APPENDIX G: INTERSITE TRANSPORTATION G.1 Site Transportation Interfaces for Hazardous Materials The following is a brief description of the existing transportation modes that serve each Nuclear Weapons Complex (Complex) site and the links to those modes for the intersite transport of hazardous materials. The purpose of this analysis is to identify transportation constraints at each site that might limit tritium supply and recycling alternatives. Transportation services at each site have been given an adjectival rating based on strengths and weaknesses. These ratings are: outstanding, good, satisfactory, poor, or unsatisfactory. The rating methodology and evaluation procedures were established by the Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Site Evaluation Panel (DOE 1991j) for rating the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), Pantex Plant (Pantex), and Savannah River Site (SRS). For consistency, the methodology was applied for the Nevada Test Site (NTS) as well. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. INEL transportation resources are good but would require additional roadway and railway construction. The northern route would cause delays of special nuclear material shipments due to winter ice and snow. The onsite rail system connects to the Union Pacific Railroad. Service is infrequent; due to lack of volume, and by special request only. Construction of an additional 7.5 miles of new rail spur would be needed for direct rail service to the proposed tritium supply site (TSS). The nearest interstate highway is approximately 46 miles from the proposed TSS via 40 miles of excellent two-lane road; however, approximately 6 miles of new connector road would need to be constructed to reach the site. The airport in Idaho Falls is 40 miles from the site. Nevada Test Site. NTS transportation resources are good. The nearest interstate highway, I-15, is approximately 60 miles from the site via four-lane divided blacktop U.S. highway. The site does not have direct rail access. The nearest railhead is at Las Vegas, approximately 65 miles south, which is served by the Union Pacific Railroad. There are no navigable waterways in the region. All air shipments arrive at McCarran International Airport located in Las Vegas, NV. There is a limited-access air strip on the site at Desert Rock; however, nearby Indian Springs would be used by Ross Aviation because of available aircraft servicing support. The site reports no significant transportation delays due to weather (NTS 1992a:3). Oak Ridge Reservation. ORR transportation resources are good, with minimal additional roadway and railway construction required. ORR has the advantage of southern routes, with minimal expected weather delays. The proposed TSS is approximately 2 miles from the ORR spur which connects to the Norfolk Southern Railroad and 4.6 miles from the Y-12 Plant (Y-12) spur which connects to the CSX Railroad. The nearest interstate highway is 4 miles away via good two-lane road. A regional airport in Knoxville, TN, is approximately 31 miles from the site. The airport is served by nine airlines and has adequate services, including a dedicated Ross Aviation loading and unloading facility. Barge shipments are possible using the Clinch River. A disadvantage is that routes to NTS, Pantex, and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) located in New Mexico, pass through or close to six to nine large metropolitan areas. Pantex Plant. Pantex transportation resources are outstanding. The site rail spur connects to the Burlington Northern and the Santa Fe Railroads. The Department of Energy (DOE) has a rail rolling stock repair capability onsite. Truck routes have the advantages of being southerly and of passing through or near, only two or three metropolitan areas en route to nearby DOE sites (e.g., NTS or WIPP). The Transportation Safeguards Division terminal with diesel and truck maintenance facility is located at Pantex. The nearest interstate highway is accessed via 7 miles of two-lane road. The Amarillo International Airport is 20 miles from the site and is served by 5 airlines. Savannah River Site. SRS transportation resources are good. Routes to NTS and WIPP have the advantage of being southerly and the disadvantage of passing through six to nine major metropolitan areas, including local business districts. The proposed TSS is approximately 1.5 miles from the site rail system that connects to the CSX and the Norfolk Southern Railroads. Barge shipments