APPENDIX B. ACCIDENTS
For this eis DOE reviewed the safety analysis reports and supporting accident analyses for the F-Area facilities that could be involved in each of the alternatives. This appendix summarizes only those accidents that potentially involve the plutonium solutions or subsequent stabilization and storage. In addition, only the consequences (resulting doses) from the potential release of the plutonium solutions or the stabilized and stored forms are included. Potential consequences from accidents involving other nuclear materials stored in F-Canyon (e.g., americium and curium solutions) are not included. These other materials are not considered relevant in making a direct comparison of the potential consequences from each alternative. DOE will discuss the impacts from other-than-plutonium solutions in the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials eis. This is appropriate because the contributions from these materials would not differ for the plutonium solution alternatives and, therefore, are not a discriminator among those alternatives. For the alternatives that would involve new facilities or extensive modifications to existing facilities, no accident analyses exist. For such cases, DOE used accident analyses for existing facilities at SRS that have similar operations or that process and handle more hazardous forms of plutonium (e.g., plutonium-238). DOE believes that the types of accidents evaluated for the existing facilities would be comparable to those for new or modified facilities. In addition, DOE believes that the consequences from these accidents would exceed those expected from a new or modified facility. New or modified facilities probably would incorporate improved design features that would mitigate or reduce the consequences from such accidents.
B.1 General Accident Information
An "accident," as discussed in this appendix, is an unplanned and
infrequent release of radioactive or hazardous materials
resulting from "initiating" events and the additional failures
resulting from the initiating event. In this case, an accident
is an inadvertent release of radioactive or hazardous materials
from their containers or confinement to the environment.1
Initiating events are typically defined in three broad categories:
- External initiators originate outside the facility and
potentially affect the ability of the facility to maintain
confinement of its materials. Examples of external
initiators include aircraft crashes, nearby explosions, and
hazardous material releases from nearby facilities that could
affect the ability of personnel to manage the facility and
its materials properly.
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1. For this appendix, "environment" includes areas within a
facility occupied by workers as well as the area outward from the
facility where the release occurs.
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- Internal initiators originate within a facility and are
usually the result of facility operation. Examples of
internal initiators include equipment failures and human
errors.
- Natural phenomena initiators are natural occurrences such as
weather-related (e.g., floods and tornadoes) and seismic
events (i.e., earthquakes).
Sabotage and terrorist activities (i.e., intentional human
initiators) might be either external or internal initiators.
During the facility design process, designers attempt to identify
the types of initiating events that could occur during and beyond
the facility's expected life cycle and, when feasible, incorporate
appropriate features in their designs to prevent the events from
causing an accident or to mitigate the impacts from accidents that
might occur. However, there is still a potential for a broad
spectrum of accidents to occur at a chemical-nuclear facility.
The likelihood of an accident occurring and its consequences
usually depends on the type of initiator(s) causing the accident,
the frequency at which that initiator occurs, and the frequency of
conditions that will lead to a release as a result of the
initiating event. Accidents can be grouped into four categories
-- anticipated accidents, unlikely accidents, extremely unlikely
accidents, and not reasonably foreseeable accidents -- based on
their estimated frequency or likelihood of occurrence. Table B-1
lists these accident categories and their corresponding frequency
ranges. The accident frequencies are listed in terms of
"incidents per year." For example, if an earthquake of
sufficient magnitude to cause a release of material to the
environment is likely to occur only once every 5,000 years, the
frequency for this accident is presented as 1/5,000, which equals 0.0002 (or in
scientific notation 2.0 - 10-4) per year (i.e., it falls into the
"unlikely accident category").
Releases of radioactive or hazardous materials can occur at
higher frequencies, but are considered "abnormal operating
events" because their occurrence is expected, regardless of
design features or administrative controls, during the life of
the facility and they usually result in no substantial offsite
consequences. An example of an abnormal operating event is a
small leak of contaminated water from a valve stem. DOE takes
extensive efforts to minimize the likelihood of these events by
physical and administrative controls. In addition, SRS personnel
are trained on how to respond to and mitigate the consequences of
such events. The impacts from these releases are included in the
calculations of impacts of routine operations. Events occurring
within this frequency range are not
considered "normal operations" as discussed in Section 4.1.
However, the consequences of these
types of events are included in reported offsite public doses.
The SRS Environmental Report for
Table B-1. Accident frequency categories.a
1992 (Arnett, Karapatakis, and Mamatey 1993) reflects offsite
contributions from any Site facilities that release radioactive
material. In addition, radiological impacts to workers from
normal operations and abnormal operating events are monitored and
recorded by individual dosimetry and exposure records. It is
inappropriate to apply accident analysis methods, such as very
conservative meteorology, for abnormal operating events.
An overall perspective of the methodology of accident analyses
contained in the source documents used to prepare this eis is
in Section B.2. These source documents, such as safety analysis
reports, provide analyses for events considered to be reasonably
foreseeable. Accidents in the not reasonably foreseeable
accident frequency range (less than once in a million years) are
not explicitly presented in this eis because their projected
risks (consequence - frequency) are not likely to be greater than
those from accidents analyzed under the other frequency ranges.
That is, if a maximum release from a tank occurs with a frequency
of once in 5,000 years, then the risk is much smaller for this event
at a lower frequency of once in 10 million years because the
consequences (i.e., the maximum release) are the same
[consequences/5000 > consequences/10,000,000].
For example, the not reasonably foreseeable accidents frequency
range includes accidents such as an aircraft crash or meteorite
penetration of the F-Canyon structure. An aircraft crash into
the F-Area would be of concern because it could result in a radioactive
release of materials from the facilities. Based on the types of
aircraft that could fly over or near the SRS, the estimated frequency (or
likelihood) of an aircraft crash into any of the facilities
considered in this eis is less than once in 10 million years. The
consequences in terms of releases would not be likely to exceed
those from a severe earthquake of a higher frequency. Therefore, the risk
from an airplane crash would be bounded by that from an severe
earthquake. The potential for a meteorite of sufficient size to
penetrate the canyon structure and release radioactive or
chemical material is less than the overall frequency of
meteorites reaching the earth. The resulting release probably
would be much smaller than that from an earthquake or fire;
therefore, this risk would be bounded.
