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APPENDIX B

PHERMEX BASELINE

This section describes the current condition of the PHERMEX firing site and summarizes the materials used to conduct current operations and the materials that have been released to the immediate environment of the firing point. This baseline represents PHERMEX conditions before any decision is made on the hydrodynamic testing alternatives. This baseline information was compiled to develop reasonable testing activities which are analyzed under each alternative in this EIS in order to determine valid impacts and to establish a comparative analysis of alternatives with respect to current conditions. Historically, numbers of tests and quantities of various materials have varied by year, in accordance with program needs. Material usage over the past five years has been used in this EIS to establish the baseline for material usage. This baseline does not reflect projected future changes in the activities at PHERMEX under various alternatives. The current levels of migration of materials by air and water pathways are discussed, as well as the disposition of materials removed from the site during periodic cleanup activities. Waste streams resulting from the current operation are also discussed.

B.1 AIR QUALITY AND NOISE

This section describes the nonradioactive ambient air criteria pollutants emitted from PHERMEX operations as well as the noise impacts from PHERMEX experiments.

B.1.1 Air Quality

The ambient air criteria pollutants potentially released due to PHERMEX operations include nitrogen dioxide, PM₁₀ (aerosolized material assumed to be respirable), beryllium, heavy metals (depleted uranium and lead), and lead (the concentration of pollutants is similar to those presented in section 5.1.2; see related discussion in section 4.2.4). Cleaning chemicals are not used on a scale large enough to produce measurable releases. Materials used are rags dampened with acetone, chlorinated hydrocarbons, toluene, xylene, or 1,1,1-trichloroethane.

Since the PHERMEX operations are classified as intermittent fugitive emission sources, no stations are established to directly monitor potential emissions from PHERMEX (see related discussion in section 4.2.5 and figure 4-6). A sitewide sampling network is available at LANL to provide air monitoring data for the site. The radiological dose from TA-15 operations has been estimated at 1 percent or less of the total LANL dose to the public.

Waste wood from the platforms used to support the experiments is taken to TA-36 for disposal in an open burn. An existing open burn permit from the NMED indicates approximately four to five burns per year are required to reduce the fire and safety hazards due to the accumulation of wood. Some of the wood waste may be contaminated with small quantities of high explosives and/or depleted uranium.

In support of the open burn permit application, the DOE Los Alamos Area Office submitted dose dispersion estimates. The nearest residential community, White Rock 1.8 mi (3 km) from the burn site,was estimated to receive 1.1 x 10^-8 rem using the HOTSPOT 6.5 modeling program and 2.9 x 10^-8 rem using the DISPERSION modeling program (DOE 1993). The NMED Air Quality Bureau reviewed the dose estimates and concluded that the results indicate reasonable assurance of no health effects in White Rock from this source (NMED 1993).

B.1.2 Noise

Noise from a 150-lb (70-kg) test explosion, the largest in normal operation at PHERMEX, was measured March 11, 1995, at several locations in and around LANL (Burns 1995; Vigil 1995; Vibronics 1995). Peak overpressure in the air, reported in dB, is the important measurement for assessing the potential effects of an air wave but is not the same as a dBA noise measurement (see section 4.2.6). These peak overpressure measurements showed 138 dB at a distance of 2,150 ft (655 m) from the 150-lb (70-kg) shot, and 137 dB at the Nake'muu ruin site, a distance of 3,880 ft (1,180 m). If the largest explosive charge for PHERMEX, 1,000 lb (450 kg), were fired, the expected pulse would be about 6 dB higher than for the 150-lb (70-kg) explosion.

Two types of instrumentation were used for the noise measurements recorded during the tests conducted at PHERMEX on March 11, 1995. A sound level meter set up for a broad frequency range (about 20 to 12,000 Hz), slow time response, and frequency sensitivity corresponding to human hearing (A scale, ANSI-S1.4-1971) was used. The results are reported in decibels weighted for hearing response, dBA. The peak overpressure was measured in the air with a microphone sensitive to low frequencies (2 to 200 Hz) and having fast time response. These results are reported in decibels (dB) and are important for assessing potential effects of an air wave but are not the same as "noise" measurements.

