Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant

4.16 Intersite Transportation of Nuclear and Hazardous Materials

4.16.1 Affected Environment

Under the Proposed Action or any of the Alternatives the transfer of hazardous material between DOE and Department of Defense (DOD) sites, including nuclear explosives, nuclear components, high explosive(s) (HE), and radioactive wastes would be required. This section discusses the current intersite hazardous material transportation activities related to Pantex Plant. Radiological impacts are emphasized. Nonradiological impacts (i.e., Safe Secure Tractor Trailer [SST] vehicle exhaust) will not be considered; SST traffic will contribute less then one-tenth of 1 percent of the baseline vehicle traffic in the vicinity of Pantex Plant. Appendix F, Transportation Risk Analysis, provides detailed background information on transportation activities.

4.16.1.1 Radioactive Material Shipments

Intersite transportation of radioactive materials is governed by the requirements of DOE orders and Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations (Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Titles 10 and 49). The Transportation and Staging Operations Department is responsible for transfers of tritium reservoirs to the Amarillo International Airport. The Transportation Safeguards Division (TSD) is responsible for coordinating offsite transfers of nuclear explosives and nuclear explosive components. The Waste Operations Department is responsible for offsite transfers of radioactive wastes and the Traffic Section of the Packaging and Shipping Department is responsible for coordinating offsite shipments of hazardous material by commercial carriers.

Intersite highway transportation of weapons, nuclear explosive-like assemblies, and weapons components is conducted by the DOE TSD using SSTs. Nuclear explosive-like assemblies not containing plutonium may be transported by air. SSTs are similar in appearance to commercial tractor-trailers but are equipped with unique safety and safeguard features that prevent unauthorized cargo removal and minimize the likelihood of an accidental radioactive material release. SSTs are also equipped with a robust tiedown and restraining system to prevent cargo movement during shipment.

Intersite shipment of tritium reservoirs is conducted by air, or infrequently, by SST. Hardened trailers are used to transport tritium reservoirs between Pantex Plant and the Amarillo Airport. Hardened trailers are similar in design to SSTs. Under contract with DOE and utilizing DOE aircraft, a contractor provides air transportation and related management services in support of the U.S. nuclear weapons program. One of the contractor's main functions is to transport tritium reservoirs to various locations throughout the continental U.S.

Offsite transfers of radioactive wastes and depleted uranium (DU) are performed by commercial trucks. These transfers are conducted in full compliance with Titles 10 and 49 of the CFR, which contain packaging requirements for intersite radioactive material transfers. These requirements are categorized based on the potential hazard of the material being shipped, which, in turn, is based on the type, quantity, and form of the radionuclide(s) being shipped.

Packaging refers to a container and all accompanying components or materials necessary to maintain confinement of radioactive material. For low potential hazard radioactive material, a DOT Type A packaging, designed to retain its contents under normal transportation conditions, is required. For higher potential hazard materials, such as weapons components, a DOT Type B packaging is required. Type B packages must meet all of the requirements for Type A packages as well as the requirement to prevent the release of radioactive material under all credible accident conditions. These conditions include the following:

A 9-meter (30-foot) drop onto an unyielding surface.
A dynamic crush test consisting of a drop of a 500-kilogram (1,100 pound) mass from 9 meters (30 feet) onto the container.
A puncture test consisting of a free drop (greater than 102 centimeters [40 inches]) onto a 15-centimeter (6-inch) diameter steel pin.
A 30-minute thermal exposure at 800 degrees Celsius (1,475 degrees Fahrenheit).
Immersion in water for 8 hours (for fissile materials packaging only).

Appendix F provides a discussion of pit containers currently in use or planned for use at Pantex Plant.

Nuclear Explosives

Intersite nuclear explosive transfers are required for the following reasons:

Weapons currently stored at classified DOD facilities are returned to Pantex Plant for dismantlement.
Weapons are returned to Pantex Plant from DOD facilities for testing, modifications, component replacement, or repairs.
Weapons are returned to DOD facilities from Pantex Plant after completion of testing, modifications, component replacement, or repairs.
Weapons are shipped between Pantex Plant and DOD sites for field testing of subsystems.

SSTs and weapon-specific handling gear (H-gear) containers are used for intersite transportation of nuclear explosives. For a bounding case weapons shipment, an external dose rate of 3 millirem per hour at the outside surface of the trailer has been measured. Typical weapon shipments produce a much lower dose rate. No measurable radiation exposure occurs within the tractor cab (PC 1995q). Certain types of nuclear explosives are transported as complete units and are attached to their H-gear containers. Nuclear warheads, however, are contained in system-specific H-gear packages. All H-gear is designed to allow secure tiedown within SSTs.

Fully assembled nuclear explosives arrive at and depart from Pantex Plant at Zone 4 West. Loading and unloading activities are discussed in section 4.12, Intrasite Transportation.

