CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This chapter outlines the environmental review for the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility Environmental Impact Statement.
Important Terminology
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program _ DOE's single, highly integrated technical program for maintaining the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in an era without nuclear testing and without new weapons development and production. To meet these requirements, a "science-based" program is being developed to increase understanding of the basic scientific phenomena associated with nuclear weapons.
Dynamic Experiment _ An experiment to provide information regarding changes in materials under conditions caused by the detonation of high explosives.
Hydrodynamic Test _ A dynamic, integrated systems test of a mock-up nuclear package (figure 1-2) during which the high explosives are detonated and the resulting motions and reactions of materials and components are observed and measured. The explosively generated high pressures and temperatures cause some of the materials to behave hydraulically (like a fluid).
Hydrodynamic Testing Facility _ A facility in which to conduct dynamic and hydrodynamic testing for nuclear and conventional weapons research and assessment. Fast diagnostic systems that are available include radiographic, electrical, optical, laser, and microwave. The testing can provide both two- and three-dimensional information for performance evaluation.
Enhanced Radiography _ A capability for producing extremely high-resolution, time-phased, photographic images of an opaque object by transmitting a beam of x-rays (or gamma rays) through it onto an adjacent photographic film; the image(s) results from variations in thickness, density, and chemical composition of the object.
1.1 OVERVIEW
The U. S. Department of Energy (DOE) proposes to provide enhanced high-resolution radiography capability to perform hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments in support of its historical mission and near-term stewardship of the nuclear weapons stockpile. This environmental impact statement (EIS) analyzes the environmental impacts of alternative ways to accomplish the proposed action. The DOE's preferred alternative would be to complete and operate the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility under the Phased Containment Option (a new option since the draft DARHT EIS) of the Enhanced Containment Alternative at its Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in northern New Mexico. An artists' concept of the DARHT Facility is shown in figure 1-1.
This EIS has a classified supplement that provides additional information and analysis. Although the details of a nuclear weapon are classified, figure 1-2 provides an unclassified summary of a nuclear weapon.
DOE began the preliminary design for DARHT in the early 1980s and conducted a series of environmental reviews for the project between 1982 and 1989. DOE concluded that no significant environmental impact should result from constructing and operating the facility. Funding for DARHT was authorized and appropriated by Congress in 1988. Construction of the DARHT Radiographic Support Laboratory began in 1988 and was completed in 1990. In 1993, DOE decided to fund the accelerator and x-ray equipment for the second axis of DARHT under a separate budget line item. Construction of the actual DARHT Facility began in April 1994.
In October 1994, three citizen groups wrote to the Secretary of Energy requesting, among other things, that DOE prepare an EIS on the DARHT Facility. They also requested that further construction of the facility be halted until an EIS was completed. On November 16, 1994, two of these groups (the Los Alamos Study Group and the Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety) filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court, Albuquerque, New Mexico, to enjoin DOE from proceeding with the DARHT project until completion of the EIS and issuance of the Record of Decision (ROD). On November 22, 1994, DOE published a Federal Register notice of its intent to prepare this DARHT EIS [59 FR 60134]; see appendix A. On January 27, 1995, the court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining DOE from further construction of the DARHT Facility and related activities, such as procuring special facility equipment, pending completion of this EIS and the related ROD. The court entered a final judgment on May 5, 1995. Figure 1-3 is a photograph of the DARHT site, taken in May 1995, showing the condition of the DARHT Facility at the time of construction shutdown and when the site was secured in a standby condition. No construction has taken place since January 27, 1995.
Preparing an EIS at this time responds to public concern and allows for a full dialogue between DOE and the State, Tribal, county, and municipal governments; other Federal agencies; and the general public. The EIS will also provide the basis for appropriate mitigation measures, if needed, for the course of action selected.
1.2 ORGANIZATION OF THIS EIS
This EIS consists of six chapters.
_ Chapter 1 _ Introduction: DARHT background and the environmental analysis process.
_ Chapter 2 _ Purpose and Need: reasons why DOE needs to take action at this time.
_ Chapter 3 _ Proposed Action and Alternatives: the way DOE proposes to meet the specified need and alternative ways the specified need could be met. This chapter includes a summary of expected environmental impacts if any of the alternatives analyzed in this EIS were to be implemented.
_ Chapter 4 _ Affected Environment: aspects of the human environment (natural, built, and social) that might be affected by any of the alternatives analyzed in this EIS.
