Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Verification And Arms Control: Fiction Or Reality?

 

CSC 1995

 

SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues

 

 

 

                                                  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

Title: Verification and Arms Control: Fiction or Reality?

 

Author: LtCol. Juan Pardo, Spanish Marine Corps.

 

Thesis: Despite the old controversy about the usefulness of verification and arms control, the

 international disarmament agreements of today offer hope for the future.

 

Background: Presently, three forums are working, with more or less intensity, on different

disarmament agreements already in force or still in process. They are the Conference on

Disarmament of the United Nations, the Negotiations on Nuclear Disarmament, and the

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Through the analysis of the most relevant

agreements under these forums, though without delving into technical and specific details, I

show the evolution of the modem disarmament agreements, and how this evolution reinforces the

importance of verification measures and procedures. I analyze the different approaches to these

kind of international agreements, with their advantages and disadvantages. Basically, I compare

the agreements written in highly specific and technical language with those written in general

terms, avoiding details. I also compare bilateral and multilateral agreements. I analyze failures

and successes, weakness and strength on each approach. Then, I emphasize the important impact

that, from my point of view, verification regimes have on arms control, as well as the risks that

verification tasks imply.

 

Conclusions and recommendations: Taking into account the current situation in disarmament

and arms control, as well as my own experience in these matters, I offer a perspective on the

future to conclude that, despite the recent world changes and the uncertain future, arms control

agreements provide an important way to further world security. Moreover, when backed by

efficient verification regimes, they will also serve to release international tensions and to defuse

mutual secretiveness. Finally, I make two brief, although to me important, recommendations:

first, not risk the success of arms control collecting intelligence through verification measures,

and second, to provide financial and technical aid to poorer countries to encourage and facilitate 

them to join and fulfill disarmament agreements.

 

 

                                                             ACRONYMS

 

ADM: Air Defense Missile

AFAP: Artillery Forces Atomic Projectiles

ACV: Armored Combat Vehicle

BTWC: Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention

CD: Conference on Disarmament

CFE: Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States

CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CWC: Chemical Weapons Convention

EC: European Community

HLWG: High Level Working Group

INF: Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NPT: Non Proliferation Treaty

OOST: Ost-Outer Space Treaty

OS: Open Skies

OSI: On-Site Inspection

PTBT: Partial Test Ban Treaty

SIPRI: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SRNF: Short-Range Nuclear Forces

START: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

UN: United Nations

UVE: Unidad de Verificacion Espanola

VCC: Verification Coordination Committee

WP: Warsaw Pact

 

                  VERIFICATION AND ARMS CONTROL: FICTION OR REALITY?

 

I. INTRODUCTION.

 

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the processes of verification and arms control

carried out in the international realm. This study intends to reconcile the antagonistic postures

between those who still think that disarmament agreements are a myth and those who firmly

believe in their usefulness.

            I will base the analysis on both the widely available bibliography and my personal

experience as a member of the Spanish Verification Unit for the last four years. During that time

 October 1990 to July 1994 in which dramatic world changes challenged the letter and spirit

 of many international agreements, I had the opportunity to participate in many verification and

arms control activities: as an inspector forming part of a national or multinational team, and as a

representative of my country in courses, meetings and seminars regarding these matters.1

            The aspiration of the human being for avoiding wars or, at least, lessening their terrible

aftermath, is as ancient as mankind. The agreements, alliances, prohibitions or limitations

carried out by nations or group of nations to attempt to reach the desired peace are innumerable.

We can find examples of disarmament measures in the ancient ages, like the "obliged delivery of

the elephants by the Carthaginians to the Romans" or the "Roman imposition to King Philip of

Macedonia to hold a fleet of not more than six vessels" and, in the middle age, the "the ban on

using the cross bow dictated in the second council of Lateran."2

            Having suggested the antiquity of disarmament agreements, I will turn now to analyze

the most recent international agreements. In this context, consider the following statement of Dr.

