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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

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APPENDIX D

GEOLOGY AND SOILS (SOILS CONTAMINATION)

This appendix describes the soils contamination resulting from firing-site activities. The description is presented both in terms of the level of soils contamination evident at firing sites, and in terms of the distance from the firing point (i.e., the soil contamination circle radius) at which levels of contamination cannot be distinguished from known background concentrations of metals.

Observed contamination of the soils surrounding the PHERMEX firing point provides the basis for a reasonable estimate of future soil contamination levels at the PHERMEX or DARHT sites and the soil contamination circle radius applicable to either site. Data from the E-F firing sites, located on the watershed for Potrillo Canyon and also within TA-15, provide additional insight into the maximum soil contamination levels and the levels of contamination as a function of soil depth. Results from an aerial radiological survey provide an integrated assessment of surface soil contamination levels and show that the land area surrounding the PHERMEX firing point exhibits uranium-238 contamination above background levels. Finally, operational aspects of the cleanup of depleted uranium are summarized.

D.1 ABSTRACT

With respect to the soils environment, the existing PHERMEX firing site is an appropriate analogue for future contamination of firing sites located at either the PHERMEX or DARHT sites. PHERMEX is located approximately 2,000 ft (610 m) southeast of DARHT in TA-15 on Threemile Mesa. Soils, precipitation, and vegetation of the two sites are similar. A similar inventory of depleted uranium, i.e., 35,000 lb (~16,000 kg) depleted uranium (Anderson 1995), has been used at PHERMEX, as is planned for the No Action or DARHT Baseline alternatives, i.e., 46,000 lb (~21,000 kg) depleted uranium. Lesser amounts of beryllium and lead are forecast to be used in future tests than have been used in the past 32 years of testing at the PHERMEX firing site (Anderson 1995). Soils contamination observed at the E-F firing sites provides an upper bound to what might be expected under either the No Action Alternative (implying continued use of the PHERMEX site) or DARHT Baseline Alternative (implying use of the DARHT site) because of the higher inventory used at the E-F firing sites between 1943 and 1973. Based on soils contamination data from PHERMEX and E-F firing sites and the ratio of inventory planned for use versus that used at PHERMEX, the maximum average soil contamination level for depleted uranium at the firing point of the DARHT site is not anticipated to be greater than 5,300 ppm. Similarly, the maximum average soil contamination level observed at PHERMEX in the vicinity of the firing point under either the No Action or Upgrade alternatives would be approximately double that observed currently at PHERMEX or 9,300 ppm.

The amount of explosive used in individual tests would be no greater than that used at PHERMEX in the past 32 years. The general pattern and number of tests (i.e., large and small explosives amounts) would be virtually the same over the next 30 years (under any of the proposed alternatives) as that used during the past 32 years. Thus, the radius of a circle defining the area with soils contamination above background (soils contamination circle) at PHERMEX should be virtually the same for either continued operation at PHERMEX or operation of DARHT. That soil contamination circle radius at the PHERMEX site is approximately 460 ft (140 m).

Approximately 70 percent of the depleted uranium used at PHERMEX in open-air experiments is removed from the firing point and disposed during periodic cleanup operations. However, all beryllium, lead, copper, and aluminum used at the firing point in each alternative is assumed to be released to and remain in the environment within the soil contamination circle. Cleanup of these materials has not been documented. Surface soil concentrations of beryllium and lead indicate they drop to background levels within 200 ft (61 m) of the firing point, well within the soil contamination circle radius of 460 ft (140 m). No information was found on the distribution of copper and aluminum in firing site soils; however, it is assumed that they, like the other metals, remain initially within the soil contamination circle.

D.2 PHERMEX FIRING SITE SOIL CONTAMINATION

Results of a soil sampling survey conducted at the PHERMEX firing site have been reported (Fresquez 1994). Over 20 soil surface samples were collected from the 0- to 3-in (0- to 7.6-cm) depth at six distances along the length of four transects radiating outward from the center of the detonation area towards the NE, E, SE, and SSE. Two sediment samples were also collected: one located in a drainage channel about 240 ft (73 m) northeast of the detonation pad and the other located approximately 200 ft (61 m) south of the pad. Results of this sampling effort are summarized in table D-1Table D-1.-Average Uranium, Beryllium, and