are possible, but normally impractical due to the shallow depth of the Savannah River. The water mode will require prior review of river depths and coordination with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for water releases from the lock and dam. SRS has a cargo dock. The nearest interstate highway is 30 miles away via predomi- nately 4-lane access road. Two regional airports are located in Augusta, GA, 20 miles away, and in Columbia, SC, 56 miles from the site. Both air fields can handle large aircraft. There are occasional landing and takeoff delays of 2 or 3 hours due to fog. G.2 Transportation Safety Studies The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP) is undertaking a program to provide the basis for a documented DOE acceptance of hazards and risks associated with future defense program transportation operations. This program will be accomplished by preparing specialized studies and integrating the findings in a Defense Programs Transportation Safety Analysis Report. The specialized studies are as follows: The Albuquerque Operations Office studied the accident risk in the transport of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons components, and special nuclear material in DOE/DP's transportation system. The study produced a probabilistic assessment of the risks associated with accidental dispersal of radioactive material being transported by DOE's Transportation Safeguards System; by DOE's air cargo contractor, Ross Aviation, Inc.; or by military airlift. The Albuquerque Operations Office assessment shows that the probability of an accident by Ross Aviation is 2.7x10-4 per year. The assessment also shows that the annual tritium release probability for Ross Aviation is 1.0x10-5 and the health risk from the accidental release of tritium is 9.0x10-8 latent cancer fatalities per year. A more detailed discussion of the assessment is included in the classified appendix of this Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS). DOE is evaluating the results of accident-environment testing performed on the safe secure trailers to demonstrate the crashworthiness of the design, and the results will be incorporated into the Defense Programs Transportation Risk Assessment. The DOE historical safety record of the safe secure trailer has been exceptionally good. There has not been an accident fatality or release of radioactive material in over 27 million miles travelled. DOE evaluated air transport: (1) operations, aircraft, hazardous material/cargo management, and packaging; (2) operational safety requirements; (3) aircraft maintenance and quality assurance; (4)emergency response; (5) personnel training; and (6) environmental safety and health management practices. The accident risk for Ross Aviation was estimated using National Transportation Safety Board accident fatality data for commercial aircraft operations in accordance with 14 CFR 121, 125, and 127. The Ross Aviation accident probability is 2.7x10-4 per year and is documented in the Defense Programs Transportation Risk Assessment (DOE 1993n:5). The Defense Programs Transportation Safety Analysis Report will also consider other transportation risk studies, such as the ongoing Department of Defense (DOD) and DOE's Study on the Logistical Transportation of Nuclear Weapons, which evaluates the transport of weapons to and from DOD sites. G.3 Hazardous Materials Packaging (Materials Containment) Hazardous materials are those substances or materials capable of posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property. To protect the public health and safety, packaging must be selected based upon the nature of the hazardous material being shipped. All hazardous materials transported by or for DOE must meet the packaging (containment) requirements prescribed by the Department of Transportation (DOT) under 49 CFR and other applicable Federal regulations. For purposes here, hazardous materials are characterized as either common or Complex-unique. Common hazardous materials are those transported in commerce by for-hire transportation carriers. Approximately 96 percent of the Complex's hazardous material shipments are transported this way. Complex-unique hazardous materials are radioactive special materials that include limited-life components (e.g., tritium reservoirs). Complex-unique hazardous materials are produced by DOE and require special physical protection (safeguards) in transit for safety and security. Complex-unique hazardous materials are transported