Plutonium Pits

As part of stockpile management activities at Pantex Plant, a limited number of pits are shipped to Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) for testing. Pits are transported intersite by SSTs in FL containers or other approved Type B packages. FL containers are double-containment stainless steel drums categorized as Type B shipping packages. The FL container has an outer steel containment drum (51 centimeters [22.5 inches] in diameter, 127 centimeters [50 inches] in height) and a stainless steel inner containment drum (35 centimeters [13.8 inches] in diameter, 97 centimeters [38 inches] in height).

When a shipment of pits to LANL is required, the pits are repacked into FL containers, within Zone 12, and sealed with a tamper-indicating device. The containers are loaded onto a pallet and driven by electric forklift to a loading dock within Zone 12. The containers are loaded and secured into an SST and driven to LANL. Figure 4.16.1.11 shows the LANL delivery location with nearby access roads. Further operations involving pits at LANL will be discussed in the Los Alamos Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement. The actual number of surveillance pit shipments from Pantex Plant is classified.

Canned Subassemblies

Canned subassemblies (CSAs) that may contain highly enriched uranium (HEU) and DU removed from dismantled weapons are shipped to the Y-12 Plant at the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) for prestorage processing and interim storage of nuclear material. CSAs are transported intersite by SSTs in DOT-criteria Type B packages including DT23, DT18, and DT20. The number of CSAs shipped from Pantex Plant is classified. DOE has assessed the impacts of transporting CSAs to Y-12 in the Environmental Assessment for the Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium at the Y-12 Plant (DOE/EA0919). A Finding of No Significant Impact was issued for this Environmental Assessment (EA) on September 14, 1995 (60 FR 54069).

When a shipment of CSAs is made from Pantex Plant, the containers, staged in an approved storage facility, are loaded onto a pallet and driven by electric forklift to a loading dock within Zone 12. These containers are loaded and secured into an SST that is then driven to the Y-12 Plant. CSAs staged in Zone 4 are loaded into SSTs at the storage magazine. The Y-12 Plant, which receives the uranium components from Pantex Plant, is located within the boundaries of ORR, near Knoxville, Tennessee. Figure 4.16.1.1-2 shows the location of ORR. Vehicular access to the Y-12 Plant is via Bear Creek Valley Road, a two-lane, paved State highway. Following this road, Interstate 40 is approximately 6 kilometers (4 miles) from the ORR site boundary and approximately 18 kilometers (11 miles) from the Y-12 Plant. Figure 4.16.1.1-3 shows the access roads to the Y-12 Plant. Arriving containers are unloaded and brought into a facility where a transfer check is performed. The transfer check confirms the identity and quantity of the shipment and verifies the integrity of the tamper-indicating devices on the containers.

Depleted Uranium

DU components removed from dismantled weapons are shipped to the Y-12 Plant at ORR for prestorage processing and interim storage. These shipments are made by commercial truck carriers using DOT Type A packaging and are made in full compliance with Titles 10 and 49 of the CFR. Table 4.16.1.1-1 presents the DU shipments for the years 19921994.

Table 4.16.1.1-1.--Depleted Uranium Shipments from Pantex Plant (.pdf)

Figure 4.16.1.1-1.--Los Alamos National Laboratory Delivery Location with Nearby Access Roads. (.pdf)

Figure 4.16.1.1-2.--Oak Ridge Reservation, Tennessee, and Region.

Figure 4.16.1.1-3.--Access Roads to the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge Reservation. (.pdf)

Tritium Reservoirs

Tritium reservoirs are shipped intersite for the following reasons:

Depleted reservoirs removed from weapons are returned to the Savannah River Site (SRS) for reuse and recycling.
Filled reservoirs are shipped from SRS to Pantex Plant for installation in weapon systems.

Tritium reservoirs are transported intersite by air or by highway, in SSTs. Tritium reservoirs are shipped in H1616 containers, which are DOT-approved Type B packages. The H1616 container has an outer drum of stainless steel that is 41.65 centimeters (16.4 inches) in diameter and an inner containment vessel made of stainless steel that is 31 centimeters (12.11 inches) in diameter and 36 centimeters (14.3 inches) in height. Tritium reservoirs within these containers do not pose an external radiation hazard.

When a shipment of depleted reservoirs is made from Pantex Plant by air, the H1616 container is loaded and sealed with a tamper-indicating device at the Tritium Staging Facility. The H1616 container is taken to a loading dock within Zone 12 and loaded and secured within a hardened trailer. The vehicle is driven from Pantex Plant to a "secure" terminal at the Amarillo International Airport where the container is removed from the vehicle, loaded aboard the aircraft, and secured; loading operations are performed under controlled conditions in secured areas at the Amarillo airport. The aircraft is flown to Bush Field in Augusta, Georgia where the H1616 containers are removed from the aircraft and loaded and secured within an SST or similar vehicle. This vehicle is driven to the H-area at SRS, where the package is unloaded. Table 4.16.1.12 summarizes air shipments of tritium reservoirs. Further operations with tritium reservoirs at SRS are discussed in the Environmental Assessment, Tritium Loading Facility (DOE 1986). Newly filled tritium reservoir transfers from SRS follow a reverse procedure.

