SUMMARY INTRODUCTION In January 1991, the Secretary of Energy announced that the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP) would prepare a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) examining alternatives for the reconfiguration of the Nation's Nuclear Weapons Complex (Complex). The framework for the Reconfiguration PEIS was described in the January 1991 Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study, a detailed examination of alternatives for the future Complex. Because of the significant changes in the world since January 1991, especially with regard to projected future requirements for the United States nuclear weapons stockpile, the framework described in the Nuclear Weapons Reconfiguration Study does not exist today. Therefore, the Department has separated the Reconfiguration PEIS into two PEISs: a Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS; and a Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. The Tritium Supply and Recycling Proposal is analyzed in this PEIS. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Proposal is currently being analyzed in a separate PEIS being prepared by DP. Another issue which was once part of reconfiguration was the storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials, primarily highly enriched uranium and plutonium. In early 1994 the Secretary established a Departmentwide program for developing recommendations and for directing implementation of decisions concerning disposition of excess nuclear materials. This program was recognized in the FY 1995. Defense Authorization Bill which directed that an office be established for this purpose. A determination was made that a PEIS was needed to support the decision making for disposition of surplus weapons-usable fissile materials. Since long-term storage is so closely related (connected) to disposition, the long-term storage analysis that had been part of the Reconfiguration PEIS was moved into the program for Long-Term Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials. As a result of this, a third PEIS, The Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials PEIS, is being prepared to analyze alternatives for the long-term storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials, primarily highly enriched uranium and plutonium. That PEIS will also address the disposition of plutonium declared surplus to national defense needs by the President. An EIS for the disposition of surplus highly enriched uranium is also being prepared. Tritium Supply and Recycling Proposal The DOE proposes to provide tritium supply and recycling facilities for the Complex. The Complex is a set of interrelated facilities supporting the research, development, design, manufacture, testing, and maintenance of the Nation's nuclear weapons and the subsequent dismantlement of retired weapons. The Complex consisted of 11 sites located in ten states (figure S-1). Hanford and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) are currently not part of the Complex. Defense missions have been terminated at the Rocky Flats Plant, Mound Plant, and the Pinellas Plant. Tritium supply deals with the production of new tritium in either a reactor or an accelerator by irradiating target materials with neutrons and the subsequent extraction of the tritium in pure form for its use in nuclear weapons. Tritium recycling consists of recovering residual tritium from weapons components, purifying it, and refilling weapons components with both recovered and new tritium when it becomes available. Tritium Supply and Recycling Proposal: Provide the long-term, assured supply of tritium. Safely and reliably fulfill all future national defense requirements for tritium. Protect the health of workers, the general public, and the environment. Figure (Page S-2) Figure S-1.-Current and Former Nuclear Weapons Complex Sites. There is now no capability to produce the required amounts of tritium within the Complex. Tritium, with a half-life of 12.3 years, is necessary for all weapons that remain in the stockpile. Thus, tritium must be replaced periodically as long as the Nation relies on a nuclear deterrent. Current projections require that a new source of tritium be available by 2009 and new tritium be available for stockpile use by 2011. This Tritium Supply and Recycling Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement evaluates the siting, construction, and operation of tritium supply technology alternatives and recycling facilities at each of five candidate sites. The use of an existing commercial light water reactor that would be used for irradiation services or purchased and converted for tritium production is also included as an alternative for long-term tritium supply. Additionally, this Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS includes an assessment of the environmental impacts associated with using one or more commercial light water reactors for tritium production as a contingency in the event of a national emergency. Specific commercial reactors are not identified in this PEIS. This PEIS also addresses the environmental impacts of an Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) or modular gas-cooled reactor used as a multipurpose reactor. A commercial reactor could also be used as a multipurpose reactor. Throughout the PEIS, reference to and discussion of impacts for the multipurpose ALWR are also applicable to a multipurpose commercial reactor. A multipurpose ("triple play") reactor is defined as one capable of producing tritium, "burning" plutonium, and generating revenues through the sale of electric power. The multipurpose ALWR would operate essentially the same as a uranium-fueled tritium production ALWR. Therefore, the environmental impacts from operation of a multipurpose ALWR would be expected to be similar to that from the tritium production ALWR. However, a plutonium Pit Disassembly/Conversion/Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility would be needed to provide the mixed-oxide fuel rods for the ALWR multipurpose reactor, and would be the major contributor to potential environmental impacts greater than that for uranium-fueled tritium production ALWR. For a modular gas-cooled multipurpose reactor, twice as many reactor modules would be needed both to meet tritium requirements and to burn plutonium. A plutonium Pit Disassembly/Conversion Facility would also be needed. Thus, the potential environmental impacts for a multipurpose gas-cooled reactor are expected to be substantially greater than a uranium-fueled tritium production gas-cooled reactor. The PEIS evaluates alternative tritium supply technologies against a baseline tritium requirement (i.e., a specific quantity of tritium, the exact amount of which is classified). Understanding the concept of the baseline tritium requirement is crucial to understanding the alternatives and the analysis in the PEIS. The baseline tritium requirement is the amount necessary to support the 1994 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, which is approved by the President as discussed in section 1.1. In this PEIS, the baseline tritium requirement is approximately 3/8ths the tritium requirement that was analyzed in the New Production Reactor Draft EIS published in April 1991. This is the tritium requirement "baseline" which the tritium supply technologies must support, and against which they are assessed. This baseline tritium requirement is made up of two specific components: (1) a steady-state tritium requirement to make up for tritium lost through natural decay; and (2) a surge tritium requirement to replace any tritium which might be used in the event the Nation ever dipped into, or lost, its tritium reserve. The sizing of the surge capacity is based on the requirement set forth in the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan to reconstitute the entire reserve in a 5-year period. The steady-state component accounts for approximately 50 percent of the baseline tritium requirement, while the surge accounts for the remaining 50 percent. Tritium supply technologies being evaluated must be able to support the steady-state tritium requirement (a specific quantity of tritium every year), and make up for any lost tritiumreserves. Under No Action, DOE would not establish a new tritium supply capability. The current inventory of tritium would decay and DOE would not meet stockpile requirements of tritium. This alternative would be contrary to DOE's mission as specified by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Alternatives for new tritium supply and recycling facilities consist of four different tritium supply technologies and five locations as shown in figure S-2. Figure (Page S-4) Figure S-2.-Tritium Supply and Recycling Alternatives. The Tritium Supply and Recycling Proposal will proceed in three phases. The first phase involves preparing information to support programmatic decisions on siting and technology. This includes preparing this PEIS and the associated Record of Decision (ROD). The ROD may include the following programmatic decisions: Whether to build new tritium supply and new or upgraded tritium recycling facilities; Where to locate new tritium supply and recycling facilities; and Which technologies to employ for tritium supply. Time Frame of Proposed Action: 1999 to 2009-Construction. 2010-Initial Operation. 2010 to 2050-Full Operation. During the second phase, DOE would develop detailed designs and meet project-specific National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements which would focus on where on a particular site the facility would be placed and construction and operation impacts. The third phase would involve constructing, testing, and certifying the selected tritium supply and recycling facilities, leading to full operation. Present plans are to have the tritium supply facilities fully operational by the year 2010 with new tritium available for use approximately 1year later. This PEIS also includes an analysis of providing tritium at an earlier date (approximately 2005) to support a higher stockpile level. Following publication of the ROD, DOE will develop a schedule as part of the plan to implement the ROD decision. The schedule will be subject to change and include reassessments required by congressional authorizations and appropriations. Because of the many uncertainties associated with this proposal, assumptions were made regarding the time periods used in the PEIS analyses. For example, the PEIS assumes an environmental baseline period for construction between 1999 and 2009, and an operational period beginning in 2010 and extending for 40 years. Project-level NEPA documents will identify in detail the specific construction and operational periods for each project implemented. AGENCY PERFERRED ALTERNATIVE The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Regulations require an agency to identify its preferred alternative(s) in the Final Environmental Impact Statement (40 CFR 1502.14(e)). The preferred alternative is the alternative which the agency believes would fulfill its statutory mission, giving consideration to environmental, economic, technical, and other factors. Consequently, to identify a preferred alternative, the Department has developed information on potential environmental impacts, costs, technical risks, and schedule risks for the alternatives under consideration. This PEIS provides information the environmental impacts. Cost, schedule, and technical analyses have also been prepared, and are summarized in the Tritium Supply and Recycling Technical Reference Report which is available in the appropriate DOE Reading Rooms for public review. Based upon the analysis presented in the documents identified above, the Department's preferred alternative is a acquisition strategy that assures tritium production for the nuclear weapons stockpile rapidly, cost effectively, and safely. The preferred strategy is to begin work on the two most promising production alternatives: (1) purchase an existing commercial light water reactor or irradiation services with an option to purchase the reactor for conversion to a defense facility; (2) design, build, and test critical components of an accelerator system for tritium production. Within a three year period, the Department would select one of the alternatives to serve as the primary source of tritium. The other alternative, if feasible, would be developed as a back-up tritiumsource. Savannah River Site has been designated as the preferred site for an accelerator, should one be built. The preferred alternative for tritium recycling and extraction activities is to remain at the Savannah River Site with appropriate consolidation and upgrading of current facilities, and construction of a new extraction facility. PURPOSE OF AND NEED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S ACTION Since nuclear weapons came into existence in 1945, a nuclear deterrent has been a cornerstone of the Nation's defense policy and national security. The President reiterated this principle in his July 3, 1993, radio address to the Nation. Tritium was used in the design process to enhance the yield of nuclear weapons and allows for the production of smaller or more powerful warheads to satisfy the needs of modern delivery systems. As a result, the United States strategic nuclear systems are based on designs that use tritium and, consequently, require a reliable tritium supply source. Tritium has a relatively short radioactive half-life of 12.3 years. Because of this relatively rapid radioactive decay, tritium must be replenished periodically in nuclear weapons to ensure that they will function as designed. Over the past 40 years, DOE has built and operated 14 reactors to produce nuclear materials for weapons purposes, including tritium. Today, none of these reactors are operational, and no tritium has been produced since 1988. Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, DOE is responsible for developing and maintaining the capability to produce tritium and other nuclear materials, which are required for the defense of the United States. The primary use of tritium is for maintaining the Nation's stockpile of nuclear weapons as directed by the President in the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Plan (section 1.4.1). The Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan is normally forwarded annually from the Secretaries of the Department of Defense (DOD) and DOE via the National Security Council to the President for approval. The Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan reflects the size and composition of the stockpile needed to defend the United States and provides an assessment of the DOE's ability to support the proposed stockpile. Many factors are considered in the development of the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, including the status of the currently approved stockpile, arms control negotiations and treaties, Congressional constraints, and the status of the nuclear material production and fabrication facilities. Revisions of the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan could be issued when any of the factors indicate the need to change requirements established in the annual document. The most current Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, which was approved by President Clinton on March 7, 1994, authorizes weapons production and retirement through fiscal year 1999. The analysis in this PEIS is based on the requirements of the 1994 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan which is based on START II stockpile levels (approximately 3,500 accountable weapons). The 1994 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan represents the latest official guidance for tritium requirements. A Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan for 1995 has not yet been issued. Appendix CA, which is classified, contains quantitative projections for tritium requirements based on the 1994 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, and details of the transportation analysis. Even with a reduced nuclear weapons stockpile and no identified requirements for new nuclear weapons production in the foreseeable future, an assured long-term tritium supply and recycling capability will be required. Presently, no source of new tritium is avail- able. The effectiveness of the United States nuclear deterrent capability depends not only on the Nation's current stockpile of nuclear weapons or those it can produce, but also on its ability to reliably and safely provide the tritium needed to support these weapons. Until a new tritium supply source is operational, DOE will continue to support tritium requirements by recycling tritium from weapons retired from the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. However, because tritium decays relatively quickly, recycling can only meet the tritium demands for a limited time. Current projections, derived from classified projec- tions of future stockpile scenarios, indicate that recycled tritium will adequately support the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile until approximately 2011. After that time, without a new tritium supply source, it would be necessary to utilize the strategic reserve of tritium in order to maintain the readiness of the nuclear weapons stockpile. The strategic reserve of tritium contains a quantity of tritium maintained for emergencies and contingencies. In such a scenario, once the strategic tritium reserve was depleted, the nuclear deterrent capability would degrade because the weapons in the stockpile would not be capable of functioning as designed. Eventually, the nuclear deterrent would be lost. The proposed tritium supply and recycling facilities would provide the capability to produce tritium safely and reliably in order to meet the Nation's defense requirements well into the 21stcentury while also complying with environment, safety, and health (ES&H) standards. Tritium, with a 12.3-year half-life, decays at the rate of approximately 5 percent per year and is necessary for all nuclear weapons that remain in the stockpile. DOE has analyzed the activities that must take place in order to bring a new tritium supply source into operation. The analysis indicates that it could take approximately 15 years to research, develop, design, construct, and test a new tritium supply source before new tritium production can begin. Thus, in order to have reasonable confidence that the Nation will be able to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent, prudent management dictates that DOE proceed with the proposed action now. Changes from the Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement The 60-day public comment period for the Draft PEIS began on March 17, 1995, and ended on May 15, 1995. However, comments were accepted as late as June 23, 1995. During the comment period, public hearings were held in Las Vegas, NV; Washington, DC; Pocatello, ID; Oak Ridge, TN; North Augusta, SC; and Amarillo,TX. Two hearings were held at each location. In addition, the public was encouraged to provide comments via mail, fax, electronic bulletin board (Internet), and telephone (toll-free 800-number). During public review of the Draft PEIS a majority of the comments regarded concerns that alternatives and/or candidate sites were not given the correct amount of consideration on factors including cost and technical feasibility. Although these concerns made up the majority of the comments, many others involved the resources analyzed, NEPA and regula- tory issues, and DOE and Federal policies as they related to the PEIS. The major issues identified by commentors included the following: The electrical requirements of the various alternatives, particularly the APT, and the potential for the ALWR and MHTGR to produce electricity; The impacts of the alternatives on groundwater, including the potential for aquifer depletion and contamination and the consideration of the use of treated wastewater for cooling; The socioeconomic impacts, both positive and negative, of locating or failing to locate a facility at one of the candidate sites; The generation, storage, and disposal of radioactive and hazardous wastes (including spent nuclear fuel) and the associated risks; The impacts of the alternatives on human health (both from radiation and hazardous chemicals) and how these risks were determined and evaluated; The relationship of this PEIS to other DOE documents and programs, particularly the Waste Management PEIS and the Fissile Materials Disposition Program, and the need to make decisions based on all associated programs and activities concurrently; The need for decisions to be based on many different factors, including environmental, cost, and safety concerns; The failure of DOE to consider a no tritium or zero stockpile alternative, and the negative national and international implications of building a new tritium supply facility; and The need for DOE to consider a commercial reactor alternative in greater detail. Additionally, as a result of public comments, DOE published on August 25, 1995 a Notice in the Federal Register (60 FR 44327) to include the purchase of irradiation services from a commercial reactor as a reasonable alternative. The Draft PEIS considered this an unreasonable alternative because of the long-standing policy of the United States that civilian nuclear facilities should not be utilized for military purpose and nonproliferation concerns. Nonetheless, the Draft PEIS included an evaluation of the environmental impacts of irradiation services using an existing commercial reactor to make tritium. Because of public comments on the Notice, public review of the Draft PEIS, and further consideration of nonproliferation issues, purchase of irradiation services is evaluated in the PEIS as a reasonable alternative. During the extended comment period, there were two major issues of concern raised: License and regulatory implications; and Non-proliferation concerns. Revisions in the Final PEIS include additional discussion and analysis in the following areas: severe accidents and design-basis accidents for all tritium supply technologies; site-specific environmental impacts of a dedicated power plant for the Accelerator Production of Tritium (APT); revisions to water resources sections; site-specific analysis of the multipurpose reactor that could produce tritium, burn plutonium as fuel, and produce electricity; and the commercial reactor alternative, specifically the purchase of an existing reactor and the purchase of irradiation services for DOE target rods to produce tritium. Each of these areas will be discussed in more detail below. Analyses of an ALWR design-basis accident was reevaluated as a result of public comments questioning the apparent severity and frequency of the accident consequences shown in the Draft PEIS. Additional analyses were performed to accurately estimate the impacts from a more reasonable design-basis accident and these results have been included in the Final PEIS. The analyses of impacts of severe reactor accidents was also revised. The Draft PEIS presented the impacts of a single severe accident for each of the reactor technologies. Since accident consequences vary greatly depending on the selected accident frequency value, a spectrum of severe accidents with a range of frequencies was used to perform a more representative analysis for each technology. The new analyses reflect the probable effects of a set of accidents for each reactor rather than the single accident scenario. Public comments also suggested that a disparity existed between the reactor and APT accident analyses, thereby creating a bias in favor of the APT. The Final PEIS now includes an APT severe accident with loss of confinement. The new accident analysis has a more severe initiating event, a lower frequency, and a higher consequence than the analysis presented in the Draft PEIS. Additionally, the Final PEIS has been modified to include a qualitative discussion of impacts to involved workers (workers assigned to the facility and located in close proximity to the facility as a result of the proposed action) and quantitative impacts to noninvolved workers (workers collocated at the site independent of the proposed action). For involved workers, impacts were addressed qualitatively, explaining the significant risk for exposure and fatality and that mitigative features would be provided in the design and operation to minimize worker impacts from accidents. For the noninvolved worker, the impacts were represented by the exposure of a hypothetical worker at several prescribed distances from the accident (but within the site boundary). These impacts were described in terms of dose (rems), increases in the likelihood of cancer fatalities, and risk of cancer for the maximally exposed noninvolved worker. Another significant change in the document is a more detailed description of potential impacts of a dedicated power plant for the APT. The section has been revised to include site-specific impacts for the gas-fired power plant. Based on public comments received at the hearings, two revisions were incorporated in the water resources sections for NTS and Pantex. For NTS, the Final PEIS incorporates more accurate recharge rates and information regarding the potential project use of the NTS aquifer to present a more accurate impact on groundwater resources. For Pantex, the Final PEIS includes the use of reclaimed sanitary wastewater sources, the Hollywood Road Wastewater Treatment Plant and the Pantex Plant Wastewater Treatment Plant for tritium supply cooling water. A more detailed analysis of the multipurpose reactor has been included in the Final PEIS. Since the multipurpose reactor would use plutonium fuel, an analysis of the construction impacts of a Pit Disassembly/Conversion/Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility to support a multipurpose ALWR has been incorporated in the site-specific analysis for each of the five candidate sites. Impacts of only the Pit Disassembly/Conversion part of the facility are included for the multipurpose MHTGR since this technology already includes a fuel fabrication component. For the operation of a multipurpose reactor, additional detail regarding the impacts on atmospheric emissions, liquid emissions, water requirements, socioeconomics, human health (for both normal operations and accidents), waste management, and intersite transportation has been included in the site-specific analysis. Analysis and a discussion of potential impacts have been expanded and included in this PEIS on the alternative of DOE purchasing an existing operating commercial reactor or an incomplete reactor and converting it to production of tritium for defense purposes. Also included in the Final PEIS is an analysis of the alternative of DOE purchasing irradiation services from one or more commercial light water reactors for the production of tritium using DOE targets. Alternatives The alternatives considered for tritium supply and recycling consist of four different supply technologies and five locations (figure S-2). The four technologies to provide a new supply of tritium are: Heavy Water Reactor (HWR), Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (MHTGR), Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR), and Accelerator Production of Tritium (APT). The five candidate sites evaluated for such a facility are INEL, Nevada Test Site (NTS), Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), Pantex Plant, and Savannah River Site (SRS). No Action To satisfy NEPA requirements, No Action is presented for comparison with the action alternatives. Under No Action, DOE would not establish a new tritium supply capability, the current inventory of tritium would decay, and DOE would not meet stockpile requirements. The current DOE missions at each candidate site are assumed to continue under No Action. Tritium Supply and Recycling The tritium supply technologies and site alternatives are described below. For each alternative except for alternatives at SRS, a new tritium recycling facility could either be collocated with the new tritium supply facilities or DOE could use the existing recycling facilities at SRS after upgrade. For the alternatives at SRS, DOE would utilize existing recycling facilities at SRS that would be upgraded to support the tritium mission. Technologies Heavy Water Reactor. The HWR would be a low pressure, low temperature reactor whose sole purpose would be to produce tritium. The HWR would use heavy water as the reactor coolant and moderator. Because of the low temperature of the exit coolant, a power conversion system designed to produce electrical power as an option would not be feasible. The conceptual design of the HWR complex includes a fuel and target fabrication facility, a tritium target processing facility, an interim spent fuel storage building, a general services building, and a security infrastructure. The HWR complex would cover approximately 260 acres. Construction of the HWR would take somewhat less than 8 years and require approximately 2,320workers during the peak construction period. Operation of the HWR would require approximately 930 workers. Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor. The MHTGR would be a high temperature, moderate pressure reactor whose primary purpose would be to produce tritium. Three 350 MWt reactors would be required to produce the goal quantities of tritium. The MHTGR would use helium gas as a core coolant and graphite as a moderator. Because of the high temperature of the exit coolant, a power conversion facility designed to produce electricity is an integral part of the design and is included in the analysis. The design of the MHTGR complex, in addition to three reactors, would include a fuel and target fabrication facility, a tritium target processing facility, helium storage buildings, waste treatment facilities, spent fuel storage facility, a general services building, a security infrastructure, and a power conversion facility consisting of three turbine-generators and associated electrical control equipment. The MHTGR complex would cover approximately 360acres. Construction of the MHTGR would take about 9 years and require approximately 2,210workers during the peak construction period. Operation of the MHTGR would require approximately 910 workers. A modular gas-cooled reactor like the MGTGR would also be capable of performing the "triple play" missions of producing tritium, burning plutonium, and generating electricity. To burn plutonium in a gas-cooled reactor, a plutonium Pit Disassembly/Con- version Facility would be needed. Additionally, because tritium production decreases significantly in a plutonium-fueled gas-cooled reactor, twice as many reactor modules would be necessary in order to produce the steady-state tritium requirements. This doubling of reactor modules would be the major contributor to potential environmental impacts for this scenario. The PEIS contains an assessment of these potential environmental impacts. Range of Selected Construction Requirements for Tritium Supply Technologies: Electrical Energy Demand: 40,000 to 120,000 MWh Land Use: 173 to 360 acres Total Number of Construction Workers: 2,200 to 3,500 Water Consumption: 41,700,000 to 200,000,000 gallons (over a 5 to 9 year period) Steel Consumption: 45,000 to 68,000 tons Advanced Light Water Reactor. The ALWR would be a high temperature, high pressure reactor whose primary purpose would be to produce tritium. There are two options for the ALWR technology: a Large ALWR (1,300MWe) and a Small ALWR (600MWe). The large and small options include four candidates: a large or small pressurized water reactor or a large or small boiling water reactor. All ALWR options would use light (regular) water as the reactor coolant and moderator. Like the MHTGR, a power conversion facility is an integral part of the design for the ALWR because of the high temperature of the exit coolant. The design of the ALWR complex would include an interim spent fuel storage building, a waste treatment facility, a tritium target processing facility, warehouses, a power conversion facility, and security infrastructure. Unlike the other technologies, the ALWR would not have a fuel fabrication facility since fuel rods would be obtained from offsite sources. The ALWR complex would cover approximately 350 acres. Construction of the ALWR would take about 6 years and require approximately 3,500workers for the Large ALWR and 2,200workers for the Small ALWR during the peak construction period. Operation of the Large ALWR would require approximately 830 workers and the Small ALWR would require approximately 500workers. An ALWR would also be capable of performing the "triple play" missions of producing tritium, burning plutonium, and generating electricity. The multipurpose ALWR would operate essentially the same as a uranium-fueled tritium production ALWR. Therefore, the environmental impacts from operation of a multipurpose ALWR would be expected to be unchanged from the tritium production ALWR. To burn plutonium in an ALWR, a plutonium Pit Disassembly/Conversion/Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility would be needed to provide the mixed-oxide fuel rods for the ALWR, and would be the major contributor to potential environmental impacts for this scenario. This PEIS contains an assessment of these potential environmental impacts. Accelerator Production of Tritium. The APT would be a linear accelerator whose purpose would be to produce tritium. The APT accelerates a proton beam in a long tunnel toward one of two target/blanket assemblies located in separate target stations. There are two target/blanket concepts being considered in the conceptual design of the APT: the spallation-induced lithium conversion target and the helium-3 target. The accelerator, 3,940 feet in length, would be housed in a concrete tunnel buried 40 to 50feet underground. The APT facility would require a peak electrical load of approximately 550 MWe to produce the 3/8 goal tritium quantity, and 355 MWe to produce the steady-state tritium requirement. The conceptual design of the APT complex would include: a target building that would house the target chambers located in a subterranean structure at the same level as the accelerator; a tritium processing facility to extract tritium from the targets; a klystron remanufacturing and maintenance facility; waste treatment buildings to treat all generated wastes; security infrastructures and various administration, operation, and maintenance facilities. The APT complex would cover approximately 173 acres. Construction of the APT would take about 5 years and require approximately 2,760 workers during the peak construction period. Operation of the APT would require approximately 624 workers. A phased construction approach to the APT is also an option. Commercial Light Water Reactor. The purchase by DOE of an existing operating or partially completed commercial power reactor is an alternative to meet the stockpile tritium requirement. Production of tritium using irradiation services contracted from commercial power reactor(s) (with the option to purchase the reactor) is also an alternative. Commer- cial light water reactors use both pressurized water and boiling water technologies. Of the two types, pressurized water reactors are more readily adaptable to the requirements of tritium production by DOE tritium target rod irradiation because they utilize burnable poison rods which could be replaced by tritium target rods. Commercial pressurized water reactors are high-temperature, high-pressure reactors that use ordinary light water as the coolant and moderator and are capable of generating large amounts of electricity through a steam turbine generator. The range of electrical production for these plants is approximately 390 million to 6,900 million kWh per year using an assumed annual capacity factor of 62percent. A typical commercial light water reactor facility includes the reactor building, spent fuel storage facilities, cooling towers, a switchyard for the transmission of generated electricity, maintenance buildings, administrative buildings, and security facilities. Acreage for existing operating commercial light water reactor facilities ranges from a low of 84 to a high of 30,000. The designs of typical commercial reactors incorporate numerous safety features including: a reactor containment building to limit any release of radioactivity; an emergency core cooling system for heat removal in the event of a loss of coolant or a loss of pumping; an emergency shutdown system with safety rods independent of the reactor control rods; and a backup system to remove heat from the reactor if the primary coolant fails to circulate. The representative drawing for the ALWR complex (figure ES-7) would be similar to a commercial light water reactor complex except that tritium target fabrication and processing facilities would not be typical facilities. If a partially completed reactor were purchased, these facilities could potentially be constructed along with the final construction of thereactor. A commercial reactor would also be capable of performing the "triple play" missions of producing tritium, burning plutonium, and generating electricity. The multipurpose commercial reactor would operate essentially the same as a uranium-fueled tritium production ALWR. Therefore, the environmental impacts from operation of a multipurpose commercial reactor would be expected to be unchanged from the tritium production ALWR. To burn plutonium in a commercial reactor, a plutonium Pit Disassembly/Conversion/Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility would be needed to provide the mixed-oxide fuel rods for the commercial reactor, and would be the major contributor to potential environmental impacts for this scenario. The PEIS contains a generic assessment of these potential envi- ronmental impacts. SITES Commercial Light Water Reactor. The commercial light water reactor alternative does not include a specific site for analysis in the PEIS. Therefore, any one of the existing operating commercial nuclear reactors or partially completed reactors is a potential candidate site for the tritium supply mission. Currently, 109 commercial nuclear power plants are located at 71 sites in 32 of the contiguous states. Of these, 53 sites are located east of the Mississippi River. No commercial nuclear power plants are located in Alaska or Hawaii. Approximately one-half of these 71 sites contain two or three nuclear units per site. Typically, commercial nuclear power plant sites and the surrounding area are flat-to-rolling countryside in wooded or agricultural areas. More than 50 percent of the sites have 50-mile population densities of less than 200 persons per square mile and over 80 percent have 50-mile densities of less than 500 persons per square mile. Site areas range from 84 to 30,000 acres. Twenty-eight site areas range from 500 to 1,000 acres and an additional 12 sites are in the 1,000 to 2,000acre range. Thus, almost 60 percent of the plant sites encompass 500 to 2,000 acres. The larger land-use areas are associated with plant cooling systems that include reservoirs, artificial lakes, and buffer areas. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. INEL was established in 1949 and currently occupies approximately 570,000 acres near Idaho Falls, ID. INEL performs research and development activities on reactor performance; conducts materials testing and environmental monitoring activities; performs research and development activities for the processing of waste; conducts breeder reactor research; and is a naval reactor training site. There are currently no defense program missions at INEL. Nevada Test Site. NTS was established in 1950 and currently occupies approximately 864,000 acres located 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, NV. The site has conducted underground testing of nuclear weapons and evaluations of the effects of nuclear weapons on military communications systems, electronics, satellites, sensors, and other materials. In October 1992, underground nuclear testing was halted, yet the site maintains the capability and infrastructure necessary to resume testing if authorized by the President. There are currently two defense program missions at NTS: maintain underground nuclear testing program capabilities and maintain nuclear emergency search team program capabilities. Range of Selected Operation Requirements for Tritium Supply Technologies: Electrical Energy Demand: 260,000 to 3,740,000MWh per year Land Use: 173 to 360 acres Total Number of Operation Workers: 500 to 930 Water Consumption: 0.03 to 16 billion gallons per year Spent Nuclear Fuel Generation: 0 to 80yd3 per year Oak Ridge Reservation. ORR was established in 1942 as part of the World War II Manhattan Project and is located on approximately 35,000 acres within the city boundaries of Oak Ridge, TN. It includes three major facilities: Oak Ridge National Laboratory; Y-12 Plant (Y-12); and the K-25 Site (the former Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant). Y-12 is the primary location of defense program missions. The Y-12 assignment includes the dismantling of nuclear weapons components returned from the Nation's arsenal, maintaining nuclear production capability and stockpile support, storing special nuclear materials, and providing special manufacturing support to DOE programs. In addition to the four defense program missions identified above, ORR also has the mission to fabricate uranium and lithium components and parts for nuclear weapons. Pantex Plant. Pantex was established in 1951 and currently occupies approximately 10,000 acres near Amarillo, TX. The current defense program missions at Pantex are to assemble and disassemble nuclear weapons; perform weapons repair, modification, and disposal; conduct stockpile evaluation and testing; and provide interim storage for plutonium. Pantex is the only DOE facility that can execute the final assembly of a nuclear weapon for the Department of Defense (DOD) stockpile. Savannah River Site. SRS was established in 1950 as a nuclear materials production site and occupies approximately 198,000 acres south of Aiken, SC. The major nuclear facilities at SRS have included fuel and target fabrication facilities; nuclear material production reactors; chemical separation plants used for recovery of plutonium and uranium isotopes; a uranium fuel processing area; and the Savannah River Technology Center that provides process support. The current defense program mission at SRS is to process tritium and conduct tritium recycling and reservoir filling in support of stockpile requirements. SRS also has the mission to process backlog targets and spent nuclear fuel. Alternatives Considered But Eliminated From Detailed Study By law, DOE is required to support the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. In order to do this, DOE must maintain a nuclear weapons production, maintenance, and surveillance capacity consistent with the President's Stockpile Plan. For the proposed action, the following alternatives were considered but eliminated from detailed study for the reasons stated below. Purchase Tritium From Foreign Sources. DOE has considered the purchase of tritium from other sources, including foreign nations. Conceptually, the purchase of tritium from foreign governments could provide a fraction of the tritium requirement. However, while there is no national policy against purchase of defense materials from foreign sources, DOE has determined that the uncertainties associated with obtaining tritium from foreign sources render this alternative unreasonable for an assured long-term supply. Redesign of Weapons to Require Less or No Tritium. The nuclear warheads in the enduring stockpile were designed and built in an era when the tritium supply was assured, when underground nuclear testing was being conducted, and when military needs required that the warheads be optimized in terms of weight