec. Hence, the total operating time would be about 5 thousandths of a second per year, suggesting that formation of ozone would be negligible.
Waste wood from the platforms used to support the experiments is taken to TA-36 for disposal in an open burn permitted by the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED). This wood is potentially contaminated with high explosives and/or depleted uranium. Dose dispersion calculations performed in support of the permit application estimated the effective dose equivalent at the nearest resident of 1 x 10-8 rem to 3 x 10-8 rem (DOE 1993). The NMED Air Quality Bureau concluded that there would be no health effects from this source (NMED 1993).
Other radiological impacts on air quality are described in section 5.1.8, Human Health.
5.1.2.2 Noise
Noise predictions were based on measurements made March 11, 1995, during a series of test explosions designed to investigate noise and shock wave behavior. Uncontained hydrodynamic testing, using high explosives similar to those used in the past at PHERMEX [150 lb (70 kg) maximum] would not exceed daytime standards for noise at nearby locations, such as Los Alamos or White Rock (appendix C, Air Quality and Noise). To be within Los Alamos County residential noise guidelines, propagated levels between 65 and 75 dBA are prohibited to exceed a duration of 10 min for a given hour between 7:00 am and 9:00 pm. Operating procedures and safety concerns limit the number of detonations to no more than three in one hour period; hence, it is not possible to exceed this limit. Noise exceeding 75 dBA is not permitted. However, because blast noise is sensitive to meteorological conditions, peak daytime standards of 75 dBA may be exceeded for large tests under unfavorable weather conditions, particularly at the ranger residence at Bandelier National Monument. For other than small tests close to the facility, nighttime standards (53 dBA) probably would be exceeded.
The general good health and abundance of wildlife in the Bandelier National Monument and on the LANL site indicate no impact on populations of wildlife from operations at the site. However, during the previously mentioned tests, browsing mule deer exhibited a startle and flight response on the first test, indicating that wildlife have not become indifferent to firing noise. On the other hand, birds did not appear to be disturbed by the noise.
Worker protection from noise would be provided in the form of ear muffs or ear plugs depending on the expected noise levels associated with PHERMEX activities.
Because of the limited amount of vehicular traffic associated with the operation of PHERMEX, traffic would not be a significant source of additional noise. Vehicular noise is exempted from Los Alamos County noise regulations.
5.1.3 Geology and Soils
Impacts of the No Action Alternative on geology and soils are described in the following subsections.
5.1.3.1 Geology
Continued operation of the PHERMEX facility would incur no new geologic hazards. PHERMEX has more than 30 years of operations history without site stability problems (see section 4.3.4, Site Stability).
5.1.3.2 Seismic
Seismically induced rockfalls could occur at the mesa rims, but the annual probability for earthquakes is low, and the PHERMEX facility has sufficient setback from the mesa rim to be unaffected by these rockfalls during its design life (see section 4.3.4, Site Stability). Vibratory ground motion resulting from the detonation of high explosives is small, in general, being less than the ground motion pulse caused by the air wave from the same detonation.
Although seismic events damaging buildings would have an impact on mission goals, no scenarios were identified wherein a seismic event could trigger an action at the PHERMEX Facility that would result in any offsite environmental impacts.
5.1.3.3 Soils
Operating PHERMEX for an additional 30 years at a moderately higher level of testing, as compared to that of the last 32 years, would result in soil contamination levels approximately double those observed today at PHERMEX. Under the No Action Alternative, maximum average depleted uranium soil contamination in the vicinity of the firing point is not anticipated to be greater than about 9,000 ppm uranium after 30 more years of operation (see appendix D.6). The present PHERMEX firing site has a soils contamination circle around the firing point of about a 460-ft (140-m) radius. Inside this circle, soils are at or above the background concentration for uranium; outside this circle, soils exhibit background concentrations. Because the variety and magnitude of explosive charges to be used in future tests will resemble those previously tested at PHERMEX, the area around the firing point where soils would exhibit uranium concentrations above background is anticipated to remain approximately the same, i.e., a circle with a 460-ft (140-m) radius. The area of land contaminated above background would be about 15 ac (6 ha). Soils sampling has shown that beryllium and lead contamination falls to background levels much closer to the firing point than uranium contamination. Thus, the soil contamination circle defined for uranium would apply to the other metals of interest. Concentrations of metal contaminants in sediments within drainage channels may approximately double; however, depleted uranium concentrations have been observed to significantly decrease with increasing distance from the firing point. Contaminants within the soil contamination circle would be available for migration in surface runoff to the canyons and deep drainage through the mesa.
5.1.4 Water Resources
Water resources examined for impact in the No Action Alternative are:
_ Surface water and sediment in Potrillo and Water canyons, which discharge into the Rio Grande
_ The main aquifer underlying Threemile Mesa
The water quality of surface water entering the discharge sink in Potrillo Canyon (see appendix E3) is assumed to be an estimate of the quality of water that may ultimately recharge the main aquifer from this area. Stream losses to the bed of Water Canyon are analyzed for their potential to migrate through the vadose zone to the main aquifer. Infiltration is examined for its ability to carry metals in solution into the mesa top at the firing point and communicate contaminants through the unsaturated zone to the main aquifer. Supporting information on deep drainage, the geochemistry of metals in LANL waters and sediments, surface water modeling, and vadose zone and ground water modeling as applied in this EIS can be found in appendix E.
A combination of data review and geochemical analysis was used to determine the solubility and sorption characteristics of several metals in the LANL water and soil/sediment environment (see appendix E2). Because they represent the largest fraction of expended materials in the tests to be conducted, depleted uranium, beryllium, lead, copper, and aluminum were all studied. The study revealed that a realistic value of solubility for beryllium in LANL waters was at its drinking water standard of 4 _g/L [40 CFR 141.62]. A realistic value for lead solubility in LANL waters was at its maximum concentration level (MCL) of 50 _g/L [40 CFR 141.11] and approximately a factor of three above its action level of 15 _g/L [40 CFR 141.80]. Values of solubility for both copper and aluminum were both found to be substantially below their secondary drinking water standards. Thus, while the analysis examines the migration of beryllium and lead to gain insight into their migration and behavior in the environment, there is no need to simulate beryllium, copper, or aluminum. The solubility of uranium in LANL waters appeared to be substantially above its proposed MCL value, and therefore its migration was modeled to estimate impact on the water resource.
5.1.4.1 Surface Water
The hydrology-sediment-contaminant transport modeling procedure described in appendix E3 was applied to assess the potential impacts of the No Action Alternative. In this alternative, the transport by surface runoff during the past 32 years for releases of depleted uranium, beryllium, and lead and for releases during the next 30 years from the PHERMEX site was analyzed. Table 5-2 shows the simulated peak concentration of contaminants in the infiltrated water at the discharge sink in Potrillo Canyon and at Water Canyon channels below the source. Details of the analysis and the treatment of runoff, storm water, and cooling water blowdown discharge at the DARHT site are described in appendix E3.
Table 5-2._Contaminant Concentrations and Time-to-peak for the No Action Alternative
Table 5-3._Peak Input Concentrations under No Action Alternative to Water Canyon Reaches
and Threemile Mesa Predicted by Surface Runoff-sediment-contaminant Transport Model
Because of their low solubility, the concentrations of beryllium and lead reach a plateau in their release to Potrillo and Water Canyons but still remain well below drinking water standards. Drinking water standards for beryllium and lead are 4 and 15 _g/L, respectively. Depleted uranium has a relatively high solubility in LANL surface and ground waters. While releases of depleted uranium to the discharge sink of Potrillo Canyon are an order-of-magnitude below the proposed MCL (20 _g/L), simulations reveal that concentrations of depleted uranium in surface waters released to Water Canyon immediately below PHERMEX could be slightly above the proposed MCL. The Rio Grande is the nearest off-LANL access point for surface water carrying contamination from the firing point. As shown in table 5-2, the quality of surface water entering the Rio Grande is forecast to be more than an order-of-magnitude below the drinking water standard for uranium and several orders-of-magnitude below the drinking water standards for beryllium and lead.
5.1.4.2 Ground Water
Two analyses of depleted uranium, beryllium, and lead migration were conducted. Stream losses into the bed of Water Canyon were analyzed to estimate the migration of contaminants through the vadose zone to the main aquifer. Similarly, infiltration carrying metal in solution into the mesa top at the PHERMEX firing point was analyzed to estimate contaminant migration to the main aquifer.
The peak concentrations of contaminants in infiltration to Threemile Mesa and in surface water losses from the uppermost reach of Water Canyon opposite the PHERMEX facility are shown in table 5-3. For those cases where the drinking water standards (shown in bold) are exceeded, analyses are necessary. Only three cases must be modeled: depleted uranium in the uppermost reach of Water Canyon and depleted uranium and lead on the mesa top at the firing point. However, all releases of beryllium and lead were analyzed to better understand the influence of dispersion and sorption on the migration of these and less mobile metals.
Analysis of depleted uranium migration through the vadose zone arising from releases to the stream bed of Water Canyon showed a peak concentration of about 0.02 _g/L after nearly 20,000 years in soil water being delivered to the main aquifer. Simulation of depleted uranium migration through the mesa to the main aquifer showed a peak concentration of about 150 _g/L after approximately 40,000 years. Water Canyon stream losses yield soil water entering the main aquifer at concentrations well below the proposed MCL for uranium (20 _g/L); however, releases from the firing point on the mesa top yield soil water concentrations approximately eight times the MCL. Simulation of lead migration through the mesa to the main aquifer showed a peak concentration of 26 _g/L in soil water entering the aquifer, nearly double the drinking water standard. Upon entering the main aquifer, the small-scale and low-volume releases from the mesa top would be dispersed in the aquifer and further mixed either with ground water (if it were recovered in the municipal water supply well), or with the waters of the Rio Grande. The average yield of the Pajarito Field wells of 2.7 ft3/s (7.7 x 10-2 m3/s) is assumed to be representative of a water supply well which could be developed in the vicinity of Threemile Mesa (see appendix E4). The total flow rate of contaminated water from the mesa top firing point would be 1.1 x 10-3 ft3/s (3.2 x 10-5 m3/s). This gives a concentration reduction factor greater than 2,000, more than sufficient to reduce the concentrations of depleted uranium and lead in municipal water supplies to levels well below the drinking water standards. Based on the average annual flow rate of the Rio Grande [~1,500 ft3/s (~42 m3/s) at Otowi], the reduction factor would be even greater for ground water release to the Rio Grande.
Both beryllium and lead releases to the stream bed of Water Canyon and the mesa were analyzed for migration to the main aquifer. The quality of surface water infiltrating the stream bed and mesa is initially below drinking water standards for both these metals (i.e., 4 and 15 _g/L respectively); therefore, releases to the main aquifer will be well below the drinking water standards after undergoing dispersion and sorption in the vadose zone. After 100,000 years in the canyon, beryllium release is less than 0.001 _g/L, and the lead release is less than 1.0 x 10-5 _g/L. From the mesa, the beryllium release is less than 4 _g/L.
Releases to the ground water pathway from operation under the No Action Alternative would not adversely impact ground water quality.
5.1.5 Biotic Resources
Biotic resources examined for impact in the No Action Alternative include terrestrial resources, wetlands, aquatic resources, and threatened and endangered species.
5.1.5.1 Terrestrial Resources
Both construction and operation impacts were evaluated for terrestrial resources.
5.1.5.1.1 Construction Impacts
Under the No Action Alternative, no further construction-related impacts to terrestrial biological resources would be expected at the PHERMEX or DARHT sites. Impacts for small and large mammals and birds would continue from construction that has already altered approximately 8 ac (3 ha) of piñon-juniper/ponderosa pine habitat (Risberg 1995). Further losses of habitat and harassment to biota from noise and human activities would not occur. Populations of plants and animals from surrounding areas may reinvade the site and colonize those parts of the site that provide habitat. Habitat destruction has already caused small mammals formerly occurring there to disperse into similar surrounding habitat. Some small losses may have occurred due to increased vulnerability to predation or absence of suitable habitat. It is not known if the increased density of small mammals resulting from this emigration would have any impacts on populations already inhabiting the surrounding area. There likely would have been a population readjustment based on habitat availability.
5.1.5.1.2 Operation Impacts
Test fragments originating from continued use of PHERMEX are highly unlikely to further impact terrestrial biota; however, tests often start grass fires. These fires are quickly controlled by the firefighters who are stationed outside the exclusion fence at the time of the tests. However, some disturbance, and possibly mortality, with respect to some individual plants and animals might occur. Confirmed nesting sites and hunting areas for the red-tailed hawk and the Cooper's hawk have been documented in the PHERMEX site vicinity; other raptors, such as the American kestrel, the flammulated owl, and the great-horned owl use the area. Although not listed as threatened or endangered, these species are protected from collection and maiming under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (Risberg 1995). No additional impacts to these species are expected under this alternative.
The concentration of depleted uranium and metals in the soil and plants is expected to remain negligible. Consequently, no additional impacts to biotic resources due to biological uptake of these substances is expected to occur under this alternative.
5.1.5.2 Wetlands
Although floodplains lie at the bottom of Potrillo Canyon and Cañon de Valle, no wetlands lie within TA-15; thus, no impacts to wetlands would occur (Risberg 1995).
5.1.5.3 Aquatic Resources
No additional impacts to the aquatic resources located within the canyons surrounding TA-15 are expected.
5.1.5.4 Threatened and Endangered Species
It is unlikely that ongoing activities at PHERMEX would change the attractiveness of the area for potential use by threatened or endangered species. The concentration of depleted uranium and metals in prey or food of threatened and endangered species is expected to remain negligible. Ingestion of these substances is not expected to have any consequences to these populations. Ongoing activities should have no adverse impacts to the nesting Mexican spotted owls in the vicinity.
5.1.6 Cultural and Paleontological Resources
Impacts on cultural and paleontological resources from the No Action Alternative are described in the following subsections.
5.1.6.1 Archeological Resources
Continuation of normal operations of the PHERMEX Facility would not change any direct or indirect impacts on known archeological sites eligible for the National Register. Debris from 30 years of testing at PHERMEX is observable in the immediate vicinity of archeological sites, especially those sites within the 490-ft (150-m) blast radius. This debris, however, has not changed the research potential of any of the identified archeological sites. As stated, an additional archeological survey is under way in those areas unsurveyed. A minimal number of new archeological sites is expected to be found as a result of this survey, but any new sites would be expected to be similar in nature to those already recorded. Impacts to any new sites are therefore expected to be the same as for the sites previously identified.
Seismic tests conducted on March 11, 1995 (Vibronics 1995) indicated that potential impacts due to the air waves is a greater concern than vibratory ground motion. An explosion of 150 lb of TNT at PHERMEX would give an overpressure of 0.02 psi (12 kg/m2) at Nake'muu. This overpressure, 0.02 psi (12 kg/m2), is approximately one-tenth the amount for window breakage and would not affect the standing walls at Nake'muu (DOE 1992, table D.4-4).
5.1.6.2 Historical Resources
No direct or indirect impacts on historic structures are anticipated.
5.1.6.3 Native American Resources
There would be essentially no impacts on Native American cultural resources.
5.1.6.4 Paleontological Resources
Because of the nature of the soil and geological substrate, the occurrence of paleontological resources is not anticipated; no potential effects are postulated.
5.1.7 Socioeconomics and Community Services
Environmental impacts on socioeconomics and community services for the No Action Alternative are presented in the following subsections.
5.1.7.1 Demographic Characteristics
The No Action Alternative would not stimulate any change in the existing demographic characteristics of communities within the region-of-interest, as described in section 4.7.1.
5.1.7.2 Economic Activities
The No Action Alternative is not expected to have a significant impact on the level of economic activity in the region-of-interest. Under this alternative, the PHERMEX facility would continue operations while DARHT-related capital funding would be phased out during FY 1995 and FY 1997, as indicated in
Table 5-4._Capital-funded Construction and Operating Costs
for the No Action Alternative (in millions of 1995 dollars)
Year/Cost |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
Total |
Capital |
6.6 |
5.8 |
1.0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13.4 |
Operations and Maintenance |
4.2 |
4.1 |
4.1 |
4.0 |
4.0 |
3.9 |
3.9 |
3.9 |
32.2 |
table 5-4. Under the No Action Alternative, the DARHT Facility, which is currently 34 percent complete and under a stop-work court injunction, would be completed for some other use. This construction will not disturb any additional area, but does represent economic activity under the alternative. The funding of PHERMEX operations would continue to support a variety of personnel, including operations support staff, physics support staff, security clearance staff, and a firing crew. The operations funding also covers the costs of facility scheduling, facility space tax, and safety and environmental compliance.
The underlying cost data in table 5-4 were provided by LANL (Burns 1995a; Burns 1995b). The costs do not include any expenses associated with site cleanup, nor do they include any decontamination or decommissioning costs associated with either the proposed DARHT or PHERMEX facilities. The construction and operations costs were adjusted for future price escalation based on the escalation price change index for U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) defense-related construction projects (Pearman 1994; Anderson 1995). A discussion of the analytical model, assumptions, and procedures underlying the economic impact analysis of the various DARHT alternatives relative to the No Action Alternative is provided in appendix G, Socioeconomic Environment.
5.1.7.3 Community Infrastructure and Services
The existing community infrastructure in the region-of-interest under the No Action Alternative would be the same as described in section 4.7.3. No significant change in the existing community infrastructure under the No Action Alternative is expected.
5.1.7.4 Environmental Justice
No significant adverse environmental impacts are identified with the continued operation of the PHERMEX Facility. Specifically, these environmental impacts include offsite air emissions and noise caused by the detonation of high explosives (section 5.1.2) and surface or underground water contamination (section 5.1.4). Also, no significant human health impacts appear to exist from either the release of radioactive or hazardous material or from exposing receptors onsite (workers) or offsite (section 5.1.8). Continued PHERMEX Facility operations would have no known disproportionate adverse health or environmental impact on minority or low-income populations in the region-of-interest [populations residing within 50 mi (80 km) of the site].
5.1.8 Human Health
This section presents the impacts to the health of the public and workers from routine operations that would be conducted at the PHERMEX Facility under the No Action Alternative. Impacts may potentially result from routine release and atmospheric transport of radioactive and hazardous material from the facility firing site as a result of planned detonations. Detailed results and methods and assumptions used in calculating potential impacts are described in appendix H, Human Health.