The H-area is located approximately 16 kilometers (10 miles) within the northwestern site boundary of SRS. Bush Field is located outside of Augusta, Georgia and is approximately 32 kilometers (20 miles) northwest of the SRS boundary. Vehicular access to SRS from Bush Field is via either South Carolina Highway 125 or U.S. Highway 278. The closest Interstate highway access to SRS is Interstate 20, approximately 32 kilometers (20 miles) northwest of the site boundary.

Table 4.16.1.1-2.--Pantex Tritium Reservoir Air Shipments, 1992-1994 (.pdf)

Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generator

Radioisotopic thermoelectric generators (RTGs) removed from dismantled weapons are shipped to LANL for prestorage processing and interim storage of nuclear material. RTGs are transported intersite by SSTs in DOT Type 6M containers. The Type 6M container is a DOT-criteria Type B package. The Type 6M container is a standard 37.85-liter (10-gallon), DOT-specification metal package. This package is constructed of 20-gauge carbon steel and measures about 33 centimeters (13 inches) in diameter and 61 centimeters (24 inches) in height.

When a shipment of RTGs is made from Pantex Plant to LANL, the Type 6M packages are loaded onto a pallet and transported by electric forklift to a loading dock within Zone 12 where the containers are loaded and secured within an SST. The SST is driven to LANL where it is brought into the TA55 area. Further operations with RTGs at LANL will be discussed in the Los Alamos Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement.

Low-Level and Low-Level Mixed Radioactive Wastes

Pantex Plant currently ships low-level radioactive materials and wastes by commercial carriers to the Nevada Test Site (NTS) in southern Nevada for ultimate disposition. These transfers are made in Type A packages in full compliance with all applicable DOT regulations. In the years 19921994, no shipments of radioactive waste from Pantex Plant have produced measurable radiation levels outside the shipment trailer. Table 4.16.1.13 presents the low-level waste shipments for the years 19921994.

Pantex Plant currently ships low-level mixed waste by commercial carriers for ultimate disposal at the Envirocare Disposal Facility approximately 129 kilometers (80 miles) west of Salt Lake City, Utah. These shipments are made in full compliance with all applicable DOT regulations. Table 4.16.1.13 presents the low-level mixed waste shipments for the years 19921994.

Transportation impacts associated with intersite transfers of radioactive wastes and alternatives to the current shipping practices are evaluated in the Draft Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE 1995)and the Environmental Impact Statement for the Nevada Test Site and Offsite locations in the State of Nevada (DOE/RIS-0243).

Table 4.16.1.1-3.--Pantex Radioactive Waste Shipments (.pdf)

4.16.1.2 Offsite Radioactive Material Shipments

Nuclear explosives and nuclear explosive components are shipped by SST to and from Pantex Plant. Transportation is conducted by the DOE TSD. Since its establishment in 1975, TSD has accumulated more than 119 million kilometers (74 million miles) of over-the-road experience in transporting DOE-owned cargo without any accidents that resulted in a release of radioactive material. The Pantex Plant Safety Information Document provides a listing of all accidents involving SSTs that involved fatalities or resulted in damage to the vehicle (Pantex 1996a). TSD has a liaison program through which it communicates with law enforcement and public safety agencies throughout the Nation, making them aware of TSD operations. The liaison program provides law enforcement officers information to assist them in recognizing TSD vehicles should they be involved in an accident, and deciding what actions to take in conjunction with the actions of the couriers in the rig and escort vehicles.

TSD personnel are briefed on construction, congestion, and severe weather prior to travel. TSD will make every effort to alter a route or change the travel time to avoid potential traffic hazards.

TSD directs and manages an emergency management drill and exercise program that involves facility personnel, resources, and offsite elements. To stay proficient in all aspects of TSD convoy operations, TSD annually plans, implements, monitors, and performs follow-up analysis for couriers, known as in-service training (IST). For each iteration of IST, TSD invites participation from a State police agency. These police agencies train with TSD in all aspects of the program, but TSD's primary interest is in their participation in convoy tactical training with emphasis on law enforcement link-up in the case of an emergency. Both Arkansas and Missouri State Police are participating in the present (fiscal year [FY] 1996) IST program; Oklahoma and Arizona State Police participated in FY 1995, and the Texas Department of Public Safety participated in FY 1994.