and volume. Replacing these warheads with new ones that would use little or no tritium for the sole reason of reducing overall tritium demand would be infeasible and unreasonable. Without underground nuclear testing to verify their safety and reliability, new warhead designs cannot deviate very far from current designs which require the use of tritium. Even with underground testing to facilitate new designs and a fully operational production complex, it would still take many years to build enough warheads to replace the enduring stockpile. Therefore, replacing the enduring stockpile of warheads with new designs would most likely take longer and could cost more than constructing and operating a new tritium supply facility. Because neither the President nor the Congress has approved that the government embark on a costly and expansive design, testing, and construction program solely to eliminate tritium requirements, weapons redesign to use less or no tritium is not a reasonable short or long-term alternative. Use of Existing Department of Energy Reactors or Accelerators. DOE (and its predecessor agencies) has designed, constructed, and operated many nuclear reactors over the past 50 years. The majority of these reactors were designed to assist in the develment of nuclear research and safety standards development. DOE has also constructed nuclear reactors to produce the materials required to support the production and maintenance of nuclear weapons and has constructed nuclear reactors in support of the Naval Propulsion Program. Among the first experimental reactors were the water boiler at Los Alamos National Laboratory and CP-3 at Argonne National Laboratory-West, which were completed in 1944. Since then, numerous experimental and research reactors were constructed for a variety of purposes, including material tests, new reactor concepts, and safety experiments. Only four DOE research reactors are currently operational: the High Flux Isotope Reactor at Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR); the High Flux Beam Reactor at Brookhaven National Laboratory; and the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II and the Advanced Test Reactor at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL). In addition, there are some low power/critical facilities supporting medical research (at Brookhaven) and supporting reactor core configuration research (at Argonne National Laboratory-West at INEL). None of these facilities is large enough to produce the amount of tritium required to support the projected stockpile requirements. All are fully or partially committed to existing programs and were con- structed in the early 1960s, rendering their design life reliability unsuitable for the time frame required for a new, assured, long-term tritium supply facility. Of the existing DOE reactors that are currently not being operated, only one has the potential for producing any significant quantities of tritium: the Fast Flux Test Facility at the Hanford Site. This facility was designed and constructed to perform materials research for the national liquid-metal breeder reactor program. This small (440-megawatt thermal (MWt)) experimental reactor, based on liquid-metal reactor technology, could, after substantial core and cooling system modifications, as well as target technology development, have the potential to supply a significant percentage of the steady state tritium requirement. The Fast Flux Test Facility, however, was designed in the late 1970s and began operation in 1980. The Fast Flux Test Facility is currently defueled. A technical study to extend the life of the Fast Flux Test Facility 10 years past its design 20-year lifetime has been completed. While technically possible to extend the lifetime, in 2010 the facility would be at the end of even the extended life. Relying on the ability to further modify and operate the Fast Flux Test Facility well into the middle of the next century is not a reasonable alternative. DOE also constructed and operated more than a dozen nuclear reactors for production of nuclear materials at SRS and the Hanford Site, starting with the early part of the Manhattan Project during World War II. None of these reactors is currently operational. Of those reactors specifically designed to produce nuclear materials for the nuclear weapons program, the K-Reactor at SRS is the only remaining reactor which could be capable of returning to operation. It is presently in a "cold stand-by state" and has not been operated since 1988. The reactor was shut down for major environmental, safety, and health upgrades, to comply with today's stringent standards. DOE discontinued the K-Reactor Restart Program when the reduced need for tritium to support a smaller stockpile delayed the need for tritium. In this context, reliance upon the ability to upgrade and operate well into the middle of the next century a first generation reactor designed in the 1940s is not a reasonable alternative for new, long-term, assured tritium supply. DOE has been a world leader in the design and construction of particle accelerators, and currently operates six national facilities. Of the existing research accelerators, none is capable of producing significant quantities of tritium. The existing DOE research accelerators are all of the pulsed design and are only capable of producing low power accelerator beams in the 800 kilowatt (kW) range. A production accelerator facility, utilizing continuous wave operation, would be required to deliver a high power proton beam of 100 megawatt (MW) for tritium production. None of the existing research accelerators could be reasonably upgraded to meet the long-term, assured tritium requirements. Alternative Sites. Section 3.3.1 describes the process that was carried out to identify the range of reasonable site alternatives for the tritium supply and recycling facilities that are considered in this PEIS. The process of determining these reasonable tritium supply alternative sites has been evolutionary, starting with the engineering studies and criteria developed by the New Production Reactor program, then utilizing additional criteria and considerations from the Reconfiguration Program, information related to changing missions at DOE sites, and input from public scoping. During the preparation of this PEIS, the Department has continued to assess other alternative sites. In fact, once the APT was added as a potential tritium supply technology, an assessment was conducted to determine if the Los Alamos National Laboratory, which operates a linear accelerator and is the home of significant accelerator expertise, would be a reasonable site for a tritium producing accelerator. The APT conceptual designs for tritium supply have established that evaporative cooling towers would be used to dissipate the heat generated in the tritium target assemblies and in the accelerator facility. These APT cooling water requirements are significantly greater than the current regulated allotment of water for Los Alamos National Laboratory and increasing the allotment to support the APT water requirement would be impractical and infeasible, and in any event beyond DOE's control. It may be possible that an APT could use nonevaporative cooling towers which would greatly reduce the water requirements. However, there is sufficient technical uncertainty regarding the feasibility and practicality of using nonevaporative cooling towers for a continuous wave APT to render this option unacceptable as a source for the Nation's only supply of tritium. The other five sites being analyzed in this PEIS could reasonably support the water requirements of the APT using evaporative cooling towers and, thus, would not incur the technical uncertainty and risk of Los Alamos National Laboratory. Thus, DOE has concluded that Los Alamos National Laboratory is not a reasonable site for an accelerator to produce tritium (LADOE1994a:1). REDUCED TRITIUM REQUIREMENTS The need for new tritium supply is based on the 1994 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan, which projects a need for new tritium by approximately 2011 based on a START II level stockpile size of approximately 3,500 accountable weapons. A smaller than START II stockpile size would extend the need date for new tritium beyond approximately 2011. If the need for new tritium were significantly later than 2011, the Department would not have a proposal for new tritium supply, and would not be preparing a PEIS for Tritium Supply and Recycling. Environmental impacts In accordance with CEQ regulations, the environmental consequences discussions provide the analytical detail for comparisons of environmental impacts associated with the various tritium supply technologies and recycling facilities. Discussions are provided for each DOE site and each environmental resource and relevant issues that could be affected. For comparison purposes, environmental concentrations of emissions and other potential environmental effects are presented with appropriate regulatory standards or guidelines. However, the compliance with regulatory standards is not necessarily an indication of the significance or severity of the environmental impact for NEPA purposes. The purpose of the analysis of environmental consequences is to identify the potential for environmental impacts. The environmental assessment methods used and the factors considered in assessing environmental impacts are discussed in section 4.1, environ- mental resource methodologies, and in the appropriate appendixes. The potential for impacts to a given resource or relevant issue is described in the introduction to each section within the site discussions (sections 4.2 through 4.10). A brief narrative summary of the impacts by site and resource or relevant issues follows. For the resource or issue area, the summary presents the range of impacts (high and low) and associated technology collocated with tritium recycling. For a more detailed summary comparison of impacts for the tritium supply and recycling alternatives, the reader is referred to section 3.6 and appendix I. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Land Resources. Construction and operation of a tritium supply would disturb between 173acres(APT) and 360acres(MHTGR). Collocation of tritium recycling would require an additional 202acres during construction and 196 acres during operation. Siting any of the tritium supply technologies alone or collocated with recycling at INEL would be consistent with site development plans. No visual impacts are expected. Site Infrastructure. New site infrastructure (e.g., roads and transmission lines) would be required to support all technologies. The power requirements would exceed the current site electrical requirements of 93 MWe by 11 MWe (MHTGR) to 515 MWe(APT). Air Quality and Acoustics. Construction activities would result in exceedance of 24-hour PM10 and state TSP standards. Air pollutant concentrations would increase during operation but would be within standards. An increase in onsite noise would result from construction and operation of a tritium supply. Offsite noise impacts would be negligible. Water Resources. Surface waters would not be affected by construction or operation. Groundwater use would range from 10MGY(APT) to 35 MGY (Large ALWR) during construction. Operation water requirements would range from 44MGY(MHTGR) to 1,214 MGY (APT). Total groundwater use for all the reactor technologies except APT would be less than 1 percent of the INEL groundwater allotment. The APT total groundwater use for operation repre- sents approximately 11 percent of the INEL groundwater allotment. Geology and Soils. Construction and operation would neither affect nor be affected by geological conditions. The soil disturbed area would range from 375 (APT) and 562 acres (MHTGR). Soil erosion due to wind and stormwater runoff would be minor. Biotic Resources. During construction and operation, terrestrial resources would be affected by the disturbance of between 375 (APT) and 562acres (MHTGR) of habitat. Impacts from salt drift are possible with the APT. Wetlands and aquatic resources would not be affected. No Federal-listed, threatened, or endangered species would be affected, but several Federal candidate or state-listed species may be affected. Cultural and Paleontological Resources. Some NRHP-eligible prehistoric and historic resources may occur within the disturbed area. Native American resources may be affected by land disturbance and audio or visual intrusions. The HWR and ALWR would not be expected to affect paleontological resources. However, the MHTGR and APT may affect paleontological resources where excavations could extend down to 50 feet or deeper. Socioeconomics. Employment in the economic study area would increase by 7,200 (MHTGR) to 10,800persons (either ALWR) during peak construction. Employment during full operation would increase in the economic study area by 4,100 (APT) to 4,900 persons (HWR and MHTGR). Unemployment would decrease from 6.4 percent, the projected baseline, to 4.5 percent for all technologies during peak construction and 4.9 (APT) to 4.6 percent (HWR and MHTGR) during full operation. Per capita income would increase by an annual average of approximately 1 percent during peak construction and full operation for every technology except HWR, which would increase by 1 to 2 percent during peak construction and 2 percent during full operation. Population and housing demand within the region of influence would increase by between 2(APT) and 9percent(ALWR) during construction and approximately 2 percent for all technologies during operation. For every technology except ALWR, total revenues and expenditures for most region-of-influence (ROI) counties, cities, and school districts would increase by an annual average of between 2 and less than 1percent through 2005 and between 1 and 0 percent through 2010. For either ALWR, total revenues and expenditures within the region of influence would increase between 4 and less than 1 percent in the first 3 years of construction and decrease 1 to 2 percent annually through 2020. Total revenues and expenditures for all technologies would increase by annual averages of less than 1 percent through 2020. Traffic conditions on access roads to INEL are expected to degrade due to increased worker traffic and congestion, particularly on U.S. Route 20/26, the primary access route. Radiological and Hazardous Chemical Impacts During Normal Operation and Accidents. The dose to the maximally exposed member of the public from total site operation for 1 year would range from 0.11 (APT with helium-3 target) to 0.36 (ALWR) mrem. The associated risk of fatal cancer from 40 years of