5.5 Kirtland Air Force Base
Under the Pit Storage Relocation Alternative (see section 3.1.3) the pit storage function currently carried out at Pantex Plant would be transferred to another site. Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) is one of the candidate sites for the storage of pits (Figure 5.5–1). The Manzano WSA is the candidate pit storage facility at KAFB. This section discusses the Manzano WSA, the affected environment at KAFB, and the potential impacts that would be associated with pit storage.
Each aspect of the affected environment at KAFB has been assessed and the potential environmental impacts to each have been evaluated. Each environmental resource is discussed in detail commensurate with the degree to which the resource could be impacted by or have an effect on interim pit storage at the candidate facility.
Kirtland Air Force Base. KAFB is an Air Force Materiel Command base sharing base facilities and infrastructure with a number of major tenants, including DOE, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), the Defense Nuclear Agency, and Phillips Laboratory. The base covers an area of 21,320 hectares (52,600 acres) on the southeast boundary of Albuquerque, New Mexico. Approximately 8,300 hectares (20,500 acres) of this area is withdrawn public lands (USAF 1993a:1-3).
Major Air Force units at KAFB include the 377th Air Base Wing, 58th Special Operations Wing (which performs helicopter crew training and pararescue training) and Phillips Laboratory (which performs research and development for space systems, ballistic missiles, geophysics, and directed energy systems). SNL conducts research and development for space systems, testing, stockpile surveillance, and the transportation of nuclear materials (USAF 1993a:3-2).
Manzano Weapons Storage Area. The Manzano WSA at KAFB consists of 4 plants inside Manzano Mountain (used primarily for research activities) and 122 magazines, of which 81 are earth covered and 41 are tunneled into the mountainside (KAFB 1993:13) (Figure 5.5–2). Construction began in June 1947, and the facility became operational in April 1950. In June 1992, the Manzano WSA was deactivated and Phillips Laboratory assumed responsibility for its maintenance. SNL continues to provide minimum security, although the Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Alarm System was deactivated with the termination of the main mission in 1992.
The Manzano WSA has enough magazine space to store more than 20,000 pits. The proposed location for the storage of pits is the set of 41 magazines that are tunneled into the mountainside. As many as 35 magazines have overburden greater than 9 meters (30 feet) of earth and granite. Depending on the storage capacity of individual magazines, it is estimated that not more than 25 of them would be required for storing 20,000 pits, leaving the rest of the magazines for other uses.
The existing fence would be reactivated to the extent necessary and no new fence or security systems would be required. If DOE chooses to store pits in the Manzano WSA at KAFB, a pit placement, retrieval, and inventory system will be implemented. The storage areas at the Manzano WSA are well suited for the Stage Right equipment and techniques successfully implemented at Pantex Plant. Consequently, the development of a pit placement, retrieval, and inventory system would not be necessary.
Figure 5.5-2.--Layout of the Manzano Weapons Storage Area at Kirtland Air Force Base.
5.5.1 Environmental Resources Not Discussed in Detail
The environmental resources discussed below have been assessed for KAFB. Analyses have shown that the impacts to these resources from the potential storage of pits at the Manzano WSA are small enough to warrant only limited discussion. Therefore, these resources are discussed briefly below and are not addressed further in this section.
5.5.1.1 Facilities and Infrastructure
The KAFB infrastructure is managed by the 377th Air Base Wing and includes support to all tenants. As the Manzano WSA is not a DOE site, the exact breakdown of infrastructure support activities that would be performed by KAFB and DOE personnel has yet to be worked out in detail. Should this site be selected for interim pit storage, a Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of the Air Force and DOE would be developed detailing these duties. The infrastructure operations at KAFB that could be impacted by or be expected to directly support pit storage operations include security, vehicle and building maintenance, safety and health protection, utilities, administration, and general support (e.g., cafeteria, general stores). Waste management and transportation support are discussed below and in sections 5.5.1.10 and 5.5.1.11, respectively.
The direct impacts from the implementation of pit storage would include a small increase in the site's security force. Electrical usage due to interim pit storage (estimated to be 4,110 megawatthours per year) represents a 0.8-percent increase over the site's fiscal year 1993 usage of 490,000 megawatthours and 0.4 percent of the fiscal year 1993 system capacity of 1,095,000 megawatthours (USAF 1993a:3-17). Maintenance support and indirect impacts resulting from pit storage worker requirements (e.g., water, wastewater treatment, and fuel) would increase minimally in comparison to the current and historical onsite infrastructure support levels and system capacities. The Manzano WSA is not currently being utilized at historical or design levels; therefore, the utility systems supporting this facility generally have excess capacity available to support pit storage activity.