B.2 Accident Analysis Methodology
The accidents analyzed and summarized in this eis are those that would result from events that are considered "reasonably foreseeable" (expected to occur at least once in 1,000,000 years). The frequencies presented in the following tables are associated with the initial event (except as noted) that leads to a release of radioactive material. Conservative assumptions have been used in calculating the potential consequences (doses) that could result from such accidents. These consequences are conservative because the release of radioactivity from the facility, associated with the initiating event (e.g., earthquake) can occur only after the failure of multiple safety systems. The earthquake-induced release is postulated to occur in the following manner: During a tank-to-tank solution transfer in the hot canyon an earthquake occurs. The transfer pipe fails or ruptures but the transfer continues and 50 percent of the contents of the tank spill to the floor of the canyon. Simultaneous with the transfer line rupture, the walls of the canyon crack to provide an unfiltered release pathway to the environment. In addition, the canyon ventilation system fails so that the hot canyon no longer maintains negative pressure (which enhances the release mechanism). After the radioactive material spills, a fraction becomes airborne and passes through the cracks in the canyon walls. This airborne radioactivity then migrates off the Site. This scenario is conservative because tank-to-tank transfers do not occur all the time, so the earthquake would have to happen while a transfer was happening. In addition, the following failures are assumed to allow the release to reach the offsite population at the projected dose levels. The stainless-steel transfer pipe must fail. Operators fail to respond to stop the transfer or are unable to stop the transfer. The canyon walls crack sufficiently to allow the escape of 10 percent of the airborne radioactive material. Power distribution and electrical relays associated with the ventilation system fail. All the released material escapes the facility in the first 2 hours and the meteorological conditions are such that only limited dispersion of the material has occurred by the time it reaches the SRS boundary. The following sections describe the methodology DOE used to analyze the postulated radiological and hazardous material accident scenarios associated with the plutonium solutions in the F-Canyon, as well as the methodology used to select the accidents that present the greatest risks to SRS workers, the public, and the environment. The analytical method described in the following sections did not include emergency response actions to accident situations (e.g., evacuation of personnel to a safe distance or notification of members of the public to take appropriate response actions such as taking shelter) in the determination of potential impacts on workers or members of the public. To minimize potential human exposures and impacts on the environment from postulated accident scenarios should they occur, the SRS has established an Emergency Plan (WSRC 1994a) that governs responses to potential accidents. Section B.6 summarizes the SRS Emergency Plan.
B.2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF AFFECTED FACILITIES
The determination of the potential accidents that can be
postulated for continued management or stabilization of the
plutonium solutions currently stored in the F-Canyon requires
identification of the facilities that support the canyon and
those that could be involved in stabilizing the solutions; these
facilities include the following:
- F-Canyon. This facility stores and manages the plutonium
solutions discussed in this eis.
- FB-Line. Under certain alternatives, this facility, located
in the F-Canyon building, would be involved with processing
the plutonium solutions to form a solid material that DOE
could safely store in appropriate SRS facilities. The FB-Line
is capable of processing the solution into solid metal
"buttons." The FB-Line vault stores plutonium metal buttons
and some plutonium oxide materials. With certain
modifications, the FB-Line could process the plutonium to
form plutonium oxide, a powder-like substance.
- F-Area Outside Facilities. Several small facilities and
processes that support the various facilities in the F-Area,
including the F-Canyon and FB-Line. The primary purpose of
the F-Outside Facilities is to provide bulk quantities of
chemicals, some of which are hazardous, to other facilities
in the F-Area. In addition, these facilities perform various
recovery operations involving radioactive materials.
- F-Canyon Vitrification Facility. This facility would be
able to convert plutonium solutions into small cylinders of
plutonium-bearing borosilicate glass.
- New Repackaging and Vault Facility. DOE would use this
facility to: (1) repackage plutonium vault metal into a
configuration that would meet the new DOE standard for
long-term storage of plutonium, and (2) store the repackaged
plutonium until the implementation of final disposition
actions.
Appendix A of this eis describes the design, operation, and
mission of these facilities as well as the
other facilities in the scope of this eis.
B.2.2 IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS
To support its decision to authorize operations at nuclear facilities, DOE requires the development of facility safety analysis reports (DOE 1992). Safety analysis reports are the primary authorization basis documents that DOE uses to define and control the parameters within which facilities must operate to ensure worker and public safety, and to comply with Departmental, Federal, state, and local requirements. To assist DOE in determining potential consequences associated with performing activities involving nuclear materials, a major portion of these reports and other facility safety analysis documentation deals with analyses of potential accident scenarios that could occur and the impacts those accidents could have on workers, the public, and the environment. To determine the types of accident scenarios to be presented in this appendix, DOE performed an extensive review of existing safety documentation for the F-Canyon and the other facilities that either support canyon activities that could be involved with the stabilization of plutonium solutions or that would store stabilized materials. This review identified a spectrum of potential radiological accidents of varying probabilities (frequencies) that could result in a release of radioactive or hazardous materials from their containers or confinement to the environment. DOE will discuss the impacts from other-than-plutonium solutions in the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials eis. This is appropriate because the contribution from these materials would not differ for plutonium solution alternatives and, therefore, is not a discriminator among these alternatives. Section B.2.3 discusses the methodology used to determine the expected consequences and risks from postulated radiological accidents. Section B.2.4 discusses the methodology used to determine the expected consequences from postulated accidents involving hazardous materials associated with safe storage or stabilization of the plutonium solutions in the F-Canyon. Sections B.2.5 and B.2.6 discuss the selection process used to identify the postulated radiological and hazardous material accidents, respectively, that would present the greatest risks to workers, the public, and the environment.