Both types of instruments were used at only one location, on State Highway 4, which is the closest possible public approach to the firing point [1.3 mi (2 km) to the south]. The slow time response and frequency sensitivity corresponding to human hearing measured 71 dBA while the fast time response instrument measured 120 dB; the peak pulse energy was at about 20 Hz. These two values are comparable because the A-scale weighing at 20 Hz is about -50 dB (ANSI-S1.4-1971). Using the sound level meter, 60 dBA was measured near the entrance to Bandelier National Monument [closest permanent residences, 2.6 mi (4.3 km)], and about 70 dBA in White Rock [a nearby residential community, 4 mi (6.4 km)]. At these levels and distances, variations in local atmospheric conditions may account for the louder noise at the more distant site, but measurements under a range of known atmospheric conditions have not been made. These measured levels can be used to estimate a sound level of 61 to 68 dBA in southern Los Alamos, the closest residential area to PHERMEX at a distance of 3 mi (5 km).

B.2 SOILS

In 1993, LANL collected and analyzed over 20 surface soil samples and 2 sediment samples at the PHERMEX firing site (Fresquez 1994). These soil sampling surveys indicated that no lead, beryllium, or mercury were observed beyond 200 ft (60 m) of the firing point. The samples were analyzed for RCRA-regulated metals (silver, arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, beryllium, selenium) using the Toxicity Characteristics Leaching Procedure (TCLP); total beryllium, gallium, lead, thorium, and uranium; semivolatile organic compounds (SVOCs); and high explosive residues. The sampling plan and the results for uranium, beryllium, and lead are described in appendix D. Most TCLP metals in surfacesoil samples were detected below proposed U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) action levels; however, two soil samples contained lead above the EPA action level of 5 ppm. Among the other metals analyzed, most beryllium values were above the EPA action level (see appendix D). No sediment samples from drainage channels leading away from the PHERMEX site contained TCLP metals above EPA action levels or other metals above their background level. The PHERMEX area soils contained traces of 21 SVOCs, but no detectable high explosive residues.

B.3 HUMAN HEALTH

The average dose received for 92 workers who were assigned dosimetry badges in 1993 and who worked regularly or occasionally at PHERMEX was 0.003 rem/person. LANL has established an administrative dose limit of 2 rem/year, which is below the DOE limit of 5 rem/year.

The PHERMEX facility operated an internal dosimetry program for three years beginning in 1992. No dose equivalent greater than 0.003 rem was detected, and over 50 percent of the participants registered doses at or below natural background levels. It was concluded that no radiological hazard exists for PHERMEX and the program was discontinued except for suspected exposures. Chemical toxicity has also been evaluated, and calculated fractions of nephrotoxic limits have not approached any levels of concern (Kottmann 1994).

B.4 ACCIDENTS

Operations at PHERMEX pose accident hazards expected at industrial sites. In addition, there are unique hazards associated with high explosives, high voltages, high densities for energy stored in capacitor banks, intense x-rays, and test materials. Hazards that have the potential to lead to accidents at a hydrodynamic test facility are summarized in table B-1Table B-1.-Hazards at Hydrodynamic Test Facilities