5.5.1.2 Land Resources
The Manzano WSA is currently being used in part for storage of a variety of items such as furniture and document boxes. These items can easily be removed and space made available for storage of pits if such a decision were made. The use of some storage magazines for the interim storage of 8,000 to 20,000 pits would not change the array of potential storage materials for which these weapon storage magazines are designed. Additionally, no land disturbance is projected under the Pit Storage Relocation Alternative as it pertains to the Manzano WSA. Impacts to land use would not be expected.
5.5.1.3 Geology and Soils
The only aspects of geology and soils that could be affected by or have an effect on the implementation of interim pit storage at the Manzano WSA are the risks associated with earthquakes. The earthquake risk was assessed and found to be bounded by other accidents, as discussed in section 5.5.2.1. The Manzano WSA is not anticipated to require upgrades that would involve land disturbance; therefore, impacts to soils are not anticipated.
5.5.1.4 Water Resources
Because of the nature of the pit storage activities, operations at the Manzano WSA would not impact surface water or groundwater. The pit storage activities would not use surface waters at the Manzano WSA. The Manzano WSA has several springs and seeps. Four springs are located on the mountains that make up the Manzano WSA (USCOE 1995c:22, 23, 27). Some magazines show evidence of water intrusion (KAFB 1993:48). These magazines were designated as unsuitable for interim pit storage and would not be used. The sanitary sewer waste from the Manzano WSA would be discharged to approved septic systems. The wastewater would not have a measurable affect on groundwater quality because of the combined effects of a deep water table (15 to 30 meters [50 to 100 feet]), low additional discharge volumes, high evaporation rates, and a composition and concentration consistent with treated and sanitary wastewater.
The water demands of pit storage operations are solely due to use by storage personnel. The water demands would be less than historical usage at the Manzano WSA and negligible in comparison to the 6.4 billion liters (1.7 billion gallons) used annually at KAFB (USAF 1994:3-20). The Manzano WSA is located outside of the 100-year and 500-year floodplains (USAF 1979).
5.5.1.5 Air Quality
Manzano WSA is in an attainment area for carbon monoxide (CO). A more detailed air quality analysis for this site is provided in section 5.5.2.3.
5.5.1.6 Acoustics
The major sources of noise within KAFB include blasting and explosives testing, aircraft operations, and equipment and machine operations. The only additional sources of noise that would be associated with pit storage operations would be from transportation vehicles. These impacts would be minimal.
5.5.1.7 Biotic Resources
No Federally listed threatened or endangered plant and animal species have been reported from the Manzano WSA, although the peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus) and the bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus) may be occasional KAFB migrants (USAF 1994:3-8, 3-9). The western burrowing owl (Athene cunicularia hypergea), a species of concern, has been reported 1.6 kilometers (1 mile) west of the Manzano WSA perimeter fence, but not within that facility's boundary. Additionally, a State endangered plant, the Wright's fishhook cactus (Mammillaria wrightii), was found on gravelly or rocky slopes at nine sites within the Manzano WSA (NHP 1995:15, C-176, C-177, plant map). Further, four springs were identified within the perimeter of the Manzano WSA (USCOE 1995c:ES 15–27). However, the Pit Storage Relocation Alternative does not include any action that would disturb the animal or plant species noted above or any of the four springs. Therefore, no impacts to biotic resources would be expected.
5.5.1.8 Cultural Resources
Twenty-seven historic and prehistoric archaeological sites have been found in the Manzano WSA. Of these sites, 8 have been recommended for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places and 14 others are considered to be potentially eligible for inclusion (Argonne 1995:1-1, 1-2, 8-2 through 8-6). The Pit Storage Relocation Alternative does not include any action that would disturb these resources. No storage facilities identified in the Pit Storage Relocation Alternative have been nominated to the National Register of Historic Places. Therefore, no impacts to cultural and paleontological resources would be expected.
To identify areas of potential concern and locations of Traditional Cultural Properties, DOE has, in the past, sought consultations with Native American groups with traditional ties to the area. Two of these groups, the Sandia and Isleta Pueblos, expressed a general concern about the Manzano WSA. Isleta Pueblo considers the Four Hills area that comprises the Manzano WSA to be within their traditional area of cultural activities. They have requested that KAFB inform them of any archaeological finds at the Manzano WSA, specifically in regards to human remains and ritual paraphernalia (Argonne 1995:1-1, 1-2). The Pit Storage Relocation Alternative is not expected to adversely affect these concerns.