Radiological impacts may result from exposure to depleted uranium and tritium released to the atmosphere from detonations at the PHERMEX site. Depleted uranium would be the principal contributor to radiation dose; tritium would contribute about 1 x 10-7 the dose of depleted uranium for chronic releases. The major exposure pathway would be inhalation of material released to the atmosphere, which would contribute more than 99 percent of the dose. Potential human health impacts may be over-estimated by a factor of 100 because of the simplified, elevated point-source atmospheric dispersion model used, rather than an explosive atmospheric dispersion model (see appendix H, Human Health).
DOE plans to perform dynamic experiments that would involve high-explosive driven mixtures of plutonium isotopes and alloys, which would be chosen for the purposes of the experiment. DOE has analyzed the impacts of dynamic experiments with plutonium that would be expected to occur under all six alternatives analyzed in the DARHT EIS. All such experiments would be conducted inside double-walled steel containment vessels. All experiments would be arranged and conducted in a manner such that a nuclear explosion could not result.
5.1.8.1 Public
Potential impacts to the MEI were evaluated at three locations in the vicinity of the PHERMEX site: Los Alamos, White Rock, and Bandelier. These locations are representative of the neighboring residential clusters in close proximity to LANL. Potential impacts to the surrounding population were also calculated. Potential radiological and nonradiological impacts are presented in the sections below.
5.1.8.1.1 Radiological Impacts
The maximum annual radiation dose to any nearby resident from routine operations would not exceed 2 x 10-5 rem EDE. Using a risk conversion factor of 5 x 10-4 latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) per person-rem for members of the public, the estimated maximum probability of a latent fatal cancer from this dose would be about 1 x 10-8. The estimated maximum cumulative dose to an individual over the anticipated 30-year life of the project would be about 7 x 10-4 rem. The estimated maximum probability of a latent cancer fatality from this dose would be about 4 x 10-7.
The annual collective dose to the population residing within 50 mi (80 km) of the PHERMEX site would be about 0.9 person-rem EDE. Latent cancer fatalities would not be expected among the population from this dose (5 x 10-4 LCFs). Over the 30-year operating lifetime, the population dose would be about 30 person-rem (1 x 10-2 LCFs).
The contribution from plutonium to the maximum annual individual dose would be about 2 x 10-10 rem over the 30-year lifetime of the project. The maximum probability of an LCF would be about 8 x 10-14. The contribution from plutonium to the population dose would be about 3 x 10-7 person-rem over the lifetime of the project. Latent cancer fatalities would not be expected (1 x 10-10 LCFs).
5.1.8.1.2 Nonradiological Impacts
Members of the public might also be exposed to heavy metals and other materials released during the detonation, including uranium, lead, beryllium, and lithium hydride. The maximum probability of a beryllium-induced cancer would be about 4 x 10-11. Toxicological effects from releases of uranium, beryllium, lead or lithium hydride would not be expected (maximum Hazard Index of 1 x 10-7). The cumulative probability of a beryllium-induced cancer over the anticipated 30-year life of the project would be about 1 x 10-9. The maximum Hazard Index expected in the first year immediately after 30 years of operations, accounting for any toxicological effects from buildup of hazardous material in soil, would not exceed 1 x 10-7. Toxicological effects would not be expected.
Cancer from exposure to beryllium released during a year of normal operations (total incidence of 4 x 10-7 cancers) would not be expected in the population in a 50-mile (80-km) radius.
5.1.8.2 Noninvolved Workers
A noninvolved worker is defined as a LANL employee who works in TA-15, but is not directly involved with the facility operations. This worker would be assumed to work continuously 2,500 ft (750 m) distant from the firing site. This distance would be based on a hazard radius that would typically be put in place for hydrodynamic testing. LANL implements this administrative exclusion area based on explosive safety principles (DOE 1994).
The annual dose to a nearby noninvolved worker would be 2 x 10-5 rem EDE. Using a risk conversion factor of 4 x 10-4 LCFs per person-rem for workers, the maximum probability of an LCF from such a dose would be about 9 x 10-9. Over the 30-year anticipated operating life of the facility, the same noninvolved worker's cumulative dose would be about 7 x 10-4 rem. The maximum cumulative probability of contracting a fatal cancer from this dose would be about 3 x 10-7.
A noninvolved worker could also be exposed to heavy metals and other materials released during the detonation, including uranium, lead, beryllium, and lithium hydride. The maximum probability of a beryllium-induced cancer would be about 3 x 10-11. Toxicological effects from releases of uranium, beryllium, lead, or lithium hydride would not be expected (maximum Hazard Index of 2 x 10-7). The probability of a beryllium-induced cancer over the anticipated 30-year life of the project would be about 9 x 10-10. The maximum Hazard Index expected after 30 years of operations, accounting for any toxicological effects from buildup of hazardous material in soil, would not exceed 1 x 10-7. Toxicological effects would not be expected.
The estimated dose to a noninvolved worker over the 30-year project life from hypothetical routine releases of plutonium would be 6 x 10-10 rem. The maximum probability of an LCF from such a dose would be about 2 x 10-13.
5.1.8.3 Workers
Average dose to workers at the facility was estimated to be no more than 0.01 rem EDE annually. The maximum probability of such a worker contracting a latent fatal cancer would be 4 x 10-6. Over the 30-year operating life of the facility, an involved worker's maximum probability of contracting a latent fatal cancer would be about 1 x 10-4. The annual collective worker dose was estimated to be about 0.3 person-rem/year. No LCFs would be expected among the worker population from this dose (1 x 10-4 LCFs). The cumulative worker dose over the anticipated 30-year life of the project would be about 9 person-rem. No LCFs would be expected among the worker population from this dose (4 x 10-3 LCFs). There would be no routine exposure to plutonium; therefore, these dose estimates include potential exposures to plutonium and were based on past PHERMEX operating experience. No operating information was available on exposure to chemicals or metals. The risks of exposure to these materials would be expected to be similarly low to those for radiation exposure.
Worker exposures to radiation and radioactive materials under normal operations would be controlled under established procedures that require doses to be kept as low as reasonably achievable. Any potential hazards would be evaluated as part of the radiation worker and occupational safety programs at LANL, and no impacts outside the scope of normal work activities would be anticipated.
5.1.9 Facility Accidents
This section presents the impacts from postulated facility accidents to members of the public, nearby noninvolved workers, and workers at the facility. The bounding accident evaluated under the No Action Alternative was the inadvertent detonation of a test assembly on the PHERMEX firing site. Accident initiation events are not addressed; instead, the accidents were evaluated on a "what if" basis even though the likelihood of occurrence is very small. More detailed results, identification of postulated facility accidents, and methods of analysis are described in greater detail in appendix I, Facility Accidents. Much of the technical basis for the health impact of the accident analysis is included in appendix H, Human Health. Transportation-related accidents are described in section 5.7, except for plutonium transportation accidents, which are included under accidental detonations below.
Radiological impacts may result from exposure to depleted uranium and tritium released from the PHERMEX site. Depleted uranium would be the principal contributor to radiation dose; tritium would contribute about 1 x 10-8 the dose of depleted uranium for acute releases. The major exposure pathway would be inhalation of material released to the atmosphere, which would contribute more than 99 percent of the dose. Potential human health impacts may be over estimated by a factor of 100 because of the simplified, elevated point-source atmospheric dispersion model used, rather than an explosive atmospheric dispersion model (see appendix H, Human Health).
In the past, DOE has conducted dynamic experiments at LANL with plutonium. Future experiments with plutonium would always be conducted in double-walled containment vessels, and these experiments could not reasonably be expected to result in any release of plutonium to the environment. However, for purposes of this EIS, health consequences of hypothetical accidental releases of plutonium have been estimated and are provided below and in appendix I. Potential health consequences of exposure to plutonium are well understood (Sutcliffe et al. 1995).
5.1.9.1 Public
Potential impacts to individual members of the public from accidents involving depleted uranium were evaluated for three nearby points of public access _ State Road 4, Pajarito Road, and the Bandelier National Monument. The MEI was located at the State Road 4 location, approximately 0.9 mi (1.5 km) southwest of the site. An individual at this location under the assumed accident and exposure conditions would receive a radiation dose of about 6 x 10-4 rem EDE. The maximum probability of an LCF from such a dose would be about 3 x 10-7. The maximum probability of a beryllium-induced cancer would be about 4 x 10-10. Toxicological effects would not be expected, as no more than 0.01 mg of any of the released constituents (uranium, beryllium, lead, lithium hydride) would be inhaled, and these inhalation intakes would be less than 0.1 percent of the applicable immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) equivalent intake values. Additional results are presented in appendix I, Facility Accidents.
Population impacts of acute accidental releases were evaluated for the direction that would result in the highest impact. Population in the maximally exposed, 22.5-degree sector (east through southeast) out to 50 mi (80 km) is about 50,000 (appendix H, Human Health, table H-6). The maximally exposed population sector in relation to distributions of minority and low-income populations within 30 mi (48 km) of DARHT is shown in Figures 5-1 and 5-2. Dose to the population in the maximally exposed direction (east-southeast) would be about 1.9 person-rem. Latent fatal cancers among the population would not be expected from this dose (9 x 10-4 LCFs). Cancer would not be expected among the population from exposure to beryllium (total incidence of 1 x 10-6 cancers).
Accidents involving plutonium were evaluated on a "what-if" basis, assuming the accident did occur without considering the very low probability of occurrence. It is important to note that any accidents involving plutonium would not be nuclear detonations, but rather detonations of the high explosive that could disperse particles of plutonium. Potential dose to an MEI of the public from accidental detonation of a plutonium-containing assembly was estimated to be about 76 rem. The maximum probability of an LCF from this dose would be about 0.04. Potential dose from a containment breach was estimated to be about 14 rem to the MEI. The maximum probability of an LCF from this dose would be about 0.007.
Population impacts of hypothetical acute releases of plutonium were evaluated using both 50th and 95th percentile atmospheric dispersion factors. Plume depletion due to natural settling and deposition processes and diffusion of released material across an entire exposed sector were considered. Dose in the maximally exposed sector from an accidental detonation was estimated to range from 9,000 to 24,000 person-rem. Latent cancer fatalities in the population would be expected to range from 5 to 12. Dose from a containment breach was estimated to range from 210 to 560 person-rem. No LCFs would be expected among the population from this dose (0.1 to 0.3 LCFs).
In addition to calculating the potential dose to the population in the hypothetical maximally-exposed sector, at the request of the State of New Mexico Environment Department and various American Indian pueblos, the potential dose to the populations of a number of individual communities in the vicinity of LANL were calculated. The communities included in this evaluation and the results of calculations are presented in appendix I.
5.1.9.2 Noninvolved Workers
For the bounding accident analysis, a noninvolved worker was assumed to be outside the facility hazard radius, at a distance of 2,500 ft (750 m), and exposed to the plume of material released from the detonation during the entire period of passage. This distance was based on a hazard radius that would typically be put in place for hydrodynamic tests. LANL implements this administrative exclusion area based on explosive safety principles (DOE 1994). This worker would receive a radiation dose of about 7 x 10-4 rem EDE. The maximum probability of LCF from this dose would be about 3 x 10-7. The maximum probability of a beryllium-induced cancer would be about 5 x 10-10. Toxicological effects would not be expected, as no more than 3.5 x 10-7 oz (0.01 mg) of any of the released constituents (uranium, beryllium, lead, lithium hydride) would be inhaled, and these inhalation intakes would be less than 0.1 percent of the applicable IDLH equivalent intake values. Additional results are presented in appendix I, Facility Accidents.
Potential impacts to noninvolved workers from hypothetical accidents involving plutonium were evaluated at 2,500 ft (750 m) and 1,300 ft (400 m) from both the inadvertent detonation and containment breach accidents. Potential impacts from the inadvertent detonation were estimated to be 90 rem and 160 rem at 2,500 ft (750 m) and 1,300 ft (400 m), respectively, with corresponding maximum probabilities of LCFs from these doses of 0.04 and 0.06. Potential impacts from the containment breach were estimated to be 20 rem and 60 rem at 2,500 ft (750 m) and 1,300 ft (400 m), respectively, with corresponding maximum probabilities of LCFs from these doses of 0.09 and 0.02. These are substantially less than the potential impacts to the public because the plutonium would largely disperse up and over noninvolved workers.
5.1.9.3 Workers
Workers may be subject to explosive, radiological, chemical, and industrial hazards while working at the PHERMEX Facility. These hazards are typically expected within normal industrial or laboratory workplaces and are controlled by worker protection programs in place at LANL. High explosives and radioactive material are not allowed in PHERMEX; therefore, only ordinary industrial and laboratory hazards are present inside the PHERMEX Facility. The firing site is where accidents outside the scope of normal industrial or laboratory accidents (that is, those involving high explosives and direct exposure to high levels of ionizing radiation) might occur.
Accidents on the PHERMEX firing site could range from those with trivial consequences to those that could be fatal to involved workers. Of greatest consequence would be the inadvertent detonation of high explosives on the firing site when workers are present, which, if it were to occur, might result in up to 15 worker fatalities. This accident is considered unlikely because of comprehensive training requirements, strict procedural control, physical interlocks and control of the fireset (detonating equipment), and limited personnel access. In the late 1950s, an explosives accident resulted in the deaths of four LANL workers (not associated with PHERMEX operations). That accident caused an extensive overhaul and upgrade of the explosive safety program. Since that accident, LANL has not experienced a high-explosive-related fatality, and such accidents are no longer considered reasonably foreseeable.
A possible second accident on the firing site with serious consequences outside the scope of ordinary industrial or laboratory hazards would be the direct exposure of a worker to the ionizing radiation pulse produced by the PHERMEX accelerator. Although this accident would be extremely unlikely, a worker could receive a very high acute radiation dose, delivered over a fraction of a microsecond, to a localized portion of the body. The potential for occurrence is reduced by physical lockout of accelerator controls when personnel are present on the firing site, high training requirements, strict procedural control, access control, and the fact that the accelerator beam pulse is very short-lived, lasting less than a microsecond. Direct exposure of workers to the accelerator beam has never occurred at LANL firing sites.
Impacts to workers from accidents involving plutonium would be essentially the same as those discussed above. An inadvertent detonation could result in up to 15 fatalities from blast effects, while no impacts would be expected from a containment breach, since all involved workers would be inside the facility and protected from material releases.
5.1.10 Waste Management
Wastes generated under the No Action Alternative would be subject to treatment, storage, and/or disposal in other LANL Technical Areas. Transportation of these wastes would be conducted following U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) guidelines and using DOE- or DOT-approved containers carried on government vehicles using public roads between LANL facilities, as needed.
Mixed waste would consist of depleted uranium contaminated with lead. The amount of mixed waste to be stored would be small and not expected to exceed one 55-gal (0.2-m3) drum or 220 lb (100 kg) per year. The volume of nonhazardous solid sanitary waste would be approximately one dumpster load per week.
During the two-year period from March 1992 through February 1994, the PHERMEX Facility disposed approximately 6,700 ft3 (190 m3) of low-level radioactive waste (LLW), representing up to four percent of the total LLW volume disposed at LANL during that period. Using depleted uranium usage as an indicator of overall program activity and LLW generation rates, estimates can be made of future waste generation levels. Since approximately 880 lb (400 kg) of depleted uranium were used at PHERMEX during this two-year period, approximately 1,800 ft3 (50 m3) LLW would be generated per 220 lb (100 kg) of depleted uranium used per year.
Yearly usage of depleted uranium under the No Action Alternative would be about 1,500 lb (700 kg). Applying the LLW generation rate of 1,800 ft3 (50 m3)/220 lb (100 kg), the estimated total LLW generated and disposed under the No Action Alternative would be about 12,500 ft3 (350 m3). The bulk of this waste would be the gravel and soil that is removed with the detonation debris. Total volume of waste generated would depend on the frequency of the firing-site detonations and periodic cleanup. Assuming the total LANL LLW disposal volume in future years will be 1.8 x 105 ft3 (5,000 m3)/yr (Bartlit et al. 1993), the No Action Alternative would contribute no more than seven percent of the total LANL LLW volume. (The LANL Sitewide EIS will address the near-term waste management matter at LANL. The long-term strategy for waste management throughout the DOE-complex, including LANL, will be analyzed in the Department's Draft Waste Management Programmatic EIS [DOE/EIS-0020D], to be released in September 1995.) Approximately 310 lb (140 kg) of solid hazardous waste and 2,500 lb (1,100 kg) of liquid hazardous waste would be disposed. This is based on estimated historical hazardous waste generation rates at the PHERMEX Facility of 220 lb (100 kg) of the solid hazardous waste and 1,800 lb (800 kg) of liquid hazardous waste disposed for every 1,100 lb (500 kg) of depleted uranium used in normal PHERMEX operations.
DOE estimates that up to two double-walled vessels per year would be used in support of the dynamic experiments involving plutonium that could be conducted at LANL. Two vessels would weigh approximately 26,000 lbs (11,820 kg); this steel may be contaminated to a level requiring handling and disposal as TRU waste. These vessels would either be cut into pieces for size reduction or disposed intact; however, the final waste configuration of the vessels has not been determined. The maximum volume of TRU waste would be equal to one TRUPACT-II container per year if the vessels are cut into pieces or two TRUPACT-II containers per year if the vessels are disposed intact.
5.1.11 Monitoring and Mitigation
5.1.11.1 Monitoring
Environmental monitoring currently performed at LANL would continue under the No Action Alternative. Existing stations for monitoring external penetrating radiation and radioactive and hazardous substances in air, water, soil, and sediment would be used to monitor the environmental impacts of the facility. Air-monitoring stations added in 1993 would serve as an enhanced air-monitoring network for the PHERMEX Facility.
5.1.11.2 Mitigation
Consequences of activities under the No Action Alternative were not considered to be of sufficient magnitude to warrant mitigation measures that would differ significantly from the measures currently applied as part of normal operations at PHERMEX. However, the DARHT Facility would be completed for other uses to be determined. Construction noise associated with the completion of the facility would be mitigated to minimize noise impacts on the surrounding environment as much as possible.
5.1.12 Decontamination and Decommissioning
After continued operations for an indefinite period, the PHERMEX facility would become a candidate for decommissioning. While a decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) plan and NEPA review would be conducted at that time, the activities and impacts associated with D&D can be summarized as:
_ Conversion of about 15,200 ft2 (1,400 m2) of office and laboratory space, or its demolition and disposal of the rubble as sanitary waste
_ Salvage of useable items of equipment, instruments, machined parts, etc. to other LANL uses
_ Characterization of wastes and treatment, storage and disposal of nonhazardous solid waste, hazardous, radioactive, and/or mixed wastes from the facilities and support equipment, containment vessels, and testing instrumentation
Nonhazardous solid waste would be expected to be disposed at the Los Alamos County landfill. Appreciable waste volumes could result if buildings are demolished. Radioactive wastes are expected to be disposed in Los Alamos low-level waste facilities; however, the volumes would be expected to be negligible compared to LANL annual low-level waste volumes.