Lead Concentrations in Surface Soils at PHERMEX

Sample Locations or Description - Distance ft (m)

Mean Concentrations (ppm)

Total Uranium

Beryllium

Lead

0

161.5

0.6

230.0

20 (6.1)

1746.9

18.5

93.9

40 (12.2)

3789.8

1.6

68.4

80 (24.4)

315.4

3.0

24.5

160 (48.8)

165.7

73.3

39.0

200 (61)

26.8

1.0

13.7

Simple Average

1210

18

52

NE Drainage Channel

105

3.1

16

S Drainage Channel

11.5

1.2

9.5

Background

(mean + 2 std dev)

3.4

2.88

54

Source: Fresquez 1994

, showing mean values at various distances from the firing point. Note, the data contained in table D-1 include background and, therefore, are not net values. Note also that the maximum average values, referred to later as the maximum average, does not occur at the same distance from the firing point for the different metals.

Total uranium (i.e., the sum of all uranium mass regardless of the isotope mix) in individual soil samples ranged in concentration from 0.8 to 13,398 ppm. The highest concentration, 13,398 ppm, is well above the other observations and resulted from a soil sample taken at the base of a building wall very near the firing point. The wall was exposed to fragments and aerosolized fractions during shots and apparently acts to concentrate depleted uranium in the soils immediately beneath the wall. Most samples were above the upper limit background (mean + 2 standard deviation) uranium concentration of 3.4 ppm for the firing site. Total beryllium (i.e., the sum of all beryllium mass regardless of the isotope mix) in individual surface soil samples ranged from 0.2 to 218 ppm, and total lead (i.e., the sum of all lead mass regardless of the isotope mix) concentrations ranged from 2.9 to 230 ppm. Most beryllium and lead data were also above the upper limit background concentrations of 2.88 and 54 ppm, respectively. However, soil concentrations of both beryllium and lead dropped to background levels at the maximum sampling radius of ~200 ft (~61 m). Simple averages of uranium, beryllium, and lead samples were 1,210, 18, and 52 ppm.

Using the radial measurement point as the center of an annulus having constant contaminant concentration, an area-weighted integration of total uranium concentration was performed. The integration considered only the upper 3 in (7.6 cm) of soil and assumed a dry bulk soil density of 1.4 g/cm3. If measured surface soil depleted uranium contamination levels were applied to a full circle of radius 200 ft (61 m), the total uranium inventory in the soil would be 1,300 lb (568 kg) uranium. The area-weighted average total-uranium concentration, which takes into account the radial pattern of material deposition, was 456 ppm.

While measured values of beryllium and lead fell to background levels within the ~200 ft (~61 m) radial distance sampled, the total uranium levels did not. A regression analysis on the full (natural log-transformed) total uranium data set (Fresquez and Mullen 1995) showed the distance from the detonation pad to a point where total uranium concentrations would drop to upper limit background levels (i.e., 3.4 ppm) was 279 ± 83 ft (85 ± 25.3 m). The 95 percent upper confidence level of this one-sided estimate was 422 ft (128.6 m). This is an estimate of the soil contamination circle radius enclosing total uranium soil concentrations above background levels.

The drainage channel located northeast of the detonation pad yielded sediments containing 105 ppm total uranium. The channel to the south of the firing pad yielded sediments with only 11.5 ppm total uranium. No TCLP or total heavy metals were detected above EPA or background concentrations in any of the drainage channels. No traces of high explosive materials were detected in any of the soil or sediment samples.

A previous sampling study conducted at the PHERMEX site in 1987 (Fresquez 1995) showed levels of total uranium up to 3,593 ppm and of beryllium up to 470 ppm. A simple average concentration of surface soil samples yielded average uranium and beryllium concentrations for the site of 432 (± 647) ppm and 31.7 (± 83) ppm. Note, these are simple averages of all data and are not area-weighted mean values that would take into account the radial pattern of contaminant distribution.

D.3 E-F FIRING SITES SOIL CONTAMINATION

The E-F firing sites are located within TA-15, in the watershed for Potrillo Canyon. It has been estimated that between 1943 and 1973 up to 150,000 lb (66,500 kg) of uranium (a combination of natural and depleted uranium) were used in tests at the E-F firing sites (Hanson and Miera 1977). This is nearly fourtimes the inventory used at PHERMEX. The amount of explosive charge in individual tests at the E-F firing sites exceeds that proposed under the DARHT EIS. This implies that both the level of soil contamination and the spatial spread of debris at the E-F firing sites would be greater than has occurred at PHERMEX and is expected to occur under the alternatives examined in this EIS.

