Cuba, Castro, And The Cuban Missile Crisis
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy
CUBA, CASTRO, AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
by
Maureen M. Lynch
Lieutenant Colonel, USMC
13 April 1995
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Cuba, Castro, and the Cuban Missile Crisis
Author: Lieutenant Colonel Maureen M. Lynch, USMC
Thesis: This thesis identifies and analyzes Cuba's role in
the Cuban Missile Crisis so as to provide important cultural
intelligence information heretofore unavailable on this
subject.
Background: The Cuban Missile Crisis was the single most
important event of the Cold War. For thirteen days, the
United States and the Soviet Union went "eyeball to eyeball"
in an epoch struggle that brought the world to the brink of
nuclear war. Inevitably, historical analyses of the Missile
Crisis focus on the superpower struggle between the United
States and the Soviets. Rarely is it considered necessary or
essential to consider the actions of a third actor, Cuba, in
the very crisis that bears its name. Consequently, to fully
understand and appreciate the lessons of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, it is necessary to understand Cuba's role in that
crisis. More importantly, however, as the Cold War fades and
the new world order takes shape, the importance of
understanding the actors and the events of that period so as
to build upon the present and prepare for the future assumes
even greater significance. Continuing among those actors,
then, is Cuba. Although now noticeably missing Soviet
military and economic support, Cuba still remains an area of
concern to U.S. national security interests. This thesis,
then, provides an important analysis of the actions of Cuba
during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Providing an important
source of cultural information, its purpose is to link U.S-
Cuban relations of the past with those of the present so as to
provide military professionals with the information they will
need to defend our nation's national security interests in the
future.
Recommendation: That this thesis be made available to all
Marine Corps University students studying Cuba and to all
those Department of the Navy personnel, both military and
civilian, responsible for political-military planning
involving U.S. relations with Cuba.
CONTENTS
Chapter Page
1. INTRODUCTION 1
Thesis Statement, 5
Research Methodology, 8
2. THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA - A LONG HISTORY 10
The Growth of the Sugar Industry, Cuban
Prosperity, and the Development of U.S.-
Cuban Relations, 12
The Postwar Years, 17
Jose Marti and the War of Independence, 19
The First Intervention, 23
The Second Intervention, 25
The Growth of Opposition Parties, 29
Batista Comes to Power, 33
The Rise of Castro, 43
3. CASTRO'S REVOLUTION 45
The Success of the Revolution, 45
The New Castro Government, 46
The U.S. Response to Castro, 50
4. CASTRO AND COMMUNISM 58
The Castro Revolution - an Ideology of
Confusion, 58
Why the Shift?, 62
Soviet Reactions to a Communist Cuba, 66
Castro's Communism, 70
5. THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 74
The Soviet Decision to Support Castro, 75
Castro's Decision, 79
Castro's Motives for Accepting the Missiles,84
Castro Reacts, 85
Withdrawing the Missiles, 91
6. CUBA AND THE CRISIS 96
Epilogue 103
Bibliography 107
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
On October 22, 1962, the President of the United States
reported to the American people the presence of "large, long
range, clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction"
on Cuba, an island 90 miles off the coast of Florida.1
Undeniably linked to a Soviet military buildup, the President
stated that the presence of nuclear weapons in Cuba
constituted an "explicit threat to the peace and security of
all the Americas."2
Detailed analysis showed the weapons to be ballistic
missiles of two distinct types: medium-range and
intermediate-range. The medium-range missiles were capable of
carrying a nuclear warhead a distance of more than 1,100
nautical miles, placing Washington, DC, Mexico City or any
other city in the southeastern part of the United States,
Central America or the Caribbean area at risk. The
intermediate-range missiles were capable of targeting most of
the major cities in the Western Hemisphere, from Hudson Bay,
Canada in the north to Lima, Peru in the south.3 The
President also reported that jet bombers capable of carrying
nuclear weapons were being simultaneously uncrated and
assembled in Cuba while Cuban air bases capable of supporting
the bombers were being constructed.4
As President Kennedy assured the nation that the United
States would not "unnecessarily risk the costs of worldwide
nuclear war," in response to the "secret, swift, and
extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles," he also stressed
that America would neither backdown nor "...shrink from the
risks to be faced."5 In response to the clandestine Soviet
military buildup, the United States implemented a naval
quarantine of Cuba. In addition, the Soviet Union was warned
that any attack from Cuba would be met . with a "full
retaliatory response" in kind.
The following day, both Cuba and the Soviet Union
requested a meeting of the United Nations (UN) Security
Council to examine what the Soviets emphasized was the United
States' "violation of the Charter of the United Nations and
threat to peace." By 4:00 p.m. that afternoon, Ambassador
Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. Representative to the UN (and the UN
Security Council), was addressing the Security Council.
Ambassador Stevenson attacked Cuba's role in the missile
crisis, declaring that Cuba had "aided and abetted an invasion
of [the] hemisphere." In response, Ambassador Valerian Zorin,
Soviet Representative to the UN, criticized Ambassador
Stevenson's charges as "completely false" and a "clumsy
attempt to cover up aggressive [US] actions in Cuba."6
Challenging Soviet allegations, Ambassador Stevenson
distributed aerial photographs clearly depicting Soviet
nuclear missile sites in Cuba.7 Ambassador Zorin continued,
however, to neither confirm nor deny the existence of the
missiles and sites, stating only that the United States would
be given a response "in due time."8
As tensions between the United States and Soviet Union
increased, General Thomas Power, Commander-in-Chief of the
Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), raised the SAC alert level to
DefCon 2 on October 24th.1 On the 26th, the Lebanese
freighter Marucla, under charter to the Soviet Union, was
boarded and inspected by a party from the USS PIERCE and the
USS KENNEDY. That afternoon, after meeting with General Issa
Pliyev, the Soviet commander in Cuba, and being informed that
all units were "ready for combat," Castro authorized Cuban air
defense forces to fire on all U.S. aircraft within range.
On October 28th, Cuban antiaircraft batteries shot down an
American U-2 over Banes in eastern Cuba, killing the pilot,
Major Rudolf Anderson, Jr. Later that same day, U.S. and
Canadian naval forces established an antisubmarine barrier
southeast of Newfoundland while the 5th Marine Expeditionary
Brigade sailed from the West Coast of the United States toward
Cuba.10
Thus, the most significant event of the Cold War, the
Cuban Missile Crisis, played out on the world stage. For
thirteen days the two world "superpowers" - the United States
and the Soviet Union - went "eyeball to eyeball" in an epoch
struggle symbolic of of the Cold War period. To the Soviets,
the United States launched the "Caribbean Crisis" in open
____________________
1"DefCon" is an abbreviation for the military phrase "Defense
Condition." Defense conditions identify the state of alert of U.S.
military forces and range from DefCon 5, which indicates a state of
"all quiet," to DefCon 1, which indicates "major attack imminent."
defiance of both international law and common sense.
Humiliatingly aware of Soviet nuclear inferiority and
vulnerability, the crisis greatly worried Soviet Chairman
Nikita Khrushchev. For the United States, the Soviets had
instigated the Cuban Missile Crisis by placing nuclear
missiles in Cuba. The only acceptable solution for President
Kennedy was the fast and complete removal of the weapons.
However, a third actor was also a key player in this
major Cold War drama. That actor was Cuba. To Cuba, the
"October Crisis" was a very real experience. Many Cubans
expected the crisis to end in a bloody, protracted war. Cuban
newspapers carried banner headlines proclaiming that Cubans
were "prepared to die for their independence" while Castro
declared that "Whoever [wanted] to investigate Cuba must know
that they will have to come in battle fatigues!"12
Cuban faith in the Soviet Union was also complete.
Military support was expected not only from Soviet
conventional forces stationed in Cuba, but also from the
soldiers of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces controlling the
missiles. As Cuban forces mobilized to protect their
homeland, Soviet aid was considered a guarantee.
In the end, however, the October Crisis turned out to be
a profoundly bitter experience for Cuba and Castro. Viewed as
an act of U. S. agression, Castro felt that Cuba had been
abandoned by the Soviets during their hour of greatest need.
THESIS STATEMENT
Historical analyses of the Cuban Missile Crisis
invariably focus on the superpower conflict between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Rarely is it considered
necessary to examine Cuba's role in the very crisis that bears
its name. However, ignoring the participation of Cuba in the
Cuban Missile Crisis can be likened to analyzing the Vietnam
War without mentioning North and South Vietnam, or the Korean
War without mentioning North and South Korea.
To fully understand and appreciate the lessons of the
Cuban Missile Crisis, then, it is necessary to understand
Cuba's role. To provide this understanding, this thesis will
first, examine the complex factors influencing Cuba's
participation, and second, define, determine, and analyze
Cuba's role.
Accordingly, the first factor to be examined is the
unique relationship existing between the United States and
Cuba and, more importantly, the Cuban "perception" of that
relationship. Separated by only 90 miles of ocean, the United
States had influenced Cuban affairs since the age of Columbus.
Linked early to economics ties and strategic security, these
interests later expanded to include political interests.
Equally impacting the U.S.-Cuban relationship, however, were
obvious and substantial cultural, socioeconomic, and
geopolitical differences existing between the two countries.
In light of these differences, it is not surprising that both
the United States and Cuba not only differed in their
understanding, interpretation, and perception of their shared
relationship, but also judged the other based on their
divergent points of view.
The second factor to be examined is the influence exerted
by the individual most responsible for Cuba's decision to
participate in the crisis, Fidel Castro. Initially hailed as
the salvation of Cuba following the dictatorial rule of
Fulgencio Batista, Castro and his revolution changed Cuba from
a pro-American cousin to one that eventually conspired with
the Soviet Union to challenge U.S. hegemony in the Western
hemisphere. Castro's influence was complete and deeply rooted
in a political and socioeconomic system that enabled him to
quickly seize power and hold it. Egocentric and fanatical,
Castro's promise for Cuba was defined by his own personal and
political objectives that would not only influence his
decision to accept communism and an alliance with the Soviet
Union, but also make the legacy of the revolution of prime
importance to Cuba's way of life. Consequently, this thesis
will examine the influence Castro wielded in the Cuban Missile
Crisis and also demonstrate that had it not been for Fidel
Castro, Cuba would not have been involved in the Cuban Missile
Crisis.
The third and final factor to be examined is Cuba's
relationship with the Soviet Union. As a communist country,
"little Cuba" appeared to benefit immeasurably from the
immense wealth and superpower status of the Soviet Union.
Soviet economic subsidies bouyed Cuba's economy while Soviet
ports provided Cuba with ready export markets. These
benefits, however, came at a price. For to the Soviets,
Cuba's strategic location provided a key position from which
to challenge their chief Cold War rival, the United States.
And even though Castro had accepted communism and a Soviet
alliance, he was to learn the subtle realities and cost of
"doing business" with the Soviets. Consequently, the Cuban
Missile Crisis is not so much about the relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union as it is about the
relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba. This Soviet-
Cuban relationship defined how each party separately
perceived, interpreted, and reacted to the events of the
crisis. This effort will present how these actions/reactions
influenced Castro and ultimately the resolution of the crisis.
Upon completion of this examination of the above factors,
this thesis will define, determine, and analyze Cuba's role in
the crisis. This analysis will be accomplished by first
reviewing the events of the crisis and then pinpointing and
analyzing Cuba's role. Key to this analysis will be the use
of recently declassified material documenting the Kennedy
administration's decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis as
well as testimony provided by Fidel Castro and key Soviet and
U.S. decisionmakers during the crisis. An analysis of this
information provides not only Castro's intent during the Cuban
Missile Crisis, but also how his actions/reactions were
significant in bringing the world to the "brink" of nuclear
war.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Consequently, the approach and source material used in
this thesis make it unique among the material currently
available concerning the Cuban Missile Crisis for three key
reasons.
First, this thesis focuses and analyzes the Cuban Missile
Crisis from the perspective of Cuba and Castro. As previously
stated, the majority of literature discussing the crisis
concentrates on the United States, the Soviet Union, and the
Cold War competition existing between the two. Although
conceptually accurate from a historical and analytical
perspective, such an emphasis is also lacking. For one to
obtain a true understanding and a more complete perspective on
the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is necessary to understand and
analyze the participation of all the actors in the crisis
which includes Cuba. Especially now, as the world transitions
from a Cold War to a post Cold War modality, the lessons to be
learned by understanding Cuba's albeit Castro's role in the
crisis provides an invaluable historical reference point from
which to proceed into the future.
Second, the source material for this thesis was compiled
from documentation and literature not accessable to previous
authors. Key among these sources is recently declassified
documentation from the White House, the Department of State,
and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); documentation
provided by representatives of Cuba and the former Soviet
Union during the January 1994 Havana Conference on the Cuban
Missile Crisis; and testimony provided by Fidel Castro,
General Anatoly I. Gribkov, General of the Army of the Russian
Federation and General Inspector of the Russian Ministry of
Defense, and former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara. In addition, personal interviews with Dr. Gregorio
DelReal, a former professor at the University of Havana who
not only knew and taught Castro, but also resided in Cuba
during the Castro takeover, and Mark Falcoff, resident scholar
at the American Enterprise Institute, provide a breadth and
understanding of Cuba, Castro, and Cuban affairs not
previously consolidated into any other single work.
And third, this thesis blends an examination and analysis
of four key areas: (1) the historical relationship between
the United States and Cuba, (2) the factors influencing
Castro's rise to power, (3) the factors impacting Castro's
decision to accept communism and an alliance with the Soviets,
and (4) Cuba's actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Unique in its approach, this methodology subsequently provides
the reader with not only a capsulized base of knowledge from
which to develop a more thorough understanding and evaluation
of Cuba's role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, but also an
understanding of the human environment that continues to
impact Cuba's relationship with the United States today.
CHAPTER 2
THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA - A LONG HISTORY
In his October 22nd "Report to the People," President
Kennedy described Cuba as having a "...special and historical
relationship to the United States..." Upon more thorough
examination, however, the relationship between the United
States and Cuba is a complex, intricate web based on
misperception and good intentions gone bad. Although Cuba and
the United States share a common history, how this history is
perceived depends on the vantage point from which it is
viewed. When discussing the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1992,
former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara best summed up
these differences in perception by stating that:
...our shared histories [Cuba's and the United States']
are viewed very differently by both countries ... this
divergence contributed both to the sharp break in
relations between our nations thirty-one years ago, and
to the attitudes with which we viewed the missile crisis.
Let me give four illustrations of these differences of
view. First, Americans have been taught that the U.S.
liberated Cuba from Spain, while Cubans learn that it was
the result of their long struggle for independence.
