5.3 Savannah River Site
Under the Pit Storage Relocation Alternative (see section 3.1.3), the pit storage function currently carried out at Pantex Plant would be transferred to another site. The Savannah River Site (SRS) is one of the candidate sites for the storage of pits (Figure 5.3–1). The P-Reactor building is the specific facility being considered for the interim pit storage at SRS. This section discusses the P-Reactor facility, the affected environment at SRS, and the potential impacts that would be associated with pit storage.
Each aspect of the affected environment at SRS has been assessed and the potential environmental impacts to each have been evaluated. Each environmental resource is discussed commensurate with the degree to which the resource could be impacted by or have an effect on interim pit storage at the candidate facility.
Savannah River Site. SRS is a government-owned and contractor-operated facility, managed by Westinghouse Savannah River Company (DOE 1993d:3-42). DOE owns approximately 780 square kilometers (300 square miles) in Aiken and Barnwell Counties, South Carolina, approximately 26 kilometers (16 miles) southeast of Augusta, Georgia and 19 kilometers (12 miles) south of Aiken, South Carolina (DOE 1993f:1). Less than 5 percent of the site is developed; the remaining area (approximately 73,300 hectares [181,000 acres]) is primarily forest land (DOE 1995q:A-25).
The primary mission at SRS from the 1950's until the recent end of the Cold War was the production and processing of nuclear materials to support defense programs. Major categories of activities at the site include tritium recycling, the processing of plutonium-238 for space missions, processing of irradiated targets and spent nuclear fuel, the interim storage of plutonium, environmental restoration actions, waste management, and research and development. P-Reactor is one of five reactors (C, K, L, P, and R) at SRS (DOE 1995q:A-25).
P-Reactor. P-Reactor is the candidate pit storage facility at SRS; it is located within a controlled area about 4 kilometers (2.6 miles) east-southeast of the geographical center of the site and about 6.5 kilometers (4 miles) west of the closest site boundary (Figure 5.3–1). P-Reactor was built in 1954 and was shut down in August 1988 for maintenance. In February 1991, it was placed in cold standby so that it could be used to provide spare parts for L-Reactor and K-Reactor. P-Reactor is now permanently shut down. The reactor building is a reinforced concrete building that houses four major process areas; the reactor area, the assembly area, the disassembly area, and the purification area (Figure 5.3–2).
The assembly area within the P-Reactor building is the proposed facility for pit storage. The assembly area was originally built for receiving, handling, and preparing fresh fuel and target assemblies for P-Reactor. Separated from the reactor building by a reinforced concrete wall and steel doors, the assembly area is a large warehouse-type facility that is divided into three large rooms; the receiving bay, process zone, and final storage area. Up to 20,000 pits could be stored in this building if appropriate modifications are made. A Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Alarm System already exists around the building. No construction involving new land disturbance would be required at the site.
If DOE chooses to store pits at the P-Reactor facility at SRS, a pit placement, retrieval, and inventory system would be developed. It is expected that an automated or shielded pit movement and inventory system would be developed for this site.
Figure 5.3-1--Location of P-Reactor at the Savannah River Site.
Figure 5.3-2--Layout of P-Reactor at the Savannah River Site.
The P-Reactor facility would require some internal facility modifications to enable a pit storage mission. Pit storage would require the installation of seismically qualified racks, and the development of an automated or shielded pit placement and retrieval system utilizing a bridge crane or high-lift forklift.
5.3.1 Environmental Resources Not Discussed in Detail
The environmental resources discussed below have been assessed at SRS. The analyses have shown that the impacts to these resources from potential pits storage activities at the P-Reactor facility would be small enough to warrant limited discussion. Therefore, these resources are discussed briefly below and will not be addressed further in this section.
5.3.1.1 Facilities and Infrastructure
The infrastructure operations at SRS that could be impacted by or be expected to directly support pit storage operations include security, vehicle and building maintenance, utilities, administration, safety and health protection, and general support (e.g., cafeteria, general stores). Waste management and transportation support are discussed below and in sections 5.3.1.10 and 5.3.1.11, respectively.