Frank Barneby, director of the very famous Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

 

(SIPRI):

 

Verification is a crucial but controversial issue in disarmament negotiations. On the one

 hand, States need adequate assurances of the compliance of others in any agreements

 reached. On the other hand, verification can be, and often is, used as an excuse for lack

 of progress in arms control and disarmament negotiations. In the end, of course, the

 main factor determining the success or failure of disarmament efforts is the political will

 of the counties involved to obtain an agreement. But, even so, the importance of

 verification cannot be doubted.3

            I will not delve deeply into the specific and technical details of the different treaties and

 agreements. After explaining the meaning of some elemental terminology, I will briefly show

 the most significant aspects of the agreements in force and negotiations in progress. Finally,

through the analyses of their results, as well as my personal experience, I will offer a future

perspective to present some conclusions and recommendations.

 

2. THE MEANING OF DISARMAMENT, CONTROL AND VERIFICATION.

            To understand the reach and importance of verification and arms control, it is first

 necessary to clarify terminology. Defining "disarmament" is not hard; it means the reduction or

elimination of weapons. The problem comes in describing precisely what weapons to eliminate.

David W. Ziegler presents a list of seven distinct possibilities along the wide range of

disarmament: (1) Total disarmament, (2) Disarmament to the lowest point consistent with

domestic safety, (3) Disarmament to the lowest point consistent with national safety, (4)

Qualitative disarmament, (5) Quantitative disarmament, (6) Budgetary limitation, and (7)

Regional disarmament.4

            More difficult is to establish an unambiguous definition for the word "control."  The word

not only has different meanings in different languages, but even within and individual language it

may have a range of meanings.  The French definition describes the verb as "to check, test or

verify by evidence or experiments," and the noun form as "the act or instance of controlling."

The English connotation of the word is "to exercise restraining or directing influence over,"

hence "to regulate and "to have power on ," hence "to rule."  The definition of the noun form is

"the skill in the use of a tool, instrument or technique," or alternatively, as "direction, regulation,

coordination."5

            This variety of meanings leads to considerable confusion on the field of disarmament

 

negotiation.  Thus, because of the predominance of English as an international language, the term

 

has come to denote a specific type of disarmament in which states restrain their armaments in

 

order to rationalize their security efforts or to curb their most dangerous military activities.  In

 

this sense of the word, control has come to be synonymous with arms limitation, but the word is

 

also used in its French sense, as meaning the act of checking or verifying the actions of states

 

implementing disarmament.6

 

            Finally, "verification" is, according to the Webster's dictionary, "the act or process of

 

verifying or the state of being verified; the authentication of truth or accuracy by such means as

 

facts, statement, citations, measurements, or attendant circumstances, confirmation by evidence

 

in law...."7  Although this definition does not seem very applicable to disarmament, we can apply

 

to it the idea of positive and negative verification.  Different authors define "verification of

 

disarmament"  in different ways.  The SIPRI offers, in my opinion a comprehensive definition

 

for our purposes:

 

Verification of disarmament. A process, specifically established or approved by a

disarmament agreement, carried out by individual state parties to the agreement, either

reciprocally or not, or by an international body established or empowered to carry out

the process, by personnel or by technical means, in order to determine the degree to

which the parties to the agreement have implemented its provisions and thereby observed

or discharged their obligations under the treaty.8

 

3. AGREEMENTS IN FORCE AND NEGOTIATIONS IN PROGRESS.

Dynamics and growing complexity of the field of arms control demand permanent action

 by nations. Currently three forums are working on the different agreements already in force or

 still in progress: (1) the Conference on Disarmament of United Nations, (2) Negotiations on

 nuclear disarmament, and (3) the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. I will

 mention the most relevant agreements under each forum.

 

Conference on Disarmament (CD) of United Nations (UN), with seat in Geneva:

            This conference consists of 10 western countries, 23 former Warsaw Pact (WP) countries,

and 21 neutral countries.  Although a significant number of committees are working on different

matters9, it is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) that, for the time being, seems to

 promise some success.