Hazardous and mixed-waste disposal requirements are expected to not exceed two to five times the annual PHERMEX generation rates, the higher value reflecting negotiated cleanup levels meeting RCRA "clean closure" criteria. These wastes would be treated and disposed in accordance with LANL RCRA permit requirements. It is not determined at this time whether onsite or offsite disposal would be chosen. The quantities would not be expected to appreciably impact existing treatment or disposal capacities.
5.2 DARHT BASELINE ALTERNATIVE
This section presents the expected environmental consequences associated with the DARHT Baseline Alternative.
5.2.1 Land Resources
5.2.1.1 Land Use
Dedication (facility is already partially constructed) of about 8 ac (3 ha) in TA-15 of the 28,000-ac (11,300-ha) LANL site for completion of construction and operation of the DARHT Facility would be consistent with current and past land uses at LANL and would have no reasonably foreseeable impact on established local land-use patterns. The disposition of the 11 ac (4 ha) associated with PHERMEX is unknown at this time.
5.2.1.2 Visual Resources
The DARHT Facility, partially constructed, would be an unobtrusive facility located in an isolated piñon/ponderosa pine forest area and would not be accessible or readily visible from offsite; therefore, its use should have no impact on visual resources.
5.2.1.3 Regional Recreation
Although a variety of recreational opportunities are available in the vicinity of LANL, only those individuals in areas relatively near TA-15 might be negatively impacted (startled) on occasion by noise associated with uncontained test firings at the DARHT site. Otherwise, no impacts on regional recreation would be expected.
5.2.2 Air Quality and Noise
Impacts on nonradiological air quality and the potential for noise impacts associated with the DARHT Baseline Alternative are discussed in this section.
5.2.2.1 Air Quality
Air quality impacts for the DARHT Baseline Alternative in this section are presented for the maximally impacted point of unrestricted public access. These impacts were determined using methods described in appendix C, Air Quality and Noise.
5.2.2.1.1 Construction
Air quality impacts for the DARHT Baseline Alternative were evaluated for emissions during both construction and operation phases of DARHT. Construction activities would emit NO2, SO2, and respirable particulates (PM10). As a by-product of construction activities, PM10 would be emitted in the form of fugitive dust from moving earth. Table 5-5 presents air quality impacts from construction activities to complete the planned DARHT construction activities. It includes impacts from fugitive dust (PM10) and construction equipment emissions (NO2 and SO2). Section 3.3.6 provides additional discussion of prior impacts associated with DARHT construction.
Table 5-5._Impacts on Air Quality from Construction Activities
Pollutant |
Averaging Time |
Concentration at Maximally Impacted Point of Unrestricted Public Access (_g/m3) |
Percent of Regulatory Limita |
|
NO2 |
Annual 24-h |
0.04 4.8 |
0.06 3.3 |
PM10 |
Annual 24-h |
0.8 17 |
1.6 11 |
SO2 |
Annual 24-h 3-h |
0.003 0.3 22 |
0.007 0.1 2.2 |
|
a Uses the applicable regulatory limit shown in table 4-3. Note: These impacts from construction activities apply to all alternatives except the No Action Alternative, which is assumed to have impacts about one-half of those listed. PM10 is a measure of fugitive dust while SO2 and NO2 are construction equipment emissions. | |||
During the construction phase, the maximum offsite increases in ambient NO2, SO2, and PM10 from construction equipment would be very small, producing impacts well within the air quality standards. The offsite impact of fugitive dust emissions would also be small; the maximum increase in the 24-h average PM10 concentration would be about 10 percent of the Federal standard. The use of standard dust suppression measures would further lower projected impacts.
5.2.2.1.2 Operations
Impacts on air quality from routine operations in the DARHT Baseline Alternative would be substantially the same as in the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.2.1.2.
Although DOE estimates that the accelerators are pulsed about 25,000 times per year, the duration of the pulse is about 60 nsec. Hence, the total operating time would be less than about two thousandths of a second per year, suggesting that formation of ozone would be negligible. Even if the estimate of the number of pulses per year was low by a factor of ten, this conclusion would not change.
5.2.2.2 Noise
Noise in the DARHT Baseline Alternative would not be significantly different from that described for the No Action Alternative in section 5.1.2.2.
5.2.3 Geology and Soils
Impacts of the DARHT Baseline Alternative on geology and soils are described in the following subsections.
5.2.3.1 Geology
Geotechnical investigations (Sergent 1988) found no potential problems for the DARHT Facility. PHERMEX has over 30 years of operation history without site stability problems (see section 4.3.4, Site Stability). It is the best analogue for future DARHT operation.
5.2.3.2 Seismic
Seismically induced rockfalls could occur at the mesa rim, but the annual probability for earthquakes is low, and the DARHT Facility has sufficient setback from the mesa rim to be unaffected by these rockfalls during its design life (see section 4.3.4, Site Stability). Vibratory ground motion resulting from the detonation of high explosives is small, in general, being less than the ground motion pulse caused by the air wave from the same detonation.
Although seismic events that damage buildings would have an impact on mission goals, no scenarios were identified wherein a seismic event could trigger an action at the DARHT Facility that would result in any offsite environmental impacts.
5.2.3.3 Soils
Operating DARHT for the next 30 years at a moderately higher level of testing, as compared to that of the last 32 years of operating the PHERMEX Facility, is anticipated to result in soil contamination levels somewhat above, but not greatly above, those observed today at PHERMEX. Under the DARHT Baseline Alternative, maximum average depleted uranium soil contamination in the vicinity of the firing point is not anticipated to be greater than about 5,000 ppm after 30 years of operation (see appendix D.6). The present PHERMEX firing site has a soils contamination circle around the firing point of about a 460-ft (140-m) radius. Inside this circle, soils are at or above the background concentration for uranium; outside this circle, soils exhibit background concentrations. Because the variety and magnitude of explosive charges to be used in future tests at DARHT will resemble those previously tested at PHERMEX, the area around the firing point where soils would exhibit uranium concentrations above background is anticipated to remain approximately the same, i.e., a circle with a 460-ft (140-m) radius. The area of land contaminated above background would be about 15 ac (6 ha). Soils sampling has shown that beryllium and lead contamination falls to background levels much closer to the firing point than uranium. Thus, the soil contamination circle defined for uranium would apply to the other metals of interest. Concentrations of metal contaminants in sediments within drainage channels are expected to be similar to those seen today in drainage channels at PHERMEX. Contaminants within the soil contamination circle would be available for migration in surface runoff to the canyons and deep drainage through the mesa.
5.2.4 Water Resources
Water resources examined for impact in the DARHT Baseline Alternative are:
_ Surface water and sediment in Water Canyon, which discharges into the Rio Grande
_ The main aquifer underlying Threemile Mesa
Stream losses to the bed of Water Canyon are analyzed for their potential to migrate through the vadose zone to the main aquifer. Infiltration is examined for its ability to carry metals in solution into the mesa top at the firing point and to communicate through the unsaturated zone to the main aquifer. Supporting information on deep drainage, the geochemistry of metals in LANL waters and sediments, surface water modeling, and vadose zone and ground water modeling as applied in this EIS can be found in appendix E.
A combination of data review and geochemical analysis was used to determine the solubility and sorption characteristics of several metals in the LANL water and soil/sediment environment (see appendix E2). Because they represent the largest fraction of expended materials in the tests to be conducted, depleted uranium, beryllium, lead, copper, and aluminum were all studied. The study revealed that a realistic value of solubility for beryllium in LANL waters was at its drinking water standard of 4 _g/L [40 CFR 141.62]. A realistic value for lead solubility in LANL waters was at its MCL of 50 _g/L [40 CFR 141.11] and approximately a factor of three above its action level of 15 _g/L [40 CFR 141.80]. Values of solubility for both copper and aluminum were both found to be substantially below their secondary drinking water standards. Thus, while the analysis examines the migration of beryllium and lead to gain insight into their migration and behavior in the environment, there is no need to simulate beryllium, copper, or aluminum. The solubility of uranium in LANL waters was found to be substantially above its proposed MCL value, and therefore its migration was modeled to estimate impact on the water resource.
5.2.4.1 Surface Water
The hydrology-sediment-contaminant transport modeling procedure described in appendix E3 was applied to assess the potential impacts of the DARHT Baseline Alternative. In this alternative, the transport by surface runoff during the next 30 years for releases of depleted uranium, beryllium, and lead from the DARHT site was analyzed. Table 5-6 shows the simulated peak concentration of contaminants in the infiltrated water in Water Canyon below the source. Details of the analysis and the treatment of runoff, storm water, and cooling water blowdown discharge at the DARHT site are described in appendix E3.
Table 5-6._Contaminant Concentrations and Time-to-peak for the DARHT Baseline Alternative
Table 5-7._Peak Input Concentrations for the DARHT Baseline Alternative to Water Canyon Reaches and Threemile Mesa Predicted by Surface Runoff-sediment-contaminant Transport Model
Because of their low solubility, the concentrations of beryllium and lead reach a plateau in their release to Water Canyon but still remain well below drinking water standards. Drinking water standards for beryllium and lead are 4 and 15 _g/L, respectively. Depleted uranium has a relatively high solubility in LANL surface and ground waters. Simulations reveal that concentrations of depleted uranium in surface waters released to Water Canyon immediately below DARHT could be slightly above the proposed MCL (20 _g/L). The Rio Grande is the nearest off-LANL access point for surface water carrying contamination from the firing point. As shown in table 5-6, the quality of surface water entering the Rio Grande is forecast to be more than an order-of-magnitude below the drinking water standard for uranium and several orders-of-magnitude below the drinking water standards for beryllium and lead.
5.2.4.2 Ground Water
Two analyses of depleted uranium, beryllium, and lead migration were conducted. Stream losses into the bed of Water Canyon were analyzed to estimate the migration of contaminants through the vadose zone to the main aquifer. Similarly, infiltration carrying metal in solution into the mesa top at the DARHT firing point was analyzed to estimate contaminant migration to the main aquifer.
The peak concentrations of contaminants in infiltration to Threemile Mesa and in surface water losses from the uppermost reach of Water Canyon opposite the DARHT Facility are shown in table 5-7. For those cases where the drinking water standards are exceeded (shown in bold), analyses are necessary. Only three cases were modeled: depleted uranium in the uppermost reach of Water Canyon, and depleted uranium and lead on the mesa top at the firing point. Releases of beryllium and lead from Water Canyon sediments and releases of beryllium from the mesa to the soil column were not analyzed in this case because the solution concentrations entering the soil column are at or below the drinking water standards. Similar releases to the uppermost reach of Water Canyon were analyzed in the No Action Alternative and were shown to be negligible (see section 5.1.4.2). Because of sorption and dispersion within the vadose zone, and solubility limits in Los Alamos waters, the metals beryllium, copper, and aluminum would not represent a hazard through the ground water pathway.
Analysis of depleted uranium migration through the vadose zone arising from releases to the stream bed of Water Canyon showed a peak concentration of about 0.02 _g/L after nearly 20,000 years in soil water being delivered to the main aquifer. Simulation of depleted uranium migration through the mesa to the main aquifer showed a peak concentration of about 80 _g/L after approximately 40,000 years. Water Canyon stream losses yield soil water entering the main aquifer at concentrations well below the proposed MCL for uranium (20 _g/L); however, releases from the firing point on the mesa top yield soil water concentrations approximately four times the MCL. Simulation of lead migration through the mesa to the main aquifer showed a peak concentration of approximately 6 _g/L in soil water entering the aquifer, less than half the action level of 15 _g/L in the drinking water standard. Upon entering the main aquifer, the small-scale and low-volume releases from the mesa top would be dispersed in the aquifer and further mixed either with ground water (if it were recovered in the municipal water supply well), or with the waters of the Rio Grande. The average yield of the Pajarito Field wells of 2.7 ft3/s (0.07665 m3/s) is assumed to be representative of a water supply well which could be developed in the vicinity of Threemile Mesa (see appendix E4). The total flow rate of contaminated water from the mesa top firing point would be 1.1 x 10-3 ft3/s (3.2 x 10-5 m3/s). This gives a concentration reduction factor greater than 2,000, more than sufficient to reduce the concentration of depleted uranium in municipal water supplies to levels well below the proposed MCL. Based on the average annual flow rate of the Rio Grande [~1,500 ft3/s (~42 m3/s) at Otowi], the reduction factor would be even greater for ground water release to the Rio Grande.
Releases to the ground water pathway from operation under the DARHT Baseline Alternative do not adversely impact ground water quality.
5.2.5 Biotic Resources
Biotic resources examined for impacts under the DARHT Baseline Alternative include terrestrial resources, wetlands, aquatic resources, and threatened and endangered species.
5.2.5.1 Terrestrial Resources
Both construction and operations impacts were evaluated for terrestrial resources.
5.2.5.1.1 Construction Impacts
Under the DARHT Baseline Alternative, further construction at the DARHT site would have little, if any, further impact on vegetation. Ground clearing and initial construction has already disturbed approximately 8 ac (3 ha) of mixed piñon-juniper/ponderosa pine habitat used by various species, and only about 0.25 ac (0.1 ha) would be further disturbed. Erosion control and revegetation of disturbed areas implemented during construction would be completed. These actions would minimize soil erosion. Section 3.3.6 provides additional details of the DARHT site.
Further construction at the DARHT site would have little, if any, further impact on the populations of small mammals that formerly inhabited the site. It is also likely that some small mammals, especially mice, would reinvade the disturbed area associated with the buildings.
Large mammals (deer, elk, coyote, bear, raccoon) use the DARHT site as habitat, mostly in a transient fashion, and it is unlikely that further construction would add to the present disruption of their use of this site (Risberg 1995).
Further construction at the DARHT site would not change the area of piñon-juniper/ponderosa pine habitat used by birds for roosting, feeding, and reproduction.
Some piñon-juniper/ponderosa pine habitat has already been disturbed by previous construction, and any reptiles and amphibians inhabiting the DARHT site have either been killed or displaced. Further impacts from completing the construction of DARHT would not be expected.
5.2.5.1.2 Operation Impacts
Further impacts to the DARHT site vegetation would be limited to effects from fires occurring during testing operations. These fires are quickly controlled by the firefighters who are stationed outside the exclusion fence at the time of the tests.
Impacts upon wildlife would be caused by repetitive, short-term disturbances from site activities. These impacts would be insignificant to overall population levels of common species, individuals, and thus populations of rare species such as the Mexican spotted owl, would not be adversely affected. DOE and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) have negotiated mitigation measures to reduce operational impacts to any threatened or endangered species in the vicinity of the DARHT and PHERMEX facilities (see section 5.11 and appendix K). Evidence from PHERMEX demonstrates that pollutant contamination of soil and plants outside the blast area is not above background levels.
5.2.5.2 Wetlands
Although floodplains lie at the bottom of Potrillo Canyon and Cañon de Valle, no wetlands lie within TA-15; thus, no impacts to wetlands would occur (Risberg 1995).
5.2.5.3 Aquatic Resources
No additional impacts to the aquatic resources located within the canyons surrounding TA-15 are expected.
5.2.5.4 Threatened and Endangered Species
It is unlikely that completion of DARHT construction would change the attractiveness of the area for potential use by threatened or endangered species. Completion of construction and operations of the DARHT Facility would not cause any adverse impacts to the nesting Mexican spotted owls in the vicinity. DOE and the USFWS have negotiated a plan to eliminate the potential for adverse impacts to these birds (see section 5.11 and appendix K).
5.2.6 Cultural and Paleontological Resources
Impacts on cultural and paleontological resources from the DARHT Baseline Alternative are described in the following subsections.
5.2.6.1 Archeological Resources
Archeological resources were evaluated from both construction and operations perspectives.
5.2.6.1.1 Construction
Completion of the DARHT Facility construction under the DARHT Baseline Alternative would not be expected to have any direct or indirect impacts on known archeological sites eligible for the National Register. Existing TA-15 security measures that restrict general access would continue to provide protection for possible intentional or incidental impacts from human activities.
5.2.6.1.2 Operations
Potential impacts related to detonation of high explosives at the designated firing point could result from 1) vibratory ground motion, 2) air waves, and 3) dispersal of metal fragments and other airborne debris.
Vibratory ground motion could induce structural instability to standing walls but would not affect other attributes of archeological sites which contribute to their research potential. Since none of the known archeological sites in the area of potential effects has standing walls, with the exception of Nake'muu, ground wave motion has the potential to affect only Nake'muu. This potential is minimal because the location of Water Canyon between the firing point and Nake'muu serves as a barrier which absorbs most of the motion. As stated, seismic tests conducted on March 11, 1995 (Vibronics 1995) indicated that potential impacts due to the air waves is a greater concern than vibratory ground motion.
Air waves would have no effect on those archeological sites whose eligibility for the National Register is based solely on their research potential. Air waves would have minimal effect on the structural stability of standing walls at Nake'muu. An air wave of 0.08 lb/in2 (0.6 kPa) from a test blast at the PHERMEX firing point was measured at Nake'muu on March 11, 1995, from an explosion of 150 lb (70 kg) of TNT. This pressure is approximately one half of the air pressure required for window breakage (DOE 1992, table D.4-4). Although no structural damage resulted from this particular test, the cumulative impacts from similar air waves are unknown. In general, quantitatively assessing the effects air waves and ground motion could have on prehistoric structures is difficult because the baseline structural integrity of these sites is unknown. This site would be monitored for any adverse effects, and mitigation measures would be taken if necessary.
Flying debris would have no impact on those archeological sites whose eligibility for the National Register is based solely on their research potential. Flying debris, depending on the size and velocity, could impact those cultural resources which are eligible for the National Register for additional reasons (Criteria A, B, or C). No known prehistoric cultural resources in the area of potential effects have been identified as eligible under Criteria A or B (association with important events or people).