Hazard	Location	Comments
Ionizing Radiation Exposure Personnel inside exclusion areas during beam pulsing	Accelerator bay, optical room, and firing pad	Beam pulse with up to 2,000 rad x-rays at one meter on axis
NonIonizing Radiation Operating personnel intersect laser beam	Laser room
Electrical Personnel in contact with the power supplies or capacitor banks Personnel in contact with laser power supplies	Accelerator room and power supply rooms Accelerator bay and laser rooms	Power supplies with voltages up to 4MV, high energy-densities in capacitor banks Power supplies with voltages up to 35 kV
High Explosives Blast Personnel in the hazard radius exclusion area during testing Accidental detonation of explosive	Firing site exclusion area Firing pad	Area radius is 2,500 ft (750 m), personnel OK in R-184 and R-310
Mechanical Crane maintenance and operation	Accelerator bay, power supply rooms, equipment and assembly rooms	Potential for misuse
Occupational Slippery surfaces due to fluids	Accelerator bay, power supply rooms, equipment room	Leaks or spills from tanks, valves, or connections
Gases Helium Sulfur hexafluoride	Firing pad, diagnostics area Accelerator hall, power supply room	Used to drive high-speed cameras Leaks from spark gaps
Chemicals/Solvents Acetone, ethanol	Accelerator bay and assembly room	Inhalation hazards
Fire Insulating oil Wicking of insulating oil Acetone, ethanol Electrical control cables, high-voltage cables, and components Fire from parked vehicles Natural gas Trash and rag accumulation Forest or brush fire	Accelerator bay and power supply rooms Power supply rooms Accelerator bay and assembly room Accelerator bay, power supply rooms, equipment room Parking and delivery area Equipment room Accelerator bay, power supply rooms, equipment room External to building	EXXON 1830 type insulating oil has a flash point above 149oC (330oF) Oil-soaked rags Volatile cleaning solvents Faulty items may cause sparks to ignite oil, etc. Gasoline in fuel tanks Hot water boiler Ignition source for oil May arise from explosives or natural causes
Natural Phenomena High winds Lightning Earthquake	TA-15 TA-15 TA-15	Damage to utilities Damage to utilities Damage to any of LANL infrastructure, design level is 0.22 G for DARHT, current expectation is 0.5 to 0.6 G for maximum earthquake.

.

The accident hazards in table B-1 are addressed by physical barriers, interlock systems, and administrative controls. The accidents with the most serious potential consequences (i.e., radiation exposure, high explosive detonation, and electrical discharges) were analyzed for likelihood of occurrence. An annual probability of less than 10^-4 was estimated for each of these accidents, with no likely common-mode accidents identified. Probabilities for the other hypothetical accidents are based on commercial industry experience. All these accident probabilities are shown in table B-2Table B-2.-Hypothetical Accidents and Probabilities

.

During the most recent 10-year period (1985 to 1994), the accident statistics for PHERMEX indicate that there were a total of 19 lost-work days due to injury. None of these injuries were considered serious; they consisted of a contusion, a concussion, and numerous back strains. The most recent incident that resulted in lost time occurred in 1991 when an employee who suffered a strain injury as a result of a lifting activity lost three workdays. There have been no reported accidents that were initiated by the detonation of explosives.

B.4.1 Radiation Exposure

The safety system associated with radiation protection provides controls and barriers to prevent radiation exposure. This system consists of positive interlocks, alarms, warning lights, television monitors, and personnel accountability sweeps of the area prior to testing. These functions can be monitored from the control room. Extensive operator training, personnel radiation dosimetry, and use of thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) surveys for facility radiation monitoring are integral parts of facility operations to monitor exposures and prevent accidental overexposure. The following two accident scenarios have been analyzed to provide the unplanned exposure to radiation probability in table B-2:

· The walk-through clearance plan fails to detect personnel in the exclusion areas

· The interlock safety system fails, and the accelerator is pulsed while personnel are in the accelerator hall

B.4.2 Electrical Discharge

Controls and barriers associated with electrical energy hazards are designed into the PHERMEX facility. Physical barriers, such as cabinets around power supplies and capacitor banks and the injector power supplies, along with an interlocked high-voltage safety system, prevent entry during pulsing orhydrodynamic testing. Only experienced, trained personnel are allowed to perform the operations at the firing point. Potential accident scenarios include personnel contact with power supplies, charged capacitor banks, or laser power supplies.

B.4.3 Explosives

The most serious hazard to operation personnel is from firing high explosives during a hydrodynamic test. The buildings and structures at the firing site are designed to withstand repetitive explosions, but only R-184 and R-310 may be occupied during a test. Safety interlocks prevent firing the high explosives if personnel exit these buildings during the firing sequence. Hazards involved with handling explosives are well recognized and are based on long experience. The hazard radius around the firing site varies from test to test depending on the size of the shot. Two main accident scenarios have been analyzed to provide the blast hazards and accidental detonation probabilities in table B-2.

· By error, some personnel are within the hazard radius during a test.

· Predetonation of the explosives occurs during test setup.

Occupational injuries at PHERMEX have primarily dealt with injuries such as strains, lacerations, and contusions that have resulted from the movement of equipment and materials associated with the experiments.