B.2.3 RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Although existing safety analysis reports and other safety documentation for SRS facilities present potential accident consequences and risks associated with operating those facilities, the assumptions and methodologies used to develop the dose estimates in such documents have changed substantially over the last several years, making it difficult to compare directly the potential impacts presented in the safety analysis report for one facility to the impacts presented in the report for another facility in a quantifiable manner. For example, much of the documentation currently available was developed in the early 1980s using analytical techniques and assumptions that have since been improved, making it difficult to compare directly the impacts presented in a 1980s document for a facility to impacts presented in a 1994 document for another facility that incorporates improved analytical techniques and methodologies. Therefore, to enable a meaningful comparison of the postulated accident impacts presented in the various documents, DOE "normalized" the information to facilitate direct comparison. The normalization of information involves reducing the information to a single standard (so the reader can compare "apples to apples"). Because the accident scenarios analyzed in this appendix consider many radioactive isotopes, the common denominator used to enable a comparison between the consequences from each radionuclide is the curie, a basic measurement of radioactivity. The methodologies for estimating how much radioactive material could be released during an accident, including the isotopic breakdown of the release (i.e., "source term"), have not changed substantially since the 1980s when DOE developed the safety analyses for the facilities within the scope of this eis. The curie content can be directly measured or determined through sampling. Therefore, the source term releases (in curies per isotope) postulated in the various safety analysis documents are directly comparable. To normalize the consequences from the various types of radiological accident scenarios analyzed in the "different-vintage" safety documents, DOE ran computer models using current methodologies and assumptions to determine the consequences resulting from a 1-curie release of each isotope postulated in an accidental release. This evaluation assumed the release of 1 curie of each isotope to the environment at ground level and at an elevated level, such as through an exhaust stack. Each evaluation was performed for the various facilities involved in the alternatives discussed in this eis. Using the computer models, the evaluation calculated doses to an uninvolved worker(2), the maximally exposed offsite individual(3), and the offsite population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Site (Simpkins 1994a,b). --------------------------------------------------------------- 2. An "uninvolved" worker (also referred to as a "colocated worker" is a worker not involved in the operation of the facility where a release occurred. This individual is assumed to be 640 meters (2,100 feet) from the point of release. This distance, as defined by in DOE (1994a), is consistent with the 0.6 kilometer (0.4-mile) "exclusion zone" established around commercial nuclear reactor facilities (NRC 1975). This analysis provides an added measure of conservatism by determining impacts to the uninvolved worker 640 meters (2,100 feet) from the point of release rather than from the area boundary, as recommended in DOE (1994a) and NRC (1975). 3. DOE assumes that the hypothetical "maximally exposed offsite individual" resides permanently at the Site boundary where he/she would recieve the largest exposure from the accident. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Two SRS-specific computer codes -- AXAIR89Q and LADTAP XL -- were used to calculate the doses from each of the 1-curie releases postulated. Both of these codes are used to perform accident analyses described in facility safety analysis reports and postulated accident impacts presented in other eiss developed for the SRS. The AXAIR89Q computer code (WSRC 1994b), which was developed in accordance with guidelines established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC 1983) regarding the modeling of atmospheric releases, models the doses from airborne constituents of postulated accidental releases of radionuclides to the environment. The modeling of the various accidents postulated for the F-Area facilities associated with the different alternatives assumed conservative (99.5 percentile) meteorological conditions (e.g., direction and speed of prevailing wind). "Conservative meteorological conditions" are defined as those for which, for a given release, the concentration of radionuclides (and the resulting doses) at a fixed downwind location will not be exceeded 99.5 percent of the time. Usually, this means a stagnant weather condition where the wind does not act to disperse (and, therefore, dilute and spread more quickly) the material released. The LADTAP XL computer code was developed to model aqueous (i.e., liquid) releases of radionuclides during routine operations and potential accidents. The modeling of the aqueous releases associated with the postulated accidents summarized in this appendix took no credit for the holdup of radionuclides within the soils surrounding the area where the accidents would occur. In other words, the modeling assumed that the entire release would discharge directly as a liquid to the ground, migrate to the Savannah River (either directly or through Fourmile Branch, as appropriate), and enter the drinking water supply. The impacts (i.e., doses) to individuals from postulated accidental releases of radionuclides to the environment for the various facilities were calculated by multiplying the quantity of each isotope in the source term release (in curies per isotope) presented in the safety analysis documents by the doses calculated for a 1-curie release, as discussed in the previous paragraphs. For example, if a facility safety analysis report stated that 4.4 - 10-4 curie of strontium-90 was released at ground level in the F-Area, and the dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual from a 1-curie release of strontium-90 at the ground level in the F-Area is 1.0 - 10-1 millirem, then the actual dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual from the 4.4 - 10-4 curie is determined by multiplying 4.4 - 10-4 curie by 1 - 10-1 millirem per curie, resulting in a dose of 4.4 - 10-5 millirem. The total dose received would then equal the sum of the doses received from each radionuclide released during the accident. Section B.3 presents the doses to uninvolved workers, maximally exposed offsite individuals, and the offsite population surrounding the SRS postulated for the facility radiological accidents evaluated in this appendix. As discussed above, this appendix presents risks to uninvolved workers and members of the public from radiological accidents involving the F-Canyon plutonium solutions in a quantitative fashion using such parameters as dose, accident frequency, and latent fatal cancers in the population (as discussed in Section B.3). However, it presents potential impacts to involved, or "close-in" workers,(4) from postulated accidents in a qualitative rather than a quantitative fashion. The following example illustrates this concept. A typical methodology for attempting to calculate the dose to an involved worker is to assume that the material is released in a room occupied by the individual and that the material instantly disperses throughout the room. Because the worker would be in the room when the release occurred, that individual probably would breathe some fraction of the radioactive (or hazardous) materials for a given number of seconds before evacuating the room. Typically, estimates of exposure time are based on assumptions about worker response to the incident (e.g., how long before the worker left the room, or whether the worker evacuated the room through an area of higher airborne concentrations). For example, consider the instance where an individual drops a vessel containing 2,000 grams (4.4 pounds) of plutonium oxide powder. Depending on the size of the room where the release occurred, the assumptions made on how much of the released powder became airborne and respirable, and the length of time the exposed individual remained in the room, the calculated dose to the individual could be anywhere between 80 rem and 78,000 rem (DOE 1994a). The uncertainty of estimation is extremely large, and no additional insight into the activity is available because the occurrence is accepted as undesirable without needing to perform the calculations. Historic evidence indicates that this would be a nonfatal accident resulting in room contamination with the potential for minor personnel contamination and assimilation. Presenting this wide range is not helpful in allowing comparisons of impacts among alternatives.
B.2.4 HAZARDOUS MATERIAL ACCIDENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Full understanding of the hazards associated with SRS nuclear
facilities under the alternatives considered in this eis requires
the analysis of potential accidents involving both hazardous and
radiological materials. For chemically toxic materials, several
government agencies recommend quantifying health effects that
cause short-term consequences as threshold values of
concentrations in air. Because the long-term health consequences
of human exposure to hazardous materials are not as well
understood as those related to radiation exposure, a
determination of potential health effects from exposures to
hazardous materials is more subjective than a determination of
health effects from exposure to radiation. Therefore, the
consequences from accidents involving hazardous materials
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4. An involved worker is a worker within 640 meters (2,100 feet)
of the location where a pastulated accident occurs, and is
usually directly involved in the activity or operation being
evaluated.