operation would range from 2.3x10-6 to 7.3x10-6,respectively. The annual 50-mile population dose from total site operation in 2030 would range from 23(APT with helium-3 target) to 73person-rem (LargeALWR) and could result in 0.45 to 1.5 fatal cancers over 40years of operation. The average annual dose to a site worker would range from 31 (MHTGR) to 49 mrem (Large ALWR) with the associated risk of fatal cancer from 40 years of operation ranging from 5.0x10-4 to 7.9x10-4, respectively. The annual dose to the total site workforce would range from 250 (MHTGR) to 392 person-rem (Large ALWR) and could result in 4 to 6.3 fatal cancers over 40 years of operation. All doses to the public and to site workers are within regulatory limits. Any exposures to site workers and the public resulting from emissions of hazardous chemicals are expected to be within regulatory limits and have negligible cancer risk. For low-to-moderate consequence/ high probability accidents, the consequences and risks associated with the APT are negligible. For the technology with the most severe consequences, the HWR, the increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary would be 8.1x10-6. Given the accident probability of 1.0x10-3 per year, the cancer risk would be 8.1x10-9 per year. For the population residing within 50 miles of the accident (150,000), the associated cancer risk would be 7.4x10-5 per year. If this accident occurred, this exposure would result in 0.074 cancer fatalities. The increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a worker located 1,000 meters from the release point would be 1.1x10-4. The cancer risk to the worker would be 1.1x10-7 per year. For high consequence/low probability accidents, the consequences to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary is small for the APT. The technology with the most severe consequences to the general population is the Small ALWR. For Small ALWR high consequence/low probability accidents, the increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary would be 2.3x10-3 with an associated cancer risk of 3.6x10-10 per year. For the population residing within 50 miles of the accident (150,000), the associated cancer risk would be 6.4x10-7 per year. If this accident occurred, this exposure would result in 4.1 cancer fatalities. The increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a worker located 1,000 meters from the release point would be 0.094. The cancer risk to the worker would be 1.5x10-8 per year. Waste Management. Spent nuclear fuel would be generated by the HWR, MHTGR, and ALWR, and require a new storage facility. The APT would not generate spent fuel. Liquid LLW would be generated by every technology except APT. Existing treatment facility may be adequate for all technologies except the Large ALWR. Solid LLW would be generated and require between 3(APT and Small ALWR) and 15 acres per year (HWR) of onsite LLW disposal area. The generation of liquid mixed LLW would be negligible for all technologies. Solid mixed LLW would increase by 3yd3 per year (MHTGR) to 122yd3 per year (HWR). The HWR increase may require new or expanded treatment and storage facilities. Hazardous waste generation would increase by approximately 4yd3 per year (APT) to 101yd3 per year (MHTGR). The use of existing hazardous waste management facilities is feasible. All technologies would generate liquid sanitary waste and require new treatment facilities. Solid sanitary waste generation would increase by 8,640yd3 per year (APT) to 15,000yd3 per year (HWR). Existing landfill design life would be reduced or require expansion. Other solid nonhazardous wastes would be recycled. Intersite Transport. For all technologies, the relative risk associated with transporting tritium is 29 percent lower than the existing case (No Action) because the distance travelled is shorter. The potential cancer fatalities per year for transporting tritiated heavy water is 3.57x10-5 (HWR) and 6.63x10-6 (APT) for both tritium supply alone and supply with recycling. There is no intersite transport of LLW for any technology. The risk of transporting new tritium for supply alone is about 2 percent greater than No Action (due to transporting new tritium to SRS). The annual risk from transporting highly-enriched uranium fuel feed material (HWR and MHTGR alternatives) from ORR to INEL is 5.1x10-4 fatalities. Nevada Test Site Land Resources. Construction and operation of a tritium supply would disturb between 173 (APT) and 360 acres (MHTGR). Collocation of tritium recycling would require an additional 202acres during construction and 196 acres during operations. Siting any of the tritium supply technologies alone or collocated with recycling at NTS would be consistent with site development plans. Some visual impacts are expected. Site Infrastructure. New site infrastructure (e.g., roads and transmission lines) would be required to support all technologies. The power requirements would exceed the current site electrical requirement of 28 MWe by 55 MWe (MHTGR) to 559 MWe(APT). Air Quality and Acoustics. Construction activities would result in exceedance of 24-hour PM10 and state TSP standards. Air pollutant concentrations would increase during operation but would be within standards. An increase in onsite noise would result from construction and operation of a tritium supply. Offsite noise impacts would be negligible. Water Resources. Surface waters would not be affected by construction or operation. Groundwater use would range from 10MGY (APT) to 35 MGY (Large ALWR) during construction. Operation water requirements would range from 44 MGY (MHTGR) to 1,214 MGY (APT). Total site groundwater withdrawals would not exceed the lowest estimated aquifer recharge rate. Geology and Soils. Construction and operation would neither affect nor be affected by geological conditions. The soil disturbed area would range from 375(APT) to 562acres(MHTGR). Soil erosion due to wind and stormwater runoff would be minor. Biotic Resources. During construction and operation, terrestrial resources would be affected by the disturbance of between 375(APT) and 562acres (MHTGR)of habitat. Impacts from salt drift are possible with the APT. Wetlands and aquatic resources would not be affected. One Federal-listed, threatened species, the desert tortoise, may be affected and several Federal candidate or state-listed species may also be affected. Cultural and Paleontological Resources. Some NRHP-eligible prehistoric and historic resources may occur within the disturbed area. Native American resources may be affected by land disturbance and audio or visual intrusions. Paleontological resources may also be affected. Socioeconomics. Employment in the economic study area would increase by 9,100 (MHTGR) to 13,700persons (either ALWR) during peak construction. Employment during full operation would increase in the economic study area by 4,600 (APT) to 5,500 persons (HWR and MHTGR). Unemployment would decrease from 5 percent, the projected baseline, to between 3.9 during peak construction and to between 4.3 (HWR) and 4.4 percent (APT) during full operation. Per capita income would increase by an annual average of approximately 1percent during peak construction and full operation for each technology. Population and housing demand within the ROI would increase by between 1 percent (HWR, MHTGR, and APT) and 2 percent (ALWR) during construction and by less than 1 percent for all technologies during operation. For each technology, total revenues and expenditures for all region of influence counties, cities, and school districts would increase by annual averages of between 4 and less than 1 percent through 2005, between 1 and 2 percent through 2010, and by less than 1 percent annually through 2020. Traffic conditions on access roads to NTS are expected to degrade due to increased worker traffic and congestion, particularly on Mercury Highway, the primary access route. Radiological and Hazardous Chemical Impacts During Normal Operation and Accidents. The dose to the maximally exposed member of the public from total site operation for 1 year would range from 0.13 (APT with helium-3 target) to 0.4 (ALWR) mrem. The associated risk of fatal cancer from 40 years of operation would range from 2.6x10-6 to 8.0x10-6,respectively. The annual 50-mile population dose from total site operation in 2030 could range from 0.08 (APT with helium-3 target) to 0.25(SmallALWR) person-rem and could result in 1.6x10-3 to 5.1x10-3 fatal cancers over 40 years of operation. The average annual dose to a site worker would range from 26 (MHTGR) to 140 (Large ALWR) mrem with the associated risk of fatal cancer from 40 years of operation ranging from 4.2x10-4 to 2.3x10- 3, respectively. The annual dose to the total site workforce would range from 33 (MHTGR) to 180 (Large ALWR) person-rem and could result in 0.53 to 2.8 fatal cancers over 40 years of operation. All doses to the public and to site workers are within regulatory limits. Any exposures to site workers and the public resulting from emissions of hazardous chemicals are expected to be within regulatory limits and have negligible cancer risk. For low-to-moderate consequence/high probability accidents associated with operation, the consequences and risks associated with the APT are negligible. For the technology with the most severe consequences, the HWR, the increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary would be 4.2x10-6. Given the accident probability of 1.0x10-3 per year, the cancer risk would be 4.2x10-9 per year. For the population residing within 50 miles of the accident (18,000), the associated cancer risk would be 1.2x10-6 per year. If this accident occurred, this exposure would result in 1.2x10-3 cancer fatalities. The increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a worker located 1,000 meters from the release point would be 2.8x10-5. The cancer risk to the worker would be 2.8x10-8 per year. For high consequence/low probability accidents associated with operation, the consequences to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary would be small for the APT. The technology with the most severe consequences to the general population is the Small ALWR. For Small ALWR high consequence/low probability accidents, the increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary would be 6.3x10-3 with an associated cancer risk of 9.8x10-10 per year. For the population residing within 50 miles of the accident (18,000), the associated cancer risk would be 6.1x10-8 per year. If this accident occurred, this exposure would result in 0.39 cancer fatalities. The increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a worker located 1,000 meters from the release point would be 0.087. The cancer risk to the worker would be 1.4x10-8 per year. Waste Management. Spent nuclear fuel would be generated by the HWR, MHTGR, and ALWR, and require a new storage facility. The APT would not generate spent fuel. Liquid LLW would be generated by every technology except APT and would require new or separate treatment facilities. Solid LLW would be generated and require between 2.5 (APT and Small ALWR) and 13.5 acres per year (HWR) of onsite LLW disposal area. Liquid mixed LLW would be generated by each technology and would require an organic mixed waste treatment capability. Solid mixed LLW would increase by 3(MHTGR) to 122yd3per year(HWR) and would require an organic mixed waste treatment capability. Hazardous waste generation would increase by 4(APT) to 101yd3peryear(MHTGR). Separate or expanded hazardous waste management facilities may be required for all technologies except the APT. All technologies would generate liquid sanitary waste and require new or separate treatment facilities. Solid sanitary waste generation would increase by 8,640(APT) to 15,000yd3 per year (HWR). Existing landfill design life would be reduced or require expansion. Other solid nonhazardous wastes would be recycled. Intersite Transport. For all technologies, the relative risk associated with transporting tritium is 30 percent lower than the existing case (No Action) because the distance travelled is shorter. The potential cancer fatalities per year from transporting tritiated heavy water is 3.57x10-5 (HWR) and 6.63x10-6 (APT). There is no intersite transport of LLW for any technology. The risk of transporting new tritium for supply alone is about 2 percent greater than No Action (due to transporting new tritium to SRS). The annual risk from transporting highly-enriched uranium fuel feed material (HWR and MHTGR alter- natives) from ORR to NTS is 5.1x10-4 fatalities. Oak Ridge Reservation Land Resources. Construction and operation of a tritium supply technology would disturb between 173(APT) and 360acres(MHTGR). Collocation of tritium recycling would require an additional 202 acres during construction and 196 acres during operation. Siting any of the tritium supply technologies alone or collocated with recycling at ORR would disturb some land designated as National Environmental Research Park. Some visual impacts areexpected. Site Infrastructure. No new site infrastructure (e.g., roads and transmission lines) would be required to support any technologies. The power requirements would be less than the current site electrical requirement of 1,411 MWe by 1,252 MWe (MHTGR) to 738MWe (APT). Air Quality and Acoustics. Construction would result in exceedance of 24-hour PM10 and state TSP standards. Air pollutant concentrations would increase during operation but would be within standards. An increase in onsite noise would result from construction and operation of a tritium supply. Offsite noise impacts would be negligible. Water Resources. Surface water use would range from 10 (APT) to 35 MGY (Large ALWR) during construction. Operation surface water requirements would range from 1,214(APT) to 16,014MGY (Large ALWR). These represent increases of between less than 1 and 2 percent during construction and 66 and 866 percent during operation. Blowdown discharges to surface waters would range from 250(APT) to 6,202MGY(Large ALWR). Groundwater would not be affected by construction or operation. Geology and Soils. Construction and operation would neither affect nor be affected by geological conditions. The soil disturbed area would range from 375(APT) to 562acres(MHTGR). Soil erosion due to wind and stormwater runoff would be minor. Biotic Resources. During construction and operation, terrestrial resources would be affected by the disturbance of between 375(APT) and 562acres(MHTGR) of habitat. Salt drift from an evaporative cooling system could impact an additional limited acreage for all technologies. Increased stream flow from construction and operational discharges could