B.5 MITIGATION AND MONITORING

B.5.1 Mitigation

The PHERMEX facility employs mitigation systems and administrative controls in a defense-in-depth approach to facility safety. Physical barriers consisting of passive shielding for radiation control and blast protection form the first level of barrier to prevent injury to personnel. Active barriers are in place, consisting of locked and interlocked gates and roadblocks or passageway closures to prevent entry to radiation areas or explosives areas. Audible and visual warning systems are in place which are activated whenever the imminent exposure to radiation or explosive blast is possible. Red stop or scram buttons are placed near visual alarms to allow any personnel inadvertently left in the area to abort the test or hazardous condition. In-place administrative procedures control the transportation and movement of explosives and hazardous materials and limit the number of personnel who might be exposed to a given hazard. Trucks and cranes may be operated only by personnel who are trained and experienced in the operation being conducted.

Access is controlled to ensure that no personnel are within the hazard area for each shot. Clearance personnel maintain radio contact with each other, and the access control office visually checks the hazard area from the firing point to the clearance radius before each test and then establishes road blocks to prevent inadvertent entry to the area until the test has completed. Small fires after a test are not unusual, and the fire suppression personnel are available at the boundary to the hazard area for each explosive shot. Fire suppression personnel, trained for the hazards to be expected when fighting fires immediately following explosives tests, are allowed access to the firing point immediately after the all-clear is sounded to extinguish any resulting fires.

B.5.2 Monitoring

Monitoring consists of radiological area monitors and visual television monitoring of critical areas. The accelerator hall and firing point are monitored annually for radioactivity. TLDs are placed at potential exposure areas in and around the facility and are read annually to monitor cumulative doses. Except for the expected high dose observed at the firing point and on the axis of the PHERMEX beam, all recorded doses are in the mrem/year range.

Environmental Surveillance at Los Alamos during 1992 describes LANL's surveillance and monitoring program (LANL 1994). LANL routinely monitors radioactive and nonradioactive pollutants in environmental media (air, water, soil) on the LANL site and in the surrounding region.

Three air-monitoring networks are operated or accessed by LANL. Nonradiological ambient air monitors are used to measure criteria pollutants, beryllium, acid precipitation, and visibility. A network of continuously operating sampling stations measures ambient airborne radioactivity. Thermoluminescent dosimeters are used to monitor doses of external penetrating radiation. LANL's air-monitoring program is discussed in detail in section 4.2.5.

Surface waters and ground water are monitored to detect any contaminants from LANL operations. Water monitoring is discussed in detail in section 4.4.3.

B.6 MATERIALS USED

The materials used at the PHERMEX site include water, industrial chemicals, and materials comprising the test assemblies. Water at the PHERMEX site is not separately metered, but is supplied through an 8-in (20-cm) line from a 250,000-gal (946,000-L) tank located near TA-15. Water is used in a cooling tower, and deionized water is used in a closed cycle for magnet cooling. Sulfur hexafluoride is used as an insulating material. The major uses of industrial chemicals on an annual basis for the No Action Alternative are:

· Helium - 6,000 ft³ (170 m³)

· Sulfur hexafluoride - 3,100 ft³ (90 m³)

· Acetone - 3 gal (11 L)

· Ethanol - 6 gal (23 L)

The tests themselves contain materials that are released to the environment during uncontained tests. Table B-3Table B-3.-Number and Type of Tests at PHERMEX (P) and FXR (F) for CY 1990 to CY 1994

shows the number of separate tests conducted at both PHERMEX and FXR during CY 1990 to 1994. The tables include all tests at the facility, not only those using the accelerator radiographic diagnostics. A large range of complexity exists among high-explosives tests, and simply counting the number of tests serves only as a broad summary of the testing efforts at each facility. Table B-4Table B-4.-Materials Released to the Environment Before Regular Firing-site Cleanup