5.5.1.9 Socioeconomic Resources
Approximately 150 additional personnel (including 120 security personnel) would be required to operate the storage magazines at the Manzano WSA if pit storage activities are moved to this facility. This number represents less than a 0.8 percent increase in the total Federal workforce at KAFB. Most of these workers can be hired locally; therefore the increase to the KAFB workforce or the regional population would not be significant. According to the 1990 Census, 150 workers represent 0.06 percent of the of the workforce employed within the KAFB Region of Influence (NM Cen, 1993:Table 145). No socioeconomic impacts would be anticipated.
5.5.1.10 Waste Management
For the purpose of this assessment, it is assumed that DOE would manage the wastes from pit storage at the Manzano WSA. Waste management figures from SNL are used for comparison. SNL manages mixed transuranic waste, transuranic waste, mixed waste, low-level waste, hazardous waste, and nonhazardous wastes in accordance with the requirements of a number of Federal and State regulations, permits obtained under these regulations (e.g., New Mexico unilateral FFCA order), and DOE orders. These requirements are primarily under the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency, DOE, and the New Mexico Environment Department.
SNL generated an estimated 90 cubic meters (110 cubic yards) of low-level waste and an estimated 1.7 cubic meters (2.2 cubic yards) of mixed waste in 1994. In addition, SNL currently stores approximately 70 cubic meters (91 cubic yards) of mixed waste onsite (DOE 1995:6-4; DOE 1993d:3-71). The new Radioactive Mixed Waste Management Facility for handling these wastes is due to become operational in the near future. SNL generated 751 cubic meters (198,450 gallons) of liquid and 127 cubic meters (166 cubic yards) of solid hazardous waste in 1991 (DOE 1993d:3-71). The pit storage operations would generate less than 1 cubic meter (1.3 cubic yard) of mixed, low-level, and hazardous wastes. Compared to the amounts of waste generated and stored at SNL, the wastes generated by the pit storage activities would be minimal and would not impact the current waste management at SNL.
5.5.1.11 Intrasite Transportation
Interstate 40 and Interstate 25 provide access to the Albuquerque metropolitan area. Access to KAFB from Interstate 40 is provided from either the Wyoming or Eubank gate entrances (Figure 5.5–1). Access to KAFB from Interstate 25 is via Gibson Boulevard.
The onsite road system at KAFB consists of paved streets and access roads. The Manzano WSA is located on the east side of KAFB. Access to the Manzano WSA is via Pennsylvania Avenue. The Manzano WSA is surrounded by fencing. Access to facilities within the area is provided via a ring road which encircles the mountain (Figure 5.5–1). Traffic within the KAFB boundaries is strictly controlled and the roads are not open to public traffic. Base personnel traffic would be controlled as Safe Secure Tractor Trailer (SST) convoys pass through the base roads. Because a release of plutonium from an intersite pit shipment would require a severe accident (e.g., an accident with a fuel tanker or a train [see section 4.16.4.2]), the controlled transportation environment at KAFB does not pose a significant threat to pit shipments. Consequently, the contribution to overall intersite transportation accident risk from onsite transport is negligible.
Two high-speed transportation corridors (Gibson and Tijeras Arroyo corridors) that would traverse KAFB have been proposed. Of these, the Tijeras Arroyo Corridor would come in closest proximity to the Manzano WSA. Both transportation routes have been discussed for a number of years. However, NEPA documentation has not been completed on either project.
5.5.1.12 Aircraft Accidents
The Manzano WSA is located in the foothills of the Manzano Mountains, approximately 6.5 kilometers (4 miles) southeast of the main (east-west) runway of the Albuquerque International Airport. Figure 5.5–1 shows the locations of the Manzano WSA relative to the two runways of interest for the Albuquerque International Airport, one of three airports in the vicinity of the Manzano WSA.
Table 5.5.1.12-1.--Albuquerque International Airport Operations for 1994 (.pdf)
The Albuquerque International Airport is the major commercial airfield in the State of New Mexico; it is the only airport with regular commercial jet service. In addition to its role as a commercial airfield, the Albuquerque International Airport is used by military aircraft at KAFB. In 1994, the Albuquerque International Airport had 220,914 aircraft operations (take-offs and landings) (PC 1996j). Table 5.5.1.12–1 summarizes the total number of airfield operations at the Albuquerque International Airport.
In addition to the Albuquerque International Airport, there are two other airports in the Albuquerque area. Coronado Airport, approximately 19 kilometers (12 miles) to the north-northwest, has two runways, used only by general aviation aircraft. Similarly, Alameda Airport, approximately 24 kilometers (15 miles) to the northwest, has two runways also used by general aviation aircraft. Both of these airports are outside the probability density function boundary for general aviation aircraft and, therefore, were not included in the aircraft crash analysis. Further details on these two airports are contained in volume II, appendix E. Only the Albuquerque International Airport and non-airport (in-flight) aircraft were included in the analysis as required by the Draft DOE Standard (DOE 1996g).