affect wetland and aquatic plant communities. No Federal-listed, threatened, or endangered species would be affected, but several state-listed species may be affected. Cultural and Paleontological Resources. Some NRHP-eligible prehistoric and historic resources are expected to occur within the disturbed area. Native American resources may be affected by land disturbance and audio or visual intrusions. Paleontological resources may be affected, but impacts would benegligible. Socioeconomics. Employment in the economic study area for collocated tritium supply and recycling would increase between 8,000(MHTGR) and 12,000persons(ALWR) during construction. Employment during operation would increase in the economic study area between 4,300(APT) and 5,200persons(HWR). Unemployment would decrease from 6.2percent, the projected baseline, to between 4.8(ALWR) and 5.2percent(HWR and MHTGR) during construction and to between 5.6 (HWR, MHTGR, and ALWR) and 5.7 percent (APT) during operation. Per capita income would increase by an average of 1 percent for all technologies during construction and operation. Population and housing demand in the ROI would increase by less than 1 percent during construction and operation for all technologies. For each technology, total revenues and expenditures for most ROI counties, cities, and school districts would increase by annual averages of approximately 1 percent or less through 2010, and by less than 1percent through 2020. Traffic conditions on access roads to ORR are expected to degrade due to increased worker traffic and congestion, particularly on Bear Creek Road, the primary access route. Radiological and Hazardous Chemical Impacts During Normal Operation and Accidents. The dose to the maximally exposed member of the public from total site operation for 1 year would range from 4.3(APT with helium-3 target) to 8.8mrem(Large ALWR) for atmospheric release and would be 14 mrem for liquid release for all technologies. The associated risks of fatal cancer from 40 years of operation would be 8.6x10-5, 1.8x10-4, and 2.7x10-4 (2.8x10-4for ALWRs), respectively. The annual 50-mile population dose from total site operation in 2030 would range from 68(APT with helium-3 target) to 90person-rem(Large ALWR) and could result in 1.4 to 1.8 fatal cancers over 40years of operation. The average annual dose to a site worker would range from 18 (MHTGR) to 26 mrem (Large ALWR) with the associated risk of fatal cancer from 40 years of operation ranging from 2.9x10-4 to 4.2x10-4, respectively. The annual dose to the total site workforce would range from 350 (MHTGR) to 490 (Large ALWR) person-rem and could result in 5.6 to 7.9 fatal cancers over 40 years of operation. All doses to the public and to site workers are within regulatory limits. Any exposures to site workers and the public resulting from emissions of hazardous chemicals are expected to be within regulatory limits and have negligible cancer risk. For low-to-moderate consequence/ high probability accidents associated with operation, the consequences and risks associated with the APT are negligible. For the technology with the most severe consequences, the HWR, increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary would be of 6.8x10-5. Given the accident probability of 1.0x10-3 per year, the cancer risk would be 6.8x10-8 per year. For the population residing within 50 miles of the accident (1,062,000), the associated cancer risk would be 7.5x10-4 per year. If this accident occurred, this exposure would result in 0.75 cancer fatalities. The increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a worker located 1,000 meters from the release point would be 1.6x10-4. The cancer risk to the worker would be 1.6x10-7 per year. For high consequence/low probability accidents associated with operation, the consequences to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary would be small for the APT. The technology with the most severe consequences to the general population is the Small ALWR. For Small ALWR high consequence/low probability accidents, the increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary would be 0.042 with an associated cancer risk of 6.6x10-9 per year. For the population residing within 50 miles of the accident (1,062,000), the associated cancer risk would be 5.1x10-6 per year. If this accident occurred, this exposure would result in 33 cancer fatalities. The increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a worker located 1,000 meters from the release point would be 0.10. The cancer risk to the worker would be 1.6x10- 8 per year. Waste Management. Spent nuclear fuel would be generated by the HWR, MHTGR, and ALWR, and require a new storage facility. The APT would not generate spent fuel. All technologies except the APT would generate liquid LLW and require a new treatment facility. All technologies would generate solid LLW and require between 0.6 (APT) and 3.5 (HWR) acres per year of onsite LLW disposal area. The increase in liquid and solid mixed LLW genera- tion would have minimal impact and could be handled with existing/planned facilities. Hazardous waste generation would increase by 4 yd3 per year (APT) to 101yd3 per year (MHTGR) and could be handled with existing/planned facilities. Liquid nonhazardous sanitary waste generation would increase from 260(APT) to 6,310MGY (Large ALWR) and require additional treatment facilities. Solid nonhazardous sanitary waste generation would increase between 8,640(APT) and 15,000yd3 per year (HWR). Existing landfill design life would be reduced or require expansion. Other solid nonhazardous wastes would be recycled. Intersite Transport. For all technologies, the relative risk of transporting tritium is 13 percent lower than the existing case (No Action) because the distance travelled is shorter. The potential cancer fatalities per year from transporting triated heavy water is 3.57x10-5 (HWR) and 6.63x10-6 (APT). There is no intersite transport of LLW for any technology. The risk of transporting new tritium for supply alone is about 2 percent greater than No Action (due to transporting new tritium to SRS). Pantex Land Resources. Construction and operation of a tritium supply would disturb between 173(APT) and 360 acres (MHTGR). Collocation of tritium recycling would require an additional 202acres during construction and 196 acres during operation. Siting any of the tritium supply technologies alone or collocated with recycling at Pantex would be consis- tent with site development plans. No visual impacts are expected. Site Infrastructure. No roads or railroads would be required to support any technologies, but all would require new transmission lines. The power requirements would exceed the current site electrical requirement of 13 MWe by 61 MWe (MHTGR) to 565 MWe (APT). Air Quality and Acoustics. Construction activities would result in exceedance of 24-hour PM10 standard. Air pollutant concentrations would increase during operation but would be within standards. An increase in onsite noise would result from construction and operation of a tritium supply. Offsite noise impacts would be negligible. Water Resources. Surface waters and groundwater would not be affected by construction or operation. Reclaimed sanitary wastewater use would range from 10 MGY (APT) to 35 MGY (Large ALWR) during construction. Operation water requirements would range from 43(MHTGR) to 1,214MGY (APT). Geology and Soils. Construction and operation would neither affect nor be affected by geological conditions. The soil disturbed area for collocated tritium supply and recycling would range from 375(APT) to 562acres (MHTGR). Soil erosion due to wind and stormwater runoff would be minor. Biotic Resources. During construction and operation, terrestrial resources would be affected by the disturbance of 375(APT) to 562 acres (MHTGR) of habitat. Impacts from salt drift are possible with the APT. Playa wetlands could be degraded by discharges. Aquatic resources would not be affected. One federal-listed species, the bald eagle, could be temporarily affected during construction, and several Federal candidate or state-listed species may also be affected. Cultural and Paleontological Resources. Some NRHP-eligible prehistoric and historic resources may occur within the disturbed area. Native American resources may be affected by land disturbance and audio or visual intrusions. Paleontological resources may also be affected. Socioeconomics. Employment in the economic study area would increase by 7,300 (MHTGR) to 10,900persons (either ALWR) during peak construction. Employment during full operation would increase in the economic study area by 4,400(APT) to 5,300 persons (HWR and MHTGR). Unemployment would decrease from 4.6 percent, the projected baseline, to between 2.2 (for all technologies) during peak construction and to between 2.5 (HWR and MHTGR) and 2.8 percent (APT) during full operation. Per capita income would increase by no more than 1 percent during peak construction and full operation. Population and housing demand within the region of influence would increase by between 3(HWR and MHTGR) and 7 percent (ALWR) during construction and between 1percent (APT) and 2(HWR, MHTGR, ALWR) during operation. Total revenues and expenditures for most region of influence counties, cities, and school districts would increase by annual averages of 1 percent to 3 percent through 2005 then decrease annually by 1 percent until 2010. Between 2010 and 2020, total revenues and expenditures for all technologies would increase at annual averages of less than 1 percent. Traffic conditions on access roads to Pantex are expected to degrade due to increased worker traffic and congestion, particularly on Farm-to-Market Road 683, the primary access route. Radiological and Hazardous Chemical Impacts During Normal Operation and Accidents. The dose to the maximally exposed member of the public from total site operation with a collocated supply and recycling facility for 1 year would range from 1.4(APT with helium-3 target) to 4.9mrem (LargeALWR). The associated risk of fatal cancer from 40 years of operation would range from 2.9x10- 5 to 9.8x10-5, respectively. The annual 50-mile population dose from total site operation in 2030 would range from 9.2 (APT with helium-3 target) to 37 (Large ALWR) person-rem and could result in 0.18 to 0.73 fatal cancers over 40years of operation. The average annual dose to a site worker would range from 22 (MHTGR) to 68 (Large ALWR) mrem with the associated risk of fatal cancer from 40 years of operation ranging from 3.5x10-4 to 1.1x10-3, respectively. The annual dose to the total site workforce would range from 67 (MHTGR) to 210 (Large ALWR) person-rem and could result in 1.1 to 3.3fatal cancers over 40 years of operation. Although the noncancer adverse health effects to the public and onsite workers are within regulatory health limits, No Action cancer risks to the public and the onsite worker from emissions of hazardous chemicals exceed the accepted regulatory threshold level of 1.0x10-6 annually. Potential mitigation, such as chemical substitution, can minimize these health risks. For low-to-moderate consequence/high probability accidents associated with operation, the consequences and risks associated with the APT are negligible. For the technology with the most severe consequences, the HWR, the increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary would be 6.2x10-6. Given the accident probability of 1.0x10-3 per year, the cancer risk would be 6.2x10-9 per year. For the population residing within 50 miles of the accident (287,000), the associated cancer risk would be 2.6x10-5 per year. If this accident occurred, this exposure would result in 0.026 cancer fatalities. The increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a worker located 1,000 meters from the release point would be 1.2x10-5. The cancer risk to the worker would be 1.2x10-8 per year. For high consequence/low probability accidents associated with operation, the consequences to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary are small for the APT. The technology with the most severe consequences to the general population is the Small ALWR. For Small ALWR high consequence/low probability accidents, the increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary would be 0.029 with an associated cancer risk of 4.6x10-9 per year. For the population residing within 50 miles of the accident (287,000), the associated cancer risk would be 6.7x10-7 per year. If this accident occurred, this exposure would result in 4.3 cancer fatalities. The increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a worker located 1,000 meters from the release point would be 0.070. The cancer risk to the worker would be 1.1x10-8 per year. Waste Management. Spent nuclear fuel would be generated by the HWR, MHTGR, and ALWR, and would require a new storage facility. The APT would not generate spent fuel. Generation of liquid LLW would increase for all technologies except the APT and require new treatment facilities. Solid LLW generation would increase for all technologies, requiring a new staging facility and between 16(APT) and 92 (HWR) additional LLW shipments to NTS. Refer to the NTS alternative for the additional LLW disposal area required at NTS. The increased generation of liquid mixed LLW could be handled with existing/planned facilities. Solid mixed LLW generation would increase from 3yd3 per year (MHTGR) to 122yd3 per year (HWR). The HWR increase would require expansion of existing and planned treatment and storage facilities. Hazardous waste generation would increase from 4(APT) to 101yd3 per year (MHTGR). Liquid sanitary waste generation would increase for all technologies and would require new treatment facilities. Solid sanitary waste generation would increase by 8,640(APT) to 15,000yd3 per year (HWR). Existing offsite landfill design life would be reduced or require expansion. Other solid nonhazardous wastes would be recycled. Intersite Transport. The risk of transporting tritium is zero since there is no intersite transportation with collocating supply and recycling for all technologies at Pantex. The potential cancer fatalities per year from transporting tritiated heavy water is 3.57x10-5 (HWR) and 6.63x10-6 (APT). For intersite transportation of LLW, credible accidents associated with locating tritium supply and recycling at Pantex would result in fatal cancers per year from radiological releases varying from 5.2x10-9(APT) to 3.0x10-8(HWR) and from 6.9x10-5 (APT) to 4.0x10-4 fatalities per year (HWR) from non-radiological causes. For intersite transportation of LLW, credible accidents associated with locating a tritium supply alone at