Second, Americans view themselves as idealistic and
selfless in not annexing Cuba after the end of the
Spanish-American war, whereas Cubans think the U.S. used
every chance to dominate their nation. Third, Americans
think they used the Platt Amendment2 to mediate and
____________________
2Named for Republican Senator Orville Hitchcock Platt who,
while serving as the Chairman of the Committee on Cuban Relations,
introduced the amendment in 1901 as part of the United States
Army's appropriations bill. The Platt Amendment provided for the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Cuba following the end of the
Spanish American War in 1898. In addition to restricting Cuba from
entering into any treaty with another country that would cause it
resolve internal disputes in Cuba, whereas Cubans tend to
think that the amendment was designed to permit the U.S.
to intervene in Cuban affairs for its own selfish
purposes; and finally, Americans tend to think that their
investments in Cuba contributed to the nations's
development, whereas the Cuban government has tended to
look at the economic relationship as exploitative.13
To understand Cuba's role in the Cuban Missile Crisis,
then, it is necessary to understand U.S.-Cuban relations
developed. To that end, this chapter will examine how and why
U.S-Cuban relations developed, what factors caused those
relations to change, and, more importantly, what political and
socioeconomic factors influenced the rise of Fidel Castro.
The United States' association with Cuba began with a
shared colonialism. Both countries were discovered by
Columbus in 1492, with Cuba emerging as a Spanish colony. In
addition to the discovery of gold and development of farming,
Cuba served as a transit station between Europe and the New
World. Due to its strategic location, forts were built to
protect Spanish trading galleons. Negro slaves were used for
forced labor while the Spanish also exploited the native
Indian population through an encomienda system of forced labor
and tribute. In actuality, Cuba was of little interest to
Spain, who considered the island as "not a colony to be
____________________
to lose its independence, the amendment also restricted Cuba from
increasing its public debt beyond the capacity of its ordinary
revenues to pay. By the terms of the amendment, Cuba was required
to permit U.S. intervention so as to preserve Cuban independence.
After considerable debate and insistance from the United States,
Cuba incorporated the amendment into its Constitution of 1901 and
treaty of 1903 with the United States. The United States
subsequently intervened in Cuba on several occasions over the next
thirty years. In 1934, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
persuaded Congress to abrograte the Platt Amendment at which time
a new treaty was then negotiated.
developed on its own." Consequently, under corrupt,
incompetent Spanish administration, Cuba flourished as a haven
for bandits, smugglers, and prostitutes.14
During the 18th century the signing of the Treaty of
Utrecht in 1713 between Britain and France and the rise of
Philip V to the Spanish throne, allowed British vessels to
carry African slaves and an annual cargo of British goods to
Cuba. Sugar production and tobacco soon became important
trade commodities in European markets. In August 1762, a
British naval force under the command of Sir George Pocock
laid seige to the island's most prosperous city and the
Spanish Main's richest port - Havana.15 Occupying the city
for ten months, the British opened the city to free trade.
Goods and slaves were imported at low prices. For Cuba,
British occupation resulted in the industrial development of
the island's major export item - sugar.
THE GROWTH OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY, CUBAN PROSPERITY, AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. -CUBAN RELATIONS
U.S. independence signaled the beginning of U.S. -Cuban
relations. In close proximity to the North American
continent, the young nation provided Cuba with new consumer
markets.
In 1796, slave revolts in Haiti, Cuba's chief competitor
in the sugar market, led to the destruction of Haiti's sugar
industry. An estimated 300,000 French Haitian refugees fled
Haiti for Cuba, bringing with them skilled mulatoo laborers
and more advanced sugar technology and managerial skills. By
the end of the 18th century, Cuba was transformed into an
economically viable Spanish possession. "King Sugar" became
Cuba's major export while the Creoles who both owned the land
and cultivated the sugar formed Cuba's new elite. The use of
Negro slaves and the availability of new markets enabled
agricultural production to thrive in Cuba. In addition to
sugar, coffee and tobacco soon became major export items to
both the United States and Europe.16 As sugar and coffee
cultivation decreased the availability of land in Cuba, the
need to import basic foodstuffs and other provisions grew.
Thus, Cuba's closest neighbor, the United States, became one
of the island's chief trading markets and suppliers.
Although the American government favored free trade with
Cuba, it opposed Cuban independence. Witnessing the slave
revolt in Haiti and the success of the slaves in achieving
political power, the Federalist administrations of George
Washington and John Adams feared the social, economic, and
political effects just such a revolt would have on America's
slave-holding South. In consequence, when formatulating Cuban
policy, the American government was cautious to distinguish
between commercial regulations in the island's ports and the
politicial structure of Spanish rule.17
However, U.S. attempts to distinguish between commercial
and political involvement in Cuba did not last long. Cuba's
close proximity to America would ensure that the fate of Cuba
was inextricably linked with that of the United States. In
1823, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams expressed this
concern when stating:
Cuba, almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of
considerations has become an object of transcendent
importance to the political and commercial interests of
our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to
the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas; the character
of its population; its situation midway between our
Southern Coast and the island of St. Domingo; its safe
and capacious harbor of Havana...; the nature of its
productions and of its wants furnishing the supplies and
needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable,
and mutually beneficial, give it an importance in the sum
of our national interests and little inferior to that
which binds the different members of this Union
together.18
During the 1820s, wealthy Creole/Cuban planters grew
dissatisfied with the ineffectiveness of Spanish rule. Afraid
that England would force Spain to abolish slavery and that the
continued political instability of Spanish rule would cause a
Haitian-type slave revolt, Cuba looked to the United States
for help and for possible annexation.19 Since slavery was an
important facet of Cuban economic existence, the pro-slavery
South became Cuba's natural ally. However, those in the
United States who opposed slavery also opposed the annexation
of a slave-holding Cuba. The addition of another slave
holding state to the Union could potentially tip the advantage
of slave versus nonslave states in the union. Consequently,
caught in the political struggle surrounding the issue of
slavery, discussion concerning Cuban annexation was
temporarily tabled.
In fact for most Americans, as long as Cuba remained
firmly in the hands of the Spanish, the United States was
content to leave Cuba alone. Aware that Spain's military and
economic power were quickly eroding, the United States
preferred to leave Cuba under a weak Spanish monarch who posed
no real threat to U.S. security or national interests. If
anyone else was to have Cuba, some U.S. politicians and
business interests reasoned, it would have to be the United
States.20
Concerned, however, that Cuba would fall into the hands
of a much stronger European power, e.g., the French or the
English, President James Monroe articulated his concerns in a
message to Congress on December 2, 1823.21 In his now
famous statement, the Monroe Doctrine, he warned Europe
against interfering in the internal affairs of the American
states and in further colonizing the Americas.
However, westward expansionism unleashed by the United
States pursuit of its "manifest destiny" caused the issue of
Cuban annexation to be reconsidered. With California annexed
following the Mexican War, the idea of building a canal
linking the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans turned many in
Congress to thoughts of Cuban annexation. Aware of Cuban
plans to rebel against Spain, President James Polk, in 1849,
offerred Spain $100 million dollars for the purchase of Cuba.
Already humiliated, however, from the loss of other former
colonies, Spain not only rejected the United States' offer but
replied that it would "sooner...see the island transferred to
any [other] power [then] would [we] prefer seeing it sunk in
the ocean."22
Following James Polk, attempts to acquire Cuba were again
tabled. Neither Presidents Zachary Taylor nor Millard
Fillmore pursued Cuba's acquisition. Rather, both presidents
attempted to enforce neutrality laws in order to prevent
American assistance to Cuban rebels. However, Franklin Pierce
pursued the idea by commissioning a study that resulted in the
"Ostend Manifesto" of 1854. The manifesto argued that the
United States was justified in occupying Cuba if conditions in
Cuba threatened the "internal peace and. existence" of the
Union. The issue of slavey, however, again proved to be a
major impediment to the plan. As the United States turned to
grapple with the Civil War and its aftermath, the acquisition
of Cuba was again tabled as the United States dealt with more
forboding crises.23
As the United States dealt with its Civil War, Cuba
turned to separating itself from colonial rule. During
October 1868, a rebellion occurred in Cuba that was to lead to
the island's Ten Years War. Although unsuccessful, the
rebellion fostered, for the first time, the idea of Cuban
independence. Cuban regionalism with its emphasis on patria
chica or local loyalties gave way to a belief in the
"fatherland."24 National symbols such as Cuba's national
anthem, flag, and national weapon, the machete, became a part
of Cuba's heritage. Most importantly, the dedication of the
"mambises" or those who had abandoned positions of importance
and comfort to fight against the Spanish became, for future
Cuban generations, an example of unselfish sacrifice for the
fatherland.
Although the United States maintained its neutrality and
did not intervene in Cuba's Ten Years War, the revolt in Cuba
not only drew the interest and sympathy of the American public
but also caused deep and bitter division within the United
States. Those supporting the Cuban revolution saw the
rebellion as the self-determination by an oppressed people.
Believing Spanish colonialism to be corrupt, archaic, and
tyrannical, they conjectured that sooner or later the United
States would have to end the Spanish carnage. Others, to
included President Ulysses S. Grant, preferred a cautious
approach of "wait and see." While still others, to include
Grant's Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, were adamently
opposed to any recognition of the Cuban revolutionaries.
Although sharing the American public's disgust with Spanish
rule and slavery in Cuba, Fish believed the revolution
exercised no real power, possessed no real government, and
suprevised no real control over the guerrilla bands comprising
the revolutionaries.25
Attempts by the United States to either mediate or end
the Ten Years War proved unsuccessful. Spain refused to
accept the terms of a U.S. proposed agreement while the lack
of a cohesive U.S. policy and international support thwarted
all other attempts. The most that either President Andrew
Johnson or Ulysses Grant were able to do was to assert the no-
transfer principle and ensure it was placed in the Monroe
Doctrine.
THE POSTWAR YEARS
Subsequently, the Ten Years War not only affected Cuba
politically but also economically. Supporters and
symapathizers of the Cuban cause either lost their fortunes
during the war or saw their properties pass to loyalists who
had sided with the Spanish. With the abolition of slavery in
Cuba in 1886, Cuban sugar plantations suffered and many
Spanish and Cuban enterprises went bankrupt. As the Cuban
economy plummeted, U.S. interests began buying sugar estates
and mining interests. When the expansion of European beet
sugar markets closed those markets to Cuba, the United States
became the largest and most important buyer of the island's
sugar. In 1890, the McKinley Tariff, which placed raw sugar
on the free trade list, increased Cuban-American trade,
especially the sugar trade, even more. Although by 1895
control of the economy was still largely in the hands of the
Spanish, American capital and influence, particularly in the
sugar industry, exerted a dominate influence. Cuba became
dependent on U.S. markets which were now chiefly controlled by
a single company, the American Sugar Refining Company.
Controlling nineteen Cuban refineries, the American Sugar
Company supplied 70 to 90 percent of the sugar consumed by the
United States. In addition to sugar, U.S. private investors
also entered Cuban iron ore exploration, cattle raising, fruit
and tobacco plantations, and public utility companies.
Subsequently, by 1895, estimates of U.S. private enterprises
placed the total amount of investments at $50 million US
dollars.26
JOSE MARTI AND THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE
Following the Ten Years War, many Cubans pressed the
Spanish government to implement "autonomismo" or autonomous
rule for Cuba. Patterned after the British colonial model,
this system of local self-government would require extensive
economic and political reform. However, by 1892, as Cubans
continued to experience Spain's oppressive and corrupt
colonial rule, it became evident that Spain had no intentions
of instituting change or reform in its policies. As
discontent and disillusionment grew, a move toward
independence again took shape. This time, the leadership for
the independence movement was provided by Cuba's "Apostle of
Independence" - Jose Marti.
In his "Fundamentals and Secret Guidelines of the Cuban
Revolutionary Party," Marti outlined the goals of the
revolution as equality, freedom from foreign political and
economic domination, and the establishment of democratic
processes. More importantly, Marti emphasized the need to not
only free Cuba from foreign power, which included the United
States, but also to end Cuba's historical colonial role.
Although viewed as "anti-Yankee," Marti favored a Latin
America patterned in the image of the United States. "The
Cubans," he wrote,
admire this nation, the greatest ever built by freedom,
but they distrust the evil conditions that, like worms in
the blood, have begun their work of destruction in this
mighty Republic...They cannot honestly believe that
excess individualism and reverence for wealth are
preparing the United States to be the typical nation of
liberty.27
Marti advocated friendlier U.S-Cuban relations as well as U.S.
support as long as that support did not result in Cuba
becoming politically or economically dependent on the United
States.
In February 1895, the war for Cuban independence
commenced. Despite Marti's death in the beginning of the war,
the Cubans achieved minor success and set up a provisional
republican government in the eastern part of the island.28
Most of Cuba, however, remained under Spanish control with
with many Cubans resorting to a scorched-earth policy to
render the island worthless to Spain. By using guerilla
tactics, the Cubans were able to hold off the Spanish and
refuse any offers of surrender that did not also guarantee
independence.
In the United States, the Cuban rebellion was met with
deep concern. Economically, the war disrupted lucrative trade
and jeopardized millions of dollars worth of American property
in Cuba. In addition, investigations and representations on
behalf of American citizens injured by the war, the drop in
customs receipts, and the requirement to pay for coastal
patrols to enforce U.S. neutrality created an expense that the
federal budget did not want to deal with.29 Strategically,
controlling the isthmus of Panama and its maritime approaches
was considered essential to U.S. national security.
Accomplishing this goal meant establishing a strong U.S. naval
presence, with access to a port in the Caribbean, preferably
in Cuba.30 A chief proponent of U.S. presence in Cuba was
Alfred Thayer Mahan. Then a professor at the U.S. Navy's
Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, Mahan's
influential writings called the attention of the American
public to the importance of national security. As Mahan
maintained, this security could best be provided by pursuing
such measures as American ownership of an Isthmian canal and
the acquisition of naval bases in Cuba. Finally, American
public opinion pushed for intervention. The American press,
especially the "yellow press" led by William Randolph Hearst's
New York Journal and Joseph Pulitzer's New York World, printed
gruesome news of Spanish atrocities and Cuban suffering
although ignoring the brutal acts of Cuban insurgents. In
addition, Cuban insurgent factions in the United States fanned
the flames of humanitarian outrage. Campaigning for
American financial support and supplies, the insurgents
preached the cause of Cuban independence and support for the
insurgents.31
For his part, American President Grover Cleveland
preferred to follow a policy of neutrality toward Cuba. After
repeated offers to assist Spain with negotiating a settlement
failed, Cleveland recommended to Congress that an American
warship be sent to Cuba to demonstrate U.S. concern for
American lives and property. On December 8, 1896, the idea was
approved by Congress. Additionally, as with American
presidents before him, Cleveland also toyed with the idea of
purchasing Cuba and "incorporating" the island into the United
States. However, Cleveland was not convinced that the Cubans
were capable of self-government. Although considering an idea
to grant the insurgent's belligerency, he rejected the idea
when he realized that recognizing a new government in Cuba
would enable Spain to abrogate its responsiblity to protect
American property still remaining in Cuba.