Besides the convention itself, a bilateral agreement between the United States and the

former Soviet Union, signed in July 1990, reinforces the firm purpose of no chemical weapons

production, supporting the CWC. Unfortunately, this agreement is still awaiting ratification.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) lacks funds and adequate organization, and the

United States is still checking the efficiency of its destruction facilities.

            On January 14, 1993, after hard and intense negotiations, more than one hundred

countries signed the CWC. In accordance with its article XXI, the agreement will enter in force

180 days after deposit of the 65th ratification instrument . Containing a global application, this

 agreement has a great advantage over the bilateral START or regional agreements concerning the

Conventional Armed Forces. It represents major progress in the field of disarmament, because

of the fact that it not only prohibits the use of chemical weapons" but also their production and

storage. However, it is the detailed verification process that this agreement contains which

actually reinforces its credibility.

 

Negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

     On the multilateral field, we can mention the following treaties and agreements: the

Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963, negotiated by the Soviet Union and Great Britain,

banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, the exterior space, and underwater; the Ost-Outer Space

Treaty (OOST), which bans the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in space; and the Non

Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 that commits countries without nuclear weapons to not

acquire them, while the owners commit themselves to look, by means of negotiations, for nuclear

disarmament.

     In the framework of bilateral negotiations, the famous Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces

(INF) Treaty, signed in December 1987 by the United States and the Soviet Union, was a

milestone of disarmament agreements. The INF Treaty revolutionized verification procedures by

providing for On-Site Inspections (OSI) of the elimination of missiles and launchers, the

confirmation of baseline data exchanged, and the establishment of portal monitoring (a

twenty-four-hour-a-day presence) at missile facilities at Votkinsk in the Soviet Union heartland

and at Magna, Utah, in the United States. Thus far, the INF Treaty has been the most extensive

and intrusive verification process agreed to in arms control history before the entry in force of the

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.11

            On July 31, 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the START I (Strategic

Arms Reduction Talks), considered the main goal in the process of reduction of weapons of mass

destruction. The two more relevant aspects of this treaty were the reduction of Intercontinental

Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) until reaching

an equal ceiling of 1600 and 6000 warheads, respectively, by the 7th year after the entry in force;

on the other hand, and more interesting to this analysis, the establishment of very important

verification measures.

            The year 1992 began what we could call the "war of initiatives," in which both the United 

States and Russia committed themselves to perform a series of unilateral measures reducing and

limiting their weapons of mass destruction. As a result, a few days before he left the White

House, George Bush signed the START II Treaty with Boris Yeltsen. The Treaty was much

more ambitious and significantly decreased the ceilings agreed to in the previous START I.

            Finally, the Short-Range Nuclear Forces (SRNF) Talks foresee the destruction and global

elimination of all the Artillery Forces Atomic Projectiles (AFAP) and all the nuclear warheads of

short-range surface-to-surface missiles. In addition, Russian President Gorbachov announced

that his country would destroy all Air Defense Missiles (ADMs) and consolidate their nuclear

warheads.

 

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

            On July 3, 1973, the inauguration of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in

Europe took place in the city of Helsinki.  All European countries (with the exception of

Albania), the United States, and Canada participated. Currently, after the incorporation of

Albania and the breaking-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia", as well as the division of

Czechoslovakia, the total number of members is 55.

            The first fruit of their negotiations was the Stockholm Document (September 19, 1986)

which represented an important milestone in arms control procedures and in confidence and

security measures. This document agreed to a series of new actions. These actions involved the

previous notification of military activities exceeding determined ceilings and provided a

verification system that included OSIs, observation of military activities exceeding certain

ceilings on troops, and evaluation visits of military units. Under this remarkable regime, the

Soviets inspected military maneuvers in Turkey and vice-versa; the Bulgarians did the same in

Italy; and the Polish in West Germany. Soviet and United States inspectors have each observed

a number of exercises by each side.13

                 Although very important, the Vienna Documents of 1990 and 1992 have already

superseded this document. The Vienna documents include important modifications to the

former Stockholm Document, mainly regarding data exchange, which include detailed

information on military forces, equipment and deployment plans, as well as military budgets.