In the history of the Manzano WSA, there have been three aircraft crashes. One crash involved an F-100C; the crash site was located east of the Manzano WSA administration area. Another crash involved a B-29 in the northern portion of the site. This aircraft departed from KAFB and crashed after approximately three minutes in flight, killing the crew. The third crash also occurred in the northern portion of the site and involved an EC-135 (KAFB 1993:69, 73, 74). None of these crashes affected the storage facilities.
If DOE chooses to relocate pits to the Manzano WSA, the pits would be stored in Type D magazines. Type D magazines (as shown in Figure 5.5.1.12–1) have access tunnels that vary in length from 20 meters to over 30 meters (65 feet to over 100 feet). The main chambers are approximately 19 meters (61 feet) long and have the capacity to store up to 800 pit containers each in a Stage Right configuration. In addition, the main chambers are protected by two vault-like steel doors at both ends of the access tunnel.
Figure 5.5.1.12-1.--Type D Storage Facility at the Manzano Weapons Storage Area.
Type D facilities are tunneled into the mountainside, which provides significant earth overburden protection from penetrating aircraft. As many as 35 magazines have overburden greater than 9 meters (30 feet) and are potentially available for pit storage.
For the 20,000-pit storage option, approximately 25 Type D magazines would be utilized. For the 8,000-pit storage option, approximately 10 Type D magazines would be utilized. The frequency of an aircraft impact at the Manzano WSA is relatively high compared with other potential storage sites. However, the earth overburden of Type D magazine provides complete protection against potential damage from aircraft impacts.
At Manzano WSA, the potential exists for airplanes overflying the area to be carrying conventional bombs. An analysis was performed to determine whether expected bomb loads (one to four 909-kilogram [2,000-pound] bombs) could damage the Manzano WSA storage magazines in the event of an airplane crash. With the minimum overburden cover of 9 meters (30 feet) of granite and earth, the magazines can not be damaged by any foreseeable aircraft events (PC 1995e).
Using the Draft DOE Standard for determining the probability of aircraft crashes and 1994 data from the FAA, the frequency of hitting one of the 25 Type D magazines was calculated as 8.8 x 10-5 for all types of aircraft (DOE 1996g). It should be noted that the frequency calculation represents a conservative upper bound. Since this frequency is greater than 10-7, in accordance with the Draft DOE Standard, further analysis was required. A local response structural analysis was performed according to the Draft DOE Standard for the facility with a 9-meter (30-foot) overburden. The analysis was performed for the maximum penetrator missile for each of the aircraft categories mentioned in section 4.15.2, except for helicopters. None of the aircraft missiles was capable of penetrating the facility. Since this frequency is 0, in accordance with the Draft DOE Standard, no further analysis was required. Further details of the frequency of hitting a magazine and the frequency of releasing material are contained in volume II, appendix E.
5.5.2 Resources Discussed in Detail
5.5.2.1 Human Health
The basic approach used in assessing human health concerns is to first identify the affected environments and establish a baseline that represents the risk from current operations. Changes in this baseline risk resulting from the Pit Storage Relocation Alternative are then examined. Impacts from both normal operations and potential accidents are estimated.
Assessing the human health risk impact from potential accidents that result from the relocation of pits to KAFB and storing them in the Manzano WSA involves a risk screening process. The first step in this process is to identify a broad spectrum of potential accident scenarios. The second step in the process uses screening techniques to identify the specific scenarios that dominate risk (i.e., scenarios that contribute an appreciable fraction of the total risk). Finally, risk is calculated as the product of frequency and consequence. Rigorous consequence evaluations are only performed for the identified risk-dominant scenarios.
Two types of accident consequences are examined:
- Worker and public exposure.
- The probability of the accident causing fatal cancer in a worker or the public.
If DOE chooses to relocate pits to KAFB, two aspects of this relocation contribute to a potential for environmental impacts. They are the impacts associated with:
- Transferring pits from the transporter to their storage location inside the facility.
- Storage itself (i.e., potential impacts resulting from having the pits reside inside the facility).
Each time pits are transferred from the transporter to their storage location inside the facility, there is a small probability that an accidental release could occur due to a handling accident. In addition, the transfer of pits from the transporter to their storage location would result in radiological exposures to involved workers.
Affected Environment
The release of radioactivity and toxic chemicals to the environment from a DOE facility is an important issue for onsite workers and the public. Since the human environment contains many sources of radioactivity and toxic chemicals, it is essential to understand the sources of these substances and how effectively they are controlled.