by government- controlled vehicles. The packagings for both common and Complex-unique hazardous materials are explained below. G.3.1 Packaging for Common Hazardous Materials Packaging used by DOE for most hazardous materials shipments is either certified to meet specific performance requirements or built to specifications described in DOT hazardous materials regulations (49 CFR). Most hazardous materials would be transported in relatively simple, unsophisticated 55-gallon or smaller steel drums, cardboard or wooden boxes, gas cylinders, and cargo tanks. For less harmful radioactive materials, DOT Specification Type A packaging is used. These packagings must retain their contents under normal conditions of transport. Sensitive radioactive materials shipments require use of highly sophisticated Type B packaging, designed to prevent the release of its contents under all credible transportation accident conditions. Though packaging and transportation are regulated by DOT under 49 CFR, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) promulgates the standards and regulations for the packaging used to transport highly radioactive and fissile materials under 10 CFR 71. Federal certification for these packaging types can take up to 5years and cost over $1 million for each packaging design due to the severe testing conditions required. Hazardous radioactive materials such as solidified high-level waste (HLW) and spent nuclear fuel must be packaged and transported in heavily shielded, virtually indestructible shipping casks in accordance with 10 CFR 71. Cold (unirradiated) fuel packaging must also meet 10 CFR 71 regulations. This packaging must retain its contents under credible accident conditions. There has not been a significant release of material under normal or accident transport environments in more than 40 years. G.3.2 Packaging for Limited-Life Components In addition to meeting the stringent Type B containment and confinement requirements of NRC's 10CFR 71 and DOT's 49 CFR, packaging for nuclear weapons and components, including tritium reservoirs, must be certified separately by DOE. Limited-life components must be transported in DOE's closed, government-owned and operated Transportation Safeguards System for intersite transport. Contract air carrier (Ross Aviation), military airlift, and specially designed safe secure trailers are utilized to ensure high levels of safety and physical protection. Limited-life components are shipped in H1616 type packaging designed to contain the material and radiation in an accident. G.4 Transportation of Radioactive Waste DOE's spent nuclear fuel and HLW produced by defense program activities are currently stored at reactor or DOE sites. The safe and permanent disposal of this nuclear waste, including its transportation, is the responsibility of DOE. The Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 specified that Yucca Mountain, NV, will be the one site evaluated as a permanent repository. Legislation prohibits the shipment of defense spent nuclear fuel to the repository; however, HLW from defense program activities may be shipped to the repository. DOE has future plans to move the spent nuclear fuel to a monitored retrievable storage facility for temporary storage, where the material will be consolidated and prepared for further transport and final storage at a permanent repository. DOE expected the monitored retrievable storage facility to be operational by 1998; however, a monitored retrievable storage facility site has yet to be selected. By law, the monitored retrievable storage facility cannot handle or store military waste and can store commercial spent fuel only temporarily. If a monitored retrievable storage facility is licensed and becomes opera- tional, spent nuclear fuel will be transported by truck, rail, barge, or a combination of these modes to the monitored retrievable storage facility. After consolidation at the monitored retrievable storage facility, the spent nuclear fuel would be shipped in dedicated trains to the repository. A 100-ton gross weight NRC-approved cask is being developed for the rail transportation of this spent nuclear fuel to the repository. Defense HLW would be shipped directly to the repository, mainly by rail from DOE sites where it is stored. The tritium supply and recycling functions do not generate transuranic (TRU) waste. TRU waste, however, is generated at the proposed sites from unrelated activities. The following is a summary of the planned disposal