TSD's emergency response plans involve a tiered organizational response to radiological incidents. In Tier 0, local law enforcement and TSD couriers assess the severity of the accident and determine the need for radiological assistance. Tier I involves the deployment of Radiological Assistance Teams, a Regional Response Coordinator, and Public Affairs Office personnel. These personnel have appropriate monitoring and communications equipment to assess the radiological status of the incident. At Tier II additional technical expertise is provided to the response group. At Tier III the accident response group will assist in recovery, repackaging, and decontamination operations. These four tiers correspond, respectively, to the following levels:

0no structural damage and no potential for public controversy.
Istatus of unknown or limited damage.
IIexcessive damage of SST or shipment.
IIIradiological release cleanup/ repackaging required.

Additional national emergency response resources from around the Nation are available if the severity of an SST convoy incident warrants such a call. Further details on other Federal agency responsibilities in the event of a radiological emergency can be found in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (61 FR 20944).

SSTs used for intersite transportation are specially designed semi-trailers that use penetration resistance and delay mechanisms to prevent unauthorized cargo removal. SSTs provide thermal protection for cargo within the trailer. A robust tie-down and restraining system is provided to secure cargo within the trailer.

SSTs are accompanied by escort vehicles equipped with armed couriers, communication and electronics systems, radiological monitoring equipment, and other equipment to enhance safety and security. Redundant communication systems assure that intra-convoy communications and communications between each vehicle and the Security Communications System in Albuquerque, New Mexico, are maintained.

SSTs follow strict procedures during transport and are not allowed to travel when hazardous road conditions exist. When hazardous road conditions are anticipated enroute, the SST stops at a safe haven, usually a predetermined military installation. In addition, SSTs are limited to a maximum 89 kilometer-per-hour (55 mile-per-hour) speed limit, even if the posted limit is greater.

TSD operations are in compliance with the requirements of 49 CFR 177 for selecting, notifying drivers of, and adhering to preferred routes. The majority of TSD travel (90 percent) is over interstate highway; the remaining 10 percent is over routes that meet the conditions for deviating from the preferred route. Regulations permit deviation from the preferred route when safety or security requirements dictate such deviation.

Regulations permit TSD deviation from the requirements regarding notification of the routes used. Routes used are classified, compartmented information that may not be disseminated except to persons with appropriate security clearance and a need to know.

All SST crew members wear radiation dosimeters. Because of the nature of the material and the design of the containers, the transport of both nuclear explosives and plutonium/uranium weapons components has led to ionizing radiation doses to SST crew members. SST crew members are required to inspect the cargo within the trailer prior to shipment. This action is the primary contributor to dose for the crew. Table 4.16.1.21 provides the doses received from transport operations for the years 19921994.

Table 4.16.1.2-1.--DOE Transportation Safeguards Division Dosimeter History (.pdf)

4.16.1.3 Intersite Shipments of High Explosive Material

Intersite transportation of HE material is governed by the requirements of DOE orders and DOT regulations. HE material is packaged and shipped in compliance with applicable regulations by DOE courier, commercial carrier, or by a DOE-contracted air carrier. Highway shipments are performed using the most direct route on interstate and state highways. Air shipments are performed through the Amarillo International Airport. Air transport of Class 1.1 explosives is allowed under DOT exemption number DOTE1088J. However, Class 1.1 shipments are generally sent by truck.

Most intersite shipments of HE material since 1992 have been bulk shipments involving unprocessed raw material that is no longer needed for weapons production. This material is being sold to commercial end users. Only a very limited amount of raw HE is expected to be shipped to Pantex Plant during the years under evaluation in this EIS.

All other hazardous material shipments are transported via commercial carriers in full compliance with applicable DOT regulations. Pantex Plant type operations do not consume or produce large quantities of hazardous materials. Consequently, the risks associated with Pantex Plant related hazardous material shipments are no greater than those associated with other industrial facilities. Further information on the types and quantities of hazardous material shipments associated with Pantex Plant operations is available in the Safety Information Document (Pantex 1996a).

Transferring the HE fabrication mission from Pantex to LANL or LLNL would require an estimated 150 rebuilds to be shipped per year from the HE fabrication site to Pantex. The public accident risk from transporting this material would be no greater than the risk encountered from industry's transport of similar explosives. Transferring all or part of the HE fabrication mission from Pantex to LANL or LLNL would require an estimated 12 round trips per year to transport HE materials, including the return of scrap HE to the laboratories.

4.16.1.4 Alternative Pit Storage Locations

If a Pit Storage Relocation Alternative is chosen, pits in DOT-criteria shipping containers will be shipped to other sites by SSTs. Since NTS, SRS, the Hanford Site, and the Manzano Weapons Storage Area (WSA) at Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) are being considered as alternative pit storage locations, these sites must have roads that allow for all-weather highway access by the SSTs. This section provides a brief description of the roadways leading to alternative pit storage sites. (SRS is described in section 4.16.1.1).

