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5.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the affected environment and the potential environmental impacts at the four sites being considered for the interim storage of pits under the Pit Storage Relocation Alternative. The discussion of the general information associated with relocation of pit storage operations is followed by discussions of each site, which focus on the facilities being considered for interim pit storage. Subsequently, the site's affected environment and the environmental impacts due to interim pit storage are presented.

The AL-R8 pit packaging that is currently used for storing pits at Pantex Plant is no longer used for intersite transportation of pits. A new storage and transport container, known as AT-400A, is being developed by Sandia National Laboratories and could be used for relocation of pits to an alternative interim storage site. This container or any other containers certified by the Department of Transportation for shipment of pits to the alternative site would be transported from Pantex Plant to an alternative site by the DOE Transportation Safeguards Division's Safe Secure Tractor Trailers. The impacts of transporting pits to the candidate facilities are discussed in section 4.16, Intersite Transportation of Nuclear and Hazardous Material.

In the candidate facilities at any of the relocation sites, the pit transportation and storage containers would be stored in a manner similar to the Stage Right pit storage system currently used at Pantex Plant (i.e., a multiple stacking configuration of containers placed horizontally on pallets) (see section 4.12.1.1). The pallets for this configuration have been designed to ensure structural integrity and stability in a maximum credible earthquake scenario. The pallets are lifted into place using a commercially available turret forklift that has been modified to provide radiation shielding that reduces operator exposure to extremely low levels (essentially background level). This electric forklift would be used for storage, retrieval, and inventory operations.

Efforts are currently underway to develop Automated Guided Vehicles (AGVs) that could be used both to place pits in the interim storage facilities and to assist in taking inventories using bar code readers. The use of AGVs could virtually eliminate any need for humans to enter the interim pit storage area. The AGVs would be utilized at the candidate sites as soon as the system becomes available.

Operations in the candidate interim storage facilities would include periodic inventory and inspections. Inspections would coincide with planned inventory activities and would consist of a visual inspection of facility conditions and container surfaces as well as removal of selected containers for surveillance tests. Except at Hanford Site, the surveillance tests would be conducted at another facility where both visual and nondestructive evaluation techniques would be used for evaluation (for corrosion), weld integrity, and integrity of insulation and plastic parts. At Hanford Site, the facility that would be used for storage is also large enough to house surveillance testing. The shielded forklift or AGV would carry a bar code reader, camera, and gamma spectrometer to allow inventory and inspection to be performed without operator exposure to radiation.

For each of the sites being evaluated in this chapter, the candidate facilities would require at least minor modification and upgrades before interim pit storage could be implemented. These modifications and upgrades would mostly involve sealing wall penetrations, rerouting utilities, and installing new doors, security equipment, and equipment to store and monitor the pits (e.g., Stage Right). Approximately 30 persons would be needed to perform materials handling activities; materials control and accountability; surveillance testing; environment, safety, and health activities; and other support. In addition, approximately 120 security personnel would be needed to provide continuous security at the site. Equipment at a site would include but not be limited to two shielded forklifts or AGVs, gamma spectrometer, radiation inspection, monitoring, and calibration equipment. Any special modifications needed for a facility are discussed in the introduction to each candidate site. Approximately 2,000 pits per year are assumed to be transported to the site for storage.

In planning the transition of facilities to accept a pit storage mission, the following guidelines would be followed:

• Laws, regulations, formal agreements, and DOE orders will form the basis for transition planning and execution.
• Transition planning will be coordinated with the appropriate regulatory agencies, host state, and other affected stakeholders.
• DOE will ensure that all vital safety and utility systems within the affected facility will be fully functional prior to pit storage.
• DOE will develop a current safety analysis report and other technical safety requirements that address the change in facility mission and condition of the facility prior to pit storage.
• DOE will establish an appropriate Environment, Safety, and Health organization to support pit storage activities prior to pit storage.

The S&D PEIS is evaluating some of the sites being considered in this EIS for interim storage, for the long-term storage of weapons-usable fissile materials. The impacts of transporting fissile materials from interim storage site(s) to the long-term storage site are too speculative for meaningful assessment at this time and are, therefore, not discussed in this EIS.