Pantex would result in fatal cancers per year from radiological releases varying from 3.25x10-9 (APT) to 2.8x10-8 (HWR) and from 4.30x10-5 (APT) to 3.70x10-4 (HWR) fatalities per year from non-radiological causes. The risk of trans- porting of new tritium for supply alone is about 2 percent greater than that for No Action (due to transporting new tritium to SRS). The annual risk from transporting highly-enriched uranium fuel feed material (HWR and MHTGR alternatives) from ORR to Pantex is 5.1x10-4 fatalities. Savannah River Site Land Resources. Construction and operation of a tritium supply technology with the upgraded recycling facility would disturb between 173 (APT) and 360acres (MHTGR). The use of an evaporative cooling tower would result in visible plumes during certain atmospheric conditions. Site Infrastructure. New site infrastructure (e.g., roads and transmission lines) would be required to support all technologies. The power requirements would range from exceeding the current site electrical requirement 130 MWe by 350 MWe (APT) to current site electrical requirement by being less than the 104 MWe (Large ALWR). Air Quality and Acoustics. Construction activities would result in exceedance of 24-hour PM10 standards. Air pollutant concentrations would increase during operation but would be within standards. An increase in onsite noise would result from construction and operation of a tritium supply. Offsite noise impacts would be negligible. Water Resources. Surface water would not be required for construction. Operation surface water requirements would range from 1,229(APT) to 15,946MGY (Large ALWR) and represent increases of between 6 and 78 percent during operation, respectively. The generation of sanitary waste would range from 0.3(APT) to 28 MGY (Large ALWR) during construction and 7(APT) to 90MGY(LargeALWR) during operation, respectively. Blowdown discharges to surface waters would range from 240(APT) to 6,192MGY (Large ALWR). Groundwater use would increase by 33MGY during construction and 90 MGY (Large ALWR) during operation, representing increases of 1and 3 percent, respectively. Geology and Soils. Construction and operation would neither affect nor be affected by geological conditions. The area of disturbed soil would range from 200(APT) to 387acres(MHTGR). Soil erosion due to wind and stormwater runoff would be minor. Biotic Resources. Terrestrial resources would be affected by the disturbance of between 173(APT) and 360acres (MHTGR) and of habitat. Salt drift from an evaporative cooling system could impact an additional limited acreage for all technologies. Construction and operational discharges to an onsite stream could affect wetland and aquatic communities. No Federal-listed, threatened, or endangered species would be affected, but several state-listed species may be affected. Cultural and Paleontological Resources. Three NRHP-eligible historic sites occur within the area that would be disturbed during construction. No historic resources would be affected. Native American resources may be affected by land disturbance and audio or visual intrusions. Paleontological resources may be affected, but impacts would be negligible. Socioeconomics. Employment in the economic study area would increase between 6,900(MHTGR) and 10,800persons (ALWR) during construction. Employment during operation would increase in the economic study area between 1,600(APT) and 2,400persons (HWR). Unemployment would decrease from 4.8percent, the projected baseline, to between 3.9(HWR, ALWR, and APT) and 4percent(MHTGR) during construction and to between 4.5(HWR) and 4.6percent(MHTGR, ALWR, and APT) during operation. Per capita income would increase by an average of approxi- mately 1percent for all technologies during construction and operation. Population and housing demand within the ROI would increase by between less than 1 percent (HWR, MHTGR, APT) and less than 3 percent (ALWR) during construction and by less than 1percent for all technologies during operation. Total revenues and expenditures for most ROI counties, cities, and school districts would increase by an annual average of less than 1 percent through 2020 for all technologies except for the ALWR. For the ALWR, revenues and expenditures would increase between 4 and less than 1 percent through and 2005 and then remain flat until 2010. Between 2010 and 2020, total revenues and expenditures would increase by annual averages of less than 1percent. Traffic conditions on access roads to SRS are expected to degrade due to increased worker traffic and congestion, particularly on South Carolina Route 125, the primary access route. Radiological and Hazardous Chemical Impacts During Normal Operation and Accidents. The dose to the maximally exposed member of the public from total site operation for 1 year would range from 2.5(APT with a helium-3 target) to 3.9mrem (Large ALWR) for atmospheric release. The associated risk of fatal cancer from 40 years of operation would range from 7.8x10-5 to 4.9x10-5, respectively. The dose from liquid releases from 1 year would range from 0.077 mrem (MHTGR and APT) to 0.26 mrem (Small ALWR). The associated risk of fatal cancers from 40 years of operation would range from 1.5x10-6 to 5.3x10-6, respectively. The annual 50-mile population dose from total site operation in 2030 would range from 220(APT with the helium-3 target) to 340person-rem (Large ALWR) and could result in 4.4 to 6.8 fatal cancers over 40 years of operation, respectively. The average annual site dose to a site worker would range from 33(MHTGR) to 42mrem (Large ALWR) with the associated risk of fatal cancer from 40 years of operation ranging from 5.3x10-4 to 6.7x10-4, respectively. The annual dose to the total site workforce would range from 510(MHTGR) to 650person-rem (Large ALWR) and could result in 8.2 to 10 fatal cancers over 40 years of operation,respectively. Although the noncancer adverse health effects to the public are within regulatory health limits, the No Action worker effects from emission of hazardous chemicals exceed this limit. The No Action cancer risks to both the public and onsite workers exceed the generally accepted threshold of regulatory concern of 1x10-6. For low-to-moderate consequence/high probability accidents associated with operation, the consequences to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary would be small for the APT. The technology with the most severe consequences to the general population is the HWR. For HWR low-to-moderate consequence/high probability accidents, the increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary would be 2.3x10-5. Given the accident probability of 1.0x10-3 per year, the cancer risk would be 2.3x10-8 per year. For the population residing within 50 miles of the accident (773,000), the associated cancer risk would be 7.3x10-4 per year. If this accident occurred, this exposure would result in 0.73 cancer fatalities. The increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a worker located 1,000 meters from the release point would be 2.9x10-4. The cancer risk to the worker would be 2.9x10-7 per year. For high consequence/low probability accidents associated with operation, the consequences to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary would be small for the APT. The technology with the most severe consequences to the general population is the Small ALWR. For Small ALWR high consequence/low probability accidents, the increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a maximally exposed individual at the site boundary would be 1.9x10-3 with an associated cancer risk of 2.9x10-10 per year. For the population residing within 50 miles of the accident (773,000), the associated cancer risk would be 2.3x10-6 per year. If this accident occurred, this exposure would result in 14 cancer fatalities. The increased likelihood of cancer fatality to a worker located 1,000 meters from the release point would be 0.067. The cancer risk to the worker would be 1.1x10-8 per year. Waste Management. Spent nuclear fuel would be generated by the HWR, MHTGR, and ALWR, and require a new storage facility. The APT would not generate spent fuel. All technologies except the APT would generate liquid LLW and require a new treatment facility. All technologies would generate solid LLW and require between 1(APT) and 12acres per year (HWR) of onsite LLW disposal area. No additional liquid mixed LLW would be generated from the tritium supply technologies. The generation of solid mixed LLW would increase by 1yd3 per year (MHTGR) to 120yd3 per year (HWR). The HWR may require new or expanded treatment and storage facilities. Hazardous waste generation would increase by 3(APT) to 100yd3 per year (MHTGR) and would require additional storage facilities except for APT. Liquid nonhazardous sanitary waste would increase by 245(APT) to 6,290MGY (Large ALWR) and require additional treatment facilities. Solid nonhazardous sanitary waste generation would increase by 1,240(APT) to 7,600yd3 per year (HWR). Existing landfill design life would be reduced or require expansion. Other solid nonhazardous wastes would be recycled. Intersite Transport. The risk associated with transportation of tritium when collocating supply and recycling is the same as No Action for all supply technologies. There is no intersite transport of LLW for any supply technology. The annual risk from transporting highly-enriched uranium fuel feed material (HWR and MHTGR alternatives) from ORR to SRS is 5.1x10-4 fatalities. Multipurpose ("Triple Play") Reactor The Department's Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is preparing a PEIS addressing the issue of how to dispose of plutonium that is excess to nuclear weapons requirements. Among the alternatives to be analyzed in the Long-Term Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials PEIS is the use of plutonium as a fuel in existing, modified, or new nuclear reactors. The nuclear reactors evaluated for tritium production in the PEIS for Tritium Supply and Recycling utilize uranium as the fuel source, and the analysis in this PEIS is based on that design. Nonetheless, it is technically feasible to also use plutonium or plutonium- uranium-oxide (mixed-oxide) fuel for a tritium production reactor. Congress and commercial entities have expressed interest in developing a multipurpose ("triple play") reactor that could produce tritium, "burn" plutonium, and generate revenues through the sale of electric power. Only the ALWR and MHTGR would be capable of performing the triple play missions; the potential environmental impacts from these triple play reactors are summarized below. Advanced Light Water Reactor. If an ALWR were used to burn plutonium, the major contributions to potential environmental impacts would be from a new plutonium Pit Disassembly/Conversion/Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility. Such a facility could disturb up to 129 acres of land, and require a peak construction force of 550 during the peak year of the 6 year construction period. During operation, this facility would require approximately 10 percent as much water as a large ALWR at a dry site, and would employ as many workers as the ALWR. Radiological exposures to workers during normal operation would be kept as low as reasonably achievable, and would not be expected to exceed 50mrem per worker per year. If all 650 workers were exposed to such a dose, a highly conservative assumption, 0.52 latent cancer fatalities (less than one) would be expected over the 40 year operation life of the facility. The goal for the facility for public radiation exposure would be not to exceed 1 mrem effective dose equivalent per year. Safety analysis reports have not been prepared for this facility. However, bounding accident scenarios have been identified from safety analysis reports for similar plants. Criticality accidents, explosions, and fires could occur in such a facility, and release radiation to the environment. The use of plutonium in an ALWR would not significantly affect the consequences of radioactivity releases from severe accidents, though there would be some small changes in the source term release spectrum and frequency. Using a mixed-oxide fuel in an ALWR would have no major effect on reactor operations, and therefore, impacts would not be expected to change significantly from those associated with utilizing a uranium fueled reactor. This is based on a study conducted by the NRC, the Final Generic Environmental Statement on the Use of Recycled Plutonium in Mixed-Oxide Fuel in Light Water Reactors. Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor. To burn plutonium in a modular gas-cooled reactor, a plutonium Pit Disassembly/Conversion Facility would also be needed, and the environmental impacts from such a facility are expected to be approximately the same as those described for the facility to support a multipurpose ALWR. In a plutonium-fueled gas-cooled reactor, however, tritium production decreases significantly. Thus, twice as many reactor modules would be necessary in order to produce the steady-state tritium requirements. This doubling of reactor modules would be the major contributor to potential environmental impacts for this scenario. Overall, building twice as many reactor modules could double most environmental impacts. Some construction impacts (land distributed, construction duration, and peak construction workforce) might be less than double because of economies of scale and shared support infrastructure. Depending upon the particular site, some impacts could be significant. During operation of twice as many reactor modules, water requirements could increase by 80 percent. Impacts to groundwater would not change significantly from those expected with the three module MHTGR at those sites that would use groundwater resources. The expected workforce increase would approximately double any socioeconomic impacts and radiation doses to workers. Radiation exposure to the public from normal operation might also double. The use of plutonium in a MHTGR would not significantly affect severe accident consequences because fuel failures are not expected in any severe accident. Spent fuel generation would also double with the addition of twice as many reactor modules. Commercial Light Water Reactor The purchase by DOE of an existing operating or partially completed commercial power reactor is a reasonable alternative being evaluated to meet the stockpile tritium requirement mission. Production of tritium using irradiation services contracted from commercial power reactors is also being evaluated as a reasonable alternative and as a potential contingency measure to meet the projected tritium requirements for the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile in the event of a national emergency. The reactors employed for domestic electric power generation in the United States are conventional light water reactors, which use ordinary water as moderator and coolant. The potential environmental impacts of the commercial light water reactor alternative are summarized below. The option to purchase an operating commercial power reactor or finish construction of a partially complete commercial reactor to support the stockpile tritium requirement would have similar impacts. The reactor technologies and characteristics would be the same. However, some additional land use impacts may occur to incorporate security infrastructure and other requirements which would be needed for a DOE-owned and -operated tritium production facility. The potential land use impacts would result from new buffer zone requirements, new fencing, security buildings, and road access restrictions or construction of new roads. The environmental impacts of completing construction of an unfinished commercial nuclear power plant would be relative to the extent that the potential power plant has been completed by the utility. For construction impact analysis, a range of reactor com- pletion (45 percent to 85 percent) was used. Environmental impacts from the upgrade of existing site infrastructure to support renewed construction activities would be minor. Completing construction of a nuclear reactor would result in impacts resulting from air emissions, increased worker numbers, and waste generation and management. Air emissions would be temporary and would not be expected to significantly affect air quality in the project area. The increase in construction workers would have potential impact on the local economy and area population, housing, and local services. Because a majority of the nuclear power plant infrastructure and the power plant itself have already been completed using a much larger overall workforce and peak workforce, socioeconomic impacts are expected to be minor. Construction activities are expected to generate construction debris and other hazardous and nonhazardous wastes. Typical hazardous wastes generated during the completion of the construction phase would include paints, solvents, acids, oils, and degreasers. Adverse environmental impacts from management and disposal of these wastes would not be expected. The commercial reactor alternatives for producing tritium would result in additional environmental impacts from the changes in the reactor operational characteristics due to the introduction of DOE target rods. Impacts would likely result from core changes, personnel requirements, effluents, waste, spent fuel, radiation exposure, and transportation/handling. Core Changes. Production of tritium in a commercial light water reactor would require physical changes to the reactor core, which could range from replacement of burnable poison elements with DOE target elements to the replacement of fuel rods with DOE target assemblies. Core changes could alter the accident basis and would modify the source term. The estimated additional core tritium content in curies per reactor at the end of the irradiation period would be 3.2x107 for a single reactor. Because of the reduced burn up in the reactor core, the total fission products in each fuel rod would decrease. Personnel Requirements. An estimated 75 additional personnel would be needed for a typical commercial nuclear power facility. The additional personnel would represent an increase of approximately 9percent for a single reactor. The number of personnel would be smaller for each commercial reactor site if multiple reactors were used. Effluent. Because of the addition of DOE target rods, airborne and water-borne effluent would be expected to change (particularly for tritium). Estimates for expected increases of gaseous tritium effluent range from 5,740 Ci per year for a single reactor to 3,680 Ci per year in the multiple reactor scenario. Estimated increases of liquid tritium effluent ranges from 1,460Ci per year for a single reactor to 935 Ci per year per reactor in the multiple reactor scenario. Waste. Additional activities associated with the handling, processing, and shipping of DOE target assemblies would be expected to increase waste generation rates at the commercial reactor site. An estimated 164yd3 per year of LLW per reactor would be expected. This would be approximately a 50-percent increase for a typical plant. No increase in mixed waste generation would be anticipated. Depending on the selected site, expansion of existing or construction of new facilities may be required. Spent Nuclear Fuel. More frequent refueling operations and the segmenting of fuel assemblies could result in an increase in spent nuclear fuel volumes With the single reactor case, 137 additional spent fuel assemblies (40yd3, assuming 8ft3/assembly) would be generated each year. This amounts to approximately 58 metric tons of heavy metal. This represents more than a 3-fold increase over the average of 56 assemblies (24 metric tons of heavy metal) for a typical pressurized commercial light water reactor. The change to 12-month refueling cycles with full core discharge would accelerate the consumption of available spent nuclear fuel pool storage and would require earlier use of additional storage alternatives such as dry storage at some commercial reactor sites. Worker Radiation Exposure. New DOE target assembly process activities and, in some cases, more frequent refueling-type operations would be expected to increase radiation exposure for some categories of workers. Estimates for expected increases of exposure for refueling personnel range from 19person-rem per reactor for maintenance workers to less than 1 person-rem for supervisory personnel. In the multiple reactor scenario, no additional refueling personnel would be required; therefore, no additional worker exposure would be expected. The increase in person-rem per reactor for all personnel ranges from 24 for maintenance workers to 1 for supervisory personnel. Radiological Impacts Normal Operations. The impact from adding tritium targets to a commercial reactor would vary depending on the reactor type, reactor site location, and the number of sites involved in the tritium production mission. The maximum impacts at a given site would occur if all of the tritium were produced at that site. The impacts would lessen at a given site if multiple sites are used. Considering that the arithmetic mean annual radiation dose to people who lived within a 50-mile radius of a commercial nuclear power plant in 1991 was about 1.2 person-rem (0.25 and 0.95 person-rem from airborne and liquid releases, respectively) and the median was less than 0.2 person-rem (NUREG/CR-2850), impacts of normal operation from tritium production are expected to be less than the NESHAPS 10 mrem limit for atmospheric releases and less than the drinking water limit of 4mrem. It is estimated that the changes in radioactive releases associated with the production of tritium in a single reactor would result in an annual dose increase of 0.51 person-rem to the 50-mile population. This would result in a calculated increase of 0.010 fatal cancer in this population as the result of 40 years of reactor operation. There would be a slightly larger increase in the total number of fatal cancers in the several population groups for the multiple reactor scenario compared with the single reactor, but the risk to an individual member of the public would be less because of the larger number of people exposed. Detailed impact analysis would be performed after the reactor/site combination(s) have selected. If the results of the impacts analysis indicates exceedances of either NESHAPS and/or drinking water limits, the reactor's radioactive waste management system would be revised to reduce the effluent to acceptablelimits. Transportation/Handling. Assuming that an inventory of 500target rods would be accumulated for shipment at one time in NRC-approved fuel assembly shipping casks, and one cask per transport truck, approximately 12shipments per year would occur. The curie content per truck would be approximately 2.7x106. the upper bound radiological consequences of an accident during transportation from a single site to SRS might incur an additional 240person-rem per year. Qualitative Comparison To aid the reader in understanding the differences in environmental impacts among the PEIS alternatives (particularly the tritium supply technology alternatives i.e., HWR, MHTGR, ALWR, and commercial light water reactor), this section presents a brief, qualitative summary comparison of the alternatives. Chapter 3, tables 3.6-1 and 3.6-2 presents quantitative comparisons of greater detail. For some of the resource areas evaluated in the PEIS, the analyses indicate that there are no major differences in the environmental impacts among the tritium supply technology and site alternatives. Resource areas where no major differences exist, or where potential environmental impacts are small, are: land resources, air quality, water resources, geology and soils, biotic resources, and socioeconomics. For these resource areas, this general conclusion is particularly true when comparing the operational impacts of the tritium supply facilities. For construction, this general conclusion is also particularly true when comparing among the various types of new tritium supply facilities (e.g., HWR, MHTGR, ALWR, and APT). However, when comparing the potential impacts of constructing a new tritium supply facility against the alternative of using an existing commercial reactor (purchase of irradiation services or purchase and conversion of an existing commercial reactor), the environmental impacts of the latter are clearly less because the facility already exists, and, thus, there are minimal construction-related environmental impacts. For tritium recycling, this also applies when comparing the existing tritium recycling facilities at SRS against constructing a new tritium recycling facility at another site. For other resource areas evaluated in the PEIS, the analyses indicate that there are notable environmental impact differences. Resource areas where notable differences exist are: site infrastructure (electrical requirements), human health (from radiological impacts due to accidents), and wastes generated. Each of these resource areas are discussed in greater detail below. Site Infrastructure. Infrastructure and electrical capacity exists at each of the alternative sites to adequately support any of the tritium supply technology alternatives. Nonetheless, because the MHTGR and ALWR technologies could generate electricity while also producing tritium, these technologies could have a positive environmental impact by delaying the need to build some electrical generating facility in the future. The PEIS acknowledges, and qualitatively discusses, these potential "avoided" environmental impacts. The APT, and to a significantly lesser degree the HWR, would be energy consumers. The PEIS assesses the environmental impacts of providing power to the energy consumers. Thus, in terms of environmental impacts, there could be approximately 1,800 MWe of difference (i.e., ALWR generating 1,300 MWe versus an APT consuming 500 MWe) between the tritium supply technologies. For commercial reactors that already exist and produce electrical power, there would be no change to the existing electrical infrastructure. Human Health. There are differences among the tritium supply technology and site alternatives regarding the potential human health impacts from accidents. The potential consequences are directly related to the amount of radioactivity released and the population density near the facility. For each of the tritium supply technology alternatives, the probability of severe accidents occurring is extremely small, on the order of once every millions of years at most. Based upon the PEIS analyses of the reactor technologies, the ALWR could cause the largest potential impacts to human health from severe accidents, while the MHTGR would have the smallest potential impacts. Because the APT does not utilize fissile materials, and there is no significant decay heat, there are virtually no radiological consequences from any APT accidents. Consequently, the APT would have the smallest potential impacts to human health from accidents. The commercial reactor alternatives do not acquire any substantial risks by assuming a tritium-production mission. Regarding the site alternatives, in the event of an accident at sites with small populations (INEL, NTS, and to a lesser extent Pantex), there would be fewer impacts to human health. Because ORR and SRS have larger populations within 50 miles of the proposed facilities, these two sites have greater potential human health impacts than the other sites. Because there are virtually no radiological consequences from any APT accidents, there are no grounds for discrimination among sites in the case of the APT. It is, in essence, site neutral with respect to potential impacts to human health. Generated Wastes Spent Fuel Generation. All of the tritium supply reactor technologies would generate spent fuel. While the MHTGR would generate the greatest volume of spent fuel (because of the graphite moderator), the residual heavy metal content of spent fuel from the ALWR would be the greatest. Reactors providing irradiation services would not generate additional spent fuel over and above what they would otherwise generate during their planned lifetime, assuming that multiple reactors are used and the operating scenarios do not change fuel cycles. However, if only a single reactor were used (irradiation services or purchased and converted), additional spent fuel would likely be generated because the reactor's refueling cycle would be shortened. The APT is not a reactor and would not generate spent fuel. Low-Level Waste. None of the alternatives would generate unacceptably large amounts of low-level waste. However, of the alternatives, the HWR would create the most low-level waste in 1 year (almost 5times as much as any other reactor alternative). The APT would generate the least amount of low-level waste annually. In producing tritium, the com- mercial reactor alternatives would generate additional low-level waste, but this amount would be less than the new reactor alternatives. With regards to sites, except for Pantex, all sites have the ability to handle and dispose of low-level nuclear waste at the site. Low-level nuclear waste generated at Pantex would need to be shipped to another site for disposal.
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