In 1976 a polar coordinate sampling pattern was used to collect soil samples at the E-F site for total uranium analysis (Hanson and Miera 1976; Hanson and Miera 1977; Hanson and Miera 1978). Samples were taken at nine distances from 33 to 660 ft (10 to 200 m) on transects that extended outward from the detonation pad every 45 degrees. Total uranium concentrations were determined for six depth increments ranging from 0 to 1 in to 0.66 to 1 ft (0 to 2.5 cm to 20 to 30 cm) depths. The variation in total uranium concentration with horizontal distance from the firing point for the surface soils [0 to 1 in (0 to 2.5 cm)] is presented in tableTable D-2.-Uranium Distribution in E-F Firing Site

Surface Soils [0 to 1 in (0 to 2.5 cm)]

Distance ft (m)

Mean Concentration (ppm)

0

4,650

33 (10)

4,520

66 (20)

1,000

98 (30)

1,800

130 (40)

745

160 (50)

395

250 (75)

350

330 (100)

520

490 (150)

725

660 (200)

165

Source: Hanson and Miera 1977

Table D-3.-Distribution of Total Uranium with Depth

in Surface Soils at the E-F Firing Site

Distance ft (m)

Percent of total uranium in top 2 in (5 cm) of the column

Lowest Reported Depth

[ft (cm)]a

Concentrationb (ppm)

0

86

0.33-0.5 (10-15)

650

33 (10)

48

0.66-1 (20-30)

~5000c

66 (20)

86

0.33-0.5 (10-15)

80

98 (30)

71

0.33-0.5 (10-15)

250

130 (40)

62

0.33-0.5 (10-15)

450

160 (50)

43

0.66-1 (20-30)

100

a Lowest depth presented in figure 5 of the Hanson and Miera report.

b Estimate from figure 5 of the Hanson and Miera report.

c Includes a value of 22,000 ppm.

Source: Hanson and Miera 1977

D-2. The area-weighted mean uranium concentration for surface soils in the sampling area was 542 ppm.

Data on the vertical distribution of uranium in site soils were presented in Hanson and Miera (1977). Data collected at the E-F firing sites indicated that uranium had migrated into the soil to the maximum sampling depth; however, sample analyses were incomplete when Hanson and Miera published their work in 1977 and samples from 0.66 to 1 ft (20 to 30 cm) were not reported for all sample distances. Available results are presented in table D-3. The anomaly observed in the 33-ft (10-m) sample from 0.6 to 1 ft (20 to 30 cm) was attributed to a single observation of 22,000 ppm. Deletion of this datum from the mean value calculation resulted in a decreasing uranium concentration with increasing depth for all profiles. Extending the slope of the 33-ft (10-m) sample line in figure 5 Hanson and Miera (1977) results in an approximate value of 1,000 ppm total uranium in the 0.66- to 1-ft (20- to 30-cm) depth interval 33 ft (10 m) from the firing point.

The uranium in the top 2 in (5 cm) ranges between 86 and 43 percent of the total uranium at a sample point, with a regular decrease beyond 66 ft (20 m). Total uranium concentrations presented by Hanson and Miera (1977) show a general decrease with increasing depth. However, even at the maximum sample depths reported, total uranium concentrations were above background.

The E-F firing sites operated over a 30-year period and used on the order of 150,000 lb (66,500 kg) of uranium. The estimate of depleted uranium used at PHERMEX during the past 32 years is 35,000 lb (16,000 kg). The forecasted depleted uranium usage over the next 30 years is 46,000 lb (21,000 kg). Thus, if the No Action Alternative is implemented, the quantity of depleted uranium used at PHERMEX would increment from 35,000 lb (16,000 kg) to 82,000 lb (37,000 kg) depleted uranium over a 30-year period. This represents slightly more than half (57 percent) of the inventory used at E-F during its 30-year operation. Thus, future soil-contamination levels at PHERMEX firing site should not exceed and would likely be less than those observed at the E-F firing sites. If deposition is a linear function of inventory, soil contamination at PHERMEX would be approximately double the levels currently observed at the PHERMEX firing point, [e.g., 9,300 ppm = 4,000 ppm x 82,000 lb (37,000 kg)/35,000 lb (16,000 kg)].