Table 5.5.2.1–1 summarizes the major sources of radiation exposure in the vicinity of the Manzano WSA. The average annual probability of contracting a fatal cancer in the State of New Mexico is 1.4 x 10-3. Using a nominal fatal cancer risk factor of 5 x 10-4 cancer fatalities per person rem and the environmental radioactivity data for Manzano/Sandia in Table 5.5.2.1–1, it is calculated that fatal cancers attributable to environmental radioactivity released in the vicinity of the Manzano WSA and SNL constitute an extremely small fraction (<<0.01 percent) of the average yearly fatal cancer probability in the State of New Mexico (Letter 1995).
Figure 5.5.2.1–1 depicts the offsite population within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the Manzano WSA. Wind speeds and directions in the Manzano WSA vicinity are presented in Figure 5.5.2.1-2. Winds are predominantly southerly during the summer and northerly during the winter.
Impacts of Facility Upgrades There is no significant impact on human health associated with Manzano facility upgrades. The only upgrade required is to modify storage magazines to accept Stage Right transfer and storage equipment. The facility impact involves modifying floor space to accept Stage Right guide rails and fastening Stage Right attachment fixtures to storage facility walls. These are standard industrial operations that do not expose workers to any special hazards (e.g., radionuclides, toxic chemicals, or high explosives).
Impacts of Storing 20,000 Pits
Human health impacts from pit storage activities could potentially result from normal operations and accident scenarios. Impacts from normal operations would be confined to onsite workers. Normal operational impacts result from the unloading of pits from SSTs at the Manzano WSA. Unloading operations would result in radiological exposure to cargo handlers. Based on conservative calculations made for handling of pits at Pantex Plant, the worker doses from unloading of 2,000 pits per year are estimated to be 27 person-rem per year or 270 person-rem for the unloading of 20,000 pits (the maximum number of pits which may be stored at the Manzano WSA).
Once removed from the SSTs, pits would be transferred into the Manzano WSA for storage. Pit transfers within the Manzano WSA would result in radiological exposures to onsite workers handling the pits. The transfer of pits would result in worker doses of less than 2 person-rem per year for handling 2,000 pits and about 13 person-rem for the placement of 20,000 pits. The combined worker dose from unloading and storage of 20,000 pits at the Manzano WSA would be 283 person-rem distributed over the 30 people directly involved in material movement. Assuming that the same 30 people continue to handle 20,000 pits over a period of 10 years and using a dose-to-risk conversion factor of 4 x 10-4 latent cancer fatality (LCF) per person-rem, there would be an additional 0.11 LCF experienced by this group due to radiological exposure from pit handling.
The probability of LCFs from all causes in the general population is estimated at 20 percent, which implies that 6 of 30 workers would develop cancer from all other causes. With an additional risk of 0.11 LCF from pit handling, the total risk of LCFs among workers at the Manzano WSA would increase by 1.8 percent.
Some operational accidents could result in impacts to both onsite workers and the offsite general population. Radiological exposures and the resultant risk of latent fatal cancers have been evaluated.
Figure 5.5.2.1-1.--Offsite Population in the Vicinity of the Manzano Weapons Storage Area.
Figure 5.5.2.1-2.--Wind Direction and Speed at Alberquerque International Airport.
The Manzano WSA is the candidate facility at KAFB for storing 20,000 pits. The risk screening methodology indicates that the radiological health risk from accidents associated with the storage of 20,000 pits is dominated by handling accidents that could occur when the pits are being transferred from the transporter. A standard tine forklift is likely to be used to remove pit containers from an SST. The probability of a standard tine forklift causing a puncture during a single handling operation is in the extremely unlikely range (i.e., 10-4 to 10-6).
It is estimated that a forklift puncture of a pit container would release 9.2 x 10-5 curies of plutonium. This is a conservative estimate of the respirable, airborne release caused by a puncture of one shipping container (DOE 1992f:7-39).
Given such a release, an involved worker (the forklift driver) would receive a dose of 6.6 rem, corresponding to an incremental increase in lifetime fatal cancer probability of 2.6 x 10-3. In addition, a non-involved worker 100 meters (328 feet) downwind along the center line of the plutonium dispersion plume would receive a 5.2 x 10-2 rem exposure, corresponding to an incremental increase in lifetime fatal cancer probability of 2.1 x 10-5. The maximally exposed member of the public would be expected to receive an exposure of 1.7 x 10-3 rem, corresponding to an incremental increase in lifetime fatal cancer probability of 8.5 x 10-7. The lifetime fatal cancer probability for an average individual from all other causes is approximately 0.2 (20 percent).