They also reinforce the verification system; open a mechanism of consultation and cooperation

on risk reduction matters; establish a formal procedure to carry out military contacts; and open a

direct communications net among capitals to transmit messages related to the agreed measures.

            The negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe among the member countries

of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which began in Vienna in March 1989, resulted in the

conclusion of the CFE Treaty on November 1990. The 22 States signed the Treaty during a

summit meeting in Paris under the framework of the CSCE.

            As a result of the dramatic political and military developments which have taken place

since 1989, some of the initial premises for the CFE Treaty changed along the course of the

negotiations. Key factors were the unification of Germany, substantial Soviet troop withdrawals

from Eastern Europe, the advent of democratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe, and

 the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact.14

            The Treaty imposes limits on key categories of forces and equipment held individually

and collectively. The purpose of these limits is not only to bring about dramatic reductions, but

also to ensure that no single country is able to play a dominating military role on the European

Continent. Tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), combat aircraft, and helicopters

are the main categories covered by the provisions of the CFE Treaty.

            The implementation of the provisions of the Treaty is subject to a precise calendar and a

very rigid process of data exchanges. However, the strength of this document lies in the very

strictly detailed verification clauses contained in its Protocol on Inspection. Under the provisions

of this protocol, it is possible to verify not only the exactness of the military information

provided by the parties, but also the complete development of the reduction process.         

            The breaking-up of the Soviet Union endangered the enforcement of the Treaty.

However, the members of NATO, together with their cooperation partners, were determined to

move forward promptly with its ratification and implementation as the cornerstone of Europe's

future military security and stability. They jointly established a High Level Working Group

(HLWG) which, in May 1992, reached an agreement with the eight former Soviet states about

the apportionment of rights and obligations assumed by the former Soviet Union under the terms

of the CFE Treaty. This agreement allowed, finally, the implementation of the CFE Treaty

throughout the area of application on July 17, 1992. Consequently, the signers immediately

implemented the verification procedures.15

            The Joint Consultative Group (JCG), a committee formed by representatives of all the

signatories countries, discusses all ambiguities, problems, and proposals. The JCG, which meets

at least twice a year, guarantees the continuity, updating and improvement of the CFE Treaty.

            Finally, the Open Skies Treaty (OS) is the most modem agreement in the field of

verification and arms control. In a speech on 12 May 1989, President Bush recalled President

Eisenhower's proposal at the 1955 Geneva Summit for "Open, Skies", which would have allowed

unarmed aircraft from the United States and the Soviet Union to overfly the territory of the other

for surveillance to "convince the world that we are... lessening the danger and relaxing tension".

As President Bush noted, the Kremlim quickly rejected this proposal in that earlier era of

mistrust.16

            After being presented such a proposal on a broader, more intrusive and radical base,

Moscow responded positively to this new Open Skies concept in September 1989.17 The

objective is to encourage reciprocal openness among members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact to

observe military activities and installations and reduce tension by increasing transparency.

Basically, the treaty allows each of the signatory states to overfly the territories of the other,

including United States, Canada and the Russian territory beyond the Urals. In this treaty-- in

fact, an enlargement of the CFE Treaty the expression "from Vancouver to Vladivostock"

 substitutes the CFE phrase "from the Atlantic to the Urals" when referring to the territory of

application.

                 Therefore, the great value of the Open Skies Treaty is that, despite the fact that it does not

contain any clause concerning the reduction of weapons or ceilings of military forces, it allows

all parties to verify disarmament agreements by means of the most advanced and sophisticated

observation devices. This treaty, already signed by the same signatories of the CFE Treaty, will

enter in force 60 days after a minimum of 20 countries, with more than 8 passive quotas18, ratify

it.