Upon assuming the presidency in 1897, William McKinley
also considered purchasing Cuba. Rather than pursuing this
course, however, he opted to "persuade" Spain to end the war
by threatening U.S. military intervention. Finally presenting
Spain with an ultimatum in the autumn of 1897, Spain reacted
by promising reforms. Although the solution seemed to satisfy
President McKinley, it only angered the insurgents all the
more, causing the war to continue on.
However, when riots broke out in Havana on January 12,
1898, McKinley responded by sending one of the U.S. Navy's
newest warships, the USS MAINE, to Havana. On February 15,
1898, the USS MAINE exploded in Havana Harbor, killing all who
were on board. When the American Naval Commission was unable
to determine who was responsible for the MAINE's explosion,
the United States held Spain responsible since the accident
occurred within Spanish jurisdiction. President McKinley
demanded Spain end its corrupt, despotic governance of Cuba
and enter into negotiations that would end the war. He later
modified this demand, stating that the only suitable
reparations was an agreement of freedom and independence for
"the people of the island of Cuba..."32 When Spain failed to
agree to US concessions, the United States declared war on
April 24, 1898.
For the United States, the Spanish American War was
short, decisive and popular.33 In June 1889, 17,000 U.S.
troops landed at Siboney and Daiquiri, east of Santiago de
Cuba. On July 1, the Americans stormed the Spanish outposts
at El Caney and San Juan Heights.34 Spanish resistance was
stubborn and casualties were heavy on both sides. However,
with the heights soon in U.S. hands, the Spanish fleet was
forced to either surrender or escape to open sea to escape
U.S. warships. Not accepting surrender, the ships of the
Spanish fleet chose the latter course and were either sunk,
driven ashore, or completely disabled. This destruction of
the Spanish fleet virtually ended the war for Spain.
On December 10, 1898, the Treaty of Paris was signed and
the war ended. Spain relinquished sovereignty over Cuba and
ceded Puerto Rico to the United States. In the U.S. Congress,
the Teller Amendment named for Senator Henry M. Teller pledged
that the United States would "disclaim any disposition or
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control
over said island, except for the pacification thereof, and [to
assert] its determination; when that is accomplished, to leave
the government and control of the island to its people."35
THE FIRST INTERVENTION
With the end of the war in Cuba and the termination of
Spanish sovereignty on January 1, 1899, the United States
assumed responsibility for the island's government. The goal
of American policy was to pacify Cuba and to eventually turn
the government over to the Cuban people. President McKinley's
appointee for the military governorship of Cuba was Major
General John R. Brooke who was succeeded a year later by
General Leonard Wood.36 Zealously attacking what he believed
to be Cuba's major problems, Wood's administration made
signifcant advances in roadbuilding, judicial reform, and in
health and education. Hospitals were built, sanitation and
health conditions improved, and yellow fever eradicated,
primarily through the work of Cuban scientist Carlos J.
Finlay. A public school system was established and the
University of Havana modernized.37
However, attempts to "Americanize" Cuba and establish a
government in the American model proved unsuccessful. For a
Cuban society raised under colonial Spanish control, political
stability based on an absolute moral code, free enterprise
economics, a theory of public interest, and a just social
order through law were alien concepts. Although a Cuban
constitution was drafted in 1901, it proved ineffectual in
bringing about necessary social and economic changes.
Subsequently, the Platt Amendment, which was appended to the
Cuban Constitution and later embodied in the Permanent Treaty
of 1903 between the United States and Cuba, dictated U.S.
policy toward Cuba.
Far reaching in implication, the Platt Amendment defined
U.S. -Cuban relations for the next 33 years. Proposed by
Secretary of War Elihu Root, the Platt Amendment applied the
Monroe Doctrine to Cuban relations by requiring that "...the
government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other
compact with any foreign power...which will tend to impair the
independence of Cuba...or permit any foreign power to
obtain...for military purposes...lodgement in ...said
island."38 Stating that Cuba could not "contract any public
debt" the servicing of which might impair her solvency, the
Platt Amendment also required that "...to enable the United
States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect
the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the
government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States
lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain
specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the
United States." This provision thus enabled the United States
to acquire rights to lease a naval coaling station at
Guantanamo Bay.39
Designed to protect Cuban independence as well as U.S.
interests in Cuba, the Platt Amendment only served to
perpetuate Cuban political irresponsibility. Developing what
soon became known as the "Platt Amendment mentality," Cuba
grew dependent upon U.S. intervention and protection, thus
stifling any attempts to develop any form of responsible self-
government.
THE SECOND INTERVENTION
Following the ratification of the Platt Amendment, US
occupation forces remained on the island for almost a year
until General Wood transferred power to Cuba's newly elected
president, Thomas Estrada Palma on May 20, 1902.
Estrada's first administration corresponded to a period
of growth in the Cuban sugar industry. Sound financial
management kept taxes low and surplus cash flow high.
However, the pattern of corruption and the political attitudes
perpetrated by a weak Spanish administration during Cuba's
colonial period remained. Public office was viewed as a
source of political profit with personalismo substituting for
principle.40 This corruption coupled with: (1) political
discord sparked by bitter factionalism, regional loyalites,
and disagreement over the Platt Amendment; (2) a dangerous
tendency to solve differences through violence; and (3) a lack
of national unity and purpose, led to increasing unrest and
instability.41
Consequently, in 1906 the United States, in keeping with
the provisions of the Platt Amendment, intervened a second
time in Cuba when President Estrada Palma's government was
overthrown by a Liberal Party revolt.42 Occupying Cuba so as
to "restore order," a provisional government under U.S.
auspices was established.43 Although President Theodore
Roosevelt was not eager to involve the United States in "a
destructive and wearisome civil war," U.S. forces remained in
Cuba until 1909. Despite this concern, however, the
cornerstone of U.S. Latin American policy as a whole under
Roosevelt became one of intervention.44
The second period of U.S. occupation in Cuba differed
significantly from the first. The United States was not eager
to govern Cuba for a second time and the provisional governor,
Charles E. Magoon, turned to dispensing government sinecures
or botellas in order to pacify quarrelling Cuban factions.45
Although Magoon implemented a series of public works projects,
organized a modern army, and introduced what appeared to be
one of the major U.S. objectives of this second occupation,
that of enacting fair legislation to prevent future civil
wars, his accomplishments were overshadowed by extravagant
spending that left Cuba with a huge floating debt.
Consequently, the second U.S. intervention not only
strengthened the Platt Amendment mentality, but also increased
doubts among Cubans about Cuba's ability to succeed at self-
government. Many Cuban leaders, intellectuals, and writers
became disillusioned with the possibility of independence and
transferred this hopelessness to the Cuban population.46 As
a result, irresponsibility and a growing cynicism increased as
did the reliance on violence to resolve political differences.
As unrest in Cuba grew, U.S. intervention continued into
the next decade. In 1915, U.S. Marines landed in Cuba to put
down an uprising of the Agrupacion Independente de Color
(Independent Color Association) party; in 1917, U.S.
intervention was required to resolve a Liberal Party rebellion
protesting the fraudulent reelection of Cuba's then incumbent
president, President Mario Garcia Menocal.47 Again, in 1920,
when fraud was claimed during Cuban elections, General Enoch
Crowder, a member of an independent Cuban consulting board,
intervened on behalf of the United States. Retained as a U.S.
advisor to Cuba, General Crowder remained to assist with a new
election and in establishing an "honest cabinet"48.
In the early 1920's, Charles Evans Hughes, Secretary of
State under Presidents Warren G. Harding and Calvin Coolidge,
began the process of stepping back from the Roosevelt Latin
American policy of intervention. An incomplete process,
however, none of the policies specifically requiring or
authorizing American intervention were ever renounced. Calvin
Coolidge, the most successful of the noninterventionists,
simply terminated American meddling in Cuban domestic affairs,
leaving the Cuban government "free to develop into the type of
corrupt dictatorship that was seemingly indigenous to the
soil."49
Throughout this period, however, U.S. economic presence
in Cuba, especially in the sugar industry, continued to
expand. A number of measures such as the Treaty of Relations
in May 1903, encouraged U.S.-Cuban economic ties and trade by
lowering tariffs for Cuban sugar exported to the United States
and providing preferential treatment to U.S. goods exported to
Cuba.50 Although a good crop and market conditions caused a
boom in the sugar market during World War I, this prosperity
ended following the termination of the war. During the summer
of 1920, prices fell 83 percent per pound. In addition, a
higher U.S. sugar tariff caused many Cuban-owned sugar
concerns to be foreclosed by U.S. banks. As a result, U.S.
investments in Cuba soared, reaching $1.2 billion dollars by
1924. Half the Cuban sugar industry was controlled by the
United States, which soon expanded into Cuba's public
utilities. The United States became Cuba's most important
export and import market, supplying 75 percent of Cuba's
imports.51 By 1929, U.S. investors acquired $1.5 billion
dollars worth of property in Cuba.
The economic and domestic conditions created in the United
States by the stock market crash of 1929, however, were
mirrored in the Cuban economy. U.S. trade in Cuba dropped by
90 percent and U.S. bankers retreated from many major
projects.52 Defaults and bankruptcies were common and as
Cuban unemployment rose, so did opposition to Cuban dependence
on U.S. business interests.
THE GROWTH OF OPPOSITION PARTIES
It was during this time period that unexpected opposition
to U.S. intervention developed. A Cuban student protest
movement initially established to pursue academic reform was
circumvented as the reform movement turned to political
issues. By the 1920's, efforts at reform the movement ceased
as students began to blame the United States and its close
supervision of Cuban affairs as the cause of the island's many
problems.53 A key leader of the reform movement was Julio
Antonio Mella, a young law student with strong anti-American
feelings. Although disposed to agree with his colleagues
concerning U.S. policies, Mella also viewed the movement as
"another battle of the class struggle."54 Through his
protest activities, Mella became associated with Carlos
Balino, a prestigious figure of Cuba's War of Independence
and, later, founder of the Communist Association of Havana.
In 1925, Balino and Mella called for a congress of all
Communist groups on the island. Despite its meager
attendance, the congress developed into the Cuban Communist
Party of which Mella became one of its most important
leaders.55
In the mid-1920's, Cuba's President-elect, Gerardo
Machado, became the target of Mella and a small group of
students. Although supported by business and conservative
sectors due to the success of his economic programs, Machado
won the support of the Cuban military through bribes and
threats. Key government positions at the local and national
level were filled by military officers while those officers
considered "disloyal" were purged from their ranks. In
addition, Machado prevented political dissension by aligning
the two opposition parties, the smaller Popular Party and the
Conservative Party with his own Liberal Party. Garnering
growing opposition, Machado was labeled the "tropical
Mussolini" by Mella for his ruthless authoritarianism.56
In November 1928, Machado was reelected to a second term
during a fake election in which Machado ran as the only
candidate.57 The United States, busy with domestic and
internal concerns, was not eager to become involved in Cuban
affairs as long as Machado maintained order and a friendly
relationship with the United States. However, an increasing
number of diverse student protest groups rose to confront the
Machado regime. Chief among the groups were the Directorio
Estudiantil Universitario (University Student Directorate or
Directorate); the left wing Ala Izquierda Estudiantil (Student
Left Wing) which became a tool of the Cuban Communist Party;
the Union Nacionalista which was organized by a War of
Independence colonel Carlos Mendieta and former Cuban
President Menocal; and the clandestine ABC, which was composed
of Cuban intellectuals, many of whom were Harvard University
graduates as well as middle class members of Cuban society.
The student demonstrations became increasingly more violent as
confrontations between the students and the government turned
into riots. Forbidden by police to hold organized meetings,
the students of the Directorate developed tangana or protest
gatherings that turned from clashes with police into organized
violence and terrorism.58 Members of the Union Nacionalista
staged a short-lived uprising in Pinar del Rio Province while
the ABC used sabotage and terrorist actions to undermine
Machado's position. Cuba was in chaos. Machado's gunmen
became a common sight in the streets of Havana while the rural
countryside was ruled by lawlessness and terror.
As the situation in Cuba worsened, the U.S. attempted to
resolve the differences between Machado and the opposition
groups by sending Assistant Secretary of State Benjamin Sumner
Welles to Cuba in April 1933.59 Upon arrival, Welles met a
Cuba divided between those who, for political and economic
reasons, favored U.S. intervention and those advocating
Machado's removal and Cuban independence. As the unrest
continued, labor strikes and the loss of the Army's support
convinced Machado that he had lost the battle to remain in
power. Subsequently, in August 1933, Machado relinquished
power and fled Cuba.
The abrupt departure of Machado was followed by the rapid
formation of a coalition government under Dr. Carlos Manuel de
Cespedes y Quesada.60 However, the oppostion movement that
had successfully displaced Machado now took the form of a
revolt as various factions fought for power. The new
coalition government under Cespedes barely survived as the
worsening depression intensified Cuba's economic conditions.
In reaction, the United States under President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt ordered two destroyers to Cuban waters.
Maintaining that the warships were not symbolic of U.S.
intentions to intervene in Cuban affairs, the President's
action appeared to violate his newly established "Good
Neighbor" policy. This policy, however, which declared, inter
alia, that "No state [had] the right to intervene in the
internal or external affairs of another" excluded Cuba since
the Permanent Treaty of 1903 (which authorized U.S.
intervention in Cuba) still existed.61 To correct the
discrepancy, President Roosevelt abrogated the Permanent
Treaty and its binding restrictions in May 1934. With that,
the United States gave up the right to intervene in Cuban
affairs and lifted restrictions on Cuba's ability to negotiate
with other foreign powers and borrow money.
For a Cuban political system used to American
intervention, however, this sudden reversal in American policy
appeared to only add to the growing state of chaos. For
thirty years, American diplomatic favoritism and recognition
had influenced Cuban politics. Accordingly, as each political
faction vied for power following the departure of Machado,
each also attempted to meet Ambassador Welles' criteria for
good government and gain the diplomatic recognition needed to
guarantee permanent political power.