The maximum explosive charge used in tests at the E-F firing sites exceeds that forecast for testing under any DARHT EIS alternative. As a result of tests involving larger explosive charges, uranium contamination in soils is spread over a larger area at the E-F firing sites than is observed at PHERMEX. The amount of explosive used in individual tests under any DARHT EIS alternative would be no greater than that used at PHERMEX in the past 32 years. Additionally, the general pattern and number of tests(i.e., large and small explosives amounts) would be virtually the same over the next 30 years (under any of the proposed alternatives) as that used during the past 32 years at PHERMEX. Based on the size of explosive forecast for use in the DARHT EIS alternatives, the current areal extent of contamination atPHERMEX is a better analogue than the E-F firing sites for estimating the areal extent of future soils contamination at either PHERMEX or DARHT.

The E-F firing sites data does reveal that surface soil contamination levels at the PHERMEX firing point can be expected to increase for alternatives that involve continued use of the PHERMEX firing site. Still, average surface-soil total-uranium concentrations local to the firing point do not exceed 5,000 ppm at the E-F firing sites. The depth profile data suggest that uranium concentrations in soil ~1 ft (30 cm) or more below the surface can be expected to exceed background levels within 160 ft (50 m) of the firing point. However, contaminant concentrations at depth were measured to be a factor of 2 to 10 below surface soil contamination levels. Thus, with regard to soils contamination levels, average surface-soil total-uranium concentration levels at the E-F firing sites represent maximums.

D.4 AERIAL RADIOLOGICAL SURVEY

An aerial radiological survey of TA-15 was conducted in 1982 to estimate the extent of uranium (uranium-238) contamination in the vicinity of firing sites (Fritzsche 1989). The survey monitored levels of protactinium (protactinium-234m), a radioactive daughter of uranium-238. Surface contamination was seen to decrease radially as the distance from the test-firing area increased. A surface area of 630,000 ft2 (58,600 m2) around PHERMEX was estimated to be contaminated above background. The contaminated area can be represented by a circular area with radius of 450 ft (137 m) centered at the PHERMEX firing point (LATA 1992). The 450-ft (137-m) radius circle is rounded to 460 ft (140 m) for convenience.

D.5 MATERIAL RELEASES AND SITE CLEANUP DURING OPERATIONS

During the 32 years of PHERMEX operations, a total of about 35,000 lb (16,000 kg) of depleted uranium has been used. This amount of depleted uranium represents a volume of about 35 ft3 (1 m3). Most of the depleted uranium was used in the form of experimental assemblies of simulated nuclear weapons. Approximately 50 percent of the depleted uranium was contained in simulated secondaries and blast pipes of pin experiments. This depleted uranium is ejected as relatively large fragments. These large fragments remain in the immediate vicinity of the firing point. An estimated 40 percent of the total was dispersed as relatively small, platelet-shaped fragments having surface areas ranging from 0.08 to 1.1 in2 (0.5 to 7 cm2). An estimated 10 percent of the depleted uranium was released as an aerosol (McClure 1995).

LANL has estimated that at least 70 percent of the depleted uranium remains on or near the firing point and is removed and disposed of (see Waste Management in appendix B) during routine housekeeping. This 70 percent consists of all of the large fragments, half of the small fragments (i.e., those ejected downward), and some portion of the aerosol. Most of the other half of the small fragments would fall within a 4,100-ft (1,250-m) circle (McClure 1995).

In addition to depleted uranium, the only other materials of regulatory concern for the firing area are beryllium and lead. Materials released during open-air tests at the PHERMEX facility have resulted in observable quantities of beryllium and lead on or near the firing site. The soil sampling mentioned above indicates that no beryllium or lead are observed at levels above background beyond 200 ft (60 m) from the firing point.