 

 

4. DIFFERENT APPROACHES: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES.

            Arms control agreements generally take one of two forms, each one with its own

advantages and disadvantages. The first approach is to formulate broad principles to deal

comprehensively with a particular issue area. The objective is to emphasize intent in general

terms with the advantage of avoiding the specifics of a laundry list that may turn out to be

incomplete. Such "deliberate vagueness" is a characteristic of the Chemical Weapons Agreement

signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachov in June 1990 and the Vienna Document 1992. On the

other hand, agreements such as the CFE Treaty and OS Treaty contain language that is highly

specific and very technical. This second approach is one of specificity which can more easily

avoid troublesome "gray areas." Disputes over definitions, and disagreements over what is or is

not included, should be less frequent.  To be exhaustive, however, can also be dangerous. It is

very difficult to think of everything, and attempts to devise language that will cover

unanticipated technical developments can open up a legal hornet's nest.19

            The verification processes can also structure themselves in a general or a specific form.

As a general rule, the more specific the treaty, the more rigorous are the provisions on the

structure of verification. We can compare, as an example, the 1992 Vienna Document and the

CFE Treaty: both agreements contemplate many similar aspects (the area of application and the

military forces subject to both documents are, although not identical, very similar); However,

while the CFE Treaty is actually an exhaustive and detailed treaty, with a rigorous verification

process, the 1992 Vienna Document is a very brief document in which implementation depends

more on the willingness of the signatories than in its own provisions. The difference is clear; the

spirit of the 1992 Vienna Document rests on mutual confidence and trust; it attempts to foster

confidence and security among the signatories by mean of a series of measures in which

application depends, mainly, on the willingness of the different countries. Contrary to this, the

CFE Treaty bases its philosophy on verification; "rely, but verify" is a very diplomatic phrase

 

with which people involved in this business sum up this concept.20

            The CSCE forum gave birth to the great contradiction between two arms control

agreements. How to reconcile these two different approaches? My personal experience suggests

that what is happening is, in reality, a spontaneous merging of both agreements, probably

because the majority of the national verification agencies employ the same inspectors to carry out

visits, observations, evaluations, and verification tasks on both agreements. The consequence is

that while smoothly carrying out the CFE inspections, members of the Vienna Document tacitly

accept many provisions of the CFE Treaty as a way to facilitate the fulfillment of an agreement

which would, otherwise, undoubtedly raise many ambiguities.21

            Another matter is the difference between bilateral and multilateral agreements.

Apparently, a bilateral agreement is easier to carry out than a multilateral one. However, it is

also true that the more countries interested in signing a treaty, the more benefits the treaty will

bring. The problem is to achieve the consensus among them; the interrelation among different

national interests often interfere with the successful entry in force. Some of the current

disarmament agreements are still waiting for the mandatory ratification of the national

parliaments.

            This is the case, for example, of the CWC. Despite the fact that more than one hundred

countries (among them United States, Russia, Israel, South Africa, Iran, and the European

Community (EC) countries) have signed it, most of the Arabic countries have refused to sign it

until Israel agrees to abide by the provisions of the NPT.  Another example of delay in the entry

in force of a treaty because of a lack of parliamentary ratification is the OS Treaty. As

mentioned above, this treaty will enter in force 60 days after at least 20 countries, with more than

8 passive quotas, ratify it. Currently, there are only 18 instruments of ratification. The key

countries include Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, three important countries with more than 8

passive quotas which are having difficulty obtaining ratification by their respective parliaments,

because of high cost.22

 

            From the point of view of verification, bilateral agreements are, in general terms, easier to

carry out, because of the fact that they only involve two parties. However, it is also true that the

multilateral agreements, despite complicated procedures to accomplish the verification processes,

allow "universal benefits;" the more members involve themselves in an international treaty, the

more credibility it will have within the International Community.