BATISTA COMES TO POWER
On the nights of September 3 and 4, 1933, the unrest in
Cuba came to an end. At Camp Columbia in Havana, army
noncommissioned officers displeased with proposed pay
reductions and a promotion freeze rebelled and took command of
the camp. Known as the "Sergeants Revolt," the group was led
by Sergeant Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar.62 Batista, who was
the Army's best stenographer, had befriended many of the
students from the Directorate who had been tried for
participating in the anti-Machado protests. When approached
by these same students following the Sergeants Revolt, Batista
agreed to join ranks in order to overthrow Cespedes' and
establish a five-man pentarchy (a five-member civilian
executive commission). Alarmed over this unexpected mutiny,
Welles cabled the President on September 5th, requesting that
three U.S. warships, two for Havana and one for Santiago, and
1,000 troops be sent to Cuba to safeguard the Cespedes
government. Opposed to intervention, the President rejected
the idea, believing that it not only constituted an undue
expression of partiality and violated neutrality, but also
condemned any Cuban administration that received U.S. support
as a creation of Washington.63 Although the President did
eventually agree to send the warships, this action was viewed
only as a precaution and was not considered a direct
intervention in internal Cuban politics.
Without the support of the United States, the ineffective
pentarchy collapsed. In an attempt to maintain some semblance
of control, Batista and the members of the Directorate met to
appoint a provisional president for Cuba. Their selection was
Dr. Ramon Grau San Martin, a University of Havana professor
who had been supportive of the Directorate during their anti-
Machado opposition. Heavily influenced by the Directorate,
Grau purged Machado followers from the government, dissolved
the old political party machine, and gave autonomy to the
University of Havana, freeing it from governmental influence.
Opposed to the dominance of foreign capital, Grau abrogated
the Cuban Constitution of 1901, promulgated provisional
statutes to govern Cuba, and called for a constitutional
convention with elections to follow in April 1934.64
Attempting to institute social reforms, Grau also established
an eight hour workday, a minimum wage system, compulsory
arbitration of labor-management arguments, and the beginnings
of agrarian reforms.65 For his part Batista, who had been
given the rank of colonel by the former pentarchy, was made
head of the Cuban army, and promptly began promoting enlisted
Cuban soldiers into the Cuban army's officer corps.
This overthrow of the Cespedes regime was considered a
defeat for President Roosevelt's new Cuban policy and, in
particular, Welles' mediation efforts. When Grau seized and
nationalized two American-owned sugar mills closed down due to
labor problems and temporarily assumed control of the Cuban
Electric Company, also closed due to labor problems and rate
disputes, U.S. apprehensions mounted.66 Concerned that
another revolt would occur, Welles appealed to the President
to send a strong statement to the Grau government calling for
conciliation between the opposition factions. When the
President denied the request, Welles recommended that
recognition not be granted to the Grau government.
As Grau continued to deal with the continued instability,
Batista gradually distanced himself from the Grau regime and
soon emerged as the only individual who could bring law and
order to Cuba. Following a conversation with Batista on
September 21, 1933, Welles, who was apparently impressed by
Batista's ability, reported his respect for Batista's
"reasonableness." Informing Batista that the only criterion
for U.S. diplomatic recognition was a government supported by
the people and capable of maintaining order, Welles continued
to explain that the United States would "...welcome any
government in Cuba, no matter by what individuals it was
composed [as long as it] fulfilled the requirements made clear
in the official declaration of the Secretary of State."67
Thus, following his meeting with Welles, Batista met with
student leaders and established a compromise by which Grau was
to be substituted by a new president, one who would be
mutually acceptable to both the students and the army.
Continuing to operate outside the Grau government, Batista
announced to the students in late October, 1933, that the army
had selected Carlos Mendieta to be the new president, and
warned the students against opposing the selection.
In late 1933, Welles was replaced by Jefferson Caffery as
the United States Ambassador to Cuba. Caffery shared Welles'
assessment of Grau's ineffectiveness, and believed the Grau
government would end only through Grau's resignation or by an
army coup. On January 13, 1934, Batista met with Caffery and
reconfirmed the criterion for U.S. diplomatic recognition.
Additionally, he declared his intent to make Carlos Mendieta
Cuba's next president. Mendieta, however, pushed to obtain
recognition of his soon to be new government prior to his
appointment as President of Cuba. Caffery considered the
proposal, fearing that to do otherwise would drive Batista to
the leftists or cause him to establish a military
dictatorship. Although President Roosevelt refused to grant
Mendieta diplomatic recognition in advance, within ten days
Grau resigned as President of Cuba, Mendieta assumed Grau's
former position as President, and the United States extended
diplomatic recognition to the new government of Cuba.
Although short, the revolution of 1933 had a profound
impact on Cuba. The army under Batista was transformed into
a political weapon that was soon used to dominate Cuban
politics. Corruption returned as Batista allied himself with
many of the former politicians expelled from power with
Machado. Repression flourished while opposition groups
resorted to the terrorism and sabotage of the anti-Machado
years. The students who were so important in Machado's
overthrow became disillusioned and frustrated. Many turned to
radical political groups such as the Communist Party while
others shed their idealism to share in the coruption of
Batista's regime. Others still attempted to carry on the
revolutionary zeal by organizing the Partido Revolucionario
Cubano (the Autenticos). A political party that took its name
from Marti's Partido Revolucionario Cubano party of 1892, the
party appointed the deposed Grau San Martin as its
president.68
Economically, foreign domination of Cuba's economy was
weakened as state involvement in its management increased.
For many, the revolution proved that profound structural
change in Cuba was not possible while remaining friendly
towards the United States. Consequently, for the more radical
elements, it became clear that only an anti-U.S. revolution
capable of destroying the Batisita military would be
successful in eradicating Cuba of its problems.69
Ruling Cuba through a series of puppet Presidents, Batista
retained tight political control on Cuba. Attempting to win
popular support, Batista sponsored legislation to improve
Cuba's public administration, health, sanitation, education,
and public works. Efforts were made to improve the living
conditions and education of Cuba's rural society while his
"Sugar Coordination Law" protected the tenants of small sugar
plantations against eviction. With each attempt at
improvement, however, Batista and his associates also
continued the practice of pocketing a portion of the funds
earmarked for social welfare projects.70 Through the army,
Batista retained tight control. When a general strike
involving labor, professionals, and students occurred
throughout the island in 1935, Batista used the military to
squelch it. Fearing that the strike might topple his Mendieta
government, students and labor leaders were persecuted,
imprisoned, or assasinated. Labor unions were dissolved while
the University of Havana was closed and occupied by the army.
In 1934, U.S. presence and intervention in Cuba lessened
significantly when Mendieta signed the Treaty of Reciprocity
with the United States.71 Modifying the terms of the
Permanent Treaty of May 1903, the treaty abrogated the Platt
Amendment but still allowed the United States to continue to
lease its naval base at Guantanamo Bay. In August of 1934,
the commercial Treaty of Reciprocity was also signed between
the United States and Cuba. Giving preferential treatment to
U.S. exports to Cuba, the treaty also guaranteed Cuba 22% of
the U.S. sugar market at a special low duty.
In 1940, under the terms of Cuba's new constitution,
Batista, under a coalition supported by the Communist Party of
Cuba and the Revolutionary Union Party, which had merged to
form the Communist Revolutionary Union (URC), was elected
President.72 However, to show continued support for the
United States, Batista as Cuba's President, declared war on
the Axis powers in 1941. In turn, the U.S. increased aid and
trade relations with Cuba and granted Batista credits for
agricultural development and for public works in Havana.73
Cuban sugar production rose with the war effort and from 1942
to 1947, the United States purchased all Cuban sugar at a
relatively high price while imposing low duties.
Batista's iron rule, however, was nothing short of
dictatorial. Confident in his presidency, Batista catered to
the wealthy while cultivating labor support. Courting the
Cuban left, Batista established diplomatic relations with the
Soviet Union in 1943. Although some acts of violence had
occurred during the late 1930's and early 1940's, Batista's
strict control prevented the growth of political opposition
groups.
Consequently, when the Cuban elections of 1944 occurred,
Batista was confident that his party would win. Grau San
Martin, Batista's former opponent who was now backed by a
coaliton of the Conservative Republican Party and the
Communists, was the opposition candidate.74 Calling for
agrarian reform and an end to administrative corruption, Grau,
however, won the election, defeating Batista soundly.
Although shocked at the defeat, Batista stepped down from his
position as President and went into retirement in the United
States.
Had Grau and his successor Carlos Prio Socarras
accomplished the intended goals of the 1933 Revolution and
instituted reform, Cuba might have avoided significant strife
and the eventual Castro rebellion of the 1950's. As it was,
Grau's conciliatory policy toward opposition groups and lack
of support from the army created an environment in which
organized urban violence ran rampant. Student activism again
took hold as students aligned themselves with oppostion groups
and used organized force to accomplish their objectives. An
entire system of nepotism, favoritism, and gangs developed as
three key urban groups, the ARG (Accion Revoluncionaria
Guiteras), the MSR (Movimiento Socialista Revolucionario), and
the UIR (Union Insurreccional Revolucionaria), came to
prominence.75
In 1947, a split occurred in the Autentico party when a
group led by the politically ambitious Congressman Eduardo
Chibas became disatisfied with Grau's ineffectiveness. Known
as the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxo), the party became
the new repository for the ideals of the "frustrated
revolution."76 Attacking Cuba's political leadership, the
Autenticos demanded social justice, economic independence, and
honest government while insisting that Cuba remain free from
political pacts. Although gaining in popularity, Chibas
commited suicide in August 1951 while giving a weekly radio
address. The purported reason for his action was frustration
at not being able to reach the objectives of the Revolution of
1933.77
Chibas's death created a leadership vacuum and rift in
the Ortodoxo Party.78 The continued ineffectiveness of the
ruling Autentico Party soon discredited the party in the eyes
of the Cuban people and only added to the growing political
instability. Consequently, on March 10, 1952, unsure if he
could successfully win the elections that year but confident
of the army's support, Batista overthrew Prio in a bloodless
cout d'etat.79
To foreign observers, particularly the United States, the
Batista-ruled Cuba of the 1950's seemed to blossom. Cuba was
stable, foreign investment was protected, and tourism
flourished. By supporting government agencies such as an
Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank, a Cuban Foreign
Trade Bank, and a Technological Research Institute, which
served as foundations for industrial research, Batista
attracted commercial interest. Although the sugar industry
still dominated all other economic areas, a U. S. Department
of Commerce bulletin described Cuba as having "one of the
highest standards of living in Latin America."80
Behind the glitter of Havana and facade of prosperity,
however, Cuba was still an island economy in colonial status.
The reformist promises of the 1940 constitution remained
largely unsatisfied. American investment in the sugar
industry had declined by the 1950's to about one-third of
Cuban production capacity although the sugar interests still
continued to influence power in controlling the annual Cuban
sugar quota in the United States. In other areas of Cuba's
economy, particularly in the public utilities, railroads,
banking, nickel mining, and various retail concerns, U.S.
capital dominated. From Batista, American investment received
beneficial treatment while Cuban investment seemed to be
ignored.
Accordingly, beneath the Batista-built shell of wealth
and democracy, Cuba was ripe for rebellion. Opposition to
Batista's dictatorial practices started to mount. University
students again took to the streets, launching an anti-Batista
campaign. The primary influencer of student activities this
time was the Ortodoxo Party which contained a small faction
that advocated violence as the best means to combat Batisto.
A member of this small faction who had earned his law degree
from the University of Havana in 1950 was Fidel Castro.
Captivated by Chebas and the zeal of the Ortodoxios
nationalistic platform, Castro saw the Ortodoxos as Cuba's
only hope for defending its sovereignty.
During the 1952 elections, Castro was asked to run as an
Ortodoxo candidate. When the elections were preempted by
Batista's coup, Castro continued his campaign, circulating a
petition that the Batista government should be deposed because
it came to power "illegitimately."
On July 26, 1953, in a demonstration of his opposition to
Batista, Castro led 165 men in an unsuccessful revolt against
the Moncada army barracks near Santiago de Cuba. Although
receiving some notoriety for his act of rebellion, it was
during his trial, however, that Castro first garnered
attention as a Cuban revolutionary. Delivering a long oration
in his defense in which he stated that "history will absolve
me," Castro condemned Batista and his lack of social reforms
and emphasized the need to restore Cuba to a constitutional
government.81
With Castro subsequently sentenced to fifteen years in
prison, Batista's position was once again secured. Running
as the self-appointed candidate of his own Progressive Action
Party, Batista easily won the Cuban presidential elections of
1954 after the oppositon candidate, Grau San Martin, withdrew
from the race.
In May 1955, Batista, in both a sign of confidence and as
a result of pressure to spare those who had participated in
the Moncada attack, declared a general amnesty. One of the
prisoners released from jail was Fidel Castro, who departed
Cuba for exile in Mexico on July 7, 1955.82
THE RISE OF CASTRO
While exiled in Mexico, Castro continued to pursue his
revolution. Establishing the 26th of July Movement (M-26-7),
a group named to perpetuate the attack on the Moncado
Barracks, Castro concentrated on clandestine politics and
prepared for the revolution that would overthrow the Batista
regime.83 On December 2, 1956, a M-26-7 group of 81 men led
by Castro sailed from Mexico on GRANMA, a yacht provided by
Batista's old adversary Prio, and landed in the Cuban province
of Oriente. A counterattack from Batista's forces killed or
captured a majority of the group. Castro and his brother,
Raul, as well as an Argentine physician named Che Guevara, and
a small remaining number of the group fled to the Sierra
Maestra mountains. There, Castro's guerrilla force grew in
strength and importance, attacking small military outposts in
order to capture weapons and ammunition. As Castro carried
out his campaign, his image as the revolutionary changed to
one of patriotic hero. An urban underground-developed that
soon became the backbone of the anti-Batista struggle.
Supplies, obtained chiefly from the United States, supported
Castro's revolutionary efforts which soon included hit-and-run
raids, sabotage, and attacks on military installations.84
As Castro's revolution gained momentum, Batista denied
that Castro was a threat, by publishing accounts that Castro
had been killed. However, when the New York Times printed an
interview with and photographs of Castro, stories of Batista's
brutality and dictatorial repressions surfaced, reaching the
United States. The $1 million dollars in military aid granted
to Batista was soon interpreted as aid to Batista in his
struggle against Castro.85 In response, the American
Ambassador in Cuba, Earl Smith, was instructed to inform
Batista that the United States would pursue a policy of
impartial neutrality and support for the Batista effort would
be suspended.