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postulated in this appendix are in terms of airborne
concentrations at various distances from the accident location.
To determine potential health effects to workers and members of
the public that could result from accidents involving hazardous
materials, DOE determined the airborne concentrations of the
hazardous materials released during an accident where the
uninvolved worker and offsite individual are located [i.e., 640
meters (2,100 feet) and the nearest Site boundary, respectively]
and compared them to Emergency Response Planning Guidelines
(ERPG) values established by the American Industrial Hygiene
Association (AIHA 1991). These values, which depend on the
material or chemical being considered, are established for three
general severity levels to ensure that the necessary emergency
actions occur to minimize worker and public exposures after
accidents. These severity levels include the following:
- ERPG-1 Values. Exposure to airborne concentrations greater
than ERPG-1 values for a period greater than 1 hour results in
an unacceptable likelihood that a person would experience
mild transient adverse health effects or perception of a
clearly defined objectionable odor.
- ERPG-2 Values. Exposure to airborne concentrations greater
than ERPG-2 values for a period greater than 1 hour results in
an unacceptable likelihood that a person would experience or
develop irreversible or other serious health effects or
symptoms that could impair one's ability to take protective
action.
- ERPG-3 Values. Exposure to airborne concentrations greater
than ERPG-3 values for a period greater than 1 hour results
in an unacceptable likelihood that a person would experience or
develop life-threatening health effects.
Because all hazardous materials do not have ERPG values, DOE
could not use such values to estimate potential impacts on the
public from each hazardous material accident postulated for the
SRS facilities discussed in this appendix. Therefore, for
chemicals that do not have ERPG values, the assessment compared
airborne concentrations of hazardous materials resulting from
postulated accidents to the most restrictive available exposure
limits established by other guidelines to control worker
exposures to hazardous materials. Table B-2 lists the hierarchy
of exposure limits that DOE used to evaluate potential health
effects resulting from postulated hazardous material accidents.
Table B-2. Hierarchy of established limits and guidelines used
to determine impacts from postulated hazardous material
accidents.
B.2.5 SELECTION OF RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS
As with any activity, a large number of potential accident scenarios can be postulated for each SRS facility; to attempt to analyze all potential accident scenarios and their impacts would not be cost-effective or meaningful. However, a broad spectrum of abnormal events and accidents can be identified and analyzed for a facility to provide a reasonable understanding of the risks associated with performing activities in that facility. Safety analysis reports and other safety documentation usually analyze a broad spectrum of accidents that are considered reasonably foreseeable (i.e., they are expected to occur at least once every 1,000,000 years) and estimate their potential impacts on workers, the environment, and the public. For this eis, the term "bounding accident" represents postulated events or accidents that have higher risks (i.e., consequences - frequencies) than other accidents postulated within the same frequency range. For example, the accident scenario within each frequency range defined in Table B-1 postulated to present the highest risk to the maximally exposed offsite individual is a bounding accident because its risk is higher than the risk of other accidents in the same frequency range. A consideration of the risks associated with bounding events or accidents for a facility can establish an understanding of the overall risk to workers, members of the public, and the environment from operating the facility. In addition, the risks of different facilities can be compared relatively by comparing the risks associated with the bounding accidents for each facility. Figure B-1 shows the concept of bounding risk accidents. Each of the radiological event tables in this appendix lists the bounding risk events first. There are some facilities for which there are no reasonably foreseeable accidents in some of the frequency ranges (e.g., material stored in a vault might have only a low-consequence anticipated event, and a high-consequence but extremely unlikely event), but not the other binning range. The frequencies listed are usually the frequency of the initiating event (e.g., earthquake). In some cases (e.g., plutonium solutions) the frequency is constructed using an "event tree." This technique asks a series of "yes-no" questions and then estimates the frequency for the "yes" and the "no" answers. In a hypothetical fire, the first question asks "Is a heat source available?" If the yes answer is estimated to occur fewer than three times per year, the frequency would be 3. Next, the answers to the questions "Is the flammable material outside its normal container?" and then "Is the material heated above the fire point?" must also be yes before the fire is projected to occur. The projections are assumed to be 10 percent and 7 percent. Finally, the presence of an ignition source must also be yes to have the fire (e.g., available 5 percent of the time). The overall frequency answers are calculated or estimated based on the actual facility conditions and technical judgment of the analysts. For this example, the frequency would be approximately the product of the numbers or (3 - 0.1 - 0.07 - 0.05 @ 0.001) or once in a thousand years. Section B.3 identifies the bounding accidents postulated for the facilities that manage materials considered in this eis. In addition, Section B.3 identifies the consequences of nonbounding radiological accidents presented in the various facility safety analysis reports and documentation to provide a complete picture of the accidents considered. Figure B-1. Methodology used to determine bounding risk accidents for the various nuclear facilities.
B.2.6 SELECTION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL ACCIDENTS
Because of the many types of materials and chemicals at the Site and the varying quantities of these materials in different locations, the analysis of potential accident scenarios involving hazardous materials was limited to substances categorized by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as "Extremely Hazardous Substances" (40 CFR Part 355), as designated under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986. Although materials not categorized as Extremely Hazardous Substances can affect the health and safety of workers and the public if released in sufficient quantities and forms, the Site has implemented programs in accordance with DOE Order requirements (e.g., DOE 1985, 1987, 1993) that incorporate programmatic and management requirements of other government agencies, such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. While these materials might present hazards to workers or the public if accidentally released to the environment, their impacts are likely to be bounded by potential impacts from accidents involving Extremely Hazardous Substances; therefore, this appendix does not analyze them. Although existing safety analysis reports and supporting safety documentation for SRS nuclear facilities include detailed information on postulated radiological accidents, recent requirements (DOE 1992) require safety analysis reports to postulate the impacts associated with hazardous material accidents to the same level of detail they use to analyze radiological accident scenarios. Because the Site is not yet in full compliance with these requirements, the only information that usually exists for a facility related to hazardous materials includes a list of those materials and their respective quantities. To determine the potential impacts on individuals at different positions (e.g., uninvolved workers and the maximally exposed offsite individual), DOE used a bounding approach to determine potential impacts from postulated accidents in the F-Area involving Extremely Hazardous Substances; the amounts of such substances and their locations were determined from the SRS Tier Two Emergency and Hazardous Chemical Inventory Report (WSRC 1994c). This annual report identifies the chemicals at the Site that are hazardous or that require the establishment of emergency response procedures. Following identification of the amounts and locations of the Extremely Hazardous Substances in F-Area, DOE calculated the airborne concentrations at 640 meters (2,100 feet) from the point of release and the nearest Site boundary (i.e., locations of the uninvolved worker and offsite individual, respectively) that would be likely from a release of the maximum inventory of each Extremely Hazardous Substance in any single location in F-Area. EPICodeTM (Emergency Prediction and Information Code), a commercially available computer code for modeling the routine or accidental releases of hazardous chemicals to the environment, calculated the airborne concentrations at the different locations (Homann 1988). In addition to modeling the release of the maximum amount of a given material in a single location in F-Area, DOE also modeled a release of the total quantity of each Extremely Hazardous Substance in F-Area as though it were in a single container. Although the likelihood of such a release is not reasonably foreseeable, the impacts from this type of release probably would bound the impacts from all other postulated releases in the area. In addition, although unlikely, the potential exists for a severe seismic event in F-Area to release a large portion of each material from its different locations. Section B.4 identifies potential accident scenarios involving hazardous materials postulated for F-Area. In addition, Section B.4 compares the estimated airborne concentrations of materials released during postulated accidents to the appropriate guidelines presented in Table B-2 to enable an assessment of potential impacts to workers and the public.