for TRU waste. The WIPP, 26miles from Carlsbad, NM, is scheduled to be the Nation's first geologic repository for TRU waste. Base facility construction was completed in 1989, but use is being delayed to satisfy legal, technical, environmental, and logistical requirements. DOE ultimately hopes to ship 8,500 drums of TRU waste to WIPP. Ninety-seven percent of the waste scheduled for WIPP will be contact-handled TRU waste that can be safely handled by workers without special protective clothing. Contact-handled TRU waste will be shipped via trucks in Transuranic Packaging Transporters, canisters designed to hold fourteen 55-gallon drums. Remote-handled TRU waste is to be handled and transported in specially shielded containers because of its higher level of radioactivity. No remote-handled TRU waste will be emplaced at WIPP during the initial 5-year test phase. Radioactive low-level waste (LLW) results from industrial processes and includes radioactively contaminated paper, protective clothing, cleaning materials, metal and glass equipment, tools, and construction items. The Complex's LLW is disposed of at permitted onsite locations with the exception of Pantex, which ships LLW to NTS. Waste that is equivalent to NRC-designated Greater-Than-Class-C LLW has a higher concentration of radionuclides and is generally not acceptable for near-surface disposal. DOE has developed a long-range strategy to dispose of Greater-Than-Class-C LLW either in conjunction with a HLW repository or in a separate facility. Mixed waste contains both radioactive and other hazardous components. Mixed HLW will be placed in a repository, mixed TRU waste will be shipped to WIPP, and mixed LLW will be held onsite or shipped to NTS after approval of its pending permit. G.5 Methodology to Determine Risk of Transporting Low-Level Waste With the exception of Pantex, all sites being considered for the tritium supply and recycling facilities either have or have planned an onsite LLW disposal facility. The incremental increase in risk of transporting LLW from Pantex as a result of locating tritium supply and recycling facilities at Pantex was estimated. The waste type reflects the isotopic composition of LLW produced by tritium supply and recycling facilities. The isotopic composition was developed based upon information in the Integrated Data Base for 1992: U.S. Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Inventories, Projections, and Characteris- tics (DOE/RW-0006). Because the actual waste composition in the future is uncertain, conservative assumptions were used where appropriate. Argonne National Laboratory-West calculated the risks of transporting LLW from Pantex to NTS using the RADTRAN 4 computer code (PX DOE 1993a:1). This risk analysis model was developed by Sandia National Laboratories, NM, to calculate the risks associated with the transportation of radioactive materials by various modes. The code has been extensively updated since it was first issued in the late 1970s and has been used to assess risk for all recent DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents involving the transport of radioactive materials. The RADTRAN 4: Volume 3 User Guide (SAND89-2370) contains derivations of the model, assumptions, and other data necessary to use the code. All LLW would be transported from Pantex to NTS in a solid form. A typical shipment consists of eighty 55-gallon (208-liter) drums transported in an enclosed semitrailer. Each drum is assumed to be fully loaded, resulting in a total shipment volume of 21.7 cubic yards (yd3). The truck is assumed to operate as an "exclusive-use" vehicle. Risks were calculated separately for occupational (truck crew members) and nonoccupational exposure groups for normal (incident-free) conditions. Normal risk is directly proportional to the external exposure rate in the vicinity of a loaded shipment. For exclusive-use shipments, the dose rate may not exceed 2 millirem (mrem) per hour in the crew compartment and 10mrem per hour at 2 meters from the lateral surfaces of the conveyance, in accordance with 10CFR 71. In general, the dose rate measured 2meters from a typical LLW shipment is on the order of 1 mrem per hour or less and seldom reaches the 10mrem per hour regulatory limit (PXDOE1993a:1). Since tritium LLW is a low-energy beta emitter that is shielded by its packaging, radiation outside the package is not detectable. Therefore, for normal operations, the transport of tritium LLW poses no increased risk to transportation