In November 1958, presidential elections were held with
Batista's candidate, Andres Rivero Aguero, winning the
election. By 1958, however, opposition to Batista began to
take on massive proportions. The overwhelming majority of
Cubans wanted Batista out and the dictatorship to end. With
no specific political ideology in mind, Cubans simply sought
the re-establishment of contitutional legality. When fraud
was subsequently claimed in the election, Castro seized the
moment. Bursting out of the Sierra Maestra mountains,
Castro's revolutionaries attacked the army under Batista's
control. As his army deserted around him, Batista fled Cuba
on January 1, 1959. The following day, Che Guevara and 600
revolutionaries took Havana.86 Castro's revolutionary forces
were now in control of Cuba.
CHAPTER 3
CASTRO'S REVOLUTION
With the overthrow of Batista, the fate of Cuba was now
in the hands of one man - Fidel Castro. Considered a hero by
many, Castro embodied what many Cubans hoped would be a new
era of peace and prosperity for Cuba. Castro and his
nationalistic fervor, it was hoped, would reestablish a
constitutional, democratic government in Cuba, free of the
corruption of the Batista regime, and one that would enable
Cuba to develop into a free and independent state. As history
has recorded, however, such was not the case. Consequently,
this chapter will examine and analyze why Castro's revolution
was successful, what influenced the breakdown in U.S.-Cuban
relations, and how that breakdown in relations impacted the
events of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
THE SUCCESS OF THE REVOLUTION
Castro's success in overthrowing Batista was the offshoot
of a violent anti-Batista movement supported by Cubans from
all walks of life. Although often asserted that Castro and
his barbudos or "bearded ones" led a popular peasant revolt,
in actuality, the "revolt" included a mix of all classes of
Cuban society. Students, university professors, middle-class
intellectuals, peasant soldiers, and businessmen alike engaged
in various forms of active and passive resistance which all
aided in Batista's downfall.87 As Dr. Gregorio DelReal, a
former law professor of Castro's and minister in the National
Bank of Cuba remembered, Castro was welcomed by the Cubans
because it was perceived that Castro would "[do] very good
things for the country. Everybody was for him [Castro]
because everybody wanted to get rid of Batista."88
For that generation of Cubans experiencing the Revolution
of 1933 and now the Castro revolution, it was easy to
understand their willingness to accept this new victor.
Castro himself had spoken of the need to restore the Cuban
constitution of 1940. Prior to 1959, he had also been a
member of the zealously nationalistic Ortodoxico Party, whose
fervor was based on a program of restoring the promises of
1933 revolutionary Cuba. Consequently, there was nothing in
Castro's actions, political or otherwise, that led the Cuban
people to believe that Castro's interests were other than
legitimate. His only intentions appeared to be to retore Cuba
to a constitutional government and to focus, at least for the
moment, on those measures necessary to best care for Cuba and
her people.
THE NEW CASTRO GOVERNMENT
Following the exodus of Batista, Castro moved quickly to
establish a new government. On January 6, 1959, Castro's
moderate designee for President, Dr. Manuel Urrutia y Lleo,
was installed as Cuba's new president.89 Castro himself
arrived in Havana on January 8th after triuphmently making his
way westward from Oriente Province. Immediately upon arrival,
Castro began implementing measures that included championing
housing for the poor and financial reform. Vowing to end the
corruption that had marked the Batista regime, Castro easily
won popular support.90
Even initial relations between the United States and Cuba
appeared hopeful in early 1959. As a result of highly
favorable media coverage and his formidable public relations
skills, Castro became something of a folk-hero in the United
States. Charismatic and articulate, the tone of Castro's
proposed policies prior to 1959, although vague, gave no
indication that traditionally close U.S.-Cuban relations would
deteriorate under a Castro regime. 91 Subsequently, on
January 7, 1959, Ambassador Smith personally delivered the
United States official note of recognition to the new
government of Cuba.92 Although the Soviet Union also
extended recognition that same month, the Cubans did not
bother to reciprocate or even reply to the Soviet
overtures.93
In addition to taking quick control of Cuba, Castro's
political skill was also demonstrated by his ability to
maintain momentum by capitalizing on the weaknesses of fellow
revolutionary groups. The Cuban Communist Party or Partido
Socialista Popular (PSP), for example, appeared to exert
little, if any, political influence on the new Castro
government. On the contrary, the PSP appeared to be only one
of the many political factions on the "outside looking in."
Issuing a statement on January 6th entitled "The Overthrow of
the Tyranny and the Immediate Tasks Ahead," the PSP promised
the new government "all the support and all the cooperation
necessary," while also calling for the "formalization,
extension, and consolidation of unity of all
revolutionaries."94 Focusing on the "disintegration of the
Batista political regime," the PSP statement provided support
for Castro's proposed "Land Law," the expansion of Cuban
export markets to socialist countries, and the restoration of
the 1940 constitution so as to prepare for democratic
elections "after the changes or adjustments deemed necessary
by the people [were made]".95
Consequently, although Castro would later state that he
had been a Communist from the beginning of the revolution, his
initial attempts at reform neither mirrored or supported the
"language of marxism."96 In fact, as the Castro regime
pursued the objectives of its revolution, it became apparent
that the revolution seemed to follow no specific political
ideology. Rather, the revolution itself seemed to originate
from an amorphous set of reformist goals designed to appeal to
a variety of groups and classes. Calculatingly ambiguous, the
appeal of the revolution appeared to reside more in Castro's
ability to represent it as "anything and everything to anyone
and everyone. The movement had "...an unusual appeal to all
sectors of Cuban society, either legitimate or convenient."97
What was even more pronounced, however, was the
realization that Castro was exceptionally ambitious,
authoritarian, and fiercely nationalistic. As described by
Dr. DelReal, "Everything with him [Castro] was ego."
Additionally, given the history of U.S. interventions, the
Platt Amendment, and the extent of U.S. economic presence in
Cuba, Castro did not hold the United States in high regard.98
Well aware of Cuba's "shared history" with the United States,
Castro was convinced that American imperialism had caused
Cuba's problems, and only the elimination of Cuba's dependence
on America could correct them.
Accordingly, the first open signs of Castro's alienation
from U.S. influence came only a few months after he seized
power. Following his April 1959 visit to the United States,
a steady breakdown in communication between Washington and
Havana slowly began. As the Castro government pursued
"revolutionary justice" to systematically hunt down and try
Batista supporters, the American public was shocked at the
level of anarchy. Public trials, jeering spectators, and an
atmosphere of tribal justice seemed to rule the day. At the
same time, Castro began nationalizing foreign-owned
businesses. Contending that private investment subverted Cuba
to foreign control, Castro appointed "intervenors" who
supervised the operation of American companies, particularly
the Cuban Telephone and Electric Companies. Under Law 851,
the Cuban government began to seize foreign-controlled
landholdings that produced rice, tobacco, and coffee.
Additional taxes were levied on foreign companies while in May
1959, the Cuban Court of Social and Constitutional Guarantees
approved the nationalization of lands owned by Nicaro Nickel,
Moa Bay Mining, and the Freeport Sulphur Company. When the
companies protested and threatened to close down their
operations, Castro simply took them over. On behalf of the
investors, the American government filed legal protests,
arguing that the new Cuban nationalization laws were in
violation of international law.99 The American protests,
however, were ignored by the Castro government.
In early 1960, the Eisenhower administration issued a
statement on Cuban-American relations that implied a
condemnation of Castro's action. Drafted with the aid of
Ambassador Philip Bonsal, the United States Ambassador to
Cuba, the statement pledged the continuation of America's
policy of nonintervention, expressed dismay at the
unwillingness of Cuba to accept the overtures of the United
States, asserted that Cuba must abide by international law,
and maintained that the American government would use legal
remedies to protect the interests of its citizens in Cuba.
The statement was criticized by the Castro government who
contended it was only another American attempt to dominate the
Cuban economy. Consequently, when Castro initiated trade
relations with the Soviet Union, his actions were viewed by
global leaders not as an attempt to widen the gulf between the
United States, but only an effort by a national leader to
foster trade between his country and the rest of the world.
THE U.S. RESPONSE TO CASTRO
For the Eisenhower administration, there seemed to be no
reversal in the course leading to a breakdown of relations
with Cuba. Concluding that Castro was determined not to have
good relations with the United States, President Eishenhower
signed a National Security Directive in March 1960, ordering
that other U.S. options be explored for destabilizing the
Castro regime. In May 1960, the Castro government announced
that British and American refineries were required to process
Soviet crude oil instead of Venezuelan oil. When the company
managers refused, Castro seized the oil companies in a
diplomatic victory. In retaliation, President Eisenhower
suspended Cuban sugar quotas for the remainder of the year to
which Castro replied by nationalizing the remaining American
sugar mills.100
Meanwhile, the Eisenhower administration began to train
and equip Cuban exiles for a future invasion of Cuba. Under
the supervision of the CIA, the arming and instruction of the
anti-Castro Cubans began in isolated camps in Central America.
The purpose of the plan was to overthrow Castro by inciting a
popular uprising. The planners assumed that once the invading
force gained a foothold in Cuba, that an anti-Castro
revolutionary government would be established that would
rally the Cuban people to its banners. Based on this
assumption, the planning focused on invading the south coast
of Cuba at a bay about 97 miles southeast of Havana known as
the Bay of Pigs.
In early January 1961, Castro ordered the American
embassy staff in Havana reduced in size to eleven persons
within two days' time. Shortly thereafter, President
Eisenhower announced that diplomatic relations between the
United States and Cuba were terminated. As ties between the
United States and Cuba ended, preparations still continued for
the planned invasion of Cuba.
On January 20, 1961, John Fitzgerald Kennedy was sworn in
as the 35th President of the United States. As a presidential
candidate, Kennedy had campaigned as being "tough on
communism." Inheriting the Cuban invasion plan, it became
apparent that despite their rhetoric, there were few
differences between he and Eisenhower in their approaches to
Castro. Briefed on the invasion plan, which now called for a
conventional military force rather than a guerrilla attack,
the new President, however, was initially disturbed about the
CIA's maneuvers and the decision to use American military
force. For several reasons, however, President Kennedy
decided to continue with the plan. Cuba was continuing to
move closer towards the Soviet orbit; Castro was sending his
pilots to Czechoslovakia for training; and sporadic raids were
being ordered by Castro against targets in other Caribbean
island nations.101
Thus, relying on the advise of his top military and
foreign-policy advisers who included CIA Director Allen
Dulles, General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and A.A. Berle,
Chairman of the President's Latin American Task Force, the
President decided to continue with the plan but with
modifications. Those modifications excluded the provision
and/or use of U.S. air support or American forces. The only
American support provided to the invading force was to be
covert.
On April 17, 1961, the planned invasion at the Bay of
Pigs occurred. From the outset, the invasion was a failure.
Landing at Playa Giron on the west coast of the Bay of Pigs,
the 1,300 man brigade tried to make its way inland through the
swamps of the Peninsula de Zapata. However, those who had
planned the invasion had seriously underestimated the size of
Castro's land forces, which now included Soviet tanks and
artillery. Additionally, Castro's air force, which supposedly
was destroyed days before, sank a major supply ship, stranding
the Cuban exiles on shore without food, water, or
reinforcements. When the fighting ended on April 19th, 90 of
the invaders had been killed while the rest were taken
prisoner.
While the tragedy of the Bay of Pigs marked a low point
in the United States international prestige, it only served to
enhance Castro's. Well aware of the victory he had obtained,
Castro was inflated by his triumph. His image, which had been
tarnished somewhat by revolutionary laws and justice, was
strengthened immensely. Invaded by a world superpower, his
ability to successfully oppose the United States was proven;
an especially significant point when heretofore U.S. -Cuban
relations had emphasized Cuban weakness and U.S. dominance.
Castro's satisfaction with Cuban efforts at the Bay of
Pigs, however, were marred by persistent, nagging concern that
in the face of a defeat, the United States would return to
attempt a second invasion. Ever mindful of this possibility,
it would become for Castro a key consideration that would not
only shape his perspective in the new relationship being
forged with the Soviet Union, but also influence his decisions
when dealing with the United States again in the future.
For the United States, the Bay of Pigs only revealed how
much the United States had misinterpreted Castro and the Cuban
Revolution. Although President Kennedy had assumed full
responsibility for the fiasco, the failure rightfully belonged
to those advisors who continued to misjudge the strength of
Castro's hold on Cuba and the unwillingness and inability of
Cubans to rise up in arms against him. Information about and
decisions concerncing Castro and Cuba focused more on Cuban-
Soviet relations and Castro as a dictator, rather then on the
social and economic conditions that led to Castro's rise to
power. Consequently, the Bay of Pigs proved to be an
irrational outburst, an U.S. attempt to strike back at a petty
Latin American dictator who irritated the United States and
got away with it than any form of specific "Cuban" policy. It
was an attack on Castro himself who did not fit the
traditional pattern of the Cuban revolutionary rather than a
definitive statement of how to deal with "the Cuban affair."
Consequently, the Kennedy administration seemed to settle
on a policy of harassment and diplomatic isolation in order to
contain Castro and keep him off balance. The harassment
included running operations back and forth between Cuba and
Florida, destroying factories, and staging hit-and-run attacks
against the Cuban coast. Operations such as deploying
American forces in the region, buzzing Cuban airfields, flying
high altitude reconnaissance missions over the island, and
staging military exercises such as PHIBRIGLEX-62, in which
United States Marines invaded the fictitious Republic of
Vieques to overthrow its imaginary dictator "Ortsac" - or
"Castro" spelled backwards - served to ensure Castro remained
off-balance.102 Covert operations, when used,"...only
provided," as Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy described, a "psychological
salve for inaction."103 Plans such as OPERATION MONGOOSE,
which were intended, as CIA Director John A. McCone later
wrote, to "encourage the Cuban people to take Cuba away from
Castro and to set up a proper form of government" were
scrapped so as to focus instead on "the immediate collection
of intelligence [and] the immediate priority objectives of US
efforts in the coming months."104
In June 1962, however, President Kennedy completed
efforts to contain Cuba's diplomatic isolation by addressing
the Organization of American States' (OAS) Conference at Punta
del Este, Uruguay. On the recommendation of the United
States, the OAS declared Castro's government incompatible with
the inter-American system and, concluding that Cuba should be
excluded from the OAS, concurred with the U.S. recommendation
to impose an arms embargo.