This event would result in an exposure to the public of 4.0 x 10-2 person-rem. Considering the likelihood and consequence of this event, on the average, a member of the public will have an increased annual risk of developing a fatal cancer from this potential accident of 2.6 x 10-14 fatal cancers per year. The annual fatal cancer risk to a person in the State of New Mexico from all other causes is 1.4 x 10-3 fatal cancers per year.
Pit container inventories at the Manzano WSA are expected to be performed using either shielded or automated techniques and equipment. Consequently, these normal operations are not expected to result in any significant radiological exposure to workers.
Other storage activities that may occur within the timeframe evaluated in this EIS include:
- Restacking a limited number of pits to comply with design laboratory temperature requirements.
- A limited number of pit movements and/or instrumentation placements to facilitate third party inspections.
Impacts of these routine activities are also considered to be negligible.
Impacts of Storing of 8,000 Pits
The risks associated with storing 8,000 pits are similar to those of the 20,000-pit storage alternative. If DOE chooses to store 8,000 pits at the Manzano WSA, the total worker doses from unloading operations would be below 113 person-rem over 4 years. This exposure would result in an additional 0.04 LCF from pit handling. With an additional risk of 0.04 latent fatal cancers from pit handling, the total risk of latent fatal cancers among workers at the Manzano WSA would increase by 0.6 percent.
Risk screening methodology also indicates that the risk from storing 8,000 pits in the Manzano WSA is dominated by forklift handling accidents. Note that the risk screening methodology evaluated all potential threats to pit container integrity, such as fire, aircraft crash, earthquakes, flood, and other internal and external events.
The relative risk contribution from earthquakes at the Manzano WSA could not be assessed due to insufficient storage facility fragility data. Since the Type D storage facilities are buried inside solid rock, a breach of a storage and shipping container would not result in a radionuclide release outside the facility as long as the rock overburden remains intact and the doors leading to the storage facility remain closed. Moreover, due to the robust design of the storage and shipping containers, a plutonium release caused by a seismic event is considered not reasonably foreseeable unless part of the rock overburden collapses and impacts a shipping container. Hence, the frequency of a plutonium release from a Manzano Type D storage facility is dependent upon the seismic capacity of the rock overburden.
The impacts of a forklift puncture at Manzano WSA would be the same whether 20,000 or 8,000 pits are stored at the site.
5.5.2.2 Environmental Justice
Affected Environment
The Manzano WSA is located on KAFB, which is adjacent to the southeastern city limits of Albuquerque, in central New Mexico. Besides the Air Force and other Department of Defense facilities, KAFB is also the location of various DOE operations, including SNL. Nearly 20,000 military and civilian personnel work on the base (KAFB 1995). In order to identify the target populations covered by Executive Order 12898, an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius circle centered on the Manzano WSA was overlaid on 1990 Census tract maps. The communities that lie within the 80-kilometer (50-mile) circle, hereafter called the Manzano Region of Influence (ROI), are shown in Figure 5.5.2.2–1.
Population. According to the 1990 Census, there were 606,446 persons within the Manzano ROI. White persons comprised 55 percent of the population, Hispanics were the second largest group with 37 percent, and American Indians accounted for just over 4 percent of the total population. Indian Reservations and trust lands belonging to 10 Native American tribes are located within the Manzano ROI, and approximately half of the American Indians counted in the area in 1990 resided on Indian land. Blacks, Asians, Pacific Islanders and other racial groups totaled less than 4 percent of the total population in 1990 (UN 1995).
Most of the population in the Manzano ROI resides in various cities, towns and Census Designated Places. Albuquerque is the most populous community with 384,736 persons or 63 percent of the total population within the Manzano ROI in 1990. An unincorporated area known as the South Valley, located immediately southwest of Albuquerque and due west of KAFB, is the second largest community in the area with a 1990 population of 35,701. More than 70 percent of residents in the South Valley were Hispanics. Rio Rancho, northwest of Albuquerque in southcentral Sandoval County, is third largest with 32,505 persons in 1990.
North and south of Albuquerque, along the Rio Grande River, are a number of towns and villages, most with primarily Hispanic populations: Belen (5,960 persons in 1990, 67 percent Hispanic), Bernalillo (5,960 persons, 75 percent Hispanic), Bosque Farms (3,791 persons, 25 percent Hispanic), Corrales (5,453 persons, 27 percent Hispanic), Los Chaves (3,872 persons, 49 percent Hispanic), Los Lunas (6,013 persons, 58 percent Hispanic), Tome-Adelino (1,695 persons, 65 percent Hispanic) and Valencia (3,917 persons, 47 percent Hispanic) (NM Cen 1992:Table 6). Most of these communities are also characterized by fairly large low-income populations. For example, Belen had 28 percent of its population below the poverty level, Bernalillo had 24 percent below the poverty level, Los Chaves had 19 percent below the poverty level, Los Lunas had 25 percent below the poverty level, and Valencia had 15 percent below the poverty level (NM Cen 1993:Table 203).