Because Nake'muu is eligible for the National Register under Criterion C based on its well-preserved standing walls, flying debris of sufficient size and velocity could result in an adverse effect. This potential was mitigated in the design stage of the project by aligning one wing of the DARHT building itself between the blast area and Nake'muu so that most blasting debris on a trajectory towards Nake'muu would be deflected away from Nake'muu. Using the height of the DARHT building alone as a barrier wall, some particles would be projected over that wall in the direction of Nake'muu. However, the only particles which would have the velocity to reach Nake'muu would be less than one inch in diameter. By the time they reach Nake'muu, they would no longer be propelled by the force of the blast itself, but would be falling to the ground by gravity alone. Based on the number of shots anticipated for the life of the DARHT Facility, the probability that any particles would reach Nake'muu was determined to be small and they would fall without sufficient force and size to affect the site. Constructing an additional barrier on top of the building would decrease even further the number of particles with the potential to reach Nake'muu. In a February 21, 1989, correspondence between the NM SHPO and the DOE, the SHPO concurred that "it is unlikely that the proposed activity will have any effect on the values for which LA 12655 [Nake'muu] is considered significant. However, I do agree that test activities should be monitored by a LANL Archaeologist, as discussed in your letter, to ensure that this assessment of effort is correct. If site damage to important site values is observed during the monitoring visits, further consultation will be necessary to determine appropriate measures to reduce adverse effects of test activities" (SHPO 1989).
The calculations above were made for explosions up to 150 lb (70 kg) of TNT originating specifically at the dual-axis firing point. Explosions exceeding this weight, anticipated to be about 500 lb (230 kg) TNT, require relocation of the firing point away from the dual-axis spot. In this situation, the shielding effect of the DARHT building would be reduced. The potential for blast debris from the larger explosions reaching Nake'muu would be mitigated by temporary construction of a sand bag revetment to create a blast shield. The blast overpressure measured during the March 11, 1995, tests scaled for 500 lb (230 kg) indicate a pressure of 0.12 lb/in2 (0.8 kPa) at Nake'muu, which is still below the value of 0.2 lb/in2 (1.4 kPa) required for window breakage (DOE 1992, table D.4-4). This overpressure, 0.12 lb/in2 (0.8 kPa), is very conservative since the mitigating effects of the canyon are not included. Other data suggest that the canyon can reduce overpressure by as much as one half (Vibronics, Inc., 1995).
If determined to be desirable, additional characterization of the potential impact of DARHT operation on Nake'muu may be conducted. For example, options include design and implementation of a long-term monitoring procedure at Nake'muu and/or completion of a structural assessment of architectural elements. If necessary, several mitigation options are available, such as stabilization of standing masonry walls.
5.2.6.2 Historical Resources
No direct or indirect impacts on historic structures are anticipated.
5.2.6.3 Native American Resources
There would be essentially no impacts on Native American cultural resources.
5.2.6.4 Paleontological Resources
Because of the nature of the soil and geological substrate, it is unlikely that paleontological resources exist at the DARHT site; no potential effects are postulated.
5.2.7 Socioeconomic and Community Services
Environmental impacts on socioeconomics and community services for the DARHT Baseline Alternative are presented in the following subsections.
5.2.7.1 Demographic Characteristics
The DARHT Baseline Alternative would not have any significant impact on the existing demographic characteristics of communities in the region-of-interest, as described in section 4.7.1.
5.2.7.2 Economic Activities
The DARHT Baseline Alternative encompasses completing construction and operation of the dual-axis facility. The DOE would complete construction and begin operation of the first axis of the proposed DARHT Facility by FY 1999. At that time, the operating costs of DARHT would replace PHERMEX operating costs, although construction expenditures would continue until the completion of the second DARHT axis in FY 2001. For the purpose of estimating the economic impacts (employment, labor income, and output) of the DARHT Baseline Alternative, the analysis recognizes the incremental construction and operating expenditures associated with the DARHT Baseline Alternative, relative to ones associated with the No Action Alternative. The estimated capital construction expenditures, shown in table 5-8, do not include any site cleanup nor decommissioning and decontamination of the dual-axis facility at the end of its lifetime. The direct and indirect economic impacts of the proposed alternative are described below.
Table 5-8._Capital-funded Construction and Operating Costs
for the DARHT Baseline Alternative (in millions of 1995 dollars)
Year/Cost |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
Total |
Capital |
6.6 |
29.5 |
17.9 |
26.8 |
24.0 |
0.6 |
0 |
0 |
105.3 |
Operations and Maintenance |
4.2 |
4.1 |
4.1 |
4.0 |
5.9 |
5.8 |
5.8 |
5.7 |
39.6 |
Over the period FY 1996 to FY 2002, the DARHT Baseline Alternative is estimated to generate 191 full-time equivalent jobs in the regional economy, 80 directly related to project construction and operating expenditures, and 111 indirectly generated by subsequent indirect spending and income generation within the regional economy. Over the same time period, the DARHT Baseline Alternative is estimated to generate an annual average of $4.1 million of regional labor income, $1.7 million directly related to the project, and $2.4 million indirectly generated through subsequent indirect spending in the regional economy. Finally, the DARHT Baseline Alternative is estimated to generate an annual average of $6.8 million of goods and services in the regional economy, $3.4 million directly generated by the project, and $3.4 million indirectly generated by subsequent indirect spending within the regional economy.
The underlying cost data were provided by LANL (Burns 1995a; Burns 1995b). The costs do not include any expenses associated with site cleanup nor decontamination and decommissioning at either the DARHT or PHERMEX facilities. These relevant data were adjusted using an escalation price change index for DOE defense-related construction projects (Pearman 1994; Anderson 1995).
5.2.7.3 Community Infrastructure and Services
The DARHT Baseline Alternative would not have any significant impact on the existing community infrastructure in the region-of-interest, as described in section 4.7.3.
5.2.7.4 Environmental Justice
Referring to other sections of the EIS, no significant adverse environmental impacts are identified with the construction or operation of the DARHT Facility under the DARHT Baseline Alternative. The impacts considered include air and noise emissions caused during facility construction and subsequent operations (section 5.2.2), and the potential for surface or ground water contamination (section 5.2.4). Any foreseeable impacts on air, noise, or water quality during the course of normal operations would not pose significant health impacts on human populations (section 5.2.8) and would fall within regulatory compliance requirements. Accordingly, DARHT Facility construction and planned operation under the DARHT Baseline Alternative would have no known disproportionate adverse health or environmental impact on minority or low-income populations in the region-of-interest [populations residing within 50 mi (80 km) of the site].
5.2.8 Human Health
Potential human health impacts under the DARHT Baseline Alternative would be essentially the same as for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.8.
5.2.9 Facility Accidents
Potential impacts of facility accidents under the DARHT Baseline Alternative would be essentially the same as for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.9.
5.2.10 Waste Management
Potential impacts of the DARHT Baseline Alternative on waste management would be essentially the same as for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.10.
5.2.11 Monitoring and Mitigation
5.2.11.1 Monitoring
Potential impacts that would need to be monitored under the DARHT Baseline Alternative would be essentially the same as for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.11.
5.2.11.2 Mitigation
Under normal operating conditions, two potential impacts would appear to warrant mitigation. Specific actions would be taken to minimize disturbance of the Mexican spotted owls inhabitating canyons near the DARHT site. Noise from construction equipment and activities would be minimized as much as possible. Operational noise from detonations would also be conducted to minimize disturbance. Facility lighting would be placed to direct illumination away from the canyons at night.
Protection of the Nake'muu archeological site might be necessary under certain detonation test configurations. Detonations would be shielded, if necessary, to avoid fragment impact to the site. No other archeological sites in the hazard radius have standing walls that would require mitigation activities. Other mitigation measures taken would not differ significantly from measures currently taken as part of normal operations at the PHERMEX Facility. Mitigation activities for cultural resources are presented in section 4.6. Construction noise associated with completing the facility would be mitigated to minimize noise impacts on the surrounding environment as much as possible.
5.2.12 Decontamination and Decommissioning
Potential impacts of decontamination and decommissioning under the DARHT Baseline Alternative would be similar to those described for the No Action Alternative in section 5.1.12. The following differences from D&D activities and impacts for the No Action Alternative would be expected:
_ Increased salvage and conversion to other uses because of the presence of two accelerator facilities and their buildings
_ Increased soil, gravel, and debris resulting from the repositioning of the firing site from the PHERMEX location
5.3 UPGRADE PHERMEX ALTERNATIVE
This section presents the expected environmental consequences associated with the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative.
5.3.1 Land Resources
Potential impacts on land resources in the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative would be essentially the same as those for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.1.
5.3.2 Air Quality and Noise
5.3.2.1 Air Quality
Potential impacts of the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative on air quality essentially would be the same as those for the No Action Alternative for operations, described in section 5.1.2.1.2, and the DARHT Baseline Alternative for construction activities, described in section 5.2.1.1.
5.3.2.2 Noise
Because the period of construction would be somewhat longer and some construction would probably take place to convert the existing DARHT Facility to other uses, construction noise would be generated for a period longer than in the DARHT Baseline Alternative. However, construction noise would not be expected to be noticeable away from the construction site. Disturbance of wildlife during operations would be about the same as with the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.2.2.
5.3.3 Geology and Soils
Potential impacts of the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative on geology and soils would be essentially the same as those for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.3.
5.3.4 Water Resources
Potential impacts of the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative on surface and ground water would be essentially the same as those for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.4.
5.3.5 Biotic Resources
Impacts on biotic resources in the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative would be essentially the same as those for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.5.
5.3.6 Cultural and Paleontological Resources
Potential impacts on cultural and paleontological resources in the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative would be essentially the same as those for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.6.
5.3.7 Socioeconomic and Community Services
Environmental impacts on socioeconomics and community services for the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative are presented in this section. Potential impacts on demographic characteristics, community infrastructure and services, and environmental justice would be essentially the same as the No Action Alternative and are described in sections 5.1.7.1, 5.1.7.3, and 5.1.7.4, respectively. Potential impacts on economic activities are presented in the following paragraphs.
The Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative involves upgrading the present PHERMEX Facility to accommodate new technology developed for DARHT. Under this alternative, the DOE is expected to complete construction and begin operation of the upgraded PHERMEX Facility in FY 2002. During the upgrade of the PHERMEX Facility, construction costs would be incurred along with PHERMEX operating costs (see table 5-9). To estimate the regional economic impacts of the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative, the analysis recognizes additional construction and operating expenditures under the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative, relative to those associated with the No Action Alternative. The estimated capital construction expenditures do not include any site cleanup nor D&D of the dual-axis facility at the end of its lifetime.
Table 5-9._Capital-funded Construction and Operating Costs for
Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative (in millions of 1995 dollars)
Year/Cost |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
Total |
Capital |
6.6 |
36.6 |
33.7 |
21.7 |
14.8 |
10.2 |
3.1 |
0 |
126.7 |
Operations and Maintenance |
4.2 |
4.1 |
4.1 |
4.0 |
4.0 |
4.0 |
3.9 |
6.0 |
34.3 |
Over the period FY 1996 to FY 2002, the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative is estimated to generate 199 full-time equivalent jobs in the regional economy, 82 directly related to project construction and operating expenditures, and 117 indirectly generated by consecutive rounds of spending and regional income generation. The Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative is also estimated to generate an annual average of $4.3 million of regional labor income, $1.8 million directly related to the project, and $2.5 million indirectly generated through consecutive rounds of spending in the regional economy. Finally, the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative is estimated to generate an annual average of $6.9 million of goods and services in the regional economy, $3.3 million directly generated by the project, and $3.7 million indirectly generated by consecutive rounds of spending in the regional economy.
The underlying cost data were provided by LANL (Burns 1995a; Burns 1995b). The costs do not include any expenses associated with site cleanup nor D&D of either the proposed DARHT or PHERMEX facilities. These relevant data were adjusted using an escalation price change index for DOE defense-related construction projects (Pearman 1994; Anderson 1995).
5.3.8 Human Health
Potential impacts of the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative on human health would be essentially the same as for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.8.
5.3.9 Facility Accidents
Potential impacts of facility accidents under the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative would be essentially the same as for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.9.
5.3.10 Waste Management
Potential impacts of the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative on waste management would be essentially the same as for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.10.
5.3.11 Monitoring and Mitigation
Monitoring and mitigation measures taken under the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative would be essentially the same as the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.11.
5.3.12 Decontamination and Decommissioning
Impacts of decontamination and decommissioning under the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative would be essentially the same as in the No Action Alternative described in section 5.1.12; however, the buildings partially constructed for DARHT would also be subject to D&D evaluation.
5.4 ENHANCED CONTAINMENT ALTERNATIVE
This section presents the expected environmental consequences associated with the Enhanced Containment Alternative. Three options were analyzed under this Alternative, as described in section 3.7: the Building Containment, Vessel Containment, and Phased Containment (preferred alternative) options. No significant differences in potential environmental impacts were determined among the three options; in many cases (see tables S-1 and 3-3) potential impacts would be essentially identical. Minor differences were determined in impacts to, or caused by air quality operations, noise, soil contamination, biotic and cultural resources (without mitigation), socioeconomics, human health, low-level waste generation, and commitment of resources. These are discussed below.
5.4.1 Land Resources
5.4.1.1 Land Use
The Vessel Containment, Building Containment, and Phased Containment (preferred alternative) options under this alternative require a building addition for the cleanout facility. To accommodate all of these options, it is anticipated that 1 ac (0.4 ha) of land would have to be cleared for construction, in addition to the 8 ac (3 ha) of land previously disturbed by DARHT. Under the Vessel Containment and Phased Containment (preferred alternative) options, an existing 0.25-mi long (0.4-km long) firebreak road would be improved by widening, grading, and paving to provide access to the proposed vessel cleanout facility. This would lead to the potential for about 0.5 ac (0.2 ha) additional disturbance on either side of the existing road. Dedication of land for the cleanout facility or access road would be consistent with current and past land uses at LANL and would have no reasonably foreseeable impact on established local land-use patterns.
5.4.1.2 Visual Resources
The proposed DARHT Facility and the cleanout facility under any of the containment options would be unobtrusive and located in an isolated piñon/ponderosa pine forest area. The buildings would not be accessible or readily visible from offsite; therefore, they should have no impact on visual resources.
5.4.1.3 Regional Recreation
Although a variety of recreational opportunities are available in the vicinity of LANL, only those in areas relatively near TA-15 might be negatively impacted by noise associated with test firings at the proposed DARHT site. Test firings within the containment building would be expected to have no impacts on recreational resources. Under the Vessel Containment and Phased Containment (preferred alternative) options, it is possible that some tests would be conducted without using a containment vessel. These tests would have the same small potential for impacts on nearby recreation as other alternatives using uncontained test firing.
5.4.2 Air Quality and Noise
Impacts on nonradiological air quality and the potential for noise impacts associated with the Enhanced Containment Alternative are discussed in this section.
5.4.2.1 Air Quality
Air quality impacts for the Enhanced Containment Alternative are presented in this section for maximally impacted point of unrestricted public access. These impacts were determined using methods described in appendix C, Air Quality and Noise.
5.4.2.1.1 Construction
Pollutant emissions during the construction phase of all three options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative would be essentially the same as those for the DARHT Baseline Alternative. Pollutant emissions associated with constructing a containment structure (Building Containment Option) or the vessel cleanout facility under the Enhanced Containment Alternative have not been quantified. However, additional impacts from the construction of either structure would be expected to be minimal.
5.4.2.1.2 Operations
Potential air quality impacts from operations under the Enhanced Containment Alternative would be very similar for all three of the options analyzed. As shown in table 5-10, the calculated values for nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide are essentially the same for all options and alternatives, while PM10 values vary slightly among alternatives. Annual PM10 air concentrations for the Enhanced Containment Alternative options are about the same among these options but are about 20 percent lower than those for other alternatives. The maximum short-term (24-h) of PM10 concentrations would differ among the enhanced containment options. The Vessel Containment and Phased Containment options would have short-term releases from uncontained detonations; potential short-term air quality impacts would be higher than the Building Containment Option and similar to those of the other alternatives analyzed.
Table 5-10._Impacts on Air Quality from Operations under the
Enhanced Containment Alternative
Pollutant |
Averaging Time |
Concentration at Maximally Impacted Point of Unrestricted Public Access (_g/m3) |
Percent of Regulatory Limita |
|
NO2 |
Annual 24-h |
0.04 2 |
0.06 1.4 |
PM10 |
Annual 24-h |
0.008 0.4c 3.3d |
0.02 0.2c 2.2d |
SO2 |
Annual 24-h 3-h |
2 x 10-4 0.006 0.03 |
0.0005 0.003 0.003 |
Beryllium |
30 days |
2 x 10-5 |
0.0002 |
Heavy Metalsb |
30 days |
0.002 |
0.02 |
Lead |
Calendar Quarter |
1 x 10-4 |
0.007 |
|
a Uses the applicable regulatory limit from table 4-3. b Sum of the air concentration of uranium and lead. c Building Containment Option d Vessel Containment and Phased Containment options. Note: NO2 and PM10 are from hydrodynamic testing and boiler emissions. SO2 is from boiler emissions. Beryllium, heavy metals, and lead are from hydrodynamic testing. Includes impacts from hydrodynamic testing and boiler emissions. | |||
Calculated values for beryllium, heavy metals, and lead for all of the enhanced containment options are essentially the same when analyzed over the 30-year project life because of the greater impact of containment releases on air quality. The Phased Containment Option would have less impact during the early years of the option because of the greater fraction of uncontained detonations. Although somewhat counter intuitive, the major reason for this is because uncontained detonations under these options allow for greater atmospheric dispersion with subsequently less air quality impact than releases from containment. The uncontained detonations were modeled as elevated releases [325 ft (99 m)] simulating explosive dispersion, while containment releases were modeled as near ground level releases. Additional discussion of atmospheric releases and modeling is provided in appendix C1, Air Quality, and appendix H, Human Health.
5.4.2.2 Noise
Under all options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative, impacts associated with noise and blast pressure waves would be reduced compared to the No Action Alternative. Uncontained detonations under the Vessel Containment and Phased Containment options could potentially have noise and blast wave impacts of the same magnitude as for the No Action Alternative. The number of detonations would be reduced by 75 percent under the Vessel Containment Option and from 5 to 40 to 75 percent under the different phases of the Phased Containment Option.
Noise associated with construction and construction worker traffic would occur until completion of the DARHT Facility and the containment building or cleanout facility under all of the containment options. However, construction noise would not be expected to be noticeable away from the construction site. Disturbance of wildlife during operations would be about the same as with the No Action Alternative (appendix C, Air Quality and Noise).
5.4.3 Geology and Soils
Impacts of the Enhanced Containment Alternative on geology and soils are described in the following subsections.