_ Chapter 5 _ Environmental Consequences: comparative analyses of the changes or impacts that any alternative would be expected to have on the affected elements of the human environment. Impacts are compared to the human environment that would be expected to exist if no action were taken (the No Action Alternative).
_ Chapter 6 _ Regulatory Requirements: agencies and individuals consulted, and environmental regulations that would apply if any of the alternatives analyzed in this EIS were to be implemented.
The Proposed Action
Provide enhanced high-resolution radiography capability to perform hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments.
DARHT EIS Alternatives
_ No Action: Continue to operate PHERMEX at LANL and FXR at LLNL.
_ DARHT Baseline Alternative: Complete and operate the DARHT Facility at LANL.
_ Upgrade PHERMEX: Upgrade PHERMEX with the enhanced radiography technology instead of completing the DARHT Facility.
_ Enhanced Containment: In addition to containing all experiments involving plutonium, enclose most or all experiments. Three containment options are considered under this alternative: 1) the Vessel Containment Option, 2) the Building Containment Option, and 3) the Phased Containment Option. The Phased Containment Option is the DOE's preferred alternative.
_ Plutonium Exclusion: Exclude any applications involving experiments with plutonium at the DARHT Facility.
_ Single Axis: Complete and operate only a single axis of the DARHT Facility.
1.3 ALTERNATIVES ANALYZED
This EIS analyzes the environmental impacts associated with constructing and operating a facility that would provide the needed enhanced capability for hydrodynamic testing and dynamic experiments. Radiographic hydrodynamic testing is now conducted at two existing facilities within the DOE complex _ the Pulsed High Energy Radiation Machine Emitting X-Rays (PHERMEX) Facility at LANL and the Flash X-Ray (FXR) Facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in California. The potential impacts of five operational alternatives also are analyzed in the EIS and compared to the expected impacts of the No Action Alternative (see box). DOE considered, but did not analyze, several other alternatives (see section 3.10).
1.4 LAWS AND REGULATIONS
This EIS is being prepared pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) [42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.], the Council on Environmental Quality NEPA regulations [40 CFR 1500_1508], and DOE NEPA regulations [10 CFR 1021].
1.5 PUBLIC REVIEW OF DRAFT EIS
In May 1995, DOE made the draft DARHT EIS available for review and comment. Over 500 copies of the draft EIS were distributed. The draft was distributed to Congressional members and committees; the State of New Mexico; the Tribal governments of Cochiti, Jemez, Santa Clara, and San Ildefonso Pueblos; other tribal governments and American Indian Organizations; Los Alamos, Rio Arriba, and Santa Fe County governments; other Federal agencies; private consultants; public interest groups; and the general public.
DOE held public hearings on May 31 and June 1, 1995, in Los Alamos and Santa Fe, New Mexico, to afford the public and other parties an opportunity to provide spoken and written comments on the draft EIS. In addition, DOE extended invitations to the State of New Mexico; Cochiti, Jemez, Santa Clara, and San Ildefonso Pueblos; Los Alamos, Rio Arriba, and Santa Fe counties; certain other Federal agencies, [in particular the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), the U.S. Department of the Interior, and the Department of Defense]; and New Mexico congressional members to participate in briefings regarding the DARHT EIS or specific issues related to the environmental analyses. During the public comment period on the draft EIS, DOE and LANL hosted several tours of the DARHT and PHERMEX sites for State personnel, Tribal officials, local government officials, other Federal agencies, and other interested parties.
The public comments received are included in their entirety in chapter 2 of volume 2; DOE responses to these comments are presented in chapter 3 of volume 2. DOE received written comments from 40 parties and oral comments from 48 individuals at its public hearing.
In addition to the unclassified portion of the draft DARHT EIS, DOE provided the draft classified supplement to the draft EIS for review by appropriately cleared parties with a need to know the classified material. These included the Department of Defense, the EPA, the State of New Mexico, and certain Tribal governments. The final classified supplement reflects the external reviews.
Major Changes _ Draft to Final DARHT EIS
_ DOE has added a Phased Containment Option to the Enhanced Containment Alternative.
_ DOE's preferred alternative has changed from the DARHT Baseline Alternative to the Phased Containment Option of the Enhanced Containment Alternative.
_ Two alternative sites within LANL have been identified as potential locations for the proposed vessel cleanout facility.
_ Recent field surveys have confirmed the presence of a federally listed threatened species, the Mexican spotted owl, in the vicinity of the DARHT site. In consultation with the USFWS, measures have been identified to mitigate any adverse effect to the spotted owl.