Figure 5.5.2.2-1.--The Manzano WSA Region of Influence.
There are also nine primarily American Indian communities in the Manzano ROI. A major portion of the northern boundary of the Isleta Indian Reservation borders the southern boundary of KAFB, but the Isleta people (2,699 in 1990) primarily live near the Rio Grande River, several miles from the KAFB boundary. In the Sandoval County portion of the Manzano ROI are seven additional Indian Reservations with persons residing in dense settlements known as Pueblos: Sandia Pueblo with 358 Indian residents in 1990; Santa Ana Pueblo with 481 Indian residents; San Felipe Pueblo with 1,859 Indian residents; Santo Domingo Pueblo with 2,947 Indian residents; Cochiti Pueblo with 666 Indian residents; Zia Pueblo with 637 Indian residents; and Jemez Pueblo with 1,738 Indian residents. In the northwest corner of Bernalillo County is the Canoncito Navajo Reservation, a satellite of the main Navajo Reservation, with 1,060 Indian residents counted in 1990 (NM Cen 1991:Table 17).
The most notable socioeconomic characteristic of these communities is their large numbers of low-income persons. The percentage of persons below the poverty level based on 1989 incomes found on these reservations were: Isleta, 27; Sandia, 19; Santa Ana, 13; San Felipe, 42; Santo Domingo, 34; Cochiti, 25; Zia, 33; Jemez, 37; and Canoncito, 60 (NM Cen 1993:Table 229).
Minority Population. Figure 5.5.2.2–2 shows 1990 Census tracts within the Manzano ROI. The tracts are shaded if minority populations comprised 25 percent or more of the populations in 1990 or if 25 percent or more of the persons in a tract were below the poverty level based on their incomes in 1989. The 25 percent threshold levels for minority or low-income persons are based on the working definitions contained in the notice of the Environmental Protection Agency's Office of Environmental Justice (59 FR 192).
Virtually every tract in the Manzano ROI had a population in 1990 in which at least 25 percent of persons were minority or non-Whites. The major exceptions were the southern-most tract in Santa Fe County, four tracts in Rio Rancho in southcentral Sandoval County, and 25 tracts located primarily in the northeastern quadrant of Albuquerque, including the Four-Hills Tract located just north of the Manzano WSA.
Low-Income Population. Low-income persons were not nearly as prevalent in the Manzano ROI in 1990 as were minority persons. High levels of poverty found in American Indian communities account for the shaded tracts in rural Sandoval County, eastern Cibola County, and western and southern Bernalillo County. The tracts shaded for low-income persons in rural Socorro, Valencia, Torrance and San Miguel Counties are also areas with largely Hispanic populations. In the Albuquerque area, high poverty levels were found primarily in the southern half of the city, with the greatest concentration of low-income persons situated in the southwest quadrant, in the unincorporated area known as the South Valley, with its 73 percent Hispanic population (NM Cen 1992:Table 6).
Impacts of Storing 20,000 Pits
Because the interim storage of pits at KAFB would not require any construction activities and because all facility modifications would take place inside existing facilities, impacts to the natural environment would be minimal. Under normal operating conditions, there would be minor increases in air pollutants associated with vehicles used during pit storage activities. Also, a minor increase in particulate matter of aerodynamic diameter less than 10 micrometers concentrations would be expected. These increases are associated with the operation of forklifts which are used to move the pits from the unloading area to the storage area.
These impacts are not likely to affect the surrounding population. Radiological releases from normal pit storage operations would have no measurable effect on an individual occupying a position near the KAFB boundary for an entire year. Levels at the site boundary would be indistinguishable from natural background radiation. No adverse health effects would be expected among the general public, including minority and low-income populations, as a result of normal storage operations.
Figure 5.4.2.2-2.--Minority and Low-Income Populations in the Manzano WSA Reigon of Influence.
An abnormal event, such as accidental puncture of a storage container by a forklift, has the potential of exposing the general public to radiation. The analysis in section 5.5.2.1, Human Health, indicates that the risk to the public from such an accident would be negligible. With no measurable impacts on the general population, the minority and low-income populations would not be disproportionately impacted.
Impacts of Storing 8,000 Pits
The human health impact of storing 8,000 pits at the Manzano WSA would be lower than those identified for the storage of 20,000 pits. No significant adverse impacts are expected, and minority populationminority and low-income populationlow-income populations would not be disproportionately impacted.