In retrospect, then, both the United States and Cuba
blamed each other for their mutual antagonism and the spiral
of fear and hostility leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis.
For Castro, this hostility was embedded in his drive to break
Cuba's dependence on the United States. Castro was convinced
that American imperialism had caused Cuba's problems and that
only the elimination of Cuba's dependence on the United States
could correct them. Despite early U.S. attempts to work with
the new regime, Castro had no intentions of collaberating with
the United States. Rather, he appeared to look for any excuse
to break U.S.-Cuban ties.
For the United States, this hostility and antagonism
centered on Castro. Long used to the turbulent politics of
Cuba, it was perceived that Cuba's problems were caused by the
new Latin dictator. Consequently, neither Castro nor his
revolution were fully understood by U.S. policy makers.
Decisions concerning Castro and Cuba's state of affairs were
subsequently clouded by historical precedence rather than
current accurate analysis and knowledge.
Crucial also to this growing hostility and fear was the
American invasion at the Bay of Pigs. Providing a key link to
the events that culminated in the Cuban Missile Crisis, the
Bay of Pigs tragedy set the stage for the crisis in three key
ways.
First, the Bay of Pigs set the tone of U.S. -Cuban
relations during the Kennedy administration. Humbled and
embarrassed by its inability to "fix" problems in Cuba by
overthrowing Castro, the U.S. approach to Cuba shifted
drastically following the Bay of Pigs. Efforts designed to
overthrow Castro now focused more on Cold War concerns of
detering Castro from exporting his revolution and discouraging
relations with the Soviets than on direct involvement in Cuban
affairs. Castro, on the other hand, exploited the American
failure at the Bay of Pigs. Strengthening his hold on Cuba,
Castro pushed the limits of U.S. diplomacy. At the same time,
however, the attempted American invasion caused Castro to grow
concerned about Cuban security. If the United States had
tried to invade once, surely they would try again. This
assumption would eventually cause Castro to misjudge U.S.
intent during the crisis and influence his decisions to accept
Soviet military support in the form of nuclear-capable
missiles.
Second, the Bay of Pigs underscored for Castro the need
to continue to pursue an alliance with the Soviet Union. Well
aware of his strategic vulnerabilities in relation to the
United States, the only way Castro could protect himself from
one superpower was to seek protection from the other.
Accordingly, to safeguard Cuba from an anticipated "second
invasion," Castro needed to ensure Cuban security was
protected. By pursuing an alliance with the Soviets, Castro
assumed that just such military protection would be provided.
And third, the attempted invasion of Cuba grew to impact
Soviet dealings with Cuba. As relations between the two
countries developed, Soviet decisions to provide military aide
to Cuba would, in part, be influenced by the need to protect
Cuba militarily from the United States. As an examination of
the events of the Cuban Missile Crisis later reveal, American
aggression as that witnessed at the Bay of Pigs simply gave
the Soviets an added reason to pursue the placement of
missiles in Cuba.
CHAPTER 4
CASTRO AND COMMUNISM
Exactly when Castro made the shift to Communism is still
a matter of speculation. The inability to identify Castro's
ideological beliefs caused a confusion, both internal and
external to Cuba, that existed from the outset of Castro's
revolution and continued long after his ascent to power.
However by 1961, Castro stated publicly that he was a
"Communist and would be one" until he died. Consequently,
this chapter will examine why Castro embraced Communism, what
impact, if any, U.S. policy had on Castro's acceptance of
Marxism, and, more importantly, how Castro's acceptance of
Communism influenced the events surrounding the Cuban Missile
Crisis.
THE CASTRO REVOLUTION - AN IDEOLOGY OF CONFUSION
Although the Batista government attempted to represent
Castro and the 26th of July Movement as Communist, there was
little information to support this claim. As the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research at the Department of State indicated
early in 1958 prior to Castro's takeover, there was "little
[available] about [the] top leadership [of the 26th of July
Movement] ... the evidence available to the Department [did] not
confirm the Cuban government's charge that Castro [was] a
Communist..."105 This conclusion corresponded with another
official Department of State report of September 1958 that
declared Castro "was not a Communist and that the Communists
[did] not play a dominant role in the leadership of the 26th
of July Movement" although the statement's explanatory note
indicated that the information "[was] not as conclusive as we
would like."106 In November 1959, CIA Deputy Director C. P.
Cabell testified before a Senate subcommittee that "Castro
[was] not a Communist...the Cuban Communists do not consider
him a Communist party member or even a pro-Communist."107
Consequently, even as late as 1960, a report from the CIA
referred to Castro as "not a Communist and certainly not an
anti-Communist," but a violently anti-American nationalist
being used by the Communists in an "intense drive" on Latin
America.108 However, just two years later in August 1962,
a subsequent CIA intelligence estimate indicated that "Fidel
Castro [had] asserted his primacy in Cuban communism" and that
"mutual ties of interest" existed "between Castro and the
"old" Communists, and between Cuba and the USSR."109
Confusion over Castro's real political ideology was also
felt within the new government and the Castro regime as well.
Although it was clear that Castro intended to pursue the
revolution at all costs, it was less clear as to what
political ideology would be used to form the framework of the
new Cuban government.
Soon after the establishment of the provisional Cuban
government in January 1960, a rift grew between 26th of July
moderates and radicals. Centering not only on the rights of
private property and the role of free enterprise, the rift
involved such questions as the holding of elections, the
function of political parties, and the relationship of
Castro's provisional government to the PSP.110 In the
resulting struggle, Che Guevara, Castro's prime guerrilla
lieutenant, and Raul Castro, Castro's brother, both radicals,
surfaced as influential members of the Castro regime. In
addition, PSP members also appeared to gain influence and were
soon appointed to positions within the new Cuban bureaucracy.
Aware of these new influencers of Cuban policy, moderate
members of the Castro regime became angered not only at
Castro's refusal to ask the United States for economic aid
during his visit to Washington, DC in April 1959, but also at
a strong anti-American speech Castro delivered at the United
Nations that following September.
Although Castro initially served as arbitrator between
the two opposing factions of his regime, appearing not to
favor one side over the other, it became apparent by October
1959, that Castro was shifting to a more radical course.
Supporting the policy recommendations of Che Gueverra and his
brother Raul, Castro began to support a closer association
with the Soviet Union.111 President Urrutia, who had been
accused of treason by Castro by publicly stating that
Communism constituted a danger to the Cuban Revolution, was
removed as President. In his place, Osvaldo Dorticos, a man
known to be more amenable to a relationship with the
Communists became Cuba's President during July 1959.112 On
October 19, 1959, Major Huber Matos, a military chief in
Camagiiey province, resigned, charging Communist penetration
of the government. Major Matos was subsequently sentenced to
twenty years in prison for conspiracy, sedition, and
treason.113 Consequently, by the end of 1959, all of Cuba's
moderate cabinet ministers were gone. A reorganization of
labor under PSP leadership now provided the revolution with an
increasingly "class character." Cuban mines, utilities, sugar
companies, oil refineries, and over 50 percent of Cuban land,
depite their ownership by U.S. companies or U.S. allies,
continued to be nationalized.
Slowly severing Cuba's relationship with the United
States, Castro began a campaign to foster a closer association
with the Soviets. On February 6, 1960, First Deputy Premier
Anastas I. Mikoyan of the Soviet Union arrived in Havana with
a Soviet trade exhibition. Meeting with Cuban leaders,
Mikoyan signed an agreement providing for $100 million in
trade credits to help lessen Cuban dependence on the United
States. During March, when the French steamer La Coubre
carrying a shipment of Belgian small arms exploded in Havana
Harbor, killing dozens of workers and soldiers, Castro blamed
the incident on the CIA, who according to Castro, sabotaged
the ship.114 On April 19, 1960, the first shipment of Soviet
crude oil arrived in Cuba. Less than a month later on May 7,
1960, diplomatic relations between Cuba and the Soviet Union
were established. By the summer, the Soviets were beginning
to supply most of Cuba's petroleum needs. When the United
States terminated Cuba's sugar quota in July 1960, the Soviet
Union announced the following day that it was willing to buy
the sugar previously destined for the United States. During
October, the Cuban government expropriated without
compensation all U.S. holdings in Cuba, which were valued at
over $1 billion. Finally, during a television appearance on
December 1, 1961, Castro disclosed that he was "a Marxist-
Leninist and... [would] continue to be one until the last day
of [his] life."115
WHY THE SHIFT?
Many reasons have been postulated for Castro's
ideological shift to Communism. Some historians believe that
Castro accepted a revolution based on socialism and
totalitarianism when his own revolutionary methods proved
unsuccessful. Others believe that Castro "went Communist" in
stages; that Castro's original revolutionary premise still
existed but that it underwent radical changes in gradual,
perceptible stages that not even Castro planned for or
promised.116 As radical members of the 26th of July moved
the Movement leftward, Castro lost faith in the Movement as a
political vehicle and subsequently turned to the Cuban
Communists or to the left as a way to accomplish the
revolution's, albeit his, objectives.117
Still many others believe that U.S. policy failed in Cuba
and, because of this failure, the United States "drove" Castro
to the Soviets. In reality, it would be more accurate to
state that U.S. policy did not force Castro to accept
Communism, but it did influence both the evolution of the
Revolution and the tempo and direction of Castro's Russian
policy.118 In short, when Castro decided to seek Soviet
support, his decision was based on injuries he felt he had
either received or those he anticipated he would receive from
the United States. As Castro recalled about his visit to the
United States in April 1959:
I remember when I visited the United States. There was
no ill will against the United States; in fact we had a
great many friends. But, the fact is that we were
practically impotent against this great campaign over
there against Cuba, as the positions of the revolutionary
government became clear. But I went to Washington. I
was invited by the press, and I didn't mind -- sincerely.
But the president of the United States didn't even invite
me for a cup of coffee, because I wasn't worthy of a cup
of coffee with the President of the United States. They
sent me Nixon...It's not a question of it being a
dishonor to have Nixon, since Nixon was vice
president... I was received at the Capitol in a little
office... I explained the social and economic situation in
Cuba, the poverty, the inequality, the hundreds of
thousands of unemployed, the landless peasants, the
measures that we had to adopt to solve the situation--
and Nixon listened, said nothing, and made no remarks.
But when the interview concluded, it's well known that he
sent a memo to Eisenhower saying, "Castro is a communist
and the revolutionary govenment has to be
overthrown"... he suggested this to the President as early
as April 1959. Not Mikoyan, not a single Soviet had
visited the country... our program was not a socialist
program [at the time] it was the Moncada program.119
A further example of how U.S. policy influenced Castro's
decision to "go communist" can be seen in Cuba's need to
obtain defense supplies and economic subsidies. Reacting to
U.S. economic pressures, Castro stated:
But at that time American economic pressures of all types
began. They became stronger and stronger...We must not
forget that they [the United States] took from us our
sugar quota, which was four million tons. This is
something that had existed in a century of trade
relations between Cuba and the United States, since we
were a colony...Why our gratitude to the USSR?.. .When we
were deprived of the sugar quota, the USSR turned up and
said it was ready to buy Cuban sugar. When [the United
States] suspended oil shipments and left us without fuel,
the USSR turned up and said it was ready to supply us
with oil. It wasn't just CIA operations, there were
political measures, economic measures, that complicated
life in this country [Cuba]. This was the foundation of
our relations with the USSR.120
Additionally, Castro's own misplaced perception that the
United States would not accept his social and economic
reforms, specifically when diplomatic questions of
compensation to U.S. citizens and businesses were raised,
which intensified his draw to the Soviet Union.121 In fact,
it was this self-expressed defiance of "Yankee imperialism"
that provided Castro with an added benefit. That benefit was
the provision of a readymade, emotionally-charged, external
threat which Castro could use to galvanize Cuban support for
his programs of national reformation. Since U.S. policy was
already confused as a result of the mixed signals sent by
Castro, it was easy for Castro to transform a policy of
erratic uncooperativeness to one of open aggression and
enemity.122 Thus, capitalizing on this change, Castro
quickened the socialization of Cuba. He accomplished this by
developing closer relations with the Soviets who were, by this
time, eager to expand their presence into the Western
Hemisphere. Castro's revolution began as an independent
nationalistic movement. Because he was able, at each stage,
to identify the revolution with Cuban patriotism through his
messianic leadership, Castro successfully transformed Cuba
into a Communist state with, at the very least, the passive
support of the majority of the Cuban people.
A political opportunist, Castro was also a Cuban patriot,
extremely nationalistic, and an exceptionally charismatic
leader. Subsequently, communism in Cuba was both totalitarian
and popular.123 In consequence, U.S. policy helped Castro
persuade the Cuban people that the United States was the enemy
of the Cuban Revolution and that security for the revolution
lay in the nationalization of the economy and association with
the Soviets.124
At the same time, Castro's conversion to Communism and
transformation of Cuba into a Communist state was also a
function of Castro's foreign policy objectives.125 Believed
by many to be international in scope, Castro fought the
revolution not only for agrarian reform in Cuba, but also to
"achieve a second liberation of Latin America" that he
(Castro) would lead. In consequence, the Cuban Revolution was
only the "means to an end." In the bigger picture, the
revolution would enable Castro to achieve, or perhaps even
surpass, as the leader of a "Latin American" revolution, the
same world prestige that Nasser, Nehru, and Tito had
achieved.126 Castro was well aware that his intentions
would, in time, cause him to confront the United States.
However, his objective was only to impose sharp limitations on
U.S. economic interests and challenge U.S. poltical leadership
while other revolutions, spurred on by the success of his
revolution in Cuba, occurred throughout the rest of Latin
America. Castro knew that Cuba alone would not be able to
confront the United States, but a show of Latin American unity
could. Cuban survival as well as Castro's, depended upon on
the successful occurrence of other revolutionary movements in
Latin America.127
When these other revolutions did not occur and it became
apparent that Castro would meet opposition from the OAS as
well as the Inter-American Peace Committee, Castro was forced
to reassess the situation. His alternatives were either to
forgo his foreign policy objectives or to seek an ally that
could shield him from the United States. The only ally
capable of providing such a shield was the Soviet Union.
Reliance on the Soviets did not necessarily mean,
however, that Castro intended to become a Marxist-Leninist.
Other Third World leaders, such as Nassar and Sukarno, had
turned to the Soviets for help without becoming Communist.
Consequently, Castro maintained first to moderates that he was
not pursuing closer Communistic ties while simultaneously
suggesting to PSP members, as well as leftist members of the
Movement, that he would welcome a Communist coalition and a
friendship with the Soviets. This dual tactic enabled Castro
to buy time and keep his options open while determining the
prospects for other Latin American revolutions. When it
became clear that other revolutions were not going to occur,
Castro's choice, i.e., to opt for Communism and Soviet
support, became obvious and he made it.