             Finally, let me mention the last, although not least, problem which arises from modem

disarmament agreements which include a verification process: the conflict between "intelligence"

and "verification." James Brown says:

The entire process of verification is one of intelligence gathering capabilities specifically

directed to arms control provisions. What can or cannot be verified sets the limits on

what can legitimately be controlled by a treaty.23

 

            Until this point, I would agree with his statement; however, he continues to set the

following five general categories of verification measures: (1) Cooperative measures; for

instance, exchange of military information; (2) National technical means, such as non- intrusive

observation from radar, optical, and satellite surveillance; (3) Technical monitoring devices

placed at or near sites; (4) OSIs; and (5) Intelligence channels, such as agents, emigre or defector

interviews, communication intercepts, and information leaks.24

            To me, with the exception of the last procedure, which in my personal opinion supposes a

serious violation of any agreement, the rest of the verification measures would be acceptable

while maintaining themselves within the limits of the provisions of the treaty. The reality is,

however, that in many occasions these measures, when used in an abusive way, go far beyond the

mere purpose of verifying. Then, when the use turns into abuse, conflicts arise, and the treaty

itself can come into risk.25

            OSIs are, perhaps, the most controversial verification procedure from this particular point

of view. They have occupied much of the time and effort of arms control negotiators. The

purpose of the OSIs is, precisely, to discourage cheating by making the cost of evasion

unattractive. Therefore, the prevention of abuse in this sort of verification is essential to the

success of the agreement.  As previously mentioned, the INF Treaty between The United States

and the former Soviet Union contains a very detailed verification process, including OSIs.

Overall, the verification provisions of this treaty have set new standards of rigor." Another

example of successful and rigorous OSIs are those carried out under the provisions of the

protocol on verification of the CFE Treaty; since the entry in force of this treaty on July 17,

1992, inspectors from the 30 signatory countries have performed more than one thousand OSIs,

either in national or multinational teams.

 

5. PRESENT AND FUTURE.

 

            The ancient human aspiration of disarmament and arms control is something that

mankind continues to try to carry out in the present and provides important hopes for the future.

The complexity of international relations and the diversity of modem weapons, as well as their

enormous destructive power, have combined to multiply the forums where these sorts of

negotiations take place.

                   Presently we already have in force, or close to implementation, treaties on nuclear,

chemical, biological and conventional disarmament. The conventions on biological and

chemical weapons, since promoted by the United Nations, contain a universal dimension. The

Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972 was very ambitious, but the lack of

a verification regime has made it a mere show of good intentions. In contrast, the CWC, as

ambitious as the BTWC, has the great advantage of a very exhaustive and detailed verification

protocol, therefore, increasing the likelihood of its successful fulfillment. However, because of

the high cost of the chemical weapons' destruction, even higher than its production, the financial

 

aid to Eastern countries from the West is essential.

 

            On the field of nuclear disarmament, regardless of certain treaties, like the NPT of 1968,

 

which is no more than an expression although important of political will, true advances have

taken place in the framework of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the former

Soviet Union. In this context, the aid from Western countries to the former Soviet republics with

nuclear capacity is also essential, not only to finance the fulfillment of the provisions of the

treaties, but also to convert the ex-Soviet nuclear industry. The key to these bilateral agreements

is their extensive and intrusive verification processes, like those of the INIF Treaty.

            Within the forum of the CSCE, the former Stockholm Document, later modified and

improved by the Vienna Documents of 1990 and 1992, contained a milestone to foster

confidence and security among the participant states. Despite the lack of a binding legal treaty,

all the signatories have scrupulously respected these political agreements and, more importantly,

they have served as the test laboratory for an exceptionally important international treaty: the

CFE Treaty.