5.5.2.3 Air Quality
Affected Environment
The Manzano WSA at Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB)KAFB is located in Bernalillo County, which is situated in the Albuquerque-Mid Rio Grande Intrastate Air Quality Control Region 152. The Manzano WSA lies outside the City of Albuquerque and is classified as "better than national standards" for sulfur dioxide (SO2), "unclassifiable/attainment" for ozone (O3), "unclassifiable" for particulate matter, "cannot be classified or better than national standards" for nitrogen dioxide (NO2), "attainment for CO, and "not designated" for lead. For CO, Bernalillo County has not had a violation during the past 3 years. As of July 15 1996, the Environmental Protection Agency redesignated Bernallilo County from nonattainment to attainment for CO. The nearest Prevention of Significant Deterioration Class I area to the Manzano WSA is the Bandelier Wilderness, approximately 80 kilometers (50 miles) to the north. The Manzano WSA has no emission sources subject to Prevention of Significant Deterioration requirements.
Impacts of Facility Upgrades
Project-related air quality impacts can be divided into two distinct categories. The first category is short-term construction-related impacts. The second category of impacts is characterized as long-term operations impacts. Long-term impacts would occur once construction is completed and the facility is in operation.
Facility upgrades would not be required at the Manzano WSA. Therefore, there would be no air quality impacts related to construction activities.
Impacts of Storing 20,000 Pits
There are no direct criteria pollutant emissions from the pits during storage. Indirect pollutant emissions would be produced from the exhausts of the vehicles used by employees used to commute to and from work. Also, exhaust emissions from the SSTs used to transport the pits from Pantex Plant to the Manzano WSA would contribute a small amount of pollution to the overall pollutant burden in Bernalillo County, New Mexico.
The calculation of emission rates of exhaust pollutants from employee and pit delivery vehicles was made based on emission factors obtained from the EPA Mobile Source Emission Factor Model (MOBILE 5a). The following assumptions were used in calculating the exhaust pollutant emissions:
- 120 vehicles would be used by security employees (365 days per year).
- 30 vehicles would be used by operations staff employees (255 days per year).
- Average round-trip commute distance: 48 kilometers (30 miles).
- Pit delivery truck round-trip distance in Bernalillo County: 80 kilometers (50 miles).
Table 5.5.2.3–1 presents the estimated annual pollutant emissions from employee and pit delivery vehicles. A comparison of these emissions with those in Bernalillo County is also provided in the table.
Table 5.5.2.3–1 shows that the resulting increase in the CO emission due to storage of pits at the Manzano WSA would be 0.08 percent. Also, these emissions from mobile sources would be distributed over a relatively large area. The increases in the ambient concentrations would, therefore, probably not be detectable. Bernalillo County was in a maintenance for attainment area for CO, and has recently been designated an attainment area for CO. Nor would these negligible increases cause any violations of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for the other criteria pollutants. The air quality impacts resulting from the long-term storage of pits at the Manzano WSA would therefore be negligible.
Impacts of Storing 8,000 Pits
Pollutant emission resulting from the storage of 8,000 pits would be less than those resulting from the storage of 20,000 pits. Since the air quality impacts from the storage of 20,000 pits were found to be negligible, the air quality impacts resulting from the storage of 8,000 pitpits would also be negligible.environmental justice
General Conformity Determination
The EPA published the General Conformity Rule 40 CFR parts 6, 51, and 93 on November 30, 1993 to implement section 176(c) of the Clean Air Act as amended in 1990. This section requires that Federal action conform to the appropriate State Implementation Plan. Conformity, as defined in the Clean Air Act, is conformity to the State Implementation Plan's purpose of eliminating or reducing the severity and number of violations of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards and achieving expeditious attainment of such standards.
A formal conformity determination is required for federal actions occurring in nonattainment areas when the total direct and indirect emissions of nonattainment pollutants (or their precursors) exceed specified annual de minimis (threshold) values. Because O3 is a secondary pollutant, the conformity determination for O3 uses the precursor emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and NO2 as surrogate pollutants. The de minimis thresholds are presented in Table 5.5.2.3–2.census tracts
Since the Manzano WSA was in a maintenance for attainment area for CO, the de minimis value for CO was 90.7 metric tons (100 tons) per year. As shown in Table 5.5.2.3–1, the emission rate for CO is well below the de minimis value. Therefore, a general conformity analysis is not required for the Manzano Manzano Weapons Storage Area (WSA)WSA. Further, the County has recently been designated attainment area for CO.
Table 5.5.2.3-2.--De Minimis Thresholds (.pdf)
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