5.4.3.1 Geology
Geologic impacts under the Enhanced Containment Alternative would be similar to those under the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.3.1.
5.4.3.2 Seismic
Seismic impacts under the Enhanced Containment Alternative would be similar to those under the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.3.2.
Although seismic events that damage buildings would have an impact on mission goals, no scenarios were identified wherein a seismic event could trigger an action at the proposed DARHT Facility that would result in any offsite environmental impact.
5.4.3.3 Soils
The three options under the Enhanced Containment Alternative present lower soils contamination levels than the No Action and DARHT Baseline alternatives. The three options are the Vessel Containment Option, the Building Containment Option, and the Phased Containment Option (preferred alternative).
Under the Vessel Containment Option, an estimated maximum of 12 percent of the DARHT Baseline Alternative inventory could be released in the vicinity of the firing point if highly unlikely events were to occur. This 12 percent is made up of two types of releases. Under the Vessel Containment Option some uncontained detonations would be conducted, up to 25 percent of the total annual depleted uranium expenditures of 1,540 lb (700 kg) or a maximum of 385 lb (175 kg) per year. Of this depleted uranium inventory, 70 percent would be removed from the firing point during routine cleanup activities leaving 30 percent for migration in the environment. To be conservative, it is assumed no beryllium or lead would be removed from the firing point during routine cleanup. Of the remaining 75 percent of the inventory shot in containment, releases are assumed to occur in no more than 6 percent of the cases. Note that total release from these 6 percent of contained tests would be highly unlikely; however, to be conservative complete release is assumed. Thus, 7.5 percent (i.e., 0.25 x 0.30) release occurs during uncontained experiments and up to 4.5 percent (0.75 x 0.06) release occurs during contained experiments; a total of 12 percent. Assuming no cleanup of beryllium or lead, their percentage of inventory remaining in firing site soils is estimated to be no more than 29.5 percent of their original inventory. Thus, annual releases of depleted uranium, beryllium, and lead would be 185, 6.5, and 10 lbs (84, 3, and 4.4 kg), respectively. These annual releases would occur for 30 years.
Soil contamination under the Building Containment Option would be somewhat less than that under the Vessel Containment Option. Under the Building Containment Option, 6 percent of the annual inventory will be released to the environment under highly unlikely circumstances. It is further assumed that none of the contamination will be removed from the soils through routine cleanup activities. Thus, annual releases of depleted uranium, beryllium, and lead would be 92, 1.3, and 2 lbs (42, 0.6, and 0.9 kg), respectively. These annual releases would occur for 30 years.
Soil contamination under the Phased Containment Option would be somewhat more than under the Vessel Containment Option. Releases would be characterized by decreasing uncontained experiments in three phases over two 5-year periods, finally decreasing to about 25 percent uncontained experiments level after 10 years. For the three time periods (i.e., 5, 5, and 20 years), over the 30-year operation of the facility, the uncontained to containment percentages of annual inventory expended would be 95 and 5, 60 and 40, and 25 and 75. Under cleanup and operational assumptions identical to those under the Vessel and Building Containment Options, the percentages of annual inventory for depleted uranium deposited in the firing site soils for the three periods are 28.8, 20.4, and 12 percent. The percentages of annual inventory deposited in firing site soils for beryllium and lead for the three periods are 95.3, 62.4, and 29.5. During the first 5-year period, annual releases of depleted uranium, beryllium, and lead would be 444, 21, and 31 lbs (200, 9.5, and 14 kg), respectively. During the second 5-year period, the annual releases of depleted uranium, beryllium, and lead would be 315, 14, and 21 lbs (143, 6.2, and 9.4 kg), respectively. During the final 20-year period, the annual releases of depleted uranium, beryllium, and lead would be 185, 6.5, and 10 lbs (84, 3, and 4.4 kg), respectively.
For each of the options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative, the circle of contaminated soil at the firing point under the Enhanced Containment Alternative is assumed to be no greater than that for the No Action and DARHT Baseline alternatives. Thus, the circle of soil centered on the firing point exhibiting uranium concentrations above background would be no greater than a 460-ft (140-m) radius. The area of land contaminated above background for uranium, beryllium, and lead would be no greater than 15 acres (6 ha).
5.4.4 Water Resources
Water resources examined for impact in the Enhanced Containment Alternative are:
_ Surface water and sediment in Water Canyon, which discharges into the Rio Grande
_ The main aquifer underlying Threemile Mesa
Stream losses to the bed of Water Canyon are analyzed for their potential to release contaminants through the vadose zone to the main aquifer. Infiltration is examined for its ability to carry metals in solution into the mesa top at the firing point and to transport contaminants through the unsaturated zone to the main aquifer. Supporting information on deep drainage, the geochemistry of metals in LANL waters and sediments, surface water modeling, and vadose zone and ground water modeling as applied in this EIS can be found in appendix E.
A combination of data review and geochemical analysis was used to determine the solubility and sorption characteristics of several metals in the LANL water and soil/sediment environment (see appendix E2). Because they represent the largest fraction of expended materials in the tests to be conducted, depleted uranium, beryllium, lead, copper, and aluminum were all studied. The study revealed that a realistic value of solubility for beryllium in LANL waters was at its drinking water standard of 4 _g/L [40 CFR 141.62]. A realistic value for lead solubility in LANL waters was at its MCL of 50 _g/L [40 CFR 141.11] and approximately a factor of three above its action level of 15 _g/L [40 CFR 141.80]. Values of solubility for both copper and aluminum were both found to be substantially below their secondary drinking water standards. Thus, while the analysis examines the migration of beryllium and lead to gain insight into their migration and behavior in the environment, there is no need to simulate beryllium, copper, or aluminum because their solute concentrations at the source are at or below their respective drinking water standards. The solubility of uranium in LANL waters was found to be substantially above its proposed MCL value, and therefore its migration was modeled to estimate its potential impact on the water resource.
5.4.4.1 Surface Water
The hydrology-sediment-contaminant transport modeling procedure described in appendix E3 was applied to assess the potential impacts of the three options under the Enhanced Containment Alternative. In this alternative, the transport by surface runoff of the 30 years of future releases of depleted uranium, beryllium, and lead from the DARHT site was analyzed. Table 5-11 shows the simulated peak concentration of contaminants in the infiltrated water in Water Canyon below the source. Details of the analysis and treatment of runoff, storm water, and cooling water blowdown discharge at the DARHT site are described in appendix E3.
Table 5-11._Contaminant Concentrations and Time-to-peak for the
Enhanced Containment Alternative
Because of their low solubility, the concentrations of beryllium and lead reach a plateau in their release to Water Canyon but still remain well below drinking water standards. Drinking water standards for beryllium and lead are 4 and 15 _g/L, respectively. Depleted uranium has a relatively high solubility in LANL surface and ground waters. Depleted uranium in surface water released to Water Canyon immediately below DARHT is slightly above the proposed MCL of 20 _g/L for the Vessel Containment and Phased Containment options, and slightly below the proposed MCL for the Building Containment Option. The Rio Grande is the nearest offsite access point for surface water carrying contamination from the firing point. As shown in table 5-11, the quality of surface water entering the Rio Grande under each of the options is forecast to be over an order-of-magnitude below the drinking water standard for uranium and several orders-of-magnitude below the drinking water standards for beryllium and lead.
5.4.4.2 Ground Water
Two analyses of depleted uranium, beryllium, and lead migration were conducted for the three options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative. The two analyses involved 1) infiltration carrying contaminants into the mesa top at the DARHT firing point and 2) infiltration of contaminants from the stream bed of Water Canyon. Both sources of infiltration and contamination were analyzed to estimate contaminant migration into the main aquifer.
The peak concentrations of contaminants in infiltration to Threemile Mesa and in surface water losses from the uppermost reach of Water Canyon opposite the DARHT Facility are shown in table 5-12. For those cases where the drinking water standards are exceeded (shown in bold), analyses were conducted. Only three cases must be modeled _ depleted uranium and lead on the mesa top at the firing point and depleted uranium in the uppermost reach of Water Canyon. Other metals and locations were not analyzed because sorption and dispersion within the vadose zone would only further reduce soil water concentrations that enter the soil column at concentrations at or below the drinking water standards.
Table 5-12._Peak Input Concentrations for the Enhanced Containment Alternative to Water Canyon Reaches and Threemile Mesa Predicted by Surface Runoff-sediment-contaminant Transport Model
For the Vessel Containment Option, analysis of depleted uranium migration through the vadose zone arising from releases to the stream bed of Water Canyon showed a peak concentration of about 0.05 _g/L after 18,000 years in soil water being delivered to the main aquifer. Analysis of the migration of depleted uranium and lead through the mesa to the main aquifer showed a peak concentration of 32 and 1 x 10-3 _g/L after approximately 42,000 and 100,000 years, respectively. Thus, while releases of lead in soil water are well below the drinking water standard action level of 15 _g/L, the release of depleted uranium from the mesa top yields soil water entering the main aquifer at concentrations less than twice the proposed MCL.
For the Building Containment Option, analysis of depleted uranium migration through the vadose zone arising from releases to the stream bed of Water Canyon showed a peak concentration of about 0.04 _g/L after 18,000 years in soil water being delivered to the main aquifer, well below the proposed MCL for uranium (20 _g/L). Analysis of the migration of depleted uranium and lead through the mesa to the main aquifer showed a peak concentration of 16.1 and 1.5 x 10-7 _g/L after approximately 42,000 and 100,000 years, respectively. Thus, the release of lead in soil water is well below the drinking water standard action level of 15 _g/L, and the release of depleted uranium from the mesa top yields soil water entering the main aquifer at concentrations below the MCL.
For the Phased Containment Option, analysis of depleted uranium migration through the vadose zone arising from releases to the stream bed of Water Canyon showed a peak concentration of about 0.06 _g/L after 18,000 years in soil water being delivered to the main aquifer. Analysis of the migration of depleted uranium and lead through the mesa to the main aquifer showed a peak concentration of 43 and 2 x 10-3 _g/L after approximately 42,000 and 100,000 years, respectively. Thus, while releases of lead in soil water are well below the drinking water standard action level of 15 _g/L, the release of depleted uranium from the mesa top yields soil water entering the main aquifer at concentrations about twice the proposed MCL.
Upon entering the main aquifer, the small-scale and low-volume releases from the mesa top would be dispersed in the aquifer and further mixed either with ground water (if it were recovered in the municipal water supply) or the waters of the Rio Grande. The average yield of the Pajarito Field wells of 2.7 ft3/s (7.7 x 10-2 m3/s) is assumed to be representative of a water supply well that could be developed in the vicinity of Threemile Mesa (see Appendix E4). The total flow rate of contaminated water from the mesa firing point would be 1.1 x 10-3 ft3/s (3.2 x 10-5 m3/s). This gives a concentration reduction factor greater than 2,000, more than sufficient to reduce the concentration of depleted uranium in municipal water supplies to levels well below the proposed MCL. Based on the average annual flow of the Rio Grande at Otowi (Graf 1993) between 1910 and 1985 of 1.1 x 106 ac-ft [1.5 x 103 ft3/s (42 m3/s)], the reduction factor would be even greater for ground water release to the Rio Grande.
Releases to the ground water pathway from operation under the Enhanced Containment Alternative would not adversely impact ground water quality.
5.4.5 Biotic Resources
Biotic resources examined for impacts under the Enhanced Containment Alternative include terrestrial resources, wetlands, aquatic resources, and threatened and endangered species.
5.4.5.1 Terrestrial Resources
Both construction and operations impacts were evaluated for terrestrial resources.
5.4.5.1.1 Construction Impacts
All of the containment options under the Enhanced Containment Alternative would necessitate the construction of either a containment building or a vessel cleanout facility in TA-15. For the containment and cleanout buildings, an additional removal of piñon-juniper/ponderosa pine habitat of about 1 ac (0.4 ha) would be incurred with a resulting disturbance and displacement of associated wildlife. Under the Vessel Containment and Phased Containment (preferred alternative) options, an existing 0.25-mi long (0.4-km long) firebreak road would be improved by widening, grading, and paving to provide access to the proposed vessel cleanout facility. This would lead to the potential for about 0.5 ac (0.2 ha) additional disturbance on either side of the existing road. See section 5.1.5.1 for a description of these types of impacts.
5.4.5.1.2 Operation Impacts
Impacts would be essentially the same as the DARHT Baseline Alternative (section 5.2.5.1.2) except that disruption of wildlife from noise associated with detonations would likely be lessened, considerably so for the Building Containment Option. Noise associated with operation of the cleanout facility would be minimal.
5.4.5.2 Wetlands
Although floodplains lie at the bottom of Potrillo Canyon and Cañon de Valle, no wetlands lie within TA-15; thus, no impacts to wetlands would occur (Risberg 1995).
5.4.5.3 Aquatic Resources
No additional impacts to the aquatic resources located within the canyons surrounding TA-15 are expected.
5.4.5.4 Threatened and Endangered Species
Potential impacts on threatened and endangered species under the Enhanced Containment Alternative would be essentially the same as those for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.5.4.
5.4.6 Cultural and Paleontological Resources
Impacts on cultural and paleontological resources under the Enhanced Containment Alternative are described in the following subsections.
5.4.6.1 Archeological Resources
5.4.6.1.1 Construction
Completion of construction of the proposed DARHT Facility and the containment building, cleanout facility, or access road under any of the proposed containment options, would not be expected to have any direct or indirect impacts on known archeological sites eligible for the National Register. Existing TA-15 security measures that restrict general access would continue to provide protection for possible intentional or incidental impacts from human activities.
5.4.6.1.2 Operations
Any uncontained detonations conducted under the Vessel Containment or Phased Containment option would have impacts described under the DARHT Baseline Alternative in section 5.2.6.1.2. Potential impacts from contained detonations would be minimal, limited to vibratory ground motion.
5.4.6.2 Historical Resources
No direct or indirect impacts on historic structures are anticipated.
5.4.6.3 Native American Resources
There would be essentially no impacts on Native American cultural resources.
5.4.6.4 Paleontological Resources
Because of the nature of the soil and geological substrate, the occurrence of paleontological resources is not anticipated; no potential effects are postulated.
5.4.7 Socioeconomic and Community Services
Environmental impacts on socioeconomics and community services for the Enhanced Containment Alternative are presented in the following subsections.
5.4.7.1 Demographic Characteristics
The Enhanced Containment Alternative would not have any significant impact on the existing demographic characteristics of communities in the region-of-interest, as described in section 4.7.1.
5.4.7.2 Economic Activities
The Enhanced Containment Alternative would involve construction and operation of the DARHT Facility but with some modification to contain airborne emissions of fragments or other debris _ either a containment vessel or a containment building. Under the Vessel Containment Option, the DOE would complete construction and begin operation of the dual-axis facility in FY 1999. At that time, DARHT operating costs would replace PHERMEX operating costs. Under the Building Containment Option, the DOE would complete construction and begin operation of the dual-axis facility in FY 2002, at which time DARHT operating costs would replace PHERMEX operating costs (table 5-13).
Table 5-13._Capital-funded Construction and Operating Costs for the
Enhanced Containment Alternatives (in millions of 1995 dollars)
For the purpose of estimating the regional economic impacts of the two containment alternatives, the analysis illustrates their respective levels of construction and operating expenditures relative to those associated with the No Action Alternative. These estimated costs do not include any site cleanup, nor D&D of the dual-axis facility at the end of its lifetime.
Over the period FY 1996 to FY 2002, the Vessel Containment Option is estimated to generate 321 full-time equivalent jobs in the regional economy, 137 directly related to project construction and operating expenditures, and 185 indirectly generated by consecutive rounds of spending and income generation within the regional economy. This alternative is also estimated to generate an annual average of $6.8 million of regional labor income, $2.9 million directly related to the project, and $3.9 million indirectly generated through consecutive rounds of spending in the regional economy. The alternative is estimated to add an annual average of $12.0 million of goods and services to the regional economy, $6.2 million directly generated by the project, and $5.8 million indirectly generated by consecutive rounds of spending within the regional economy.
Alternatively, the 150-lb (70-kg) Building Containment Option is estimated to generate 209 full-time equivalent jobs in the regional economy, and the 500-lb (230-kg) Building Containment Option is estimated to generate 238 full-time equivalent jobs. Of these totals, for the smaller and larger buildings, respectively, 87 and 99 jobs would be directly accounted for by project construction and operating expenditures. The other 122 or 139 jobs for the two building sizes would be indirectly accounted for by consecutive rounds of regional spending and income generation.
Correspondingly, the Building Containment Option is estimated to add annual averages of $4.5 million and $5.1 million in regional labor income, with $1.9 million and $2.1 million directly related to the project, and $2.6 million and $3.0 million indirectly generated by consecutive rounds of spending in the regional economy. Relative to these impacts, the Building Containment Option is estimated to generate annual averages of $7.6 million [150 lb (70 kg)] and $8.4 million [500 lb (230 kg)] of goods and services in the regional economy, $3.6 million [150 lb (70 kg)] or $4.0 million [500 lb (230 kg)] directly generated by the project, and $4.0 million [150 lb (70 kg)] or $4.4 million [500 lb (230 kg)] indirectly generated through consecutive rounds of spending in the regional economy.
The Phased Containment Option (preferred alternative) involves construction and operation of the DARHT Facility, but with modifications to phase in the containment of airborne emissions of fragments or other debris. The DOE would be expected to complete construction and begin operation of the dual axis facility in FY 1999. During this phase, construction and operations and maintenance costs are similar to the vessel containment option and reflect those of the DARHT Baseline Alternative (table 5-13). These estimated costs do not include any site cleanup, decommissioning, or decontamination of the dual axis facility at the end of its lifetime.
In the period FY 1996 to FY 2002 the preferred alternative is estimated to generate 253 FTE-equivalent jobs in the regional economy, 106 being directly related to project construction and O&M expenditures and the other 147 being indirectly generated by consecutive rounds of spending and income generation within the regional economy.
Corresponding to these employment impacts, the Phased Containment Option (preferred alternative) is estimated to generate an annual average of $5.4 million dollars of regional labor income in the period FY 1996 to FY 2002: $2.3 million being directly related to the project and the other $3.1 million being indirectly generated through consecutive rounds of spending in the regional economy.
Finally, the Phased Containment Option (preferred alternative) is estimated to generate an annual average of $9.0 million dollars of goods and services in the regional economy during the period FY 1996 to FY 2002: $4.4 million of these being directly generated by the project, and the other $4.6 million being indirectly generated by consecutive rounds of spending within the regional economy.