at PHERMEX and FXR for CY 1990 to CY 1994

Year	DU (kg)	Be (kg)	Pb (kg)	Cu (kg)	Other Metals	HE (kg)	Tritium (Ci)	LiH (kg)	Fluoride Salts (kg)
PHERMEX CY94 CY93 CY92 CY91 CY90	66 251 244 245 71	4 4 2 2 -a	12 20 48 0b 0b	7 75 0b 0b 11	77 91 29 156 75	148 269 146 340 301	0b 0b 0.8 0b 0b	9 12 17 21 -a	-a -a -a -a -a
FXR CY94 CY93 CY92 CY91 CY90	204 186 154 214 315	4 2 10 6 16	0 0 10 0 0	14 20 22 41 19	4 3 19 14 15	371 413 1,744 1,466 411	0 0 0 0 0	5 9 13 14 15	0 0 0 0 9
a None reported. b The material was reported as 0. Notes: "DU," short for depleted uranium, refers to uranium in which the isotope uranium-235 has been depleted below the content of 0.7 percent found in naturally occurring uranium. The majority isotope in the material is uranium-238. When referring to PHERMEX, "other metals" means the sum of all aluminum, boron, brass, iron, inconel, niobium, nickel, silver, tin, tantalum, titanium, tungsten, and vanadium used during each year. For FXR, "other metals" includes those metals listed above, plus barium, chromium, cobalt, and molybdenum. Standardized symbols are used for the following materials: beryllium (Be), lead (Pb), copper (Cu), high explosives (HE), and lithium hydride (LiH).

shows the corresponding materials released as a result of these tests, prior to regular firing-point cleanups.

For this EIS, DOE averaged the amount of material used at PHERMEX over the past five years to estimate the expected amounts of material that will be used in the future. However, operations at PHERMEX during the last five years underrepresent the facility's use of depleted uranium. For thisestimate, DOE looked at use over the past 30 years. For example, the average annual release of depleted uranium during the mid-1980s was approximately 450 lb (200 kg) per year. Earlier use expended even greater amounts of material. Based on the known use of depleted uranium during the period from 1963 until 1994, DOE estimates that the expected use of depleted uranium would be higher than the average of the past five years, as shown in table B-4.

For this EIS, DOE estimates that the average annual releases over the past 32 years to the environment as a result of high-explosives testing, prior to regular firing-point cleanups, were:

· Depleted uranium - 1,100 lb (500 kg)

· Beryllium - 15 lb (7 kg)

· Lead - 22 lb (10 kg)

· Copper - 155 lb (70 kg)

· Other metals - 310 lb (140 kg): consists of 50 percent aluminum, 35 percent stainless steel, and 15 percent other metals and alloys, including tantalum, brass, nickel, silver, tin, and very small quantities of others.

· Tritium - 2 Ci

· Lithium hydride - 155 lb (70 kg)

· High explosives - 2,400 lb (1,100 kg)

The alternatives analyzed in this EIS predict an increase in hydrodynamic testing and dynamic experiments. This predicted increase incorporates conservative estimates for the purpose of analyzing impacts in this EIS. It reflects the increased use of radiographic hydrodynamic testing and dynamic experiments over the next few years for reasons such as: the cessation of underground nuclear testing and the pursuit of a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty, the need for stewardship of the nuclear weapons stockpile, benchmarking computer simulations of the stockpile that will be compared to the past data obtained from underground nuclear tests, increases in proliferation assessment and disablement, and the need for tests to improve nuclear weapons safety, security, and reliability.

B.7 WASTE MANAGEMENT

During more than 30 years of PHERMEX operations, a total of about 35,000 lb (16,000 kg) of depleted uranium has been used. This amount of depleted uranium represents a total volume of about 35 ft³ (1 m³). LANL has estimated that at least 70 percent of the depleted uranium remained on or near the firing point after test assembly detonations and has been removed during routine operational cleanup of the firing site. The depleted uranium and other firing-site debris are handled as low-level radioactive waste. Approximately 10 to 12 truck loads, each having an average weight of 7 tons (6,400 kg) are sent to TA-54 Area G for disposal each year, totaling about 160,000 lb (70,000 kg). This material consists mainly of firing-site soil, wood, metal, glass, plastic, rubber, and cabling used to set up a test assembly detonation. The average quantity of depleted uranium in this waste would be about 770 lb (350 kg), less than 1 percent of the total waste mass.