_ DOE has decided to propose to incorporate upgraded accelerator equipment within both the first and second axis of the proposed DARHT Facility.
_ DOE has started preparation of the Stockpile Steward-ship and Management PEIS.
_ The final EIS includes unclassified aspects of the analysis contained in the classified supplement.
1.6 MAJOR CHANGES, DRAFT TO FINAL DARHT EIS
DOE has revised the draft EIS in response to public comments received, provided additional environmental baseline information, and discussed additional technical considerations. The major changes in this final EIS are noted in the box.
The final DARHT EIS also reflects the commitment made by the President on August 11, 1995, to seek a "zero-yield" Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. A "zero-yield" treaty would ban any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. In committing the United States to this policy, the President stated that maintaining a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile is a supreme interest of this country and that the Nation's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program will ensure the safety and reliability of weapons in the enduring stockpile. The type of capability proposed for the DARHT Facility is essential to assuring the continued safety and reliability of the stockpile under a "zero-yield" test ban.
1.6.1 Phased Containment Option
(Preferred Alternative)
The draft DARHT EIS indicated that DOE's preferred alternative for meeting its need for enhanced radiographic hydrodynamic testing was to complete and operate the DARHT Facility. Under this alternative, most tests and experiments would be uncontained tests _ that is, the test assembly would be placed in the open air at the firing point, the high explosives would be detonated, and the DARHT Facility would be used to radiograph and measure the resulting explosion or implosion. The draft EIS also analyzed an Enhanced Containment Alternative with two options. Under the Vessel Containment Option, most tests and experiments would be conducted inside modular steel containers. Under the Building Containment Option, all tests and experiments would be conducted inside a concrete building that would enclose the firing point.
After reviewing the environmental impacts identified in the draft EIS, DOE reconsidered the advisability of conducting the majority of the future hydrodynamic testing program as uncontained tests. DOE noted that, over the past 50 years, the ongoing program of uncontained testing had contaminated the soil in the vicinity of the existing firing sites at TA-15, particularly as a result of tests with depleted uranium. DOE re-examined an earlier LANL suggestion to explore the use of modular steel containment vessels, which would require DOE to build a separate vessel cleanout facility to recycle the containers for repeated use.
At the same time, in response to DOE's invitation to comment on the draft DARHT EIS, many commenters indicated that they would prefer that more tests be contained. Many of the comments received agreed that further contamination from depleted uranium and other hazardous materials could be lessened if DOE would conduct most or all tests and experiments following one or the other of the Enhanced Containment Alternative options discussed in the draft EIS. Both the New Mexico Environment Department and the EPA expressed this point of view (see volume 2 of this EIS). In addition to public comments received, during consultations with American Indian Tribes and the USFWS, DOE agreed that containment would provide additional mitigation from flying shrapnel, which in turn could mitigate possible adverse impacts to cultural resource sites or wildlife.
The Enhanced Containment Alternative options analyzed in the draft EIS posed hypothetical "bounding" situations, where DOE based its analysis of environmental impacts on somewhat infeasible operating conditions. From a programmatic standpoint, however, either of these options would have serious design or operating limitations. For example, under the Building Containment Option the concrete containment structure would have to be very large in comparison to the firing site to contain the overpressure from an explosive test; DOE would forego the capability for experiments or tests using larger amounts of high explosives or some other specific types of large tests because of the structural limitations of the building. This option places limits on DOE's ability to conduct dynamic experiments with plutonium because of the difficulty in moving the large, double-walled steel containment vessels needed for plutonium experiments in and out of the containment building.
Under the Vessel Containment Option, the EIS analysis assumes that the DARHT Facility would begin operation with 75 percent of the tests and experiments conducted inside modular, single-walled steel containment vessels. However, the number of tests that could be conducted early in the operating life of the facility would be significantly reduced if this limitation were imposed. Although some conceptual work has been done, DOE has not yet designed the vessels. DOE would have to perfect a prototype vessel before fabricating all the vessels required. Also, the Vessel Containment Option depends on construction of a vessel cleanout facility; the design for this building could not be finalized until after the prototype vessels were perfected to determine the specific details of cleanout equipment, interface to the vessel, and other operational techniques. DOE estimates that it would take approximately 10 years beyond the availability date for the DARHT Facility to complete these activities and be able to conduct a full schedule of contained tests.