B.3 Postulated Facility Accidents Involving Radioactive Materials
This section presents potential impacts from postulated radiological accidents at the facilities that could be involved with safe management of the plutonium solutions being stored in the F-Canyon. For each facility, it presents the impacts of the bounding radiological accidents (calculated using the methodology described in Section B.2.3). In addition, it summarizes the impacts from other postulated radiological accidents presented in safety analysis reports and other facility safety documentation to provide a complete picture of the types of accidents considered reasonably foreseeable at each facility in the scope of this eis.
B.3.1 POSTULATED RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS FOR F-ARea FACILITIES
The primary purpose of many of the facilities in the F-Area at the Site was to support the recovery of plutonium-239 in the F-Canyon. To provide perspective on the types of accidents that could occur at these facilities, it is necessary to understand the general activities performed. Appendix A discusses the design, operation, and past missions of the various facilities analyzed in this appendix. For all F-Area facility accidents summarized in the following sections, with the exception of a severe earthquake-induced release of radionuclides to the environment, the accident impacts are independent of each other. In other words, DOE assumes that the accidents are not caused by a common initiator and, therefore, their consequences and risks are not additive. However, a severe seismic event (i.e., earthquake) 5 is considered a common-cause initiator because it could cause the simultaneous release of radioactive and hazardous materials from each nuclear facility in F-Area. Therefore, the determination of the consequences to workers and members of the public from such an earthquake in F-Area would require the adding together of the consequences of the earthquake from the materials released from each facility in the scope of this eis. Table B-3 lists the postulated radiological impacts on the uninvolved worker, the maximally exposed offsite individual, and the offsite population from a severe earthquake-induced release of radioactive materials from these facilities in their current mode of operation (No-Action Alternative). Table B-4 lists the impacts postulated from a severe earthquake in F-Area to each facility in a fully operational mode. The facility and process descriptions in Appendix A might be helpful in understanding the accident analyses. Table B-3. Postulated cumulative radiological impacts in the event of a severe earthquakea in the F-Area for facilities in their current mode of operation. $Table B-4 Postulated cumulative radiological impacts in the event of a severe earthquake in the F-Area for facilities in their fully operational mode of operation. ------------------------------------------------------------------ 5. New nuclear facilities constructed at the Site are designed to be seismically "rugged" to withstand ground accelerations equal to or greater than 0.2 times the force of gravity, or 0.2g (a "design-basis earthquake"). The magnitude of such an earthquake could cause several structural damage that could lead to partial structural collapse an unmitigated releases of material to the environment. Older facilities not constructed to the same standards would be likely to exhibit more substantial damage. ------------------------------------------------------------------
B.3.1.1 F-Canyon
Because the F-Canyon was designed to process radioactive materials rather than store them for extended periods of time, the potential consequences presented in this section are based on the assumption that the radioactive solutions in the canyon would not remain in the facility for longer than 180 days from the time the fuel or targets were dissolved. However, because canyon operations were suspended in the middle of a processing cycle, the solutions currently in the facility have been there far longer than intended (more than 2 years), thus increasing the uncertainty associated with continued management or further processing of the material as time passes. The likelihood for potential accidents and the consequences that could result from continuing to manage them in their current form and condition could increase substantially because of changes in management activities implemented to ensure the material remains within approved parameters and conditions. Because the canyon was never intended to store radioactive solutions for longer than 180 days, there is the potential for accidents other than those considered in existing safety analyses to occur and for the frequencies of the accidents postulated in this appendix to increase. However, because of the uncertainties associated with continuing to store the solutions for long periods without processing, quantification of the actual changes in risk that could occur with continued storage of these solutions is difficult. Table B-5 lists nuclides and maximum isotopic curie fractions. Table B-5. Source term isotopic distribution. Current operations at the F-Canyon do not include dissolution of reactor-irradiated materials or transfers of solutions to the FB- or FA-Line facilities for further processing. Table B-6 summarizes the impacts from the potential radiological accidents considered in this appendix associated with current operations at the canyon. Table B-7 summarizes the increased risk of latent fatal cancers associated with the radiological accidents listed in Table B-6. Latent fatal cancers are determined using guidance provided by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP 1991) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (10 CFR Part 20). For prompt doses of less than 20 rem, latent fatal cancers are calculated by multiplying the consequences of an accident (in terms of dose) by 5.0 - 10-4 cancer per rem for the public or 4.0 - 10-4 cancer per rem for workers. For prompt doses of more than 20 rem, 1.0 - 10-3 cancer per rem and 8.0 - 10-4 cancer per rem are used for the public and workers, respectively. The risk of latent fatal cancers (per year) accounts for accident frequency and is equal to the number of latent fatal cancers (per accident) multiplied by the accident frequency (in terms of accidents per year). No fatalities to involved or "close-in" workers from the accident scenarios postulated under current or full operations in the F-Canyon are a likely result of exposure to radiation. With the exception of accidents 1, 2, 6, and 8 in Table B-6, releases from the accidents are likely to be contained within the processing area and filtered through the canyon ventilation system. Because the ventilation system flows from the areas of lowest to highest radioactivity, and because releases exhaust through an exhaust stack after passing through a filtration system, the doses received by workers from these accidents are not likely to be substantially larger than those received during routine operations. For the postulated accidents where the release is not likely to be maintained within the ventilation system (i.e., airborne releases from the ground level or liquid releases), involved worker exposures would be unlikely to result in adverse health effects. For an inadvertent nuclear criticality in the processing vessels, the doses to involved workers would be reduced due to the shielding between the vessels and the locations that workers could occupy. Although the likelihood for an involved worker fatality due to radiation exposure following a severe earthquake is minimal, there is a potential that the earthquake itself could inflict significant injuries, including death, on involved workers. For example, involved workers could be injured due to flying debris caused by the earthquake. Although not a direct cause of the accident scenarios postulated for the F-Canyon, worker doses would be likely to occur as a result of cleanup activities after postulated accidents. However, doses to individuals probably would be maintained within the limits established for worker exposures from routine operations. Table B-6. Postulated radiological events and accidents involving plutonium solutions for operations at F-Canyon. Table B-7. Increased risk of latent fatal cancers from the radiological events and accidents postulated for operations at the F-Canyon. Although DOE has not yet performed accident analyses for the F-Canyon Vitrification Facility, the postulated accidents for F-Canyon would be representative of this new facility because the source terms would be comparable.