Nevada Test Site

NTS is located in southern Nevada, approximately 105 kilometers (65 miles) northwest of Las Vegas. Interstate 15 is the major regional access road for NTS. Interstate 15 connects San Diego, California to Salt Lake City, Utah, passing through the Las Vegas metropolitan area. Vehicular access to NTS is provided by U.S. Route 95. The Mercury Highway is the primary route into NTS from U.S. Highway 95. Figure 4.16.1.41 shows the roadways in the vicinity of NTS.

Hanford Site

The Hanford Site is located in southeastern Washington State, northwest of the tri-cities of Richland, Kennewick, and Pasco. The tri-cities are linked to other regions of the country by interstate highways. Both Route 395 and Route 240, which crosses through the Hanford Site, connect with Interstate 90 to the north. The tri-city area is linked to other parts of the country via Interstate 82 and Route 12. Access to the Hanford Site is provided by Routes 240 and 24, which traverse the site. Figure 4.16.1.42 shows the roadways in the vicinity of the Hanford Site.

Manzano Weapons Storage Area

The Manzano WSA is located on KAFB, near Albuquerque, New Mexico. Interstate 40 and Interstate 25 provide access to the Albuquerque metropolitan area. KAFB can be accessed from Eubank or Wyoming Boulevard (from Interstate 40) or Gibson Boulevard (from Interstate 25). Figure 4.16.1.43 shows the roadways in the vicinity of KAFB.

Figure 4.16.1.4-1.--Roadways in the Vicinity of the Nevada Test Site.

Figure 4.16.1.4-2.--Roadways in the Vicinity of the Hadford Site.

Figure 4.16.1.4-3.--Roadways in the Vicinity of the Kirtland Air Force Base.

4.16.2 Impacts of Proposed Action

Under the Proposed Action, DOE would continue to perform the following intersite transportation activities related to Pantex Plant:

Nuclear weapon shipments between the Pantex Plant and DOD sites.
Pit and RTG shipments between Pantex Plant and LANL.
HEU component shipments between Pantex Plant and the Y-12 plant.
DU shipments between Pantex Plant and the Y-12 Plant.
Tritium reservoir shipments between Pantex Plant and SRS.

4.16.2.1 Nuclear Weapon Shipments

Human health impacts associated with weapon shipments include the radiological exposure of transport personnel and members of the general public as well as the potential release of radioactive material during an accident. The health risks associated with these shipments are evaluated in terms of the expected excess latent cancers (i.e., the number of cancers above those expected without any impacts from weapon shipments).

An analysis was performed using the Analysis of Risk Occurring in Transportation (ADROIT) code to determine the incident-free radiological impact to the public from intersite weapon shipments (a description of the ADROIT code is provided in appendix F). The ADROIT code utilizes the RADTRAN IV methodology to estimate incident-free exposures. This methodology is used to calculate the off-link exposure to persons adjacent to the transport route (e.g., residents); on-link exposure to persons sharing the transport route (e.g., passengers within passing vehicles); exposure to persons at stops (e.g., residents or truck crews not directly involved with the shipment); and maximally exposed members of the public. The exposures calculated for the first three groups are added together to estimate general population exposures for the 10-year period under evaluation in the EIS. The estimated radiation exposure to the public is provided in Table 4.16.2.11. Since the number of shipments between Pantex Plant and DOD sites is subject to change from the current schedule, Table 4.16.2.11 shows the impacts associated with possible changes from the base shipment schedule.

Approximately 20 percent of the general population is expected to develop a lethal cancer from all sources (NAP 1990). The incident-free impact from intersite weapons shipments is conservatively estimated to cause a maximum of 1.8 x 10^-3 excess latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) in the exposed population on and along the roadways (for a 100 percent increase shipment scenario).

Intersite weapon shipments also pose a public health risk from potential severe accidents that could result in the dispersal of radionuclides from SSTs. The risk is the expected number of excess latent cancers caused by dispersal accidents. The ADROIT code calculates the public health risk from potential accidents involving SSTs carrying nuclear explosives and weapons components. The risk assessment implemented in the ADROIT code considers both the frequency and consequences of accidents resulting in severe impact, puncture, crush, and thermal environments. Probability of releases is developed based on event tree analysis. Consequences are evaluated through an assessment which integrates dispersal calculations, route characterization, population data, and dose-health effects models to provide an estimate of excess LCFs.