Under the Enhanced Containment Alternative, three options are explored: the Vessel Containment Option, the Building Containment Option, and the Phased Containment Option. Normally, when containment would be used for a test shot, the blast products would remain in the containment vessel or building element designed to contain the test. Hence, a containment vessel would contain the blast debris; the debris would be taken to appropriate LANL facilities according to the nature of the debris. For the containment options, potential releases from containment vessels or the containment building are described by two conservative performance assumptions: no more than 1 percent of the blast byproducts could escape a normal test, and no more than 5 percent of the tests could cause a rupture of the containment vessel or building. While containment vessels and buildings would be designed not to fail and are not expected to fail, these assumptions address the possibility of failure. A rupture of a containment vessel means the development of a crack, not a catastrophic explosion of the entire containment vessel. Thus, a 6 percent release of inventory as blast byproducts for all contained test shots represents a highly unlikely result. To be conservative, it is also assumed that all blast byproducts that escape contained tests (i.e., in Vessel Containment, Building Containment, and Phased Containment options) would be in the soils surrounding the firing point and not removed from the site by any routine cleanup activity.

Under the Vessel Containment and Phased Containment options, some uncontained experiments would be conducted. In the case of the vessel containment option, up to 25 percent of the inventory would be shot in uncontained tests. In the case of the phased containment option, three phases would occur in the uncontained-to-contained percentages: 95 percent uncontained and 5 percent contained for 5 years, 60 percent uncontained and 40 percent contained for 5 years, and finally 25 percent uncontained and 75 percent contained for 20 years. All uncontained testing would be conducted under site cleanup protocols similar to those used today, and consequently only 30 percent of the depleted uranium inventory expended in uncontained tests would remain in the soil at the firing site. However, all beryllium and lead released in uncontained tests is assumed to remain in the soils at the firing site.

D.6 SOIL CONTAMINATION CIRCLE RADIUS AND SOIL CONTAMINATION LEVELS

The estimate of the soil contamination circle radius from the aerial radiological survey (i.e., 460 ft or 140 m) is comparable to the 420-ft (128-m) radius calculated by Fresquez and Mullen (1995) as defining the 95 percent upper-confidence level of enclosing all above-background total-uranium soil contamination. The soil survey conducted by Fresquez (1994) only characterized an ~200-ft (~61-m) radius circle centered on the firing point and may reflect only a portion of the fragment and aerosol size fractions. However, the aerial radiological survey takes into account uranium (uranium-238) concentration levels associated with the complete range of fragment sizes as well as the aerosol fraction. Based on the similarity of tests to be run in the future as compared to past PHERMEX operations (e.g., explosive charges, the range and pattern of large and small tests), we conclude that the soil contamination area around PHERMEX [defined approximately by a circle with radius 460 ft (140 m) centered on the firing point] is appropriate for application to alternatives involving either PHERMEX or DARHT sites.

The inventory of depleted uranium used at PHERMEX over the last 32 years is ~35,000 lb (~16,000 kg). Of this, 30 percent, or 11,000 lb (4,800 kg) of depleted uranium, is estimated to remain within the soil contamination circle. Clearly, this is greater than the estimated 1,300 lb (568 kg) of uranium accounted for in the surface soils (i.e., to 3 in or 7.5 cm depth) within 200 ft (61 m) of the firing point at PHERMEX. However, a circle of radius 200 ft (61 m) represents only ~20 percent of the area of the soil contamination circle that has a radius of 460 ft (140 m). If 11,000 lb (4,800 kg) of depleted uraniumwere uniformly distributed in the upper ~1 ft (~30 cm) of soil within an ~460-ft (~140-m) radius soil contamination circle, the resulting uranium concentration would be ~190 ppm.

Under the No Action Alternative, the total inventory of depleted uranium used at PHERMEX after an additional 30 years would be 82,000 lb (37,000 kg) of depleted uranium. Of this, 30 percent, or ~24,000 lb (~11,000 kg), of depleted uranium would remain onsite within the soil contamination circle and contribute to soil contaminant concentrations. If initially distributed uniformly in the upper ~1 ft (30 cm) of the soil contamination circle, the resulting uranium concentration would be 430 ppm.

While total uranium concentration in soils in the immediate vicinity of firing points is known to be significantly higher (e.g., average values of 3,789 and 4,650 ppm values calculated for PHERMEX and E-F firing sites), these areas represent a relatively small fraction of the overall soil contamination circle in an area-weighted average. Area-weighted average concentrations calculated at E-F (542 ppm for a 660-ft or 200-m radius) and PHERMEX (456 ppm for a 200-ft or 61-m radius) are comparable to those calculated for the uranium inventory forecast to be within the soil contamination circle of PHERMEX operations (i.e., 190 ppm current and 430 ppm future).