workers or to the public. The risk from accident conditions results from the release and dispersal of radioactive material to the environment following an accident and the subsequent exposure of people via a number of potential pathways. Because accident occurrences are infrequent and statistical in nature, accident risks are calculated by multiplying the consequences of an accident by the probability of the accident occurring; therefore, accident risk estimates can be directly compared to incident-free risks. A representative highway route from Pantex to NTS was calculated using the HIGHWAY computer code. The calculated route conforms to all applicable routing regulations and common practices but may not be the actual route used for LLW shipments. The representative route is 1,200 miles. Accident occurrence and fatality rates were determined using state-level and national statistics. The severity categories for the release of radioactive material during accidents are described in the NRC's regulation, Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes (NUREG-0170). As a conservative measure, all 80 drums were assumed to be equally breached during an accident of sufficient severity. For a given release, 10 percent of the radioactive inventory was assumed to become aerosolized and dispersed, with 5 percent of the aerosolized fraction being respirable. Tritium is shipped in solid form, but could become vaporized in an accident. For tritium, 100 percent of the release was assumed to be respirable (PX DOE 1993a:1). The 1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP Publication 60) provides health risk factors to convert dose rates to fatal cancers (PX DOE 1993a:1). For occupational exposure groups, the conversion factor is 4.0x10-4 fatal cancers per person-rem and for nonoccupational exposure groups the conversion is 5.0x10-4 fatal cancers per person-rem. The following formulas were used to estimate the accident-related health risk of transporting tritium LLW from Pantex to NTS. (a) Effects of radiological release from an accident: Latent cancer fatalities per year = 6.5x10-7 person-rem per shipment x 5.0x10-4cancers per person-rem x number of shipments per year (b) Effects of nonradiological accident: Traffic fatalities per year = 4.3x10-6 fatalities per shipment x number of shipments per year G.6 Supporting Transportation Data Table G.6-1 provides a 5-year summary of the hazardous and nonhazardous cargo shipped by commercial carrier to and from each of the five candidate sites from 1987 through 1991. For the entire Complex, cargo traffic by weight decreased approximately 15 percent per year during this period. Table G.6-1 shows that traffic in 1991 for the sites examined was down 57 percent from 1987 traffic, or about the same annual percentage decline experi- enced by the Complex as a whole. Table G.6-2 lists all of the hazardous material shipments by chemical for 1991, for the five candidate sites. All of these shipments were by commercial carriage. Table G.6-1.-Five-Year Summary of Traffic To/From Proposed Tritium Supply and Recycling Sites Site 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 - Shipments Weight Shipments Weight Shipments Weight Shipments Weight Shipments Weight (number) (pounds) (number) (pounds) (number) (pounds) (number) (pounds) (number) (pounds) Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Nonhazardous 19,239 42,898,007 20,815 44,405,718 23,062 20,088,963 26,075 12,803,235 29,999 11,615,910 Hazardous 1,849 46,575,944 2,321 66,214,775 1,879 51,740,159 1,455 43,140,437 1,542 51,584,218 All cargo 21,088 89,473,951 23,136 110,620,493 24,941 71,829,122 27,530 55,943,672 31,541 63,200,128 Nevada Test Site Nonhazardous 21,967 131,434,065 24,055 106,140,873 26,248 140,037,819 23,077 84,782,403 21,875 79,756,555 Hazardous 2,381 59,344,141 2,389 66,842,376 2,501 69,578,710 1,722 45,471,622 1,304 34,782,556 All cargo 24,348 190,778,206 26,444 172,983,249 28,749 209,616,529 24,799 130,254,025 23,179 114,539,111 Oak Ridge Reservation Nonhazardous 37,872 25,120,900 39,578 25,230,131 36,609 20,043,727 38,009 16,573,098 38,922 14,738,586 Hazardous 3,206 16,124,730 3,070 11,895,666 2,531 9,108,989 1,878 6,530,250 1,281 4,419,765 All cargo 41,078 41,245,630 42,648 37,125,797 39,140 29,152,716 39,887 23,103,348 40,203 19,158,351 Pantex Plant Nonhazardous 7,739 3,547,477 8,140 3,257,166 7,676 3,309,524 8,268 2,867,899 9,772 3,156,359 Hazardous 1,802 1,076,257 1,659 1,135,110 1,589 1,018,242 1,768 814,347 1,273 763,083 All cargo 9,514 4,623,734 9,799 4,392,276 9,265 4,327,766 10,036 3,682,246 11,045 3,919,442 Nonhazardous 14,249 871,069,675 16,309 870,424,143 21,192 512,795,471 35,415 501,730,778 33,484 315,737,363 Hazardous 397 9,564,842 534 12,044,143 537 10,180,879 852 8,778,981 562 8,205,286 All cargo 14,646 880,634,517 16,843 882,468,286 21,729 522,976,350 36,267 510,509,759 34,046 323,942,649 Table G.6-2.