The direct impacts from the implementation of pit storage would include a small increase in the site's security force. Electrical usage due to interim pit storage (estimated to be 4,110 megawatthours per year) represents a 0.6 percent increase over the site's 1993 usage of 659,000 megawatthours and just under 0.2 percent of the site's remaining fiscal year 1993 system capacity of 2,980,000 megawatthours (DOE 1995p:C.4-66). Maintenance support and the indirect impacts resulting from pit storage worker requirements (e.g., water, wastewater treatment, and fuel) would increase minimally in comparison to the current and historical onsite infrastructure support levels and system capacities. The P-Reactor facility is not currently being utilized at historical or design levels; therefore, the utility systems generally have excess capacity available to support pit storage activity.
5.3.1.2 Land Resources
No land disturbance is projected under the Pit Storage Relocation Alternative for SRS. The Pit Storage Relocation Alternative does not include any new land uses at SRS. Impacts to land use would not be expected.
5.3.1.3 Geology and Soils
The only aspects of the geology and soils resource area that could be affected by or have an effect on the implementation of interim pit storage at SRS are the risks associated with earthquakes. P-Reactor is not anticipated to require upgrades that would involve land disturbance; therefore, impacts to soils are not anticipated. The risk due to earthquakes was assessed and found to be bounded by other accidents, as discussed in section 5.3.2.1.
5.3.1.4 Water Resources
Because of the nature of the pit storage activities, operations at the P-Reactor would not impact surface water, groundwater, or floodplains. The pit storage activities would not use surface waters at SRS and the nearest 100-year floodplain is 2.4 kilometers (1.5 miles) to the south and would not be impacted by pit storage activities. The increase in discharge of sanitary sewer waste due to a larger number of workers than presently utilized at the P-Reactor would be negligible in comparison to the site's annual wastewater treatment of 708 million liters (187 million gallons) and capacity of 2,043 million liters (540 million gallons). Since the site-wide compliance for SRS in 1993 was 99.9 percent, and because all sanitary discharges are regulated by National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits, no impacts to surface water quality are expected (WSRC 1994:16). No wastewater is discharged directly to groundwater; therefore groundwater quality would not be affected (DOE 1995k:4-411). The water demands of pit storage operations are solely due to use by storage personnel. In comparison to historical usage at the P-Reactor and the over 14 billion liters (3.7 billion gallons) used at SRS in 1993, water demands from pit storage are negligible (DOE 1995p:4-46).
5.3.1.5 Air Quality
Based on data collected at stations in Aiken and Barnwell counties, SRS and the surrounding area are well within all applicable local, State, and Federal ambient air quality standards (DHEC 1992; DHEC 1993; DHEC 1994). The impacts to air quality from normal pit storage operations would be due entirely to vehicle emissions (approximately 150 vehicles per day). The air impacts caused by vehicle emissions from pit storage activity would be negligible relative to the overall vehicular emissions at SRS.
5.3.1.6 Acoustics
The major sources of noise at SRS are located in developed or active areas and include industrial facilities, equipment, and machines. Because of the distance of P-Reactor from the site boundary and residential receptors, noise emitted from the site is not distinguishable above background noise levels at the SRS boundary (DOE 1995k:4-351). The only sources of noise that would be associated with pit storage operations would be from transportation vehicles and air conditioning and heating equipment for the occupied areas of the facility. These impacts would be minimal.
5.3.1.7 Biotic Resources
No Federally listed threatened or endangered plant and animal species are known to occur at P-Reactor (DOE 1995k:4-386). The smooth coneflower (Echinacea laevigata) is the only threatened or endangered plant that occurs on SRS. The bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus) and red-cockaded woodpecker (Picoides borealis) nest at SRS, and the wood stork (Mycteria americana) forages in the Savannah River Swamp and several of its tributaries on SRS. The peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus) and Kirtland's warbler (Dendroica kirtlandii) may occur on an incidental basis. The shortnose sturgeon (Acipenser brevirostrum) occurs in the Savannah River near SRS (DOE 1995m:3-42 through 3-44). The interim storage of pits at the P-Reactor would not disturb the above mentioned species at SRS. Further, no wetlands at SRS would be disturbed by the Pit Storage Relocation Alternative (DOE 1995k:4-423). As a result, impacts to biotic resources would not be expected.