The soil contamination circle radius of current PHERMEX operations, 460 ft (140 m), is assumed to apply to alternatives involving either the PHERMEX or DARHT sites. Based on soils contamination data from PHERMEX and E-F firing sites and the ratio of inventory planned for usage versus that used at PHERMEX, the maximum average soil contamination level for depleted uranium at the firing point of the DARHT site is not anticipated to be greater than 5,300 ppm (i.e., 4,000 ppm x 46,000 lb (21,000 kg) depleted uranium/35,000 lb (16,000 kg) depleted uranium). Similarly, the maximum average soil contamination level observed at PHERMEX in the vicinity of the firing point under either the No Action or Upgrade PHERMEX alternatives is not anticipated to be greater than double that observed currently at PHERMEX or 9,300 ppm [i.e., 4,000 ppm x 82,000 lb (37,000 kg) depleted uranium/35,000 lb (16,000 kg) depleted uranium].

It is apparent from the recent surface soil survey of PHERMEX (Fresquez 1994) that beryllium and lead contamination drops to background levels inside of the soil contamination circle for depleted uranium. However, no information is available on site cleanup and removal of beryllium and lead. Therefore, the entire original inventory of both beryllium and lead is assumed to be dispersed within the soil contamination circle and available for migration in hydrologic pathways.

There is no information on the distribution of copper and aluminum in the soils surrounding the PHERMEX firing point. Nor is there information about periodic cleanup activities at the firing point removing either copper or aluminum. Consequently, total inventories of copper and aluminum are assumed to be in the soils and available for migration via surface water and ground water pathways.

D.7 REFERENCES CITED IN APPENDIX D

Anderson, A.B., 1995, Materials Expended Report for Phermex, LANL Memorandum No. DX-11-95-109, March 16, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Fresquez, P., 1994, Results of the Soil Sampling Survey Conducted Over Active RCRA Firing Site TA-15-184 (PHERMEX), LANL Memorandum No. ESH-8/EFM-94-111, May 26, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Fresquez, P., 1995, Documentation of a Soil Uranium and Beryllium Study Conducted at PHERMEX in 1987, LANL Memorandum No. ESH-20/EARE-95-0449, February 23, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Fresquez, P., and M. Mullen, 1995, Regression Analysis on Soil Uranium Data Collected from PHERMEX, LANL Memorandum No. ESH-20/EARE-95-0367, February 2, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Fritzsche, A.E., 1989, An Aerial Radiological Survey of Technical Area 15 and Surroundings, Los Alamos National Laboratory, EGG-10282-1095, September, EG&G Energy Measurements, Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Hanson, W.C., and F.R. Miera, Jr., 1976, Long-Term Ecological Effects of Exposure to Uranium, LA-6269, July, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Hanson, W.C., and F.R. Miera, Jr., 1977, Continued Studies of Long-Term Ecological Effects of Exposure to Uranium, LA-6742/AFATL-TR-77-35, June, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Hanson, W.C., and F.R. Miera, Jr., 1978, Further Studies of Long-Term Ecological Effects of Exposure to Uranium, LA-7162/AFATL-TR-78-8, July, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

LATA (Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc.), 1992, Appendix E to the Operable Unit 1086 RFI Work Plan, Calculation of Acceptable Levels of Surface Contamination at Technical Area-15 (PHERMEX), November, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

McClure, D.A., 1995, DARHT EIS Section 3.1.3.2 Effluents (Mass Balance), internal memorandum to S.T. Alexander March 21, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

beryllium D-1, D-2, D-3, D-6, D-7, D-8, D-9

containment D-7

contaminant D-3, D-6, D-8

depleted uranium D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-6, D-7, D-8

detonation D-2, D-3, D-4

firing point D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-6, D-7, D-8

firing points D-8

ground water D-8

heavy metals D-3

high explosive D-3

phased containment D-7

potential releases D-7

secondaries D-6

soil D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-6, D-7, D-8, D-9

soils D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4, D-5, D-4, D-6, D-7, D-8

surface water D-8

vessel containment D-7

waste management D-6

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