-Hazardous Materials Shipments for Proposed Tritium Supply Technologies and Recycling Sites, 1991 [Page 1 of 3] Commodity INEL NTS ORR Pantex SRS - Shipments Weight Shipments Weight Shipments Weight Shipments Weight Shipments Weight (number) (pounds) (number) (pounds) (number) (pounds) (number) (pounds) (number) (pounds) Acetylene gas 0 0 2 840 0 0 0 0 0 0 Aluminum sulfate, solid 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 50,800 Ammonia hydroxide 0 0 3 108 1 496 0 0 0 0 Ammonia, anhydrous 5 3,005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Ammonium fluoride 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Argon 2 14,561 4 1,750 0 0 2 11,640 2 810 Asbestos articles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 505 Asphalt 0 0 7 182,660 2 3,244 0 0 1 900 Beryllium metal 3 74 0 0 14 32,338 0 0 0 0 Blasting agents 1 150 0 0 0 0 4 278 0 0 Cadmium nitrate 0 0 0 0 2 1,386 0 0 0 0 Cadmium sulfate 1 125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Calcium nitrate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 Chlorine 4 1,500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Class A explosives, n.o.s. 1 225 3 5,403 2 1,214 69 26,684 0 0 Class A poison 1 530 1 132 1 2 1 18 4 215 Class B explosives, n.o.s. 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 3,384 0 0 Class B poison 5 137 6 594 6 1,849 3 706 4 136 Class C explosives, n.o.s. 7 297 3 531 3 62 550 74,288 16 6,583 Combustible liquid, n.o.s. 9 143,696 26 313,837 2 1,759 0 0 10 7,397 Corrosive material, n.o.s. 92 693,757 94 220,153 126 562, 948 39 30,137 73 155,530 Dry ice 0 0 0 0 15 228 0 0 0 0 Empty hazmat containers, non-RAM 1 37,000 82 692,937 28 53,218 1 6,000 4 24,450 Ferrous sulfate 0 0 0 0 1 2,804 0 0 0 0 Flammable gas, n.o.s. 23 137,556 26 105,297 27 20,473 6 697 7 5,279 Flammable liquid, n.o.s. 45 479,105 106 84,386 88 91,163 35 10,497 106 120,882 Flammable solid, n.o.s. 12 249 2 6,002 13 2,846 37 2,370 6 301 Fluoboric acid 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 Fuel oil (e.g., diesel, 1-6) 458 29,210,972 176 13,075,374 1 176 0 0 2 14,950 Gasoline 96 4,510,733 177 11,156,027 2 6,509 0 0 0 0 Hazardous waste (non-RAM) 0 0 8 8,498 13 67,001 0 0 31 84,477 Helium 16 0 10 196,002 26 59,123 13 4,046 3 455 Hydrocarbon diluent 0 0 1 5,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 Hydrochloric acid 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 8 4,115 Hydrofluoric acid, concentrated 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 150 Hydrofluoric acid, solution, spent 0 0 0 0 1 100 0 0 0 0 Hydrogen gas 5 1,708 0 0 2 4,508 3 696 3 304 Hydrogen peroxide 1 20 0 0 3 3,940 0 0 6 1,125 Lithium metal 0 0 0 0 33 17,043 71 12,999 1 326 Lubricating oil 3 1,131 48 228,877 20 20,380 21 16,225 15 16,556 Magnesium, powder, metal and strip 0 0 1 70,000 3 708 0 0 0 0 Methyl isobutyl ketone 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 420 0 0 Nitric acid, (40 percent or less) 1 438 3 30 1 605 0 0 10 10,510 Nitric acid, (over 40 percent) 0 0 1 6 2 39,500 0 0 5 91,816 Nitric acid, fuming 1 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 14 2,420 Nitrogen 73 1,868,275 6 70,330 3 44 2 480 0 0 Nonflammable gas, n.o.s. 96 121,888 122 317,950 114 107,183 96 45,630 49 202,915 Organic peroxide, n.o.s. 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 529 5 129 ORM A, n.o.s. 3 702 2 804 0 0 8 322 2 387 ORM B, n.o.s. 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ORM C, n.o.s. 1 2 3 270 0 0 0 0 0 0 ORM D, consumer commodity 7 45,813 26 9,608 0 0 2 594 14 13,658 ORM E, n.o.s. 1 2 2 4,150 0 0 0 0 1 496 Oxidizer, n.o.s. 4 1,378 18 4,886 0 0 7 3,485 28 231,114 Oxygen 137 5,741,266 7 12,833 2 33 0 0 0 0 RAM, empty packages 37 842,604 0 0 110 628,991 75 551,005 42 1,922,961 RAM, fissile, n.o.s. 12 236,232 0 0 16 18,223 0 0 1 504 RAM, fissile, <20 percent U-235 0 0 0 0 7 90,970 0 0 0 0 RAM, fissile, >20 percent U-235 0 0 0 0 2 13 0 0 0 0 RAM, fissile, HRCQ, IR PINS 6 219,900 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 4,214,075 RAM, instr. and articles 4 235 5 1,480 0 0 0 0 4 773 RAM, LSA, n.o.s. 177 6,277,183 2 81,420 