5.3.1.8 Cultural Resources
No historic, prehistoric, or paleontological sites have been found in the immediate vicinity of P-Reactor at SRS. Further, no National Register of Historic Places-eligible buildings are located at the P-Reactor. The Pit Storage Relocation Alternative would not adversely impact cultural and paleontological resources at SRS.
Native American groups with traditional ties to the area include the Westo, Shawnee, Yuchi, Apalachee, Chickasaw, Creek, and Cherokee (DOE 1993d). Consultations regarding traditional Cultural Properties and concerns have been conducted by DOE. As a result, Pee Dee, Creek, and Yuchi townsites are considered sensitive, and the Yuchi and Muskogee Creek groups have expressed a general concern regarding traditional use areas (DOE 1995m:55, 56; DOE 1993d:4-56, 57). These areas are not located at P-Reactor and, as a result, no impacts are expected from the Pit Storage Relocation Alternative.
5.3.1.9 Socioeconomic Resources
Approximately 150 additional personnel (including 120 security personnel) would be required for interim storage of pits at SRS. This number represents less than a 1.0 percent increase in the total SRS workforce. Most of these workers can be hired locally; therefore, no significant site or regional population and workforce increases are anticipated. According to the 1990 Census, 150 workers represent 0.07 percent of the workforce employed within the SRS Region of Influence (SC Cen 1993:Table 145; GA Cen 1993:Table 145). No socioeconomic impacts would be anticipated.
5.3.1.10 Waste Management
Currently, SRS manages high-level waste, mixed transuranic waste, transuranic waste, mixed waste, low-level waste, hazardous waste, and nonhazardous wastes in accordance with the requirements of a number of Federal and State regulations, permits obtained under these regulations, and DOE orders. These requirements are primarily under the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency, DOE, and the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. SRS anticipates generating 18,000 cubic meters (23,500 cubic yards) of low-level waste, approximately 2,000 cubic meters (2,600 cubic yards) of mixed waste, and 1,400 cubic meters (1,800 cubic yards) of hazardous waste in 1996 (DOE 1995m:A-1). The pit storage operations would generate less than 1 cubic meter (1.3 cubic yards) of mixed, low-level, and hazardous waste. This amount of waste would not impact current waste management at SRS.
5.3.1.11 Intrasite Transportation
The P-Reactor facility is located approximately 4 kilometers (2.6 miles) east-southeast of the geographical center of SRS and approximately 6.5 kilometers (4 miles) west of the closest site boundary (Figure 5.3–1). State Highway 125 provides access to the P-Reactor facility from the Augusta region; State Highway 64 provides access from Snelling. The P-Reactor facility is located on SRS primary Road F. All roads within SRS are suitable for passage in all weather conditions. Although some roads within the SRS boundaries are public access roads, the DOE would control access during passage of Safe Secure Tractor Trailer (SST) convoys. Because a release of plutonium from an intersite pit shipment would require a severe accident (e.g., an accident with a fuel tanker or train [see section 4.16.4.2]), the controlled transportation environment within SRS does not pose a significant threat to pit shipments. Consequently, the contribution of overall intersite transportation risk from onsite transportation is negligible.
Table 5.3.1.12-1.--Bush Field Operations for 1994 (.pdf)
5.3.1.12 Aircraft Accidents
There are four airports in the vicinity of P-Reactor. Bush Field, the major commercial airfield in the area, has two runways and is approximately 38 kilometers (24 miles) west-northwest of P-Reactor. The airport is used by commercial (air carrier and air taxi), military, and general aviation aircraft. In 1994, Bush Field had 39,461 aircraft operations (take-offs and landings). Table 5.3.1.12–1 summarizes the total number of airfield operations at Bush Field (PC 1996j). The closest airport, the county airport near Barnwell, has three runways and is located approximately 18 kilometers (11 miles) east of P-Reactor. This airport is used by general aviation aircraft. Similarly, Aiken Airport, approximately 46 kilometers (29 miles) north-northwest, has three runways, used only by general aviation aircraft.