            The CFE Treaty, although sponsored by the CSCE, only has NATO and former Warsaw

Pact members as signatories. This was the price necessary to achieve significant results. This

treaty plays a significant role in the new international order, both for the role to which it was

originally designed, and as a forum which allows intense contact among military people from

both groups of states27.   The military contacts, not only during the inspections, but also in

seminars, courses, conferences, and meetings, are helping to knock down a world of

incomprehension, intolerance, fear and distrust which characterized the years of the Cold War.

In addition, its exhaustive verification protocol, which is successfully being performed, allows

not only verification of the provisions of the treaty, but also prevents or, at least, makes difficult

the use of conventional weapons in current or future conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe.

            The scrupulous fulfillment of all terms of the CFE Treaty, its extension to other

provisions like the limitation on personnel strength, the possibility of including new armaments

and equipment in the list of "existing types"" and finally, the possibility of including future naval

forces, makes the future of the conventional disarmament in Europe optimistic. However, after

the entry in force of the OS Treaty we will see the future even more optimistically. This Treaty,

besides complementing the already exhaustive CFE inspections regime, will enlarge, as I have

mentioned before, the territory of application to the United States, Canada and the territory

beyond the Urals. The possibility of the adherence to this treaty of the CSCE members other

than the CFE countries is the next challenge for the CSCE. If this comes to fruition, the

Conference will become a true mechanism of collective security in Europe.

 

6.- CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

 

            As we have seen before, not all the forums have achieved the same success. However,

one fact seems to be clear: today, issues related to the verification of arms control have become

increasingly important. Despite the old controversy about the usefulness of verification in

disarmament negotiations, these treaties demonstrate that the key to any arms control agreement

lies in the provisions for its verification. The more rigorous and detailed the verification

protocols are, the more difficult and risky the evasion or circumvention.29

            The purpose of verification provisions in arms control agreements is, precisely, to

promote compliance by making the costs and risks of evasion or circumvention unacceptably

high. Thus, all modem arms control agreements contain details of what is or is not permitted

along with specific procedures to ensure that evasion or circumvention is difficult and

unattractive.30

                 Disarmament agreements, when well supported by efficient verification processes, will

help foster mutual confidence and world security.  Moreover, verification measures conducted

amidst frank discussions will serve to relieve international tensions and to defuse mutual

secretiveness.

            In conclusion, I would make two recommendations: first, based on my own experience in

 

these matters, I would strongly encourage people involved in disarmament and arms control to

avoid the easy temptation of taking advantage of the verification procedures to make or obtain

intelligence. In other words: verification does not mean espionage. Inspectors work in front of

the public; spies do it clandestinely. This unfair play will dangerously risk the present and the

future of disarmament agreements. Finally, I would call attention to the importance of the

solidarity among rich and poor nations to make possible the processes of disarmament. They

suppose a high cost that many countries cannot afford. The treaties themselves are very

important; their verification processes also. But that is not enough: the financial and technical

aid from West to East, from North to South is, no doubt, essential to successfully achieve the

goals of the international treaties.

1                      The Spanish Verification Unit (Unidad de Verificacion Espanola UVE) was created in

October 1990 to face the multiples obligations acquired by Spain on the field of the verification

and arms control as a consequence of the current and future international agreements signed by

my country. I pride myself on having being one of the founders. My background consists of

responsability for information exchanges as well as my participation in about thirty CFE or

CSCE            activities, including inspections or evaluations in the following countries: Albania,

Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep., Eslovenia, Hungary, Poland,

Russia,            Slovaquia, Sweden, Ukraine and Yugoslavia.

2                      Ensenat y Berea, Amador. Tratados y Acuerdos de Desarme: Un Camino hacia la Paz.

Estudio            monografico para el Master en Relaciones Internacionales, Curso 1992  1993. Madrid.

3                        Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Strategic Disarmament,

Verification and National Security (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1977), p. v.

4                      Ziegler, David W. War, Peace, and International Politics (Western Washington

University. Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), p.253.