Lead has been a constituent of a small number of test assemblies fired at the site; however, when lead is present in a test assembly, the site is cleaned both before and after the test so that the site is cleared of lead before the next test. The firing-site debris (including soil on and around the firing site) is characterized periodically for the presence of RCRA-controlled metals. The negative findings of these characterizations have always resulted in the firing-site debris being classified as low-level radioactive waste (not mixed waste). Other lead is used for shielding (rather than as part of a test assembly) which may become contaminated with radioactive material and is kept onsite for reuse. Approximately 10 percent, less than one 55-gal drum or 220 lb (100 kg) per year, of the lead shielding that is potentially radioactively contaminated is considered unusable, becomes waste, and is transferred to the established LANL mixed-waste program.

As shown in table 3-1, plastics, glues, foams, binders, and other organic materials are used in constructing test assemblies. However, only small quantities, less than a few pounds total for each assembly, are used, and these are mostly destroyed when the assembly is detonated. What little remains would be part of the shot-point debris described above.

A small amount of industrial chemicals and solvents are routinely used to support normal operations at PHERMEX. The major industrial chemicals used on an annual basis are solvents: 3 gal (11 L) of acetone and 6 gal (23 L) of ethanol. Other solvents, which are used on rags for cleaning and are used in very small quantities, are chlorinated fluorocarbons, toluene, 1,1,1-trichloroethane, and xylene. The cleaning rags are collected and disposed as solid potentially hazardous waste following laboratory guidelines. Historically, no more than 220 lb (100 kg) of solid hazardous waste and 1,800 lb (800 kg) of liquid hazardous waste have been disposed for every 1,000 lb (450 kg) of depleted uranium used at PHERMEX firing site.

Nonhazardous solid waste from the building is sent to the county landfill. Approximately one dumpster of nonhazardous solid waste is generated per week.

Wastes generated under current operations and under the proposed alternatives would be subject to treatment, storage, and disposal in other LANL Technical Areas. Transportation of these wastes is conducted using DOE- or DOT-approved containers carried on government vehicles using public roads between LANL facilities, as needed.

The PHERMEX facility has sanitary and storm water management systems. The sanitary system employs a septic tank and leach field. The storm system directs rainwater away from buildings. The sanitary system is registered with Los Alamos County and the storm system has an EPA authorization to discharge. Cooling tower blowdown consisting of a few gallons per year is discharged into the sanitary system.

When containment was used for a test shot, the containment vessel was taken to another LANL facility for cleaning and refurbishing. The blast debris removed was taken to appropriate LANL facilities for processing and disposition.

B.8 DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIAL RELEASED TO THE ENVIRONMENT

For the purposes of this EIS, DOE has estimated the distribution of test assembly material released to the environment to support evaluation of potential impacts for the proposed alternatives. Approximately 50 percent of the depleted uranium in test assemblies at the PHERMEX site is contained in simulated secondaries and blast pipes of pin experiments. During detonation this fraction of the depleted uranium is ejected as relatively large fragments (see figure B-1) that remain in the immediate vicinity of the firing point and are collected during routine cleanup operations. Another approximately 40 percent of the total depleted uranium may be dispersed as relatively small, platelet-shaped fragments having surface areas ranging from 0.08 to 1.1 in² (0.5 to 7 cm²). About half of this material remains in the immediate vicinity of the firing point and is also collected during routine cleanup. Therefore, about 70 percent of the total depleted uranium used on the firing site is collected during cleanup operations. The remaining depleted uranium (about 10 percent of the total) may be released as an aerosol, all of which was considered respirable for the EIS analyses. Respirable particles are those with an activity median aerodynamic diameter (AMAD) of 3.94 x 10^-4 inches (10 µ) or less.

The other half of the small depleted uranium fragments (20 percent of the total depleted uranium) dispersed as a result of detonation typically falls within a 4,100-ft (1,250-m) circle. Larger particles of the aerosolized fraction may also fall out from the plume of released material and be deposited near the firing point. These two fractions constitute the majority of depleted uranium contamination that has been detected in the soil (McClure 1995).