The accidental dispersal latent cancer risk is obtained by summing the risk (frequency times consequence) from potential accidents at different locations along individual weapon shipment routes. The dominant risk environments are highway accidents involving severe collisions and fires, particularly accidents involving very long duration fires. There is not a single, dominant scenario associated with risk significant events; instead, there is a collection of scenarios that constitutes the dispersal risk. These scenarios have the following characteristics:

Accidents that involve either a severe collision and fire (such as a collision with a heavy truck or fixed object that also involves a fuel fire) or a very long duration fuel fire (such as an accident with a fuel tanker or train that involves a fuel fire).
Accidents that result in a violent reaction of HE contained within a weapon.

Given a very severe transportation accident, radioactive materials could be dispersed into the atmosphere and subsequently expose the general public in the vicinity of the accident to ionizing radiation. Table 4.16.2.11 presents radiological risks from dispersion accidents occurring during intersite weapon shipments. The accidental dispersal of radionuclides from these shipments is estimated to cause 1.6 x 10^-6 excess LCF in the population along weapon shipment routes with a maximum annual individual excess LCF risk of 1 x 10^-9. The annual LCF risk from all causes for an individual in the U.S. is 2.2 x 10^-3 (DOE 1995v:4-110). Table 4.16.2.11 also summarizes the expected number of traffic fatalities resulting from weapon shipments. Appendix F provides additional information on traffic fatality estimates.

Table 4.16.2.1-1.--10-Year Impacts from Proposed Weapon Shipments (.pdf)

4.16.2.2 Plutonium Pits

Human health impacts associated with plutonium pit shipments to LANL include the radiological exposure of transport personnel and members of the general public as well as the potential release of radioactive material during an accident. The ADROIT code calculates the impacts from both incident-free transport and potential accidents resulting from pit shipments between Pantex Plant and LANL. The incident-free transport of pits during the 10-year period under evaluation in the EIS will result in 2 x 10^-5 excess LCFs in the exposed population on and along the roadways. Approximately 20 percent of the general population is expected to develop a lethal cancer from all sources.

The expected number of excess LCFs associated with potential accidents has been estimated as 2 x 10^-9 with a maximum annual individual excess LCF risk of 5 x 10^-13. The annual LCF risk from all causes for an individual in the U.S. is 2.2 x 10^-3.

4.16.2.3 Canned Subassemblies

DOE has prepared an Environmental Assessment for the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, DOE/EA-0929 (DOE 1994). The Environmental Assessment evaluates the environmental effects of transportation, prestorage processing, and interim storage of bounding quantities of enriched uranium at the Y-12 Plant over a 10-year period. Included in the sources for HEU is the continued shipment of retired weapons components, known as secondaries or CSAs, which are removed from nuclear weapons dismantled at Pantex Plant.

The Environmental Assessment analyzes the effects of shipping the maximum bounding quantities of HEU to the Y-12 Plant from numerous sources, including Pantex Plant. The 10-year collective dose to all transport workers under incident-free conditions was estimated to be 246 person-rem for all shipments of HEU, including those from Pantex Plant. The 10-year collective dose to the public from incident-free transportation was estimated to be 486 person-rem for all shipments of HEU, including those from Pantex Plant. DOE has determined that these impacts are not significant (DOE 1995v).

4.16.2.4 Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generators

RTG Shipments from Pantex Plant to LANL will continue. These shipments do not significantly contribute to potential environmental impacts from intersite transportation because:

An RTG within a transfer container does not present an external radiological hazard.
RTGs are constructed in such a way that an accidental release of plutonium is not a reasonably foreseeable event in the transportation environment. RTGs are able to withstand an exposure of 1000 ûC (1,832 ûF) for 1 hour or an impact of 571 kilometers (355 miles) per hour on a steel surface with no plutonium release.
RTGs are transported intersite in Type B packages, which further decrease the risk associated with their transport.

4.16.2.5 Depleted Uranium

Shipments of DU from Pantex Plant to the Y-12 Plant do not significantly contribute to potential environmental impacts from intersite transportation because DU does not produce an external radiological hazard. Moreover, the inhalation hazard of DU in the event of an accident is significantly less than that posed by other radionuclides shipped intersite (DOE 1988).

4.16.2.6 Tritium Reservoirs

Human health impacts associated with tritium reservoir shipments involve the potential for accidental dispersion of tritium due to reservoir failures during transfer. The ADROIT code calculates the public health risk from potential accidents involving aircraft carrying tritium reservoirs. The dominant risk environment is accidents at or near an airport that involve severe crashes and/or fires. The expected number of excess LCFs associated with potential accidents is estimated to be 4 x 10^-8 (8 x 10^-8 for a 100-percent increase shipment scenario) with a maximum individual annual cancer risk from tritium reservoir shipments of 9 x 10^-11. The annual LCF risk from all causes for an individual in the U.S. is 2.2 x 10^-3.