5                        Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: G. and C. Merrian,

1969).

6                      SIPRI. Strategic Disarmament, Verification and National Security, p. 11.

7                        Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: G. and C. Merrian

1966),   p. 2543.

8                      SIPRI. Strategic Disarmament, Verification and National Security, p. 13.

9                      The committee on Radiological Arms, the committee of the Experts on Seismology, the

Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention

(CWC) are the four committees under this forum.

10                   As a matter of fact, the use of chemical weapons was already banned by the Geneva

Protocol of 1925.

11                   SIPRI. Strategic Disarmament. Verification and National Security, pp. 13-14.

12                   Besides the new members coming from the former Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia itself still

belong   to the CSCE, although for the time being it is in the status of "suspended".

13                   Lehman 11, the Honorable Ronald F. "Verification in the Age of Glasnost and Open

Skies",  in Verification. The Key to Arms Control in the 1990s (Washington: Ed. by John G.

Tower,  James Brown & William K. Cheek, Brassey's (US), Inc., 1992), pp. 4-5.

14                   Ibid, p. 4

15                   NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992), pp. 75-76.

16                   Lehman 11. Verification in the Age of Glasnost and Open Skies, p. 9.

17                   This initiative was presented by president Bush to the Senior Political Committee of the

North Atlantic Council in August 31, 1989. Soviet Foreign' Minister Shevardnadze responded

positively to US Secretary of State Baker at a ministerial meeting in Wyoming in September

1989.

18                   The term "Passive Quota" is defined by the Open Skies Treaty as the number of times

that one state party can be overflown, under the provisions of the treaty, in a year.

19                   Brown, James. Verification. The Key to Arms Control in the 1990s , p.xvi.

20                        Although the phrase "rely, but verify" is widely accepted in the field of verification, I

would argue that if someone verifies, it is because he doe's not rely. Therefore, we could say,

more honestly, "mistrust and verify".

21                        Presently, there is a working group in the CSCE, in Vienna, working in the

homogenization of the military data exchanged every year under the provisions of both

agreements, the CFE Treaty and The Vienna Document 1992. The intention is that one only

national data exchange satisfy the provisions of both documents. This is, no doubt, a clear

symptom of how close each one is to the other.

22                        Information provided to the author by fax from the Spanish Verification Unit on January,

20, 1995. In according with the same source, it seems to be that, hopefully, the treaty could be

ready to entry in force after next summer.

23                   Brown, James. Verification. The Key to Arms Control in the 1990s, p. xvii.

24                   Ibid pp. xvii  xviii.

25                   As responsible of the Information Section in the Spanish Verification Unit, I always

inculcated to the inspectors that intelligence could and must support the verification tasks, but,

under no any circumstance, verification must be used as a mean to make or obtain intelligence.

26                   Brown, James. Verification. The Key to Arms Control in the 1990s, p. xviii.

27                   The CFE Treaty defines two groups of States Parties, one is NATO and the other is the

former              Warsaw Pact. Despite the dissolution of the last one as an alliance, the fulfillment of the

provisions of the treaty are being carried out successfully.

28                   The protocol on "Existing Types" contains a list with the categories, models, types and

versions of all the conventional weapons limited and/or subject to the CFE Treaty. This list is

open to new armaments and equipment proposed by the states parties. This means that the list

can be            modified, in the bosom of the JCG, in Vienna, by agreement among all the states parties

without having to make any amendment to the Treaty itself, which would be much more

complicated.

29                        "Circumvention" is a term widely used in the CFE Treaty and, in fact, already

consecrated by the CFE inspectors. According to the Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary

(Springfield, Massachusetts: MerrianWebster Inc., 1985) it means the act of "managing to get

around            especially by ingenuity or stratagem". To me, this term implies something more than

"Evasion", which the same source define as "the act or an instance of evading".

30                   Brown, James. Verification. The Key to Arms Control in the 1990s, p. xvi.

 

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