The release and aerosolization fractions described above are also used to estimate the dispersion of other constituents in test assemblies detonated on the PHERMEX firing site. Thus, the other metals (beryllium, lead, copper, and "other metals" in table B-4) are presumed to distribute in ways similar to depleted uranium. Lithium hydride converts to the hydroxide and is not an environmental problem. The high explosives convert to water, NO₂, and CO₂; any residues are extremely minor.

B.9 TRANSPORTATION

Test assemblies that include high explosives are shipped using DOE and LANL trucks, containers, and tie-down techniques from the assembly area at TA-16 to the PHERMEX site. This is a total distance of about 3.5 miles under a speed limit of 35 miles per hour. This shipment is conducted on LANL secure roads and is not conducted on public roads. Transportation requirements consist of one trip for each assembly and up to three trips for shipment of support materials. Support shipments might include high explosives or surrogate materials, but not both simultaneously. Shipments of radioactive surrogate materials exhibit no external radiation exposure characteristics either because of the nature or the characterization of the shipping container.

B.10 REFERENCES CITED IN APPENDIX B

Burns, M.J., 1995, White Rock Noise Measurements During PHERMEX Tests, 11 March 1995, LANL Memorandum No. DC-DO: DARHT-95-31, March 13, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1993, 1992 LANL Dose [Annual Air Emissions Report for the calendar year 1992], June, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Fresquez, P., 1994, Results of the Soil Sampling Survey Conducted Over Active RCRA Firing Site TA-15-184 (PHERMEX), LANL Memorandum No. ESH-8/EFM-94-111, May 26, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

Kottman, J.H., 1994, Discontinuance of Uranium Bioassay Program, LANL Memorandum No. DX-11:94-287, June 22, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory), 1994, Environmental Surveillance at Los Alamos During 1992, LA-12764-ENV, UC-902, July, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

McClure, D.A., 1995, DARHT EIS Section 3.1.3.2 Effluents (Mass Balance), Internal memorandum to S.T. Alexander March 21, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

NMED (New Mexico Environment Department), 1993, Letter from L. Gay (NMED) to S. Fong (Department of Energy, Los Alamos Area Office), May 27, New Mexico Environment Department, Santa Fe, New Mexico.

Vibronics, Inc., 1995, Acoustic and Seismic Testing at the PHERMEX Facility, Conducted for : Environmental Impact Statement for DARHT Facility, Los Alamos National Laboratory, March 10, 1995 - March 11, 1995, Vibronics, Inc., Evansville, Indiana.

Vigil, E.A., 1995, Noise Measurement at State Road 4 and Bandelier Turn Off at State Road 4 During PHERMEX Test on March 11, 1995, LANL Memorandum No. ESH-5:95-11825, March 17, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.

accelerator B-4, B-5, B-7

accident B-3, B-4, B-3, B-5, B-6

accidents B-3, B-4, B-3

air quality B-1, B-2

beryllium B-1, B-2, B-3, B-7, B-8, B-11

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty B-9

containment B-11

contaminants B-7

depleted uranium B-1, B-8, B-7, B-8, B-10, B-11

detonation B-4, B-3, B-4, B-3, B-6, B-8, B-10, B-11

detonations B-10

dose B-1, B-2, B-3, B-7, B-12

dynamic experiments B-9

earthquake B-4

firing point B-1, B-2, B-6, B-7, B-10, B-11

ground water B-7

heavy metals B-1

high explosive B-2, B-3

high explosives B-1, B-3, B-4, B-6, B-8, B-9, B-11, B-12

human health B-3

hydrodynamic test B-3, B-4, B-6

infrastructure B-4

mitigation B-6

monitoring B-1, B-5, B-6, B-7

Nake'muu B-2

noise B-1, B-2, B-12

nuclear weapons stockpile B-9

proliferation B-8, B-9

radiation B-4, B-3, B-4, B-5, B-6, B-7, B-12

radiation exposure B-4, B-3, B-5, B-12

radioactive waste B-10

secondaries B-11

soil B-2, B-3, B-7, B-10, B-11, B-12

soils B-2, B-3

transportation B-6, B-10, B-12

tritium B-8, B-9

waste management B-10