The North Army Base, approximately 61 kilometers (38 miles) northeast, has one runway used by military aircraft only. All four airports are outside the probability density function boundary for all categories of aircraft, and were therefore not included in the aircraft crash analysis. Only non-airport (in-flight) aircraft were included in the analysis as required by the Draft DOE Standard (DOE 1996g). Further details on these four facilities are contained in volume II, appendix E.
P-Reactor was modeled conservatively as a facility with a length of 69 meters (225 feet), a width of 57 meters (187 feet), and a height of 9 meters (30 feet). Using the Draft DOE Standard for determining the probability of aircraft crashes and 1994 data from the FAA, the frequency of hitting P-Reactor was calculated as 1.2 x 10-6 for all types of aircraft (DOE 1996g). It should be noted that the frequency calculation represents a conservative upper bound. Since this frequency is greater than 10-7, in accordance with the Draft DOE Standard, further analysis was required. A local response structural analysis was performed according to the Draft DOE Standard, for the facility with a wall thickness of 76 centimeters (30 inches).
The analysis was performed for the maximum penetrator missile for each of the aircraft categories mentioned in section 4.15.2, except for helicopters. The commercial air carrier and large military aircraft categories were the only two aircraft missiles capable of penetrating the facility; the frequency of releasing material from P-Reactor was # 9.2 x 10-9. Since this frequency is less than 10-7, in accordance with the Draft DOE Standard, no further analysis was required. Further details of the frequency of hitting P-Reactor and the frequency of releasing material are contained in volume II, appendix E.
5.3.2 Resources Discussed in Detail
5.3.2.1 Human Health
The basic approach used in assessing human health concerns is to first identify the affected environments and establish a baseline that represents the risk from current operations. Changes in this baseline risk resulting from the Pit Storage Relocation Alternative are then examined. Impacts from both normal operations and potential accidents are estimated.
Assessing the human health risk impact from potential accidents resulting from the relocation of pits to SRS and storing them in the P-Reactor facility involves a risk screening process. The first step in this process is to identify a broad spectrum of potential accident scenarios. The second step in the process uses screening techniques to identify the specific scenarios that dominate risk (i.e., scenarios that contribute an appreciable fraction of the total risk). Finally, risk is the product of frequency and consequence. Rigorous consequence evaluations are only performed for the identified risk dominant scenarios.
Two types of accident consequences are examined:
- Worker and public exposure.
- The probability of the accident causing fatal cancer in a worker or the public.
If DOE chooses to relocate pits to SRS, two aspects of this relocation would contribute to a potential for environmental impacts. These impacts are associated with:
- Transferring pits from the transporter to their storage location inside the facility.
- Storage itself (i.e., potential impacts resulting from having the pits reside inside the facility).
Each time pits are transferred from the transporter to their storage location inside the facility, there is a small probability that an accidental release could occur due to a handling accident. In addition, the transfer of pits from the transporter to their storage location would result in radiological exposures to involved workers.
Affected EnvironmentThe release of radioactivity and toxic chemicals to the environment from a DOE facility is an important issue for onsite workers and the public. Since the human environment contains many sources of radioactivity and toxic chemicals, it is essential to understand the sources of these substances and how effectively they are controlled.
Table 5.3.2.1–1 summarizes the major sources of radiation exposure in the vicinity of SRS. Cancer statistics for the States of Georgia and South Carolina indicate that annually, an average person in those states has a 1.7 x 10-3 probability of contracting a fatal cancer (DOE 1990a:4-36). Using nominal fatal cancer risk factor of 5 x 10-4 cancer fatalities per person rem and the environmental radioactivity data for SRS in Table 5.3.2.1–1, it is calculated that fatal cancers within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of SRS attributable to environmental radioactivity released from SRS constitute 0.005 percent of the average yearly fatal cancer probability in Georgia and South Carolina (DOE 1994o:4-20).