The underlying cost data were provided by LANL (Burns 1995a; Burns 1995b). The costs do not include any expenses associated with site cleanup nor D&D of either the proposed DARHT or PHERMEX facilities. Those relevant data were adjusted using an escalation price change index for DOE defense-related construction projects (Pearman 1994; Anderson 1995).
5.4.7.3 Community Infrastructure and Services
The Enhanced Containment Alternative would not have any significant impact on the existing community infrastructure in the region-of-interest, as described in section 4.7.3.
5.4.7.4 Environmental Justice
Referring to other sections of the EIS, the construction and operation of the DARHT Facility under any of the containment options of the Enhanced Containment Alternative would pose no significant environmental impacts. The foreseeable impacts include fugitive air and noise emissions during facility construction and operations (section 5.3.2), and potential surface or underground water contamination (section 5.3.4). No significant human health impacts appear to exist from either radioactive or hazardous material released or from exposing receptors onsite (workers) or offsite (section 5.1.8). Accordingly, DARHT Facility construction and planned operations under the Enhanced Containment Alternative options would not pose a disproportionate adverse health or environmental impact on minority or low-income populations in the region-of-interest [populations residing within 50 mi (80 km) of the site].
5.4.8 Human Health
This section presents the impacts to the health of workers and the public from routine operations that would be conducted at the DARHT Facility under the Enhanced Containment Alternative. Impacts may potentially result from release and atmospheric transport of radioactive and hazardous material from the facility firing site as a result of planned detonations. Methods and assumptions used in calculating potential impacts are described in appendix H, Human Health.
Radiological impacts may result from exposure to depleted uranium and tritium released to the atmosphere from detonations at the DARHT site. Depleted uranium would be the principal contributor to radiation dose; tritium would contribute about 1 x 10-7 the dose of depleted uranium for chronic releases. The major exposure pathway would be inhalation of material released to the atmosphere, which would contribute more than 99 percent of the dose. Potential human health impacts may be over estimated by a factor of 100 because of the simplified, elevated point-source atmospheric dispersion model used rather than an explosive atmospheric dispersion model (see appendix H, Human Health). Potential impacts from any uses of plutonium would be essentially the same as for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.8.
5.4.8.1 Public
Potential impacts to the MEI were evaluated at three locations in the vicinity of the DARHT site _ Los Alamos, White Rock, and Bandelier. These locations are representative of the neighboring residential clusters in close proximity to LANL. Potential impacts to the surrounding population were also calculated. Potential radiological and nonradiological impacts are presented in the sections below.
5.4.8.1.1 Radiological Impacts
Estimated radiological impacts to the public under the three options would be very similar. The maximum annual dose to any nearby resident under the Vessel Containment, Phased Containment, and Building Containment options would be about 2 x 10-5 rem. Using a risk conversion factor of 5 x 10-4 LCFs per person-rem for members of the public, the estimated maximum probability of a latent fatal cancer would be less than 1 x 10-8 for all three options. The estimated cumulative dose to an individual over the anticipated 30-year life of the project would be about 6 x 10-4 rem under the Phased Containment Option, and about 5 x 10-4 rem under the Vessel Containment and Building Containment options. The estimated maximum probability of a LCF from this cumulative exposure would be about 3 x 10-7 under the Phased Containment Option, and about 2 x 10-7 under the Vessel Containment and Building Containment options.
The annual collective dose to the population of 290,000 individuals living within 50 mi (80 km) of DARHT from the Vessel Containment, Phased Containment, and Building Containment options would be about 0.44, 0.57, and 0.27 person-rem, respectively. No LCFs would be expected among the population from these population doses (2 x 10-4, 2 x 10-4, and 1 x 10-4 LCFs, respectively). Over the anticipated 30-year operating life of DARHT, the potential impacts for the Vessel Containment, Phased Containment, and Building Containment options would be about 13, 17, and 8 person-rem, respectively. LCFs would not be expected (6 x 10-3, 8 x 10-3, and 4 x 10-3 LCFs, respectively).
5.4.8.1.2 Nonradiological Impacts
Members of the public might also be exposed to heavy metals and other materials released during the detonation, including uranium, lead, beryllium, and lithium hydride. Potential impacts from these exposures would be very small under all three options. The maximum probability of a beryllium-induced cancer would be about 1 x 10-11. Toxicological effects from releases of uranium, beryllium, lead, or lithium hydride would not be expected (maximum Hazard Index of 5 x 10-8). The probability of a beryllium-induced cancer over the anticipated 30-year life of the project would be about 3 x 10-10. The maximum Hazard Index expected in the first year immediately after 30 years of operations, accounting for any toxicological effects from buildup of hazardous material in soil, would not exceed 4 x 10-8. Toxicological effects would not be expected.
Cancers would not be expected in the population in the surrounding 50 mi (80 km) from exposure to beryllium released during a year of normal operations under any of the enhanced containment options. The estimated total incidence would be about 1 x 10-7 under the Vessel Containment and Phased Containment options, and about 5 x 10-8 under the Building Containment Option.
5.4.8.2 Noninvolved Workers
A noninvolved worker is defined as a LANL employee who works in TA-15, but would not be directly involved with the proposed facility operations. Nearby workers not involved with the proposed DARHT detonation process would not likely be affected by detonations occurring within containment. It was assumed that access control would still be in place for the Enhanced Containment Alternative. Uncontained detonations could still occur under this alternative [Vessel Containment and Phased Containment (preferred alternative) options], as well as potential breaches of the containment vessels or releases from the containment building. To evaluate potential impacts from these occurrences, a noninvolved worker is assumed to work continuously 2,500 ft (750 m) distant from the firing site. This distance is based on a hazard radius that would typically be put in place for hydrodynamic test. LANL implements this administrative exclusion area based on explosive safety principles (DOE 1994).
The annual dose to a noninvolved worker is estimated to be about 2 x 10-5 rem EDE under the Vessel Containment and Phased Containment Options and 1 x 10-5 rem under the Building Containment Option. The maximum probability of an LCF from these doses would be about 6 x 10-9 and 5 x 10-9, respectively. Over the 30-year anticipated operating life of the facility, a noninvolved worker's cumulative dose would be about 5 x 10-4 rem and 4 x 10-4 rem, respectively. The maximum probability of LCF from these doses would be about 2 x 10-7 for both.
A noninvolved worker could also be exposed to heavy metals and other materials released during the detonation, including uranium, lead, beryllium, and lithium hydride. The maximum probability of a beryllium-induced cancer would be about 2 x 10-11 under the Vessel Containment and Phased Containment options and 1 x 10-11 under the Building Containment Option. The probability of a beryllium-induced cancer from exposure over the anticipated 30-year life of the project would be about 5 x 10-10 and 3 x 10-10, respectively. Toxicological effects from exposure to releases of uranium, beryllium, lead, or lithium hydride would not be expected (maximum Hazard Indexes of 9 x 10-8 and 6 x 10-8, respectively).
5.4.8.3 Workers
Impacts to workers under the Enhanced Containment Alternative could be somewhat higher than those observed under previous PHERMEX operating experience or projected for the uncontained alternatives because cleanup of contained space (vessels or buildings) could involve exposure to greater quantities and concentrations of materials. The average annual worker dose would probably not exceed 0.020 rem. The maximum probability of LCF from this dose would be 8 x 10-6. The annual collective worker dose, assuming a maximum of 100 workers, would probably not exceed 2 person-rem. Latent cancer fatalities would not be expected from this dose (8 x 10-4 LCFs). The cumulative worker dose over the assumed 30-year lifetime of the facility would probably not exceed 60 person-rem. Latent cancer fatalities would not be expected from this dose (2 x 10-2 LCFs).
Involved worker exposures to radiation and radioactive materials under normal operations would be controlled under established procedures that require doses to be kept as low as reasonably achievable. Any potential hazards would be evaluated as part of the radiation worker and occupational safety programs at LANL, and no impacts outside the scope of normal work activities would be anticipated.
5.4.9 Facility Accidents
This section presents the impacts from postulated facility accidents involving depleted uranium to individual members of the public, noninvolved workers nearby, and workers at the facility. The bounding accident evaluated under the Enhanced Containment Alternative differed for the Vessel Containment, Phased Containment, and Building Containment options. Under the Vessel Containment and Phased Containment options, the bounding accident is the catastrophic failure of a containment vessel. Under the Building Containment Option, the bounding accident is the cracking and loss of integrity of the containment walls or major failure of the HEPA-filtered overpressure release system. Both of these bounding accidents would result in greater potential consequences to members of the public and noninvolved workers than inadvertent uncontained detonation of a test assembly. This is because the hypothetical release of materials would be at ground level rather than at a higher elevation, resulting in a more dense dispersion plume closer to the ground. The inadvertent detonation would be the bounding accident for workers at the facility. Accident initiation events were not addressed; accidents were simply evaluated on a "what if" basis even though the likelihood of occurrence is very small.
Radiological impacts may result from exposure to depleted uranium and tritium released to the atmosphere from detonations at the DARHT site. Depleted uranium would be the principal contributor to radiation dose; tritium would contribute about 1 x 10-8 the dose of depleted uranium for acute releases. The major exposure pathway would be inhalation of material released to the atmosphere, which would contribute more than 99 percent of the dose.
More detailed results, identification of postulated facility accidents, and methods of analysis are described in greater detail in appendix I, Facility Accidents. Much of the technical basis for the health impact of the accident analysis is included in appendix H, Human Health. Transportation-related accidents are described in section 5.7.
In the past, DOE has conducted dynamic experiments at LANL with plutonium. Any future experiments with plutonium would always be conducted in double-walled containment vessels, and these experiments would not be expected to result in any release of plutonium to the environment. Potential impacts from facility accidents involving any use of plutonium would be essentially the same as for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.9.
5.4.9.1 Public
As in the uncontained alternatives, potential impacts to members of the public were evaluated for three nearby points of public access: State Road 4, Pajarito Road, and the Bandelier National Monument. The MEI would be located at the State Road 4 location, approximately 0.9 mi (1.5 km) southwest of the site. An individual at this location under the assumed accident and exposure conditions would receive a radiation dose of about 0.01 rem EDE under the vessel containment failure scenario and about 0.001 rem under the building containment breach scenario. The maximum probability of a LCF from these doses would be about 6 x 10-6 and 6 x 10-7, respectively. The maximum probability of beryllium-induced cancers would be about 8 x 10-9 and 8 x 10-10, respectively. Toxicological effects would not be expected, as no more than 0.2 and 0.02 mg, respectively, of any of the released constituents (uranium, beryllium, lead, lithium hydride) would be inhaled. The intakes are less than 2 percent of the IDLH equivalent intake values. Additional results are presented in appendix I, Facility Accidents.
Maximum population dose would occur under the containment vessel breach scenario, in the east-through-southeast direction, with a population dose of about 17 person-rem. Population dose under the building containment breach scenario would be about 1.7 person-rem. Latent cancer fatalities among the population would not be expected from either of these doses (9 x 10-3 and 9 x 10-4 LCFs, respectively). Cancer would not be expected among the population from exposure to beryllium (total incidence of 1 x 10-5 cancers and 1 x 10-6 cancers, respectively).
5.4.9.2 Noninvolved Workers
As in the No Action Alternative, nearby workers not involved with the detonation process would be affected to a lesser extent than involved workers because of their distance from the firing point. Under the Vessel Containment and Phased Containment (preferred alternative) options, access control and other area restrictions would be maintained for planned uncontained detonations that could take place. Other precautions taken under the No Action Alternative would also be maintained. However, for contained detonations, it was assumed that the hazard radius would be lessened, to 1,300 feet (400 m), and that a noninvolved worker would be at this distance and exposed to the material released from the detonation during the entire period of passage.
A noninvolved worker would receive a radiation dose of about 0.05 rem EDE under the vessel containment failure scenario and a dose of about 0.005 rem under the building containment breach scenario. The maximum probability of an noninvolved worker contracting a fatal latent cancer from these doses would be about 2 x 10-5 and 2 x 10-6, respectively. The maximum probability of beryllium-induced cancers would be about 3 x 10-8 and 3 x 10-9, respectively. Toxicological effects would not be expected, as no more than 0.7 mg of any of the released constituents (uranium, beryllium, lead, lithium hydride) would be inhaled. The inhalation intakes for LiH is the largest fraction of IDLH equivalent intake values at less than 8 percent. Additional results are presented in appendix I, Facility Accidents.
5.4.9.3 Workers
Impacts to involved workers would differ little from those described under the No Action Alternative in section 5.1.9.3. During completion of DARHT construction and the associated containment building or vessel cleanout facility, normal construction-type hazards would be encountered. During operations, the accident of greatest consequence would be the inadvertent detonation of high explosive on the firing site or in the containment building when workers are present. This accident is considered unlikely, but it could result in the deaths of all workers (a maximum of 15) in the immediate area.
Also, like the No Action Alternative, another possible accident on the firing site with serious consequences outside the scope of normal industrial or laboratory hazards would be the direct exposure of a worker to the ionizing radiation pulse produced by the DARHT accelerator. Although this accident would be extremely unlikely, a worker could receive a very high acute radiation dose, delivered over a fraction of a micro-second, to a localized portion of the body.
5.4.10 Waste Management
Under this alternative, debris from the majority of detonations at the facility would be contained either by vessels or inside a containment building. Volumes of nonhazardous solid waste, solid and liquid hazardous waste, mixed waste, and TRU waste generated under the Enhanced Containment Alternative for the Vessel Containment, Building Containment, and Phased Containment options would be essentially the same as those for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.10. Wastes generated under the Enhanced Containment Alternative, as for other alternatives, would be subject to treatment, storage, and/or disposal in other LANL Technical Areas. Transportation of these wastes would be conducted following DOT guidelines and using DOE- or DOT-approved containers carried on government vehicles using public roads between LANL facilities, as needed.
5.4.10.1 Vessel Containment Option LLW
Under the Vessel Containment Option, some uncontained detonations would be conducted, up to 25 percent of total annual depleted uranium expenditures of 1,540 lb (700 kg) or a maximum of 385 lb (175 kg) per year. The total estimated LLW generated and disposed from uncontained detonations would be less than 3,000 ft3 (90 m3), based upon a LLW generation rate of 1,800 ft3 (50 m3) LLW per 220 lb (100 kg) of depleted uranium used, as developed for the No Action Alternative (section 5.1.10). The bulk of this waste would be the gravel and soil that is removed with the detonation debris. Total volume of waste generated would depend on the number and frequency of the firing-site detonations and periodic cleanup.
For contained detonations, a reasonably predictable amount of waste would be generated each time. For contained major (hydrodynamic) detonation, the waste volume generated would be about 36 ft3 (1 m3) or up to five 55-gal drums. Some of the waste would be finely divided debris containing uranium, other metals, and occasionally lead. Much of this material would be separated out in the associated recovery facility and either recovered or disposed of separately, so that a reduced volume of LLW would remain for disposal. Assuming 50 percent recovery or separation of contained detonation material, and 20 major contained detonations per year, no more than 360 ft3 (10 m3) of LLW would be generated per year from contained detonations.
Total LLW generation is expected to be no more than 3,600 ft3 (100 m3) of LLW per year under the Vessel Containment Option. Assuming the total LANL LLW disposal volume in future years would be 180,000 ft3yr (5,000 m3/yr) (Bartlit et al. 1993), the Enhanced Containment Alternative, Vessel Containment Option would be projected to contribute no more than two percent of the total LANL LLW volume.
Given a bounding failure rate of five percent and 20 shots per year, one vessel may be projected to fail each year. The failed vessels would be decontaminated and decommissioned and reused as scrap metal so that they would not enter the waste management program.
5.4.10.2 Building Containment Option LLW
All detonations under the Building Containment Option would be conducted inside the containment building. Under this option, no uncontained detonations would occur, and therefore none of the large volumes of contaminated gravel and soil would be generated from cleaning the firing site of debris. LLW generation would be limited to that from contained detonations. As described above under the Vessel Containment Option, this would typically be no more than about 36 ft3 (1 m3) or up to five 55-gal drums per major hydrodynamic detonation. Assuming 50 percent recovery or separation of contained detonation material and 20 major contained detonations per year, no more than 360 ft3 (10 m3) of LLW would be generated per year under the Building Containment Option. Assuming the total LANL LLW disposal volume in future years would be 180,000 ft3/yr (5,000 m3/yr) (Bartlit et al. 1993), the Enhanced Containment Alternative, Building Containment Option would be projected to contribute no more than 0.2 percent of the total LANL LLW volume.
5.4.10.3 Phased Containment Option LLW
Under the phased Containment Option, the following three distinct phases would occur: 1) containment of 5 percent of the materials used during the first five years of operation, 2) containment of 40 percent of the materials used during the second five years of operation, and 3) beginning in the 11th year of operation, containment of at least 75 percent of the materials used. Under these distinct phases, there would be approximately 12,000 ft3/yr (350 m3/yr) of LLW generated during the first 5-year period, approximately 7,500 ft3/yr (210 m3/yr) in the second 5-year period, and 3,600 ft3/yr (101 m3/yr) during the last 20 years of the design life of the facility. The amount of LLW generated is reduced as the percentage of containment increases due to a lesser volume of soil removal.
Assuming the total LANL LLW disposed volume in future years would be 180,000 ft3 (5,000 m3/yr) (Bartlit et al. 1993) the volume of LLW generated under the Phased Containment Option would contribute 7 percent in each of the first five years, 4 percent in each of the second five years, and 2 percent in each of the last 20 years. Again, failed vessels would be decontaminated, decommissioned, and designated as scrap metal.
5.4.11 Monitoring and Mitigation
5.4.11.1 Monitoring
Monitoring under the Enhanced Containment Alternative would be essentially the same as that undertaken for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.11.
5.4.11.2 Mitigation
Under normal operating conditions, two potential impacts would appear to warrant mitigation. Specific actions would be taken to minimize disturbance of the Mexican spotted owls inhabitating Cañon de Valle and Water Canyon near the DARHT site. Noise from construction equipment and activities would be minimized as much as possible. Operational noise from detonations would also be conducted to minimize disturbance. Facility lighting would be placed to direct illumination away from the canyons at night.