B.3.1.2 FB-Line Facility
The FB-Line is not currently processing plutonium solutions and its vessels are empty. The current mission of the FB-Line is to store solid plutonium materials, such as buttons and scrap materials, in its vaults. The resumption of processing activities at the FB-Line would introduce the potential for different types of radiological accident scenarios than those that currently exist. For example, it would introduce potential accidents associated with processing F-Canyon solutions and forming new plutonium buttons. Table B-8 summarizes postulated radiological accidents for the FB-Line under full operating conditions to process buttons and their impacts on workers and members of the public. Table B-9 summarizes the risk of latent fatal cancers associated with the radiological accidents postulated for processing buttons in the FB-Line. In addition to processing F-Canyon solutions to form metal buttons, the FB-Line, with certain modifications, could process the solutions to form plutonium oxide powder. Although specific analyses have not been developed for the FB-Line to analyze the processing of plutonium solutions to form oxide powder, Phase II of the HB-Line facility was designed to process neptunium and plutonium solutions to form plutonium-239 oxide. A comparison of the accidents listed in Table B-8 and the safety analysis report for the HB-Line facility (Meehan 1994) determined that the accident consequences associated with producing plutonium oxide powder would probably not be greater than those for producing metal buttons, although some of the postulated accident scenarios would change. For example, plutonium in its metal form is more flammable than in its oxide powder form. Therefore, the likelihood of a fire involving plutonium oxide would probably be lower than that for metal. In addition, DOE must consider the fact that a plutonium oxide powder is significantly more dispersible than a solid metal piece of plutonium. For example, if two similar storage containers, one containing a plutonium metal button and the other containing plutonium oxide powder, were dropped and ruptured, the resulting exposures to workers and members of the public could be significantly higher from the container storing the powder than from the container storing the metal button. However, as stated above, DOE does not believe that the overall risks associated with processing the plutonium solutions to metal or oxide powder would be significantly different. Table B-8. Postulated radiological events and accidents associated with processing of plutonium solutions to metal(a) at the FB-Line. Table B-9. Increased risk of latent fatal cancers from the radiological events and accidents postulated for processing of plutonium solutions to metal(a) at the FB-Line facility. With the exception of an inadvertent nuclear criticality during processing, no fatalities to involved workers from the accident scenarios postulated under current or full operations in the FB-Line would be likely as a result of exposure to radiation. Current operations primarily involve storage activities in the FB-Line vault(s). Because access to storage areas in the FB-Line is strictly limited, the number of individuals who could receive impacts from an accidental release of material in a storage vault would be limited. Under full operations, potential accidents resulting from processing, such as a fire or uncontrolled reaction, would not result in substantial exposures. Based on historic accident information, such as that in the 200-Area incident data base, exposures to involved workers are likely to be within limits established for routine operations if emergency response actions are implemented for an accident. For an inadvertent nuclear criticality during processing in the FB-Line, the radiation field generated by the criticality could lead to involved worker fatalities. Of the approximate 74 persons who could be in the FB-Line facility during processing activities, about 56 would be in areas where they could receive substantial doses from a criticality. Of these 56 individuals, an estimated 4 workers could receive lethal doses of radiation, while the other individuals would be exposed to varying nonlethal levels of radiation. As with the postulated accidents discussed above for the F-Canyon, there is a potential that a severe earthquake could inflict significant nonradiation-induced injuries, including death, on involved workers. For example, involved workers could be injured by flying debris due to the earthquake. Although not a direct cause of the accident scenarios postulated for the FB-Line, worker doses could be incurred as a result of cleanup activities following postulated accidents. However, doses to individuals would be maintained within the limits established for worker exposures resulting from routine operations.
B.3.1.3 F-Area Outside Facilities
The primary purpose of the F-Area Outside Facilities is to provide bulk quantities of chemicals, some of which are hazardous, to other facilities in F-Area. Although they were not specifically designed to withstand severe external or natural phenomena events, DOE anticipates that the design of the facilities would limit potential consequences of accidents initiated by such events. Although most materials stored in the F-Area Outside Facilities are nonradioactive, some chemicals received from facilities such as the F-Area Canyon contain small amounts of radioactive material. The Outside Facilities are operational and continue to provide support to other facilities in F-Area, as needed. Table B-10 summarizes the potential consequences associated with postulated radiological accidents for these facilities. Table B-11 summarizes the risk of latent fatal cancers associated with the Table B-10. Postulated radiological events and accidents for full operations at the F-Area Outside Facilities. Table B-11. Increased risk and latent fatal cancers from the radiological events and accidents postulated for full operations at the F-Outside Facilities. radiological accidents postulated for these facilities. No fatalities to involved workers from the accident scenarios postulated for the F-Area Outside Facilities would be likely a result of exposure to radiation, and DOE anticipates that doses received from the accidents listed in Table B-10 would be minimal. Although the likelihood for an involved worker fatality due to radiation exposure after a severe earthquake would be minimal, the earthquake itself could inflict significant injuries, including death, on involved workers. For example, involved workers could be injured from flying debris caused by the earthquake. For a tornado-initiated release, no worker injuries or exposures to workers resulting from material released due to the tornado, or injuries from the tornado itself, are likely. DOE bases this conclusion on the condition that workers would receive proper notification of severe weather conditions in the SRS area in accordance with emergency plans (WSRC 1994a); this would enable workers to take the necessary precautions, such as placing the facility in a safe shutdown condition and taking shelter until the weather passed. Although not a direct cause of the accident scenarios postulated for the F-Area Outside Facilities, DOE anticipates that workers would incur doses as a result of performing cleanup activities after a postulated accident. However, doses to individuals would be maintained within the exposure limits established for worker exposures from routine operations.