Figure 5.3.2.1–1 depicts the offsite population within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of SRS. Meteorological data for the P-Area are presented in Figure 5.3.2.1–2 (DOE 1994v:4-25; DOE 1993a:12). Winds from the northeast sector occurred most often, with southwest and northeast quadrants more frequent than northwest and southeast quadrants.
Impacts of Facilities UpgradesThere is no significant impact on human health associated with SRS facility upgrades. The principal upgrade required is to modify P-Reactor to accept Stage Right transfer and storage equipment. The facility impact involves modifying floor space to accept Stage Right guide rails and fastening Stage Right attachment fixtures to storage facility walls. These are standard industrial operations that do not expose workers to any special hazards (e.g., radionuclides, toxic chemicals, or high explosives).
Impacts of Storing 20,000 PitsHuman health impacts from pit storage activities could potentially result from normal operations and accident scenarios. Impacts from normal operations would be confined to onsite workers. Normal operational impacts result from unloading of pits from SSTs at the P-Reactor facility. Unloading operations would result in radiological exposure to cargo handlers. Based on conservative calculations made for handling of pits at Pantex Plant, the worker doses from unloading of 2,000 pits per year are estimated to be 27 person-rem per year or 270 person-rem for the unloading of 20,000 pits (the maximum number of pits which may be stored at the P-Reactor facility).
Once removed from SSTs, pits would be transferred into the P-Reactor facility for storage. Pit transfers within the P-Reactor facility would result in radiological exposures to onsite workers handling the pits. The transfer of pits would result in worker doses of less than 2 person-rem per year for handling 2,000 pits and about 13 person-rem for the placement of 20,000 pits. The combined worker dose from unloading and storage of 20,000 pits at the P-Reactor facility would be 283 person-rem distributed over the 30 people directly involved in material handling. Assuming that the same 30 people continue to handle 20,000 pits over a period of 10 years and using a dose-to-risk conversion factor of 4 x 10-4 latent cancer fatality (LCF) per person-rem, there would be an additional 0.11 LCF experienced by this group due to radiological exposure from pit handling.
The probability of LCFs from all causes in the general population is estimated at 20 percent which implies that 6 of 30 workers would develop cancer from all other causes. With an additional 0.11 LCF from pit handling, the total risk of latent fatal cancer among workers at the P-Reactor site would increase by 1.8 percent.
Some operational accidents could result in impacts to both onsite workers and the offsite general population. Radiological exposures and the resultant risk of latent fatal cancers have been evaluated and described in paragraphs that follow.
The risk screening methodology indicates that the radiological health risk from accidents associated with the storage of 20,000 pits in P-Reactor is dominated by handling accidents that could occur when the pits are being transferred from the transporter. A standard tine forklift is likely to be used to remove pit containers from an SST. The probability of a standard tine forklift causing a puncture during a single handling operation is in the extremely unlikely range (i.e., 10-4 to 10-6).
Figure 5.3.2.1-1--Offsite Population in the Vicinity of the Savannah River Site.
Figure 5.3.2.1-2--Wind Direction and Speed at the Savannah River Site, South Carolina, 1986.
It is estimated that a forklift puncture of a pit container would release 9.2 x 10-5 curies of plutonium. This is a conservative estimate of the respirable, airborne release caused by a puncture of one shipping container (DOE 1992f:7-39).
Given such a release, an involved worker (the forklift driver) would receive a dose of 6.6 rem, corresponding to an incremental increase in lifetime cancer probability of 2.6 x 10-3. In addition, a non-involved worker 100 meters (328 feet) downwind along the center line of the plutonium dispersion plume would received a 5.2 x 10-2 rem exposure, corresponding to an incremental increase in lifetime fatal cancer probability of 2.1 x 10-5. The maximally exposed member of the public would receive a 1.1 x 10-5 rem exposure, corresponding to an incremental increase in lifetime fatal cancer probability of 5.5 x 10-9. The lifetime fatal cancer probability for an average individual from all other causes is approximately 0.2 (20 percent).