After considering the benefits of mitigation afforded by enhanced containment weighed against the programmatic constraints that would result from implementing either of the two Enhanced Containment Alternative options and in response to public comment on the draft EIS, DOE decided to analyze a third option, Phased Containment, and to designate this as the Agency's preferred course of action. Accordingly, in this final EIS the preferred alternative identified in the draft EIS (to complete and operate the DARHT Facility) has been renamed the DARHT Baseline Alternative; this alternative still serves as a starting point for other alternatives and provides a basis of comparison. The Phased Containment Option of the Enhanced Containment Alternative, now the DOE's preferred alternative, is essentially like the Vessel Containment Option except that implementation would be phased in over 10 years to reach the level of containment analyzed under the Vessel Containment Option. This would be accomplished in two 5-year increments over 10 years; the third phase would extend for the remainder of the operating life of the facility.
Implementing the Phased Containment Option would bring containment to the levels described in the Vessel Containment Option of the Enhanced Containment Alternative in the draft EIS for the last 20 years of the expected operating lifetime. This option would also allow DOE to proceed in the near-term to complete the DARHT Facility instead of waiting to design prototype vessels and the vessel cleanout facility, but would also allow DOE to take advantage of the additional environmental protection benefits of containing most tests and experiments in the future. DOE and LANL would develop operating procedures so that, if programmatic requirements so indicated, any given test or experiment could be performed uncontained (except for dynamic experiments with plutonium, which would always be contained in double-walled steel vessels). However, in the aggregate over the lifetime of the facility, most tests and experiments could be contained in vessels. The preferred alternative includes construction and operation of the vessel cleanout facility as part of DOE's proposal.
Because this EIS includes the proposed vessel cleanout facility as part of both the Vessel Containment Option and the Phased Containment Option (preferred alternative) of the Enhanced Containment Alternative, DOE has added site-specific details to this final EIS pertaining to the proposed cleanout facility. In the draft EIS, DOE mentioned generally that the facility would occupy about 1 ac (0.4 ha); in the final EIS, DOE identifies two specific 1-ac (0.4-ha) parcels and an access road location. DOE and LANL have conducted site-specific field surveys of the two parcels and the access road location to obtain additional environmental baseline data concerning cultural resources and biologic resources, specifically threatened and endangered species habitat. The two alternative sites and potential access road location are identified in section 3.7; environmental baseline information is identified in chapter 4 and analyzed in chapter 5.
1.6.2 Mexican Spotted Owl
The draft DARHT EIS included a discussion of federally listed threatened and endangered species, but did not mention the Mexican spotted owl, a species that was federally listed as threatened in November 1994. Just after the draft EIS was issued in May 1995, LANL biologists conducted their first field survey for the Mexican spotted owl and identified that suitable habitat existed in the vicinity of the DARHT site. Later in May, they documented field observations of two spotted owls and in June and July confirmed that the owls had successfully nested and fledged two owlets. The final EIS has been revised to include this information and the results of consultations between DOE and the USFWS.
The draft DARHT EIS stated that DOE had not yet started consultation with the USFWS under the requirements of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Like NEPA, the ESA includes certain procedural provisions that a Federal agency must take to ensure that the habitat for threatened or endangered species is not jeopardized. Although NEPA regulations provide that a NEPA review should discuss the status of any consultations with the USFWS under the ESA, the NEPA review and the ESA process are independent regulatory requirements. The ESA review is initiated when an agency submits a completed biological assessment to the USFWS. DOE and LANL revised the draft biological assessment in May 1995 and included the new information on the Mexican spotted owls and the mitigation measures developed in consultation with the USFWS. DOE submitted the revised assessment to the USFWS in July 1995, and in August the USFWS concurred with DOE's finding that the DARHT Facility is not likely to adversely affect the Mexican spotted owl.
The final DARHT EIS includes updated information pertaining to the discovery of the Mexican spotted owls in the vicinity of the DARHT site (see section 4.5.4, chapter 5, and appendix K). It also includes a discussion of the process and results of the informal consultation between DOE and the USFWS (section 6.8 and appendix K). Mitigation measures agreed to between DOE, LANL, and the USFWS to protect the Mexican spotted owl and other wildlife and plant species are discussed in section 5.11.2 and appendix K.