13 79,150 1 6 2 29 RAM, LSA, waste 0 0 204 7,293,198 1 18,750 0 0 0 0 RAM, LTD quant, n.o.s. 85 61,506 5 30,284 97 315,878 3 8,468 25 62,751 RAM, n.o.s. 69 546,097 22 825 426 1,062,587 198 159,731 20 162,534 RAM, n.o.s. HRCQ 0 0 0 0 1 50,300 0 0 2 1,040 RAM, n.o.s., special 24 11,181 27 2,078 21 43,924 0 0 2 2,185 RAM, n.o.s., waste 0 0 0 0 1 16,436 0 0 0 0 RAM, U-metal, PYROP 0 00 0 0 3 1,388 0 0 3 0 RAM, U-NO3, solid 0 0 0 0 1 30 0 00 0 0 Small arms ammunition 2 6,498 4 4,168 31 45,359 40 19,581 0 0 Sodium hydroxide (caustic soda) 5 235,260 1 160 2 39400 0 0 17 0 Sodium metal (non-RAM) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 815 0 0 Sodium nitrate 1 11 2 624 2 5,384 0 0 3 0 Sulfuric acid 5 192,870 1 15 28 1,160,833 2 141 11 0 1,1,1-Trichloroethane 1 3,170 0 0 2 42,355 0 0 1 0 Wet cell batteries 9 738 90 593,257 0 0 32 28,971 42 51,649 Table G.6-3 gives air distances between selected sites. These distances are those usually travelled when transporting limited-life components by Ross Aviation. Table G.6-3.-Air Mileage Between Selected Sites Site SRS Pantex ORR NTS INEL Idaho National 1,550 720 1,395 495 - Engineering Laboratory Nevada Test Site 1,705 705 1,570 - 495 Oak Ridge Reservation 190 875 - 1,570 1,395 Pantex Plant 1,010 - 875 705 720 Savannah River Site - 1,010 190 1,705 1,550 Source: DOE 1994b:1. G.7 Largest Components Requiring Transportation The reactor vessel and steam generator are unusually large components that require special consideration for transport to the site for installation. Table G.7-1 provides the weight and dimensions for representative reactor vessels and steam generators for each of the reactor technologies. Table G.7-1.-Representative Vessel and Steam Generator Size Type of Reactor Reactor Vessel Steam Generator - Weight Length Outside Weight Length Outside (tons) (ft) Dimensions (tons) (ft) Dimensions (ft) (ft) Heavy Water Reactor 130 32 20 NA NA NA Modular High 893 74 25 355 92 17 Temperature Gas- Cooled Reactor Advanced Light 480 43 20 310 75 16 Water Reactor Boiling Water/ 350 73 22 NA NA NA Advanced Light Water Reactor Note: NA - not applicable. Source: DOE 1994c:1. -TSAR_DOE_SECTION- G.8 Tritiated Heavy Water G.8 Tritiated Heavy Water Tritiated heavy water is required only for the Heavy Water Reactor (HWR) and the Accelerator Production of Tritium (APT) technologies. Locating an HWR at INEL, NTS, ORR, or Pantex would require the 1-time shipment of approximately 680 metric tons of tritiated heavy water from SRS to the selected site for the initial filling of the reactor's primary coolant system. Transporting this amount would require an estimated 38 truckloads of 18 tons each, or eighty 55-gallon drums per truckload. The level of tritium contamination in the heavy water varies from 3 to 13 curies per liter. At the maximum concentration, a truckload would not exceed 2.0x105Ci of tritium. Transporting heavy water for the initial filling would occur within a 1-year period (DOE1991k:K-12, K-24). DOE evaluated the risk of transporting tritiated heavy water from SRS to INEL (DOE 1991k:K-30, K-32); this also represents a typical route in this PEIS. Based on the assessment, the estimated cancer fatalities resulting from potential traffic accidents associated with the transport of tritiated water would be 3.57x10-5. During the reactor's 40-year lifetime, additional heavy water would be needed for makeup from leaks, transport to the Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Basin, and maintenance activities. The total amount of heavy water required to be transported could be the remainder of the 1,700 metric tons inventory available at SRS. The potential annual cancer fatalities from traffic accidents to transport the entire 1,700metric tons inventory to meet both the initial filling and replenishment needs is estimated to be 8.94x10-5. Locating the APT technology at INEL, NTS, ORR, or Pantex would require the shipment of approximately 86 metric tons of tritiated heavy water from SRS for the initial fill of the helium-3 target and approximately 1 metric ton annually for makeup. The total amount of heavy water to be transported for the life of the APT would be approximately 126 metric tons. The potential annual cancer fatalities from traffic accidents to transport the entire amount of heavy water for the APT is estimated to be 6.63x10-6. Because tritium is a beta emitter, the radiological risk from incident-free transportation is extremely small.
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