SOVIET REACTIONS TO A COMMUNIST CUBA
For their part, the Soviets saw numerous benefits in
establishing an alliance with Castro. First, Cuba provided
the Soviet Union with a Communist outpost in the Western
hemisphere - an area long viewed as the exclusive hegemony of
the United States since the Monroe Doctrin of 1823. Second,
Cuba provided promise as a potential military facility and
"listening post" within close proximity of the Soviet's chief
opponent - the United States. Third, Cuba could provide the
Soviets with a military force and civilian technical
assistance personnel that could prove valuable to the Soviets
in furthering their own global objectives.128 And finally,
Cuba provided the Soviets with a revolutionary "success story"
or model they could use when exporting communism to the rest
of the Third World. Castro had collaborated with the
Communist Party; a marked difference from other revolutions
that excluded rather than welcomed Communist collaboration.
As Mark Falcoff, resident scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute stated, "...the Soviets always had a terrible
inferiority complex about their system. They knew that no one
ever opted for their system voluntarily. That is why Cuba was
important to them...no one really liked them, not even their
own sattelites, who had lingering animosity for them..."
Castro, in fact, ruthlessly pursued a social and economic
revolution that euphemistically put "power" in the hands of
workers and peasants at the expense of individual rights and
freedoms.129 Consequently, Soviet Chairman Nikita Kruschev
had not only taken the Cuban government to heart, but had also
offered it to the rest of Latin America. Thus, the Cuban
revolution provided the Soviets with the opportunity to claim
universal applicability of Communism throughout all of Latin
America. In short, it represented the pattern of revolution
that the Communists would have liked to see spread throughout
all the Third World.
At the same time, however, Soviet reactions to the
acceptance of Cuba as a communist state and Castro as the
leader of Marxism-Leninism in Cuba were both cautious and
unenthusiastic. The Cuban Revolution did not "fit" the
normal, planned Soviet strategy for fostering international
Communism. The revolution was not led by a Communist party
nor an openly Marxist leadership, as those in Europe had been.
According to Soviet ideologists, countries like Cuba -
"semifeudal" and under the imperialistic yoke - had to take
the road to socialism in stages.130 Should young Communist
parties start to build socialism without the minimal and
indispenseable Communist base, such undue haste, it was
thought, may "narrow the popular basis of socialist revolution
and compromise the noble idea of socialism in the eyes of the
masses."131 Nor did Cuba seek peaceful coexistence with the
West. Soviet acceptance of Castro's socialist intent implied
Soviet acceptance of military responsibility for Cuba's
defense. This defense was essential if the Communist myth
that "no country that had abandoned capitalism would return to
it" was to survive.
Accepting military responsibility for a country just
ninety miles from the United States, however, jeopardized the
Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence. Peaceful coexistence
meant "lulling" opponents into a false sense of security until
it was possible for the Soviet Union to gain the upper hand.
With Cuba so close to the United States, creating the needed
"sense of security" while also accomplishing any type of
military buildup would be difficult. Consequently, Cuba with
its strategic location presented both opportunities and
possibilities as well as inherent disadvantages and risks.
Additionally, there was disagreement within the
international Communist party, specifically between the
Soviets and the Chinese, on how to handle Third World
revolutions. The Chinese Communists, although unable to
provide large-scale support, enthusiastically embraced the
Cuban cause. Following the Bay of Pigs invasion in April
1961, for example, the Chinese government celebrated the
"Cuban victory" by holding a huge rally in Peking. Attended
by Cuba's Minister of Education, Armando Hart, who was on a
visit to the Chinese capital at the time, the demonstration
was described in the Chinese press as proving "that the
Chinese people [were] the most trusted and loyal friends of
Cuba, Latin America, and all oppressed nations."132 The
Soviets for their part recognized the event by sending
greetings to Castro via Cuban President Dorticos. While the
Soviets praised Castro for the progress he was making in
"...the building of a new state - democratic and free of
oppressors and exploiters," the Chinese greetings exulted the
revolution itself, referring to the "development and
strengthening of the revolution and its construction,"
encouraging Castro to continue in his efforts.133
CASTRO'S COMMUNISM
Consequently, despite intense lobbying efforts Castro
encountered resistance in his attempt to become a member of
the Soviet bloc. By the end of 1961, Castro faced a desperate
situation. Cuba's admission to the Soviet bloc was denied,
Soviet economic help was insufficient, conditions in Latin
America were unfavorable for revolution, and the Communist old
guard (the original members of the PSP) were pressing to
control the "backbone of the state." To solve this dilemma,
Castro turned to drastic measures. On December 1, 1961 Castro
provided public affirmation of his "real" ideological
disposition by stating that he had always been a Marxist-
Leninist and by pledging that he would be one until he died.
Subsequently, on May 14, 1962, a definitive commercial treaty
was signed between Cuba and the Soviet Union. By June, it was
obvious that the Soviets accepted Castro as the supreme
representative of Marxism-Leninism in Cuba.
For Castro, however, this acceptance did not mean that
power and political control in Cuba would be automatically
turned over to the PSP. On the contrary, the Communist "old
guard" was relegated to only a secondary role in the Cuban
Communist Party. Castro remained the sole dominate force in
Communist Cuba and continued to develop his own brand of
Communism, blending "fidelismo" and Marxism-Leninism into
one.134
The common thread binding Castro to the former Soviet
Union, then, centered on Castro and the personal objectives he
maintained for himself and his revolution - that of
maintaining absolute power; making Cuba a world class actor
with major international influence; and transforming Cuban
society. To accomplish these objectives, Castro first turned
to the Cuban Communists. Constantly moving leftward, then,
Castro gained support from the Cuban Communist party in order
to foster an association with the Soviets. Consequently, it
was Castro who agreed to the initiation of the relationship
that eventually evolved between Cuba and the former Soviet
Union.135 As Castro subsequently revealed, "The important
thing for us was the global strategic might of the Soviet
Union. We saw that it was Soviet will, Soviet determination,
Soviet global might, that protected us."136 Through Marxism-
Leninism and Soviet support, Castro found the means to obtain
his objectives, absolve Cuba of two hundred years of
oppressive U.S. imperialism, and ultimately, eliminate U.S.
influence in Cuba. By turning to the Soviets, Castro embraced
the arch political, military, and ideological rival of the
United States, thus taking nationalistic revenge. It was
Castro who actively courted the Soviets, seeing in the former
Soviet Union the opportunity to achieve his own personal
objectives while still maintaining firm control over Cuba's
political system.
Subsequently, Castro's quid pro quo relationship with the
Soviets was based on a convenient parallel of national
interests and foreign policy that provided both with
considerable benefit.137 For Castro, an alliance with Soviet
Russia provided critical economic subsidies, Soviet military
and technical assistance, a political sponsor willing to
promote and support Castro's aspirations of leadership in the
nonaligned movement, and finally, a protector though not a
guarantor of Cuban independence from the United States.
Extensive Soviet military, economic, and political support
provided Castro with the flexibility he needed to conduct an
activist foreign policy totally out of proportion to Cuba's
physical size in the world.
Also, in order to check Cuban dependence on America,
Castro had turned his back on a world superpower, the United
States. For purely pragmatic reasons that bordered on
economic survival, it was necessary that he establish a
corresponding relationship with a nation of commensurate
strength. The only other power that fulfilled this
requirement was the Soviet Union. As Mark Falcoff stated,
"...the only way [Castro's] economic policy could keep from
collapsing [was] to [have] an outside patron... [Castro's]
economic policies would not work without an authoritarian
political structure to force everyone to work. So, it was a
convergence of two needs: to reject the U.S. and the
practical need to find an alternative." For Castro, that
alternative was the Soviet Union.
For the Soviet Union, an alliance with Cuba provided the
Soviets with an "edge" in their Cold War struggle against the
United States. Prior to their association with Cuba, the
Soviets had been unable to successfully establish a secure
foothold in the Western hemisphere that would allow them to
challenge U.S. hegemony. With Cuba, just such a foothold was
established. In addition, Cuba had willingly pursued entrance
into the Soviet bloc. Unique among the family of Soviet
revolutions, Cuba was the only country that had opted to enter
the Soviet orbit voluntarily. Despite the opposition that
still haunted Cuba's acceptance as a communist country, Cuba
provided the Soviets with a model that could be used to export
communism throughout the rest of Latin America. Consequently,
the Soviets were committed to Cuba at a level more than the
United States realized, but would soon discover, during the
Cuban Missile Crisis.
CHAPTER 5
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
During his October 22nd report to the people, President
Kennedy referred to the presence of medium and long-range
ballistic missiles in Cuba. In preparation for the
President's address, an October 20th CIA estimate indicated
the presence of four MRBM and two IRBM launch sites in various
stages of construction and organized into at least three
regiments. Of these, two regiments of eight launchers each
were believed to be mobile and designed to launch the MRBMs
while one regiment of eight fixed launchers were believed to
be designed for the IRBMs.138 In January 1992, General
Anatoly I. Gribkov, General of the Army of the Russian
Federation, provided clarification that showed the true threat
facing the United States during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
According to General Gribkov, "We brought...twenty-four R-12
launchers, and for each one, 1.5 missile loadings. In
addition, there were six Luna launchers, with 1.5 missile
loadings each, with nuclear warheads. That is, for six
launchers, there were nine tactical nuclear rockets."139 The
R-12's were SS-4's, with a missile range of 2,500 kilometers.
The tactical Luna missiles were FROGs (Free Rocket Over
Ground) with a range of 60 kilometers. At the time of the
crisis, 42,00 Soviet troops were in Cuba. "...In the event of
an [American] attack," Gribkov stated, " the aggressor would
have suffered great losses, either in the event of an air
attack with a subsequent landing , or in a direct assault. An
air attack would not have destroyed all the missiles. Even if
the intermediate-range missile regiments had been destroyed
leaving only the six Luna launchers, they would have been
ready with nuclear weapons, and we [were] all perfectly aware
of the fact that losses would have been tremendous."140 Had
the United States opted to attack Cuba rather than resort to
a quarantine, it was likely that Cuban, Soviet, and American
casualties would have been tremendously high and the island of
Cuba pulverized. In addition, with both the Soviets and the
Cubans willing to "fight to the last," a long, protracted war
could well have been imagined. Consequently, this chapter
will examine why Castro, faced with just such an option,
agreed to the deployment of missiles in Cuba, what
specifically Castro hoped to gain by placing the missiles on
the island, what agreements, if any, were made between Castro
and Khruschev, and what role Cuba and Castro played in the
events leading up to and concluding in the Cuban Missile
Crisis.
THE SOVIET DECISION TO SUPPORT CASTRO
The Soviet decision to place missiles in Cuba and
initiate the "Caribbean Crisis" was clouded in ambiguity. In
his report to the Supreme Soviet on December 12, 1962, Nikita
Kruschev claimed that his sole aim was to defend "little Cuba"
from the "imperialist monster."141 Indicating that he was
acting on a request from Castro, Kruschev stated that he
placed missiles in Cuba based on a Soviet-Cuban agreement
reached at the end of August and announced in a communique on
September 2, 1962.142
In support of these claims, General Anatoly I. Gribkov of
the Main Operations Directorate, Soviet General Staff has made
similiar comments. As the planner of Operation Anadyr, the
name of the secret deployment of men, missiles, and materiel
to Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis, General Gribkov
recalled that the Soviets grew concerned about Cuba's security
following the Bay of Pigs. In the Soviet estimate, the best
way to deal with the "critical situation" was to provide
military assistance to Cuba. In May 1962, the Soviet military
High Command was directed to prepare a proposal for a plan and
force structure to assist the Cuban military in securing the
defense of Cuba. A draft of this agreement was prepared and
called an "Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of
Cuba and the Government of the USSR on Military Co-operation
for the Defense of the National Territory of Cuba in the Event
of Aggression." The preamble of the draft agreement referred
to the necessity of taking steps "for the joint defense of the
legitimate rights of the people of Cuba and the Soviet Union,
taking into account the urgent need to adopt measures to
guarantee mutual security, in view of the possibility of an
imminent attack against the Republic of Cuba and the Soviet
Union." Consequently, the terms of the agreement provided for
not only the defense of Cuba, but also for the defense of
Soviet interests.143
Accordingly, the first draft of the agreement was
initialled by the Cuban Minister of Defense, Raul Castro, and
the Soviet Minister of Defense, Rodion Ya. Malinovsky, during
July 1962. However, an August revision of that draft was
never signed by either Castro, Nikita Khruschev, or their
representatives.144 During early May 1962, Aleksandr
Alekseev, former Ambassador to Cuba, was told by Khruschev
that "we (meaning either he, the Soviet government, or
someone) have decided to send missiles to Cuba because there
[was] no other way to protect Cuba's revolution despite our
interventions in the U.N. We have not been able to stop the
United States."145 Consequently, the defense of "little
Cuba," which was considered to be of vital importance to the
Soviets, was actually based on a Soviet-Cuban military
agreement that neither Kruschev nor Castro had signed.
Although Kruschev's primary goal for placing missiles in
Cuba, then, was to ensure the security of Cuba through an
"effective means of deterrence," three additional reasons,
equally important, have also been postualated for Kruschev's
decision. The first of these was Kruschev's desire to "repay
the Americans in kind" for surrounding the Soviet Union with
military bases and missiles, and to make the United States
"learn what it's like to live under the sights of nuclear
weapons."146 Intending to "do the same thing the Americans
do...to use the same methods," Khruschev took every precaution
to ensure the secrecy of the missile placement so "U.S. public
opinion [would] not be aware of this until November 4th or
after November 4th... The Americans are going to have to
swallow this the same way we had to swallow the pill of the
missiles in Turkey. We (the USSR and Cuba) are two sovereign
states, and when everything [was] ready in November, I will
travel to Cuba and we will tell the world about this
operation."147
Second, Khruschev's decision reflected the tensions and
continuing competition of Cold War politics. The placement of
missiles in Cuba was designed to test the resolve of the
United States so that "even though you do not shoot each
other, you still position weapons as close as possible ... in
order to open fire in case of conflict."148 As the failure
of American efforts at the Bay of Pigs seemed to demonstrate
eighteen months earlier, Khrushchev believed that he was
dealing with an "inexperienced young leader [President
Kennedy] who could be intimidated and blackmailed."