4.16.3 Impacts of No Action Alternative

Because of the uncertainty in predicting the number of future weapon shipments related to stockpile management, the potential environmental impacts from the No Action Alternative are bound within those presented for the Proposed Action. Even though dismantlement shipments would cease under No Action, other shipments related to stockpile management may increase.

4.16.4 Impacts of Pit Storage Relocation Alternative

INTERSITE TRANSPORTATION IMPACTS

The additional intersite shipment of 20,000 pits will increase the radiological impact to the public from 4.0 person-rem to a maximum of 7.0 person-rem over the period covered by the Proposed Action.

The additional intersite shipment of 20,000 pits will increase the dispersal risk (i.e., the risk to public health from accidental releases of radioactive material) from 1.7 x 10^-6 LCFs to 2.2 x 10^-6 LCFs, a 29 percent increase over the Proposed Action.

All intersite transportation alternatives meet the DOE Safety Policy of a cancer risk from radiological accidents of less than one-tenth of 1 percent above background cancer rates.

4.16.4.1 Impacts of Relocating 20,000 Pits

Under this option, up to 20,000 pits would be relocated from Pantex Plant to one of three candidate storage sites: NTS, Manzano WSA at KAFB, or SRS.

Human health impacts associated with plutonium pit shipments to alternative storage sites include the radiological exposure of transport personnel and members of the general public as well as the potential release of radioactive material during an accident. The ADROIT code calculates the impacts from both incident-free transport and potential accidents resulting from pit shipments between Pantex Plant and the alternative pit storage sites. Table 4.16.4.11 summarizes the impacts associated with shipments of 20,000 pits.

The incident-free transport of pits would result in a maximum of 1.5 x 10^-3 excess LCFs in the exposed population on and along the roadways. The baseline cancer fatality incidence in the general public is 20 percent.

The public risk from dispersal accidents is the expected number of latent cancers caused by accidents involving the dispersal of radionuclides from SSTs. Given a very severe transportation accident, radioactive materials could be dispersed into the atmosphere and subsequently expose the general public in the vicinity of the accident to ionizing radiation. Table 4.16.4.11 presents radiological risks from dispersion accidents occurring during intersite weapon shipments. The accidental dispersal of radionuclides from these shipments is estimated to cause 5 x 10^-7 excess LCFs in the population along the pit shipment routes with a maximum annual individual excess LCF risk of 1 x 10^-10 for the SRS alternative. The annual LCF risk from all causes for an individual in the U.S. is 2.2 x 10^-3.

Table 4.16.4.1-1.--Radiological Exposure and Health Risk from 20,000 Pit Shipments from Pantex Plant to Other Potential Sites (.pdf)

Table 4.16.4.2-1.--Radiological Exposure and Health Risk from 8,000 Pit Shipments from Pantex Plant to Other Potential Sites (.pdf)

4.16.4.2 Impacts of Relocating 8,000 Pits

Under this option, 8,000 pits would be relocated from Pantex Plant to one or more of four candidate storage sites: NTS, SRS, Hanford Site, and Manzano WSA at KAFB.

Table 4.16.4.21 summarizes the impacts associated with 8,000 pit shipments. Impacts related to loading or unloading pits into SSTs are discussed in Section 4.12, Intrasite Transportation.

The incident-free transport of pits would result in a maximum of 6 x 10^-4 excess LCFs in the exposed population on and along the roadways.

The public risk from dispersal accidents is the expected number of latent cancers caused by accidents involving the dispersal of radionuclides from SSTs. The accident scenarios analyzed here have the following characteristics:

Accidents that involve either a severe collision and fire (such as a collision with a heavy truck or fixed object that also involves a fuel fire) or a very long duration fuel fire (such as an accident with a fuel tanker or train that involves a fuel fire).
Accidents that result in a fire-driven dispersal.

Given a very severe transportation accident, radioactive materials could be dispersed into the atmosphere and subsequently expose the general public in the vicinity of the accident to ionizing radiation. Table 4.16.4.21 presents radiological risks from dispersion accidents occurring during intersite weapon shipments. The accidental dispersal of radionuclides from these shipments is estimated to cause a maximum of 3.2 x 10^-7 excess LCFs in the population along pit shipment routes with a maximum annual individual excess LCF risk of 1 x 10^-10 for the Hanford Site and SRS alternatives. The annual LCF risk from all causes for an individual in the U.S. is 2.2 x 10^-3.

4.16.5 Cumulative Impacts

The cumulative impacts presented here include impacts of the continued operations at Pantex Plant combined with impacts associated with activities described in the WM PEIS, SSM PEIS, and S&D PEIS. Since the Pantex Plant EIS Proposed Action and the SSM PEIS No Action Alternative represent a continuum of operations, the impacts associated with any new mission or facility that could be implemented at Pantex Plant are discussed in the context of that continuum. The impacts from the WM PEIS program are combined with those of the Pantex Plant EIS Proposed Action. The impacts from the S&D PEIS are combined with those of the SSM PEIS No Action Alternative. A detailed discussion of this methodology is presented in section 4.2.