B.3.1.4 235-Storage Vaults
The current mission of the 235-F Storage Vaults is to store plutonium-bearing products safely. Table B-12 summarizes postulated radiological accidents for the 235-F facility. Table B-13 summarizes the risk of increased latent fatal cancers associated with the radiological accidents postulated for this facility. With the exception of an inadvertent nuclear criticality in the storage vaults, no fatalities to involved workers from the accident scenarios postulated for the 235-F facility would be likely as a result of exposure to radiation. Because the number of individuals permitted in the storage vaults is strictly limited, the number of individuals who could be affected by the postulated accidents would be limited. Based on historic accident information (e.g., the 200-Area incident data base), exposures to involved workers are likely to be within limits established for routine operations, even if the inventories of materials in the vaults increased as a result of stabilization of materials at other SRS facilities. For an inadvertent nuclear criticality in the vaults, the radiation field generated by the criticality could lead to involved worker fatalities. No more than two involved workers would be likely to receive lethal doses of radiation; a limited number of additional individuals could receive exposures significantly above the annual administrative limit established for routine operations. Table B-12. Postulated radiological events and accidents for storage operations at the 235-F Facility Storage Vaults. Table B-13. Increased risk of latent fatal cancers from the radiological events and accidents postulated for storage operations at the 235-F Storage Vaults. As with the postulated accidents discussed above for the other facilities, there is a potential that a severe earthquake could inflict significant nonradiation-induced injuries, including death, on involved workers. In addition, although cleanup activities would not be a direct cause of the accident scenarios postulated, they could cause worker doses after such accidents. However, doses to individuals would be within the limits established for worker exposures from routine operations. Postulated radiological accidents involving the 235-F storage vaults would be representative of the new repackaging and storage vaults because the mission and source term would be similar. One exception would be the probable elimination of the storage container rupture accident due to plutonium repackaging.
B.4 Postulated Accidents Involving Extremely Hazardous Substances
Based on a review of current inventories at the various facilities in F-Area (DOE 1994b), DOE determined that seven Extremely Hazardous Substances are in use in the area. Table B-14 lists the total annual maximum and average daily quantities of these substances based on 1-year inventories. In addition, Table B-14 lists the maximum amounts of each substance in a single location in F-Area. Table B-14. Inventories of Extremely Hazardous Substances(a) in F-Area. To determine airborne concentrations at 640 meters (2,100 feet) and the nearest Site boundary (the locations of the uninvolved worker and maximally exposed offsite individual, respectively), DOE assumed an inadvertent release of the maximum amount of each material in a single location to the environment. The EPICodeTM computer code (discussed in Section B.2.6) was used to model the release of each material. Table B-15 lists the results of the analyses and compares the expected airborne concentrations at the uninvolved worker and offsite individual locations to the different threshold Emergency Response and Planning Guidelines (ERPGs), or their equivalents. Table B-15. Impacts from potential non-seismic-initiated releases of Extremely Hazardous Substances in F-Area. Because a severe seismic event has the potential to initiate releases of the same types of materials from different locations in F-Area, DOE analyzed a release of the maximum daily inventory (listed in Table B-14) to the environment. Table B-16 lists the results of these analyses. A total release of the entire inventory of a particular material from F-Area to the environment is extremely unlikely, especially if the material is in several different locations, facilities, or buildings in the area. However, the assumption of a total release of the maximum inventories in the area provides a bounding estimate for the largest airborne concentrations DOE could expect following a severe seismic event. As listed in Tables B-15 and B-16, the airborne concentrations for a gaseous release of hydrogen fluoride (hydrofluoric acid) exceed the ERPG-3 threshold limits at 640 meters (2,100 feet) from the point of release. As described in Section B.2.4, ERPG-3 threshold values represent the airborne concentration at which an individual would experience or develop life-threatening health effects if exposed for longer than 1 hour. Because individuals could be notified and evacuated to a safe Table B-16. Impacts from potential releases of Extremely Hazardous Substances in F-Area resulting from a severe earthquake. location (e.g., inside a building with adequate ventilation) within 1 hour of an inadvertent release of hydrogen fluoride, DOE does not expect any life-threatening or long-term health effects to uninvolved workers. Uninvolved workers could experience mild burning of the lungs from inhaling airborne concentrations at the nearest SRS boundary would be below ERPG-1 threshold values, no measurable health effects would be likely to members of the public. However, for involved workers, there is a potential for serious worker injury and potential fatalities because of the large concentrations expected at locations close to the point of release that could hinder personnel from taking the appropriate emergency response actions. In the event of a severe earthquake, Table B-16 indicates that a release of the total quantities of nitric acid in the F-Area would exceed ERPG-3 values at a distance of 640 meters (2,100 feet) and ERPG-1 values at the nearest Site boundary. As discussed in Section B.2.4, the health effects from being exposed to ERPG-1 threshold values for longer than 1 hour would be minor (e.g., irritation of the eyes and objectionable odor). In addition, because some time would be required for airborne concentrations at the nearest Site boundary, emergency actions could notify members of the public about appropriate responses to avoid these minor effects. For uninvolved and involved workers, although ERPG-3 threshold values would be exceeded, no worker fatalities from exposure to the acid would be likely, although some individuals could experience significant short-term health effects, such as burning of the lungs and irritation of the skin. Because this scenario assumed that all nitric acid in the F-Area was released from a single location during a severe earthquake, airborne concentrations would be lower than those listed in Table B-16.
B.5 Secondary Impacts from Postulated Accidents
The primary focus of accident analyses performed to support the operation of a facility is to determine the magnitude of the consequences of postulated accident scenarios on public and worker health and safety. However, DOE recognizes that accidents involving releases of materials could adversely affect the surrounding environment. For this appendix, postulated impacts on the environment from potential accident scenarios are "secondary impacts." To determine the greatest secondary impacts that could occur to the environment from the postulated accidents, DOE evaluated each radiological accident scenario. The following sections quali- tatively summarize the results of the evaluations.