Protection of the Nake'muu archeological site may be necessary under certain uncontained detonation test configurations of the Vessel Containment and Phased Containment (preferred alternative) options. Mitigating measures similar to those of the other alternatives (e.g., blast shielding) may be necessary to avoid fragments reaching the site. No other archeological sites in the hazard radius have standing walls that would require mitigation activities. The containment structures used in this alternative would reduce the environmental consequences of operating DARHT and the need for mitigation for detonations performed in containment. Mitigation activities for cultural resources are presented in section 4.6 and 5.11.
5.4.12 Decontamination and Decommissioning
Decontamination and decommissioning under the Enhanced Containment Alternative would be essentially the same as described for the DARHT Baseline Alternative in section 5.2.12. In addition to those D&D activities and impacts, this alternative would result in decommissioning of a containment building and/or an undetermined number of vessels used for a 20- to 30-year design life. However, the amount of soil cleanup would be substantially less (25 to 90 percent) because of containment of wastes within the vessels or building.
5.5 PLUTONIUM EXCLUSION ALTERNATIVE
This section presents the expected environmental consequences associated with the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative.
5.5.1 Land Resources
Potential impacts of the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative on land resources would be essentially the same as for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.1.
5.5.2 Air Quality and Noise
Potential impacts of the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative on air quality essentially would be the same as those for the No Action Alternative for operations, described in section 5.1.2.1.2, and the DARHT Baseline Alternative for construction activities, described in section 5.2.1.1. Potential noise impacts would be essentially the same as for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.2.
5.5.3 Geology and Soils
Potential impacts of the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative on geology and soils would be essentially the same as for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.3.
5.5.4 Water Resources
Potential impacts of the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative on surface and ground water would be essentially the same as for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.4.
5.5.5 Biotic Resources
Potential impacts of the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative on biotic resources would be essentially the same as for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.5.
5.5.6 Cultural and Paleontological Resources
Potential impacts of the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative on cultural and paleontological resources would be essentially the same as for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.6.
5.5.7 Socioeconomic and Community Services
Environmental impacts of socioeconomics and community services for the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative are presented in sections 5.5.7.1 through 5.5.7.4.
5.5.7.1 Demographic Characteristics
The Plutonium Exclusion Alternative would not have any significant impacts on the existing demographic characteristics of communities in the region-of-interest, as described in section 4.7.1.
5.5.7.2 Economic Activities
Under the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative, the DOE would continue operating the PHERMEX Facility on a full-time basis while construction is completed on the DARHT Facility. Once construction of the dual-axis facility is completed, the DOE would begin operating the DARHT Facility on a full-time basis and operate the PHERMEX Facility on only a standby basis. The DOE expects to complete construction and begin operation of the DARHT Facility in FY 1999. At that time the present analysis assumes full-time operation of the DARHT Facility would begin, while full-time operation of the PHERMEX Facility would be scaled back to half time.
Table 5-14 illustrates the combined costs of operating and maintaining PHERMEX along with constructing, operating, and maintaining the DARHT Facility. These combined costs are expressed relative to ones that would be incurred under the No Action Alternative. The estimated costs do not include any site cleanup or D&D of the DARHT or PHERMEX Facilities at the end of their lifetimes. The economic impacts of these expenditures are described in terms of the number of regional jobs, labor income, and goods and services produced in the regional economy.
Table 5-14._Capital-funded Construction and Operating Costs for
the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative (in millions of 1995 dollars)
Year/Cost |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
Total |
Capital |
6.6 |
29.5 |
17.9 |
26.8 |
24.0 |
0.6 |
0 |
0 |
105.3 |
Operations and Maintenance |
4.2 |
4.1 |
4.1 |
4.0 |
7.9 |
7.8 |
7.8 |
7.6 |
47.4 |
The Plutonium Exclusion Alternative would generate 233 FTE jobs in the regional economy. Of this total, 99 would be directly accounted for by project construction and varying levels of operation and maintenance of the PHERMEX and DARHT Facilities. The remaining 134 FTE jobs would be indirectly accounted for by consecutive rounds of regional spending and income generation.
Correspondingly, the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative is estimated to generate an annual average of $4.9 million in regional labor income. Of this total, $2.1 million is directly related to project construction and facility operation and maintenance. The remaining $2.9 million is indirectly generated by consecutive rounds of spending in the regional economy.
Meanwhile, the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative is estimated to generate a total of $8.6 million of goods and services in the regional economy, with $4.5 million directly accounted for by project construction and facility operations and maintenance. The remaining $4.1 million is indirectly accounted for by consecutive rounds of regional spending and income generation.
5.5.7.3 Community Infrastructure and Services
The Plutonium Exclusion Alternative would not have any significant impact on the existing community infrastructure in the region-of-interest, as described in section 4.7.3.
5.5.7.4 Environmental Justice
The construction and operation of the DARHT and PHERMEX facilities under the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative would pose no significant environmental impacts. The foreseeable impacts include fugitive air and noise emissions during facility construction and operations (section 5.2.2), and potential surface or underground water contamination (section 5.2.4). No significant human health impacts appear to exist from either radioactive or hazardous material release or from exposing receptors onsite (workers) or offsite (section 5.1.8). Accordingly, DARHT Facility construction and planned operations under the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative would not pose a disproportionate adverse health or environmental impacts on minority or low-income populations in the region-of-interest [populations residing within 50 mi (80 km) of the site].
5.5.8 Human Health
Potential impacts of the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative on human health would be essentially the same as for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.8.
5.5.9 Facility Accidents
Potential impacts of facility accidents under the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative would be essentially the same as for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.9.
5.5.10 Waste Management
Potential impacts of the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative on waste management would be essentially the same as for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.10.
5.5.11 Monitoring and Mitigation
Potential impacts that would need to be monitored or mitigated under the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative would be essentially the same as for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.11.
5.5.12 Decontamination and Decommissioning
Impacts of D&D under the Plutonium Exclusion Alternative would be essentially the same as for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.12.
5.6 SINGLE AXIS ALTERNATIVE
This section presents the expected environmental consequences associated with the Single Axis Alternative.
5.6.1 Land Resources
Potential impacts on land resources in the Single Axis Alternative would be essentially the same as those for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.1.
5.6.2 Air Quality and Noise
Potential impacts of the Single Axis Alternative on air quality essentially would be the same as the No Action Alternative for operations, described in section 5.1.2.1.2, and the DARHT Baseline Alternative for construction activities, described in section 5.2.1.1.
Potential noise impacts would be essentially the same as for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.2.
5.6.3 Geology and Soils
Potential impacts of the Single Axis Alternative on geology and soils would be essentially the same as those for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.3.
5.6.4 Water Resources
Potential impacts of the Single Axis Alternative on surface and ground water would be essentially the same as those for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.4.
5.6.5 Biotic Resources
Impacts on biotic resources in the Single Axis Alternative would be essentially the same as those for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.5.
5.6.6 Cultural and Paleontological Resources
Impacts on cultural and paleontological resources from the Single Axis Alternative would be essentially the same as those for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.6.
5.6.7 Socioeconomic and Community Services
Environmental impacts on socioeconomics and community services for the Single Axis Alternative are presented in this section. Potential impacts on demographic characteristics, community infrastructure and services, and environmental justice would be essentially the same as the DARHT Baseline Alternative and are described in sections 5.2.7.1, 5.2.7.3, and 5.2.7.4, respectively. Potential impacts on economic activities are presented below.
5.6.7.1 Economic Activities
Under the Single Axis Alternative, the DOE is expected to complete construction of the facility by FY 1999. At that time, DARHT operating costs would replace PHERMEX operating costs (see table 5-15). For purposes of estimating the impacts of the Single Axis Alternative on the regional economy (employment, labor income, and output), the analysis shows the construction and operating expenditures under the Single Axis Alternative relative to those under the No Action Alternative. The estimated capital construction expenditures do not include any site cleanup nor D&D of the dual-axis facility at the end of its lifetime.
Table 5-15._Capital-funded Construction and Operating Costs for
the Single Axis Alternative (in millions of 1995 dollars)
Year/Cost |
1995 |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
Total |
Capital |
6.6 |
29.5 |
17.9 |
5.7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59.6 |
Operations and Maintenance |
4.2 |
4.1 |
4.1 |
4.0 |
5.3 |
5.2 |
5.2 |
5.1 |
37.2 |
Over the period FY 1996 to FY 2002, the Single Axis Alternative is estimated to generate 104 FTE jobs in the regional economy, 44 directly related to project construction and operating expenditures, and the other 60 indirectly generated by consecutive rounds of spending and income generation within the regional economy. The Single Axis Alternative is also estimated to generate an annual average of $2.2 million of regional labor income, $0.9 million directly related to the project, and $1.3 million indirectly generated through consecutive rounds of spending. Finally, the Single Axis Alternative is estimated to generate an annual average of $3.8 million of goods and services in the regional economy, $1.9 million of these directly generated by the project, and $1.9 million indirectly generated by consecutive rounds of spending in the regional economy.
The underlying cost data were provided by LANL (Burns 1995a; Burns 1995b). The costs do not include any expenses associated with site cleanup, nor D&D of either the DARHT or PHERMEX facilities. These relevant data were adjusted using an escalation price change index for DOE defense-related construction projects (Pearman 1994; Anderson 1995).
5.6.8 Human Health
Potential impacts of the Single Axis Alternative on human health would be essentially the same as those for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.8.
5.6.9 Facility Accidents
Potential impacts of facility accidents under the Single Axis Alternative would be essentially the same as those for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.9.
5.6.10 Waste Management
Potential impacts of the Single Axis Alternative on waste management would be the same as those for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.10.
5.6.11 Monitoring and Mitigation
5.6.11.1 Monitoring
Potential impacts that would need to be monitored under the Single Axis Alternative would be the same as those for the No Action Alternative, described in section 5.1.11.
5.6.11.2 Mitigation
Mitigation measures taken under the Single Axis Alternative would be the same as those for the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.11.2.
5.6.12 Decontamination and Decommissioning
Potential impacts of D&D under the Single Axis Alternative would be essentially the same as under the DARHT Baseline Alternative, described in section 5.2.12, except that there would be only one accelerator hall and support equipment for D&D evaluation.
5.7 TRANSPORTATION OF MATERIALS
This section presents the results of an analysis of incident-free (routine operations) and accident consequences associated with transportation of materials, details of which are given in appendix J, Transportation of Materials. For purposes of this EIS, one transportation analysis applies to the No Action Alternative and the Upgrade Alternative (associated with PHERMEX); another analysis applies to the remaining alternatives (associated with DARHT).
All transportation would be in LANL-controlled areas. The analysis presented in appendix J is based on the assumption that the test device would be secured to a flat-bed truck and transported to the receiving facility. The assembled test device would be transported from TA-16-410 to the PHERMEX or the DARHT Facility using roads internal to TA-16 and TA-15 (see figure 3-1). The truck would be loaded at TA-16-410 and transported nonstop approximately 4.7 mi (7.5 km) to the magazine (Building R_242). From the magazine, the test device would be transported nonstop approximately 1.2 mi (2 km) to the PHERMEX gate or 0.9 mi (1.5 km) to the DARHT gate. At each of the facilities, the test device would be transported approximately 1,000 ft (300 m) from the facility gate to the firing site. Because the total distances are so similar, less than 0.3 mi (0.5 km) difference, the longer distance to PHERMEX is used for data presented here.
For purposes of this analysis, 20 shipments per year were assumed. Although 150 lb (70 kg) high explosive is the normal maximum at the firing points, three hypothetical test devices were assumed for analysis to cover a range of high explosive content, including the maximum sizes for the firing points, 500 lb (230 kg) (see sections 3.4.2 and 3.5.2). The three hypothetical test devices are: Test Device 1 with 22 lb (10 kg) high explosive, Test Device 2 with 500 lb (230 kg) high explosive, and Test Device 3 with 1,010 lb (460 kg) high explosive.
Contrary to intuition, Test Device 1 would produce the worst-case worker doses because the device materials would be less dispersed in an accidental explosion. The worst-case results, Test Device 1, are presented in this section unless otherwise stated.
5.7.1 Incident-free Transportation
Potential impacts of routine transportation are discussed in the following sections.
5.7.1.1 Nonradiological Impacts
Nonradiological impacts of routine transportation would result principally from pollutants emitted from the vehicles. The estimated number of fatalities due to vehicle emissions from routine transportation was found to be essentially zero (2.4 x 10-4 LCFs over the life of the project).
5.7.1.2 Radiological Impacts
Radiological doses to the truck crew, onsite workers, and the public, resulting from transportation activities, were calculated using methods described in appendix J, Transportation of Materials. Results of the analysis are provided in table 5-16. The calculated dose is based on 20 shipments per year. The dose to truck crews over the life of the project would be about 1 x 10-4 person-rem. The calculated dose to the public over the life of the project would be less than 3 x 10-9 person-rem. The total dose to the onsite worker population over the life of the project for the No Action Alternative would be about 0.004 person-rem.
Table 5-16._Summary of Analyses for Routine Transportation
for the No Action Alternative and DARHT Baseline Alternative
Population Groupa |
Per Shipment |
Annually | ||
Radiological Dose (person-rem) |
Health Effects (LCFs) |
Radiological Dose (person-rem) |
Health Effects (LCFs) | |
|
Radiological Impactsb Truck Crew Onsite Worker Total |
6 x 10-6 2 x 10-4 2 x 10-4 |
2 x 10-9 7 x 10-8 7 x 10-8 |
1 x 10-4 3 x 10-3 4 x 10-3 |
4 x 10-8 1 x 10-6 1 x 10-6 |
Nonradiological Impacts Onsite Worker |
4 x 10-7 |
8 x 10-6 | ||
Total Radiological and Nonradiological Impacts Truck Crew Onsite Worker |
6 x 10-6 2 x 10-4 |
2 x 10-9 5 x 10-7 |
1 x 10-4 3 x 10-3 |
4 x 10-8 9 x 10-6 |
|
a The calculated dose to the public is less than 1 x 10-10 person-rem and for this analysis is considered essentially zero. b The maximum individual in-transit dose is 6 x 10-9 person-rem per shipment. Truck crew doses for the DARHT Baseline Alternative are slightly lower. | ||||
The potential LCFs were calculated using dose conversion factors given in ICRP 60 (ICRP 1991), i.e., 0.0004 LCFs/person-rem to the onsite worker and truck crew and 0.0005 LCFs per person-rem to the general public, respectively. Cancer would not be expected to occur for the life of the project (workers and crew, 2 x 10-6 LCFs; onsite worker, 5 x 10-5 LCFs; public, less than 4 x 10-11 LCFs).
5.7.2 Impacts of Transportation of
Materials Under Accident Conditions
Potential impacts of transportation of materials under accident conditions are discussed in the following subsections. If an accident occurs, the resulting debris and contamination, if any, would be removed and taken to appropriate LANL facilities as is done for firing-point debris.
5.7.2.1 Nonradiological Impacts
Transport vehicle speed is limited to 35 mph; therefore, vehicle collisions with other vehicles on the transportation route are not considered severe enough to cause fatalities to the truck occupants or occupants of the other vehicles involved in the accident. For the purposes of the analysis in appendix J, the transport vehicle is assumed to impact a stationary object with sufficient force to detonate the high explosive.
Impacts due to explosions are modeled based on accidental detonation of high explosive in each of the hypothetical test devices. Assuming that a peak overpressure of 30 psi (186 kpa) is fatal, all individuals within an approximate radius of 15 ft (5 m), 43 ft (13 m), and 53 ft (16 m) for test devices 1, 2, and 3, respectively, would be subjected to potentially fatal overpressures. The truck crews are assumed to be located within 30 ft (10 m) of the accident. Additionally, approximately 50 percent of the individuals at distances up to 80 ft (24 m) might be killed because of the blast wave. Injuries and fatalities to bystanders from flying shrapnel have not been estimated. There have been no such transportation accidents during more than 30 years of firing activities at TA-15.
In addition to evaluating the impacts from a detonation of the high explosives, an assessment of the consequences of a release of the hazardous materials associated with the devices was performed. It was assumed that 10 percent of the material released would be respirable (see appendix C). The results, based on the meteorological data for the LANL site, are shown in table 5-17. For comparison, although plume passage times are very short in duration, the IDLH exposure limits are also provided in table 5-17.
Table 5-17._Nonradiological Transportation Accident Impacts to the Public
Population Group |
Beryllium (mg/m3) |
Lead (mg/m3) |
Lithium Hydride (mg/m3) |
|
Allowable Limita |
10 |
700 |
55 |
Onsite Workerb |
1.2 x 10-4 |
1.9 x 10-4 |
1.2 x 10-3 |
Offsite Individualc |
1.1 x 10-4 |
1.7 x 10-4 |
1.1 x 10-3 |
|
a IDLH limits taken from NIOSH 1990. b Assumed to be located 0.5 mi (0.75 km) northwest. c Assumed to be located 1 mi (1.5 km) southwest. | |||
5.7.2.2 Radiological Impacts
The analyses of radiological impacts evaluates the impacts to MEI and the public because of a release of radioactive material. The analysis is based on the assumption that the transport vehicle would impact a stationary object, and the high explosive would be detonated. The accident rate used, about 4 accidents per 10 million mi (2 accidents per 10 million km) (Saricks and Kvitek 1994), is a combination of accident rates for rural and urban federally aided highway systems.
Radiological doses were calculated for two population densities of interest [i.e., laboratory open space, about 5 workers/0.4 mi2 (1 km2); and occupied buildings, about 360 workers/0.4 mi2 (1 km2)]. It was assumed that 10 percent of the material aerosolized was respirable. The calculated dose, on a per shipment basis, to the two populations is estimated to be 0.2 person-rem and 17 person-rem, respectively. The integrated risk to the public (i.e., consequences times accident frequency integrated over the entire shipping distance) was estimated to be less than 1 x 10-4 person-rem.
Table 5-18._Radiological Accident Impacts
to the Maximally Exposed Individuals
Receptor |
Radiological Dose per Accident (rem) |
|
Maximum Onsite Workera |
4.1 x 10-4 |
Maximum Offsite Individualb |
2.4 x 10-4 |
|
a Assumed to be located 0.5 mi (0.75) km northwest. b Assumed to be located 1 mi (1.5) km northwest. | |
Radiological doses were also calculated for the MEI, located about 300 ft (100 m) from the release, the onsite MEI, located at the nearest occupied facility, and the offsite MEI, located at the site boundary. For this analysis, based on the location of the site boundary and the nearest public roadway, and the meteorological data, the offsite MEI was assumed to be located approximately 0.9 mi (1.5 km) to the northwest. The onsite MEI is assumed to be located 2,500 ft (0.75 km) to the northwest. The results of the radiological analyses for the MEI are presented in table 5-18.