This event would result in an exposure to the public of 4.6 x 10-3 person-rem. Considering the likelihood and consequence of this event, on the average, a member of the public will have an increased annual risk of developing a fatal cancer from this potential accident of 3 x 10-15 fatal cancers per year. The annual fatal cancer risk to a person in the States of South Carolina and Georgia from all other causes is 1.7 x 10-3 fatal cancers per year.
Pit container inventories at P-Reactor are expected to be performed using either shielded or automated techniques and equipment. Consequently, these normal operations are not expected to result in any significant radiological exposure to workers.
Other storage activities that may occur within the time frame evaluated in this EIS include:
- Restacking a limited number of pits to comply with design laboratory temperature requirements.
- A limited number of pit movements and/or instrumentation placements to facilitate third-party inspections.
Impacts of these routine activities are also considered to be negligible.
The greatest threat to pit containers from natural phenomena is from natural earthquakes. Analysis of available seismology studies and estimates of the reactor building's seismic capacity indicate that the relative risk from earthquakes is over two orders of magnitude below the risk from a forklift accident, (3.0 x 10-15 LCF per year to an average member of the public) (DOE 1994v:4-24; DOE 1994u:C-25; NRC 1985:C-45).
Impacts of Storing 8,000 PitsThe risks associated with storing 8,000 pits in P-Reactor are similar to but less than those of the 20,000-pit storage alternative. If DOE chooses to store only 8,000 pits at SRS, the worker doses from unloading and pit transfer operations would be below 113 person-rem over 4 years. This exposure would result in an additional 0.04 LCF in this group. With 0.04 LCF from pit handling, the total risk of LCFs among workers at SRS would increase by 0.7 percent.
Risk screening methodology also indicates that the risk from storage of 8,000 pits in P-Reactor is dominated by forklift handling accidents. These impacts would be similar to those described for the storage of 20,000 pits (i.e., a LCF risk of 3.0 x 10-15 latent fatal cancers per year to an average member of the public).
5.3.2.2 Environmental Justice
Affected Environment
P-Reactor is located at SRS in west-central South Carolina along the Savannah River which forms the border between South Carolina and its western neighbor, Georgia. A 1990–1991 survey of the SRS workforce found that 90.5 percent of onsite workers reside in four South Carolina counties and two Georgia counties (DOE 1992g). In order to identify the target resident populations covered by Executive Order 12898, an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius circle centered on the P-Reactor facility at SRS was overlaid on 1990 Census maps. The communities which lie within the 80-kilometer (50-mile) circle, hereafter called the P-Reactor Region of Influence (ROI), are shown in Figure 5.3.2.2–1.
Population. According to the 1990 Census, 621,677 persons reside within the P-Reactor ROI. The population is 61 percent White and 37 percent Black (UN 1995). Twenty-seven counties are wholly or partially included within the ROI. Blacks are a majority of the population in ten of these counties; 7 of 14 counties in South Carolina and 3 of 13 counties in Georgia. The largest population concentration within the ROI is northwest of SRS in Aiken, Columbia, and Richmond Counties (GA Cen 1992:Tables 1 and 8; SC Cen 1992:Tables 1 and 8).
Communities with 1990 populations greater than 10,000 persons within the ROI are: Augusta, Georgia (44,639), the South Augusta Census Designated Place (CDP) (55,998), the West Augusta CDP (27,637), Aiken, South Carolina (19,872), North Augusta, South Carolina (15,351), and Orangeburg, South Carolina (13,739). There are also eight towns and CDPs within the ROI whose 1990 population counts are between 1,000 and 10,000 persons. The combined 1990 population for all communities within the ROI that are greater than 1,000 persons is 213,968, or 34.4 percent. Thus, nearly two-thirds of the 1990 population within the ROI lived in rural areas and in towns with populations less than 1,000 persons (GA Cen 1992:Table 6; SC Cen 1992:Table 6).