1.6.3 Upgraded Accelerator Equipment
As part of the ongoing process for the development of technology for enhanced, high-resolution radiography capability, DOE has decided that it would be useful, cost-effective, and feasible to plan for upgraded accelerator and x-ray diagnostic equipment to be incorporated into all alternatives that propose to use accelerators as described in the DARHT Baseline. By extending the accelerators using existing designs to increase the minimum electron-beam energy, about 25 percent from a nominal 16 MeV to a nominal 20 MeV using new x-ray detection equipment, and by enhancing existing equipment to generate a higher current beam, DOE proposes to increase the output x-ray intensity by about 2 to 4 times while still maintaining the small x-ray spot size. The facilities proposed in the various alternatives in this EIS support the upgraded accelerator equipment without modifications in facility footprint or service. For the purposes of this EIS, DOE has decided to bound the impact analysis by considering electron beam energies of up to 30 MeV and output x-ray dose of up to 2,000 R. No additional environmental impacts have been identified between the draft EIS and the final EIS as a result of the proposed accelerator upgrade; however, project costs would be higher as shown in table 3-4.
1.6.4 Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS
The draft DARHT EIS was issued in May 1995, and although it referenced DOE's plans to prepare a Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic EIS (PEIS), DOE did not formally issue its Notice of Intent to prepare the PEIS until June 1995. The text of the final EIS has been modified to reflect DOE's May 1995 report, The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program: Maintaining Confidence in the Safety and Reliability of the Enduring U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, and the PEIS Notice of Intent (see section 2.6).
1.6.5 Unclassified Impacts for the Classified Supplement
DOE prepared a classified supplement as part of the DARHT EIS. The draft classified supplement was completed concurrently with the unclassified portion of the draft DARHT EIS in May 1995, and the final classified supplement was completed concurrently with this unclassified portion of the final EIS. After the draft EIS was issued and as part of its ongoing declassification efforts and normal classification reviews, DOE determined that most of the environmental impacts identified were not classified, although they depend on classified information. Accordingly, in May 1995, DOE issued an unclassified summary of the environmental impacts from the classified supplement. This was released after the draft EIS had already been distributed, but it was made available to the general public and was announced in the Federal Register and at the public hearings on the draft DARHT EIS. For the most part, this information discusses the potential for adverse impacts to workers and the public under routine and accident conditions during dynamic experiments with plutonium. Many people commented on the information contained in the unclassified summary (see volume 2). One commenter asked that DOE incorporate the results of the unclassified summary into this final EIS.
To provide the public with as full a disclosure as possible of the environmental impacts that will be considered by the DOE in deciding whether or not to proceed with the DARHT proposal, DOE has incorporated the results of the environmental impact analysis contained in the classified supplement into this unclassified portion of the final DARHT EIS. The human health impacts and accident scenarios analyzed are included in chapter 5 and appendixes H and I.
1.6.6 Other Changes
The final DARHT EIS reflects other changes made to update information, correct errors, and incorporate the suggestions and comments made by the state, tribes, other local governments and Federal agencies, the general public, and DOE and laboratory reviewers. Of note is information from two sources released just before this final EIS was issued: information from the President's statement of August 11, 1995, regarding this Nation's commitment to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and moratorium on small-scale nuclear tests, and information from a report, Stockpile Surveillance: Past and Future, released August 7, 1995, by the three DOE weapons laboratories _ LANL, LLNL, and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) _ that discusses the expected lifetimes of weapons systems in the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile and the potential for safety, reliability, or aging concerns based on past surveillance results.
1.7 NEXT STEPS
The ROD may be issued no sooner than 30 days after the final EIS. The ROD will explain all factors, including environmental impacts, that DOE considered in reaching its decision (see inside back cover). The ROD will specify the alternative or alternatives that are considered to be environmentally preferable. If the selected alternative is different from the environmentally preferred alternative, the ROD will present the rationale for its selection. DOE anticipates that, in addition to environmental impacts, the decision will be based on cost, technology, national security, and infrastructure considerations. If mitigation measures, monitoring, or other conditions are adopted as part of the Agency's decision, these will be summarized in the ROD as applicable, and included in a Mitigation Action Plan. The Mitigation Action Plan would explain how and when mitigation measures would be implemented, and how DOE would monitor the mitigation measures over time to judge their effectiveness. The Mitigation Action Plan must be in place prior to taking action that causes the impact. The ROD and Mitigation Action Plan also will be placed in the LANL Community Reading Room and will be available to interested parties upon request.
1.8 REFERENCE CITED IN CHAPTER 1
Johnson, K., et al., 1995, Stockpile Surveillance: Past and Future, August, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratory.
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