The largest dose among the groups investigated was calculated to be to the onsite worker and amounted to 4.1 x 10-4 rem. The dose to the offsite MEI would be 3.7 x 10-4 rem. The maximum probability of LCF from this dose would be about 2 x 10-7 for both the onsite worker and the offsite individual. The dose to the individual at 300 ft (100 m) was calculated to be essentially zero; the radioactive cloud was lofted well above and over the individual.
5.8 UNAVOIDABLE ADVERSE IMPACTS AND IRREVERSIBLE AND/OR IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES
The following subsections address unavoidable adverse environmental impacts and irreversible and/or irretrievable commitment of resources.
5.8.1 Unavoidable Adverse Impacts
Potentially unavoidable adverse impacts associated with the No Action Alternative, DARHT Baseline Alternative, Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative, Plutonium Exclusion Alternative, and Single Axis Alternative were identified as follows:
_ Contaminating soils with various materials, including depleted uranium, beryllium, lead, copper, aluminum, and other metals within approximately 460 ft (140 m) of the firing point during testing
_ Disturbing wildlife as a result of blast noise from detonation of high explosives. DOE and the USFWS have negotiated to reduce noise impacts to any threatened or endangered species in the vicinity of the DARHT and PHERMEX facilities (see section 5.11).
_ Initiating small fires as a result of explosives testing.
Unavoidable adverse impacts identified with the Enhanced Containment Alternative would be limited to destruction of a small amount [about 0.25 ac (0.1 ha)] of piñon/ponderosa pine forest habitat for the construction of the cleanup/recycle facility. Any tests which are uncontained may result in the same unavoidable adverse impacts listed above.
5.8.2 Irretrievable and/or Irreversible Commitment of Resources
Irretrievable and/or irreversible commitment of resources associated with the various alternatives are presented in table 5-19.
Table 5-19._Irreversible and/or Irretrievable Commitment of Resources
Factor |
No Actiona Alternative |
DARHT Baseline Alternative |
Upgrade PHERMEXe Alternative |
Enhanced Containment Alternative |
Plutonium Exclusion Alternative Single Axis Alternative | |||
Vesselsb |
Buildingc |
Phasedd |
||||||
|
CONSTRUCTION Construction Materials Concrete (yd3) Cement (tons) Rebar (tons) Fuel Diesel (gal) Gasoline (gal) Propane (lb) Electricity (kWh) Work Force (worker years) Craft Noncraft Project Management (people) Waste Disposal Costs ($ thousands) |
15,000 4,500 600 9,500 9,500 9,500 365,000 50 12 max. 15/day 14.5 |
15,000 4,500 600 11,500 11,500 11,500 365,000 59 14 max. 15/day 14.5 |
28,000 9,000 1,000 17,000 17,000 17,000 750,000 120 29 max. 15/day 14.5 |
16,000 5,100 600 12,500 12,500 12,500 365,000 74 18 max. 15/day 14.5 |
22,000 7,100 900 18,500 18,500 18,500 450,000 140 26 max. 15/day 30.0 |
16,000 5,100 600 12,500 12,500 12,500 365,000 74 18 max. 15/day 14.5 |
15,000 4,900 600 11,500 11,500 11,500 365,000 59 14 max. 15/day 14.5 |
15,000 4,900 600 11,500 11,500 11,500 365,000 59 14 max. 15/day 14.5 |
TOTAL COSTS ($ millions) (construction and equipment) |
49 |
123 |
145 |
154 |
159 |
154 |
123 |
85 |
OPERATIONS Materials Used (Annual) Water (gal) Helium (ft3) Sulfur Hexafluoride (ft3) Energy (Annual) Natural Gas (ft3) Electricity (kWh) |
40,000 6,000 3,100 8,700 550,000 |
70,000 36,000 0 10,400 2,250,000 |
70,000 36,000 0 13,000 2,500,000 |
110,000 36,000 0 13,300 2,600,000 |
110,000 36,000 0 14,800 2,900,000 |
100,000 36,000 0 12,600 2,520,000 |
100,000 36,000 0 10,400 2,250,000 |
60,000 36,000 0 10,400 1,350,000 |
Table 5-19._Irreversible and/or Irretrievable Commitment of Resources _ Continued
Factor |
No Actiona Alternative |
DARHT Baseline Alternative |
Upgrade PHERMEXe Alternative |
Enhanced Containment Alternative |
Plutonium Exclusion Alternative Single Axis Alternative | |||
Vesselsb |
Buildingc |
Phasedd |
||||||
|
Work Force, (worker years) Radiation-trained workers Support staff Operating Costs per Year ($ millions) Material Usage Depleted Uranium (lb) Beryllium (lb) Lead (lb) Copper (lb) Other Metals (lb)f High Explosive (lb) Tritium (Ci) Lithium Hydride (lb) |
9 5 4.2 1,540 20 30 220 440 3,300 3 220 |
15 5 6.5 1,540 20 30 220 440 3,300 3 220 |
15 5 6.5 1,540 20 30 220 440 3,100 3 220 |
24 5 10.4 1,540 20 30 220 440 3,300 3 220 |
24 5 10.4 1,540 20 30 220 440 3,300 3 220 |
22 5 7.5g 9.5h 10.4i 1,540 20 30 220 440 3,300 3 220 |
20 5 6.5 1,540 20 30 220 440 3,300 3 220 |
13 5 5.4 1,540 20 30 220 440 3,300 3 220 |
|
a No construction at PHERMEX; however, construction at proposed DARHT site to complete building for nonhydrodynamic testing purposes. b DARHT Facility plus vessel cleanout facility. c DARHT Facility plus vessel cleanout facility and containment building. d For operations, represents the annual average over the 30-year operating life. The Phased Containment Option of the Enhanced Containment Alternative is divided into three distinct phases of operation: 1) the first five years of operation are marked by 5 percent containment, 2) the second five years of operation are marked by 40 percent containment, and 3) the final phase beginning in the 11th year of operation is marked by 75 percent containment. e New construction at PHERMEX plus DARHT construction noted in footnote a. f When referring to PHERMEX, "other metals" means the sum of all aluminum, boron, brass, iron, inconel, niobium, nickel, silver, tin, tantalum, titanium, tungsten, and vanadium used during each year. g FY 1999 _ 2002 h FY 2003 _ 2007 i FY 2008 and beyond | ||||||||
5.9 CUMULATIVE IMPACTS
The following discussion of cumulative impacts addresses the potential for impacts that are insignificant, when viewed separately, but may become significant when viewed together. Cumulative impacts include impacts on the affected environment of the proposed activities over the life of the project, in addition to past and reasonably foreseeable future activities, whether onsite or offsite and public or private. The only measurable cumulative impacts are those discussed in this section.
As currently projected for the foreseeable future, concentrations of metal contaminants (depleted uranium, beryllium, lead, and other metals) in soil would approximately double for the TA-15 PHERMEX test area under the No Action Alternative or the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative. For the DARHT Baseline Alternative, Plutonium Exclusion Alternative, and the Single Axis Alternative, an area equivalent to that of the PHERMEX test area would be contaminated at the DARHT test site to approximately the current level of the PHERMEX test area. In the Enhanced Containment Alternative, if the vessel approach were used for uncontained tests, the DARHT test site would be contaminated to approximately 10 percent of the current contamination level of the PHERMEX test area. All of these areas could in time (centuries to millennia) contribute to contamination of ground water; however, the contamination levels were estimated through model simulations over 30 years and were found to be lower than drinking water standards. LANL has contaminated soils in other areas that might contribute to ground water contamination. Although these other potential sources have not been quantified, the contribution of any of the alternatives is not expected to increase the cumulative effects to ground water.
Collective worker dose for the LANL site for 1993 amounted to 239 person-rem, with approximately 0.3 person-rem attributable to testing at the PHERMEX Facility. Because the future testing program is expected to be roughly the same under all alternatives, and worker dose is related to operations, worker dose would be expected to be roughly the same 0.1 percent regardless of the alternative analyzed. Testing at PHERMEX or DARHT would be expected to contribute the same, about 0.1 percent, to LANL worker dose and would be inconsequential in terms of cumulative impacts.
Collective dose for the population within 50 miles (80 km) of the LANL site was 1.4 person-rem for 1992. Under the various hydrodynamic testing alternatives addressed here, the collective dose would be expected to range from 0.13 to 0.32 person-rem/yr. Thus, at a maximum for foreseeable conditions, hydrodynamic testing at TA-15 would continue to contribute roughly 10 to 25 percent of the reported collective population dose from LANL operations. Assuming the last 32 years of hydrodynamic testing to have resulted in about 10 person-rem and that an additional 30 years would double that, the cumulative collective dose from hydrodynamic testing at LANL would be about 20 person-rem out of an approximate 90 person-rem for all site sources (based on constant 1992 level). Cancer would not occur from such a cumulative collective dose since the calculated risk is 0.05 LCFs. The annual collective population dose for the same population from natural background radiation would be about 110,000 person-rem/yr. Hence, over the 30-year period, the collective population dose from natural background radiation would be about 3,200,000 person-rem, for which, using the same conversion factor, about 1,600 LCFs would be inferred.
5.10 IMPACTS ON LONG-TERM PRODUCTIVITY
This section addresses the relationship between short-term uses of the environment and the maintenance of its long-term productivity.
Based on the analyses performed in this EIS, impacts on long-term productivity at Area III of TA-15 would be limited to consequences of deposition of depleted uranium and other metals on the soils of the site from continued testing and the potential of such metals for affecting the piñon/ponderosa pine forest habitat. However, no adverse effects on the piñon/ponderosa pine forest habitat over the last 32 years of operations similar to those proposed have been observed. Therefore, no impacts are expected on long-term productivity of the site from implementation of any of the alternatives.
5.11 MITIGATION MEASURES
One purpose of an EIS is to identify measures that could be taken to mitigate any adverse impacts that are disclosed through the impact analysis. Mitigation measures can be those that are required by law or regulation, those that are built into a project from the start, or those that are developed in response to adverse effects identified in the impact analysis. This section summarizes the mitigation measures that might be applied for any alternative analyzed in this EIS. Mitigation measures required by law or regulation are not discussed in this section. Routine mitigation measures that would be taken as part of standard operating practices for construction or operation, such as providing silt fences around the construction site to reduce soil transport or operating sirens to warn personnel and wildlife of tests, are not included.
The mitigation measures discussed here are of three types. Some are common to all alternatives analyzed. Others are engineered design features that have been made part of the DARHT Facility, and would be common to all alternatives that would use that facility (all alternatives except the No Action and Upgrade PHERMEX alternatives). The third type are those that were identified for a specific alternative. Although these are included earlier in this chapter under each alternative, they are summarized here.
5.11.1 Mitigation Common to All Alternatives
Some mitigation measures would apply to all alternatives, regardless of what course of action the DOE would select. References to the DARHT Facility would apply to actions taken to complete the building for other uses as well as actions taken to complete the DARHT Facility for the proposed use.
_ DOE will continue to consult with the four Accord tribes (Cochiti, Jemez, Santa Clara and San Ildefonso Pueblos) to ensure protection of cultural resources in the vicinity of the DARHT and PHERMEX sites (section 4.6.3), and will periodically (at least once a year) arrange for Tribal officials to visit cultural resource sites within TA-15 that are of particular interest to the Tribes.
_ Evaluation of cultural resources in the vicinity of TA-15 will be coordinated with the New Mexico State Historic Preservation Officer for concurrence of eligibility determinations and potential effects (see section 4.6.1).
_ DOE will periodically (at least once a year) pick up metal fragments in the area, and will invite the local tribes to participate so that they can observe whether there has been damage to any cultural resource sites.
_ DOE will develop a way, possibly in conjunction with the State Historic Preservation Officer, the National Park Service, or the local Tribal governments, to periodically photograph or otherwise record the condition of the Nake'muu ruin to determine if activities at TA-15 are causing any structural changes to the ruin over time.
_ DOE and LANL have developed a Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan for the DARHT Facility which was implemented before construction activities began. The plan includes measures for erosion control, sedimentation control, surface restoration and revegetation, storm water retention, and a general housekeeping plan (see appendix K).
_ DOE and LANL will develop a habitat management plan for all threatened and endangered species occurring throughout LANL. This plan would be used to determine long-range mitigation actions to protect the habitat for these species (see appendix K).
_ DOE and LANL will take specific mitigation actions to protect the nesting habitat of the Mexican spotted owl, such as not disturbing habitat within 0.25 mi (0.4 km) of known nesting habitat (see appendix K).
_ Construction activities will be restricted at the DARHT site during the breeding season for the Mexican spotted owl (March 1 to August 31). These measures include limits on light sources, noise, and restricted access for personnel and equipment (see appendix K).
_ To protect the habitat for many wildlife species, including Mexican spotted owls, raptors, and salamanders, DOE will not remove trees or dead snags without contacting the LANL ecological studies team (see appendix K).
_ To protect the habitat for many wildlife species, including threatened and endangered species, LANL ecological studies team will conduct field surveys to check for the presence of these species prior to site activities such as collecting metal fragments; an appropriate vegetation buffer zone will be maintained between facilities and the canyon rims to minimize erosion from site activities (see appendix K).
_ Native trees will be planted, as appropriate, for erosion control and landscaping to provide additional wildlife habitat (see appendix K).
_ Waterflow from the facilities will be monitored to ensure compliance with permitted outfalls (see appendix K).
_ Any permanent or temporary fencing or other barriers will be constructed so as to minimize the effects on large mammal and predator species movements (see appendix K).
_ The LANL ecological studies team will collect baseline data on any contaminants present, and will monitor contaminants by sampling soils, plants, animals, and roadkill at the TA-15 facilities.
_ Construction noise would be minimized as much as possible to mitigate adverse impacts to site workers and the general public.
5.11.2 Mitigation by Engineered Design Features
These mitigation measures have been engineered into the DARHT Facility. The facility was designed and (partially) constructed to incorporate many features that would limit potential adverse environmental impacts.
_ Orienting the two accelerator halls of the DARHT Facility to provide a "blast shadow" to minimize the possibility of flying fragments reaching the Nake'muu ruin.
_ Providing radiation shielding around the accelerators to limit radiation exposure to workers in the facility.
_ Construction of an earthen berm to limit radiation exposure beyond the firing site.
_ Providing spill containment (physical barriers or sills) inside the facility, with sufficient capacity to contain all hazardous material spills that could conceivably occur in the facility.
_ The DARHT site layout includes mitigation to specific cultural resource sites. The access road was routed to avoid two cultural resource sites, and the sites were fenced to protect them from disturbance during construction. At the request of the San Ildefonso Pueblo, a third site was capped and covered by the earthen radiation shielding berm instead of excavating the site. See section 4.6.1.
5.11.3 Mitigation By Alternatives
For the DARHT Baseline Alternative and all alternatives that would involve operating the DARHT Facility (all alternatives except the No Action Alternative and the Upgrade PHERMEX Alternative), glass plates, sandbags, or other shielding material would be used for mitigation during large uncontained shots to:
_ Deflect metal fragments and protect cultural resource sites from being reached by flying shrapnel
_ Break up fragments, buffer noise, and limit contaminant releases to the Mexican spotted owl habitat
For the Enhanced Containment Alternative the following mitigation measures would apply.
_ The method of enhanced containment, under the Building Containment, Vessel Containment, or Phased Containment options, would mitigate soils contamination and other adverse impacts from flying shrapnel for those tests that would be contained.
_ Under any option, the cleanout facility would mitigate adverse impacts from cleaning out the containment vessel or building by means of recycling materials and the processes used. See section 3.7.1.3.
5.12 REFERENCES CITED IN CHAPTER 5
Anderson, A.B., 1995, EIS Information, LANL Memorandum No. DX-11:95-74, February 15, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
Bartlit, et al., 1993, A Fresh Perspective on the Proposed Expansion of Area G at TA-54, October, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
Burns, M.J., 1995a, Response to Initial DARHT EIS Data Request, LANL Memorandum No. DX-DO:DARHT-95-16, January 30, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
Burns, M.J., 1995b, Revised Cost Estimates and Suggested Text Revisions for the Final DARHT EIS, LANL Memorandum No. DX-DO: DARHT-95-100, August 16, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1994, DOE Explosives Safety Manual, DOE/EV/06194, Revision 7, August, Washington, D.C.
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1993, 1992 LANL Dose [Annual Air Emissions Report for the calendar year 1992], June, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1992, Final Environmental Impact Statement and Environmental Impact Report for Continued Operation of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, DOE/EIS-0157, August, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Fong, S., 1993, Letter to L. Gay (New Mexico Environment Department), May 21, Department of Energy, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
Gay, L., 1993, Letter to S. Fong (U.S. Department of Energy), May 27, New Mexico Environment Department, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
Graf, W.L., 1993, Geomorphology of Plutonium in the Northern Rio Grande, LA-UR-93-1963, March, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
ICRP, 1991, "1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection," Annals of the ICRP, ICRP Publication 60, Vol. 21, No. 1-3, ISSN-0146-6453, Pergamon Press, Oxford England.
Korecki, N.T., 1988, Geotechnical Investigation Report Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrotest Facility Los Alamos National Laboratories Los Alamos, New Mexico SHB Job. No. E88-1154, Sergent, Hauskins and Beckwith Consulting Geotechnical Engineers, Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Merlan, T.W., 1989, Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrotest (DARHT) Facility, Letter to H.E. Valencia, February 21, SHPO (State Historic Preservation Officer), State of New Mexico Office of Cultural Affairs, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
Pearman, D.W., 1994, Economic Escalation Indices for Department of Energy (DOE) Construction, Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Projects, DOE Memorandum to Distribution, February 22, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.
Risberg, D., 1995, Draft Biological and Floodplain Wetland Assessment for the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamics Test Facility (DARHT), LA-UR-95-647, February, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
Saricks, C., and T. Kvitek, 1994, Longitudinal Review of State-Level Accident Statistics for Carriers of Interstate Freight, ANL/ESD/TM-68, March, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois.
Sutcliffe, W.G., et al., 1995, A Perspective on the Dangers of Plutonium, April 14, UCRL-ID-118825, Center for Security and Technology Studies, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California.
Vibronics, Inc., 1995, Acoustic and Seismic Testing at the PHERMEX Facility Conducted For: Environmental Impact Statement for DARHT Facility Los Alamos National Laboratory (March 10, 1995 _ March 11, 1995) Evansville, Indiana.
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