Minority Population.
Figure 5.3.2.2–2 shows 1990 Census tracts within the ROI. The tracts are shaded if 25 percent or more of their populations were minority persons in 1990 or if 25 percent or more of their populations were below the poverty level based on their incomes in 1989. The 25 percent threshold levels for minority or low income persons are based on the working definitions contained in the notice of the Environmental Protection Agency's Office of environmental justiceEnvironmental Justice (59 FR 192).
With the exception of five tracts northeast of the P-Reactor facility and a number of ROI tracts to the northwest, in Augusta and Aiken Counties, virtually every tract within the ROI has at least a 25 percent minority population. All of the tracts in the largely rural counties west, south and east of the P-Reactor facility—namely, Burke, Emanuel, Jefferson, Jenkins and Screven in Georgia; and Allendale, Bamberg, Barnwell, Colleton and Hampton in South Carolina—have populations that are 25 percent or more minority or non-White. In the Augusta urban area, including the City and its unincorporated neighbors, West and South Augusta, most tracts contain 25 percent minority populationminority populations; Blacks comprise 45 percent of the total population (GA Cen 1992:Tables 5 and 6; SC Cen 1992:Tables 5 and 6).
Low-Income Population.
The greatest concentration of low-income population within the ROI is found in the largely rural counties west, south and east of SRS. With the exception of seven tracts, all of Burke, Emanuel, Jefferson, Jenkins and Screven counties in Georgia have populations in which at least one in four persons live below the poverty level based on their incomes in 1989. In South Carolina, threshold levels of low-income persons are not as widespread. Portions of Allendale, Hampton, Bamberg and Barnwell counties in South Carolina are the areas closest to the P-Reactor facility where 25 percent or more persons lived below the poverty level in 1989.
Figure 5.3.2.2-1--P-Reactor Region of Influence.
Figure 5.3.2.2-2--Minority and Low-Income Populations in the P-Reactor Region of Influence.
Several cities and towns within the ROI have poverty rates which are characteristic of their neighboring areas. In Georgia, Augusta had a 33 percent rate, while Sylvania and Waynesboro had 26 and 34 percent rates, respectively. In South Carolina, Allendale had a 44 percent poverty rate, while Bamberg, Barnwell and Orangeburg had poverty rates of 34, 26, and 25 percent, respectively (GA Cen 1993:Tables 178 and 203; SC Cen 1993:Tables 178 and 203).
Impacts of Storing 20,000 Pits
Because the interim storage of 20,000 pits at the P-Reactor facility would not require any construction activities and because all facility modifications would take place inside existing facilities, impacts to the natural environment would be minimal. Under normal operating conditions, there would be minor increases in air pollutants associated with vehicles used during pit storage activities. Also, a minor increase in particulate matter of aerodynamic diameter less than 10 micrometers concentrations would be expected. These increases are associated with the operation of forklifts which are used to move the pits from the unloading area to the storage area. These impacts are not likely to affect the surrounding population.
Radiological releases from normal pit storage operations would have no measurable effect on an individual occupying a position near the Savannah River Site (SRS)SRS boundary for an entire year. Levels at the site boundary would be indistinguishable from natural background radiation. No adverse health effects would be expected among the general public, including minority and low-income populations, as a result of normal storage operations.
An abnormal event, such as accidental puncture of the transport container from a forklift, has the potential of exposing the general public to radiation. The analysis in the section 5.3.2.1, Human Health, indicates that the risk to the public from such an accident would be negligible. With no measurable impacts on the general population, the minority and low-income populations would not be disproportionately impacted.
Impacts of Storing 8,000 Pits
The human health impact of storing 8,000 pits at the P-ReactorP-Reactor facility would be lower than those identified for the storage of 20,000 pits. No significant adverse impacts are expected, and minority and low-income populationlow-income populations would not be disproportionately impacted.
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