B.5.1 BIOTIC RESOURCES
Limited areas of surface contamination would occur in the
immediate area around the affected facility if a postulated
accident took place. Terrestrial biota in or near the
contaminated area could be exposed to small quantities of
radioactive materials and ionizing radiation until the affected
areas could be decontaminated. DOE believes that impacts on
biotic resources from the accidents analyzed in this appendix
would be minor.
B.5.2 WATER RESOURCES
No adverse impacts on water quality from any of the accident
scenarios considered in this appendix are likely. Although some
scenarios include liquid releases to the environment,
consequences from these releases would be limited. Although
contamination could reach groundwater supplies, the slow
rate at which this contamination would to migrate to the
groundwater would limit both the prompt and cumulative impacts on
the environment and individuals exposed to groundwater.
B.5.3 ECONOMIC IMPACTS
With the exception of severe accident scenarios, such as those
initiated by severe earthquakes, limited economic impacts are
likely as a result of the accident scenarios postulated in this
appendix. Cleanup of contamination would be localized at the
facility where the accident occurred, and DOE believes that the
current workforce could perform the cleanup activities. In
addition, DOE expects that offsite contamination would be limited
or would not occur. Severe accidents, such as a breach of the F-
Canyon, would cause DOE to incur substantially larger economic
impacts to either repair the facilities or place them in a
condition that minimized further risks to workers and the
public.
B.5.4 NATIONAL DEFENSE
Because the facilities considered in this eis represent redundant
(or potentially redundant) processing and conversion capabilities
on the Site or with other DOE facilities, none of the postulated
accident scenarios in this appendix is likely to impact the
defense capabilities of the United States.
B.5.5 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION
Contamination of the environment from the accidents postulated in
this appendix would be limited to the immediate area surrounding the
facility where the accident occurred. All of the postulated
accidents would result in minimal offsite contamination.
B.5.6 THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES
There are no habitats of Federally listed threatened or
endangered species in the immediate vicinity of the SRS
facilities considered in this eis. Because the accident
scenarios postulated in this appendix would result in only
localized contamination, DOE does not expect these accidents to
affect any threatened or endangered species.
B.5.7 LAND USE
Because the accidents postulated in this appendix would result in
only localized contamination around the facility where an
accident occurred, and minimal offsite contamination is likely,
DOE expects no impacts on land use.
B.5.8 TREATY RIGHTS
The environmental impacts of each accident postulated in this
appendix would be maintained within the SRS boundaries and the
area where the particular accident scenario occurred. Because
there are no Native American lands within the Site boundaries,
treaty rights would not be affected.
B.6 Accident Mitigation
Although DOE expends extensive efforts and large amounts of
capital to prevent accidents involving radioactive and hazardous
materials, accidents and inadvertent releases to the environment
can still occur. Therefore, an important part of the accident
analysis process is the identification of actions that can
mitigate consequences from accidents if they occur.6 This
section summarizes the SRS Emergency Plan, which governs
responses to accident situations that affect Site employees or
the offsite population.
The Savannah River Site Emergency Plan (WSRC 1994a) defines
appropriate response measures for the management of Site
emergencies (e.g., radiological or hazardous material accidents).
It incorporates into one document the entire process designed to
respond to and mitigate the consequences of a potential accident.
For example, it establishes protective action guidelines for
accidents involving chemical and radiological releases to keep
onsite and offsite exposures as low as possible. It accomplishes
minimization or prevention of exposures by minimizing the time spent
in the vicinity of the hazard or the release plume,
keeping personnel as far from the hazard or plume as possible
(e.g., using physical barricades and evacuation), and taking
advantage of available shelter.
Emergencies that could cause activation of all or portions of
this plan and the SRS Emergency Response Office include the
following:
- Events (operational, transportation, etc.) with the
potential to cause releases above allowable limits of
radiological or hazardous materials.
- Events such as fires, explosions, tornadoes, hurricanes,
earthquakes, dam failures, etc., that affect or could affect
safety systems designed to protect Site and offsite
populations and the environment.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
6. This analysis takes no credit for accident response under the
SRS Emergency Plan in determining the potential consequences
and risks to workers or members of the public presented in other
sections of this appendix.
----------------------------------------------------------------
- Events such as bomb threats, hostage situations, etc., that
reduce the security posture of the Site.
- Events created by proximity to other facilities such as the
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (a commercial nuclear plant
across the Savannah River from the Site) or nearby commercial
chemical facilities.
Depending on the types of postulated accidents and the potential
impacts that could result from those accidents, emergencies are
classified in several categories in accordance with requirements
defined in the DOE 5500 Series of Orders, as follows:
- Alerts are confined within the affected facility boundary;
no measurable impacts to workers or members of the public
outside the facility boundary are likely.
- Site Area Emergencies are events that are in progress or
that have occurred involving actual or likely major failures
of facility safety or safeguards systems needed for the
protection of onsite personnel, the public, the environment,
or national security; because they have the potential to
impact workers at colocated facilities or members of the
public in the SRS vicinity, these situations require
notification of and coordination of responses with the
appropriate local authorities.
- General Emergencies produce consequences that require the
implementation of protective actions to minimize impacts to
both workers and the public; full mobilization of all
available onsite and offsite resources is usually required to
deal with the event and its consequences.
In accordance with the Site Emergency Plan, DOE conducts frequent
drills and exercises at the SRS to develop, maintain, and test
response capabilities, and validate the adequacy of emergency
facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and training.
For example, drills occur periodically for the following accident
scenarios in the facilities or facility areas: facility/area
evacuations; shelter protection; toxic gas releases; nuclear
incident monitor alarms (following an inadvertent nuclear
criticality); fire alarms; medical emergencies; and personnel
accountability (to ensure that all personnel have safely evacuated a
facility or area following an emergency). DOE and Westinghouse
Savannah River Company conduct and evaluate periodic drills with
the following organizations or groups to ensure that they continue
to maintain (from both a personnel and an equipment
standpoint) the capability to respond adequately to emergency
situations: first aid teams; rescue teams fire wardens and firefighting
teams; SRS medical and health protection personnel and personnel
from the Eisenhower Army Medical Center; SRS and local communications
personnel and systems; and SRS security forces.
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