Pantex Plant-related transportation impacts result in a small increase in cumulative exposures from nationwide radioactive material shipments. Under the Proposed Action, Pantex Plant-related intersite transportation activities will result in a maximum annual collective dose to SST crews of 0.32 person-rem (3.2 person-rem for 10 years of operations) and a maximum annual collective general population dose of 0.40 person-rem (4.0 person-rem for ten years of operation).

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission evaluated radiological impacts for transportation of radioactive material categories unrelated to Pantex Plant activities. These categories include: limited quantity shipments, medical, industrial, fuel cycle, and waste. The transportation of these materials results in an annual collective worker dose of 5,600 person-rem. The annual collective general population dose for these shipments was estimated to be 4,200 person-rem.

Other studies of radioactive material transportation in the U.S. have been performed. Weiner et al. (1991) evaluated eight categories of radioactive material shipments by truck, including, industrial, radiography, medical, fuel cycle, research and development, unknown, waste, and other. Based on a median external exposure rate, an annual collective worker dose of 1,400 person-rem and an annual collective general population dose of 1,400 person-rem were estimated.

Weiner et al. (1991) also evaluated six categories of radioactive material shipments by plane: industrial, radiography, medical, research and development, unknown, and waste. Based on a median external exposure rate, an annual collective worker dose of 290 person-rem and an annual collective general population dose of 450 person-rem were estimated.

Pantex Plant-related transportation impacts result in a small increase in cumulative exposures from other reasonably foreseeable DOE transportation activities. Proposed projects that involve extensive transportation of radioactive materials include shipments of high-level radioactive waste to a geologic repository, shipments of transuranic waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, and DOE spent nuclear fuel regionalization by fuel type.

For the assumed geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, the transportation impacts include a worker collective dose for truck shipments of 8,600 person-rem and a general population collective dose from truck shipments of 48,000 person-rem (DOE 1986).

For the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, the transportation impacts include a worker collective dose from truck shipments of 1,900 person-rem and a general population collective dose from truck shipments of 1,500 person-rem (DOE 1990).

For the regionalization of DOE spent nuclear fuel by fuel type, the transportation impacts include a worker collective dose of 417 person-rem for the 40-year shipment campaign and a general population collective dose of 910 person-rem for the 40-year shipment campaign.

The determination of past transportation impacts is difficult because of the lack of historical shipping information. However, based on the projected impacts of Pantex Plant activities, along with the similarity of future activities with those of the past (excluding pit shipments between Pantex Plant and the Rocky Flats Plant, it is estimated that the impact from past Pantex Plant-related shipments were no more than 10 person-rem per year. Assuming 46 years of operation, past activities resulted in less than 0.23 excess LCFs.

4.16.5.1 Impacts of Alternatives in the Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

The WM PEIS analyzes a range of alternatives, including waste shipments by rail and truck. These shipments included a range of 0 to 470 truck shipments and 0 to 200 rail shipments of LLMW/LLW. Impacts to the offsite Maximally Exposed Individual are provided in section 4.14.5.1 (Human Health).

4.16.5.2 Impacts of Alternatives in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

The SSM PEIS includes three alternatives that apply to Pantex Plant: No Action, Downsize Existing Capability, and Relocate Capability. Under the No Action Alternative, no downsizing or modification of facilities would occur. Due to the reduced workload expected in the future, impacts from intersite transportation activities are expected to be less than current impacts. Under the downsizing alternative, the facilities would be consolidated; however, this would not result in a reduction of intersite transportation impacts from those of the No Action Alternative. Under the Relocation Alternative, intersite transportation associated with assembly and disassembly operations and HE fabrication at Pantex Plant would cease.

4.16.5.3 Impacts of Alternatives in the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

Under the S&D PEIS Collocation Alternative, construction of new storage facilities would be required in order to store plutonium and HEU at Pantex Plant. If Pantex Plant is chosen as the collocation site, weapons-usable fissile materials would be transported from existing storage sites to Pantex Plant. The transportation health effects were calculated, and the potential fatalities would be 0.461.

For the Disposition Alternatives, because the emphasis at this stage in the decision process is on choosing the technology rather than the actual site, the cumulative impacts discussion is qualitative and necessarily imprecise, particularly for the generic sites. The evolutionary Light Water Reactor was chosen as the bounding alternative for disposition. Implementation of this Disposition Alternative would require construction and operation of the pit disassembly/conversion facility, the plutonium conversion facility, and the mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility. The bounding alternative also assumes that all facilities previously mentioned would be collocated at the same site. The potential fatalities from transporting materials for disposition would be 5.64 (DOE 1996a:chapter 4).

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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)