Subsequently, the Soviet leader secretly placed nuclear arms
in Cuba on the assumption that the United States, when faced
with such a fait accompli, would acquiesce to the Kremlin's
demands. Such a victory over the United States would not only
give Khruschev the victory he needed to preserve his prominent
position in the USSR, as the Bay of Pigs had done for Castro
in Cuba months earlier, but also strengthen Khruschev's
position within the international Communist community.149
A third reason for Khrushchev's decision centered on his
intentions to use the missiles as a bargaining chip in a
summit or UN confrontration with President Kennedy, e.g.,
trading the withdrawal of missiles in Cuba for commensurate
U.S. withdrawals in Turkey, so as to capture the real prize -
Berlin. Had the United States responded to the Cuban Missile
Crisis by striking Cuba such an act, in Khruschev's
estimation, would have split the NATO alliance, fueled anti-
Americanism in Latin America, and temporarily occupied the
United States while the Soviets used the opportunity to move
against Berlin. Accordingly, the deployment of missiles in
Cuba was an attempt to alter the Soviet's weak strategic
position as it related to the missile gap. The placement of
nuclear missiles in Cuba would have provided the Soviets with
a swift, comparatively inexpensive but significant addition to
their nuclear missile strike capability. Such a capability
could have altered the U.S.-Soviet Cold War balance of power.
Consequently, the Soviets had much to gain by placing nuclear
missiles in Cuba. Not only would the missiles have enabled
the Soviets to significantly alter the Cold War balance of
power and their position within the international Communist
party, but they also would have provided the USSR with a
bargaining chip useful in furthering their own international
objectives.
CASTRO'S DECISION
For his part, Castro denied that he initiated a request
to place missiles in Cuba. On the contrary, Castro stated
during a speech on January 2, 1963 that the introduction of
strategic weapons into Cuba had been decided by a mutual
agreement between the Soviets and Cuba. "Moscow offered them
to us...Such is the truth even if other explanations are
provided elsewhere."150 However, in an interview several
months following the crisis, Castro contradicted this
explanation by stating that the Soviets proposed placing the
missiles in Cuba "to strengthen the socialist camp on the
world scale. . Since we [Cuba] ...already [received] a large
amount of assistance from the socialist camp, we decided that
we could not refuse. That is why we accepted them. It was
not in order to ensure our own defense, but primarily to
strengthen socialism on the international scale."151 After
Khruschev's ouster in 1965, Castro again reiterated the
assertion that the missiles were placed in Cuba at the
Soviet's request and that he only agreed to their placement in
order to strengthen socialism. Even as late as January 1992,
Castro still asserted that "We analyzed the issues, and all of
us had the same interpretation: ... the real issue was
strategic; that it was imperative to strengthen the socialist
camp...if we expected the socialist countries to fight for us,
we, for simple reasons of image, could not selfishly refuse
that cooperation to the socialist camp."152
A review of the facts, however, indicated that Castro's
acceptance of the missiles was not as simple as reacting to a
proposed Soviet defense plan or supporting the aims of
internationl Socialism. Rather, Castro significantly
influenced the events and factors that not only led to the
Soviet decision for the missile deployment, but also provided
him with a legitimate reason for their use.
Castro's influence of the Soviet decision leading to the
missile deploment actually began two years earlier. In July
1960, President Eisenhower, in retaliation for the
confiscation of U.S.-owned oil refineries, reduced the Cuban
sugar quota by 700,000 tons. Reacting to the President's
action Krushchev sent a cable to Castro, committing the USSR
to assuming the 700,000 tons of sugar by which the American
quota was reduced. In addition, Khrushchev also stated that
"In a figurative sense, if it became necessary, the Soviet
military can support the Cuban people with "rocket
weapons."153 Although Khruschev later attempted to clarify
that he was speaking in "figurative" terms only, it appeared
that Castro preferred to look at Krushchev's offer as very
real. During a mass rally in Cuba on July 10, 1960, Castro
stressed numerous times that the Soviet offer of the rockets
had been both "absolutely spontaneous," to ensure it was
understood that he was "innocent" in the Soviet offer of
rocket assistance, and also real, not "figurative." Thus,
despite Soviet comments to the contrary, Castro not only
exaggerated Soviet intent concerning the missiles, but also
publicly reinforced the idea that the Soviets had offerred to
protect Cuba with missiles.
At the same time, the Soviets, since 1960, had resisted
Cuban demands for specific military-security guarantees. Even
after the Bay of Pigs, the Soviets carefully referred to
"capabilities" rather than commit themselves to Cuba's
defense. But Castro's demands, combined with an internal
Cuban struggle between the Cuban Communist Party and the
"Castroites," created tensions that severely strained Cuban-
Soviet relations through the spring of 1962. This
disagreement peaked at the end of March when Castro purged
Annibal Escalente, an old guard Communist who served as the
second in command of the Cuban Communist Party. In an effort
to reduce tensions in their relationship with Cuba and thus,
retain their valuable outpost in the Western Hemisphere, the
Soviets agreed to several of the demands made by Castro.
Consequently, by late spring, following the departure of
Escalente, an obvious shift had occurred in Soviet policy
toward Cuba. During the annual May Day slogans of 1962
celebrating Communism, Cuba's postion as a Communist country
was listed with those of other prominent Socialist nations.
During a speech to a group of Cubans in Moscow, Khruschev also
publicly stated, for the first time, that the USSR was
providing weapons to Cuba. In July 1962, Soviet ships
transporting military arms began sailing towards Cuba. Later
that same month, Raul Castro, upon returning from a visit to
the Soviet Union, boasted that the only serious threat now
affecting Cuba was an American invasion "which [Cuba could]
now repel."154
Thus, although Khruschev's official reason for offering
the missiles to Castro was to defend Cuba, Castro's acceptance
of them went beyond his public assertions that he wanted to
advance the cause of Socialism. To Castro, accepting military
support from the Soviets placed Cuba in the same position of
dependency that had existed between the United States and Cuba
for over two hundred years. Not wanting to develop such a
dependency again, although an economic dependence upon the
Soviet Union already existed, Castro framed his acceptance of
the missiles as an effort to suport Soviet political
objectives as they related to socialism. As Alekseev further
recalled, the draft military agreement was "brought...to
Castro" who "studied it. There were a great many technical
provisions; the political aspects were rather thin, and Fidel
Castro introduced the necessary corrections."155
In fact, Alekseev at first voiced concern that Castro
would refuse to accept the agreement. To Alekseev, Castro's
first line of defense for the Cuban Revolution was the
solidarity of Latin America. If missiles were installed in
Cuba, "... this would provoke a rejection of the Cuban
Revolution from the rest of the hemisphere." Subsequently,
when meeting with Castro in Cuba concerning the Soviet missile
offer, Alekseev recalled that "...Castro did not give an
immediate reply. After thinking about it, Castro asked if
"...this [was] in the interest of the socialist camp." And we
said, "No, this [was] in the interest of the Cuban
Revolution." This [was] what Khrushchev had said."156
However, it was apparent that Castro and the six members of
his Secretariat, the main policymaking body of the Cuban
government, believed that Soviet motives were not only to
defend Cuba. As Emilio Aragones, former Director of Cuba's
Bank of International Finance and a Secretariat member
recalled,"...in that meeting, comrade Fidel asked us our
opinion about the Soviet plan. We, the six members of the
Secretariat, were unanimously in favor of the emplacement of
the missiles in Cuba; but we six, especially Fidel Castro,
were sure that we were doing this and undertaking these
measures not so much to defend Cuba as to change the
correlation of forces between capitalism and socialism."157
As Dimitri Volkogonov, Director of the Institute of Military
History, Soviet Ministry of Defense, explained further, "I
think that when we talk of motives, we should keep in mind
that it was really a dual task: to help Cuba defend its
independence, and, on the other hand, to raise [the Soviet]
position as a strategic nuclear power.158 Accordingly,
Castro was made well aware that the reason for the placement
of the missiles was the defense of Cuba and of the Cuban
Revolution. Using missiles to defend the revolution, however,
would have undermined Castro's legitimacy within the Latin
American community. Consequently, accepting the missiles in
the name of Socialism, a Soviet political ideology, not only
allowed Castro to share the "blame" for the missiles with
Soviet Russia, but also changed the focus of the missile
deployment from one supporting a revolution to one supporting
an ideology. In essence, Castro shifted the focus of the
deployment from one that emphasized Cuban objectives to one,
that at a minimum, showed a shared emphasis on Soviet
objectives for Socialism.
CASTRO'S MOTIVES FOR ACCEPTING THE MISSILES
In addition to his public support for his Soviet
benefactors and for international socialism, Castro's
acceptance of the missiles also enabled him to achieve a far
more significant objective. First and foremost, the missiles
provided Castro with the ability to deter an American
invasion. Still convinced that the United states would invade
Cuba a second time, the missiles provided Castro with the fire
power he needed to deter such an invasion and thus guarantee
the security of Cuba and of the Cuban revolution.
In addition, Castro also believed that the missiles would
enable him to strengthen his ability to eliminate Cuba's
dependence on the United States. In essence, the missiles
would enable Cuba, as a member of the Soviet bloc, to "thumb
its nose" at the United States in retaliation for two hundred
years of oppression. By possessing nuclear missiles, Castro
could finally end any vestiges of Cuba's long history of
vulnerability to the United States.
CASTRO REACTS
The response in Cuba to President Kennedy's October 22nd
address to the nation and announcement of a quarantine was
received with a "curious mixture of exhilaration and
calm."159 While Castro himself was very calm, exhilaration
seemed to come from the Cuban people as they reacted to
Castro's announcement of a full-scale mobilization of Cuba.
Certain that the United States would launch a major invasion,
the Cuban newspaper "Revolucion" carried a banner headline
that read "The Nation on a War Footing." As Cuba prepared for
war, General Sergio del Valle, the Chief of Staff of the Cuban
Army during the crisis, recalled that the Cuban leaders
anticipated massive U.S. bombings followed by an all out
invasion. "We were convinced that the invasion or aerial
attack would be carried out long before the president
intervened on the 22nd... our entire population began to
prepare to defend the country...we mobilized 270,000 men, we
organized 56 infantry divisions, many of whom were not well
prepared...the entire nation was made ready..."160
Accordingly, for Cuba the threat of war and U.S. invasion was
very real. As Sergo A. Mikoyan, personal secretary and son of
Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan remembered, the
threat was so real that many "Cubans and Soviets in Cuba were
ready to die to the last man" in order to defend their
homeland.161
Had the United States invaded Cuba, the ensuing conflict
would have been much different from that anticipated by U.S.
planners. The United States expected the main fighting to be
over in ten days and that U.S. forces would sustain 18,484
casualties.162 On the contrary, however, an invasion of Cuba
would have had far more catastrophic results. First, an
invasion would have ignited a guerilla war in Cuba that would
have lasted for years. And second, General Gribkov was given
authority to fire the Luna tactical nuclear missiles in the
event of an U.S. invasion. Consequently, had an invasion
occurred, such an action may have lead to nuclear holocaust.
As Castro prepared for the anticipated invasion, then,
the "chess match" between the United States and the Soviets
played on. While each nation's respective UN representatives,
to include Cuba's, called for UN Security Council action,
Khruschev responded to the President's plan to establish a
naval quarantine of Cuba. Sending a letter to the White House,
Khurschev declared that "...the measures outlined...represent
a serious threat to peace and security. The United States has
openly taken the path of...aggressive actions both against
Cuba and against the Soviet Union."163
On October 24th, UN Secretary General U Thant
subsequently sought to negotiate a settlement between the two
superpowers. On the United States part, U Thant called for a
voluntary suspension of the U.S. naval quarantine for a period
of two to three weeks while for the Soviets, a voluntary
suspension of arms shipments to Cuba. Although Kruschev
accepted U Thant's appeal, President Kennedy did not.
Instead, U.S. military forces were placed on a heightened war
readiness alert. Specifically, General Thomas Power,
Commmander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC), raised
the alert level of Strategic Air Command to DefCon 2. Unknown
to the President, however, the message announcing the DefCon
change was sent in the "clear," making it possible for Soviet
communications to also intercept and "hear" the transmission.
The following day, President Kennedy, in an additional
retaliatory move, sent a letter to Khruschev, laying
responsibility for the crisis on the Soviet Union. In his
letter, the President reminded the Soviet Premier of repeated
U.S. warnings against deploying missiles in Cuba and of
repeated Soviet assurances that no need or reason existed to
undertake such a deployment. Consequently, after receiving
both President Kennedy's letter and numerous reports of a
planned U.S. invasion while also reacting to the CINCSAC
DefCon alert order, Khruschev ordered that a letter be drafted
containing the basis of a solution to the crisis. Initially,
the Khruschev letter demanded that the U.S. submit to a non-
invasion pledge and withdraw its Jupiter missiles from Turkey
and Italy. Later that same day, however, Khruschev received
new reports suggesting that an American invasion of Cuba was
imminent. Subsequently, Khruschev re-dictated his letter to
the President, ommitting reference to the removal of missiles
from Turkey and Italy and sent the letter the next day.
Meanwhile, as the United States maintained its naval
quarantine of Cuba, Soviet vessels enroute to Cuba were forced
to turn back. Among these vessels was the tanker "Bucharest"
which was intercepted by U.S. naval warships but permitted to
proceed without boarding. The following day, the Lebanese
freighter "Marucla" under charter to the Soviet Union was
boarded by a party from the USS PIERCE and USS KENNEDY. When
no prohibited material was found, the ship, too, was allowed
to continue on its course.
On October 26th, Khruschev's re-dictated letter was
delivered to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Several hours after
its delivery, however, Khruschev learned from Soviet
Intelligence that reports of an imminent U.S. attack on Cuba
were false and that the United States had not yet settled on
a specific course of action regarding the crisis. Seeing an
opportunity, Khruschev thus decided to reassert his demands
for the removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey. Preparing a
second letter to President Kennedy, Khruschev reiterated his
previous demands but inadvertently ommitted any reference to
the removal of missiles in Italy.
Meanwhile in Cuba, Castro continued to prepare the island
to defend against an U.S. invasion. As part of these
preparations, Cuban antiaircraft batteries were ordered to
open fire at all low-level overflights. Unaware that
intelligence concerning the U.S. attack was faulty, Castro's
order to shoot was based on the belief that the overflights
were preliminary air attacks on the missile sites. As Castro
later recalled,
... It should be said that a surprise air strike was a
threat that was hanging over us from the very
beginning...the situation grew increasingly tense, and
low level overflights more frequent, and we became
convinced that it was extremely dangerous to allow low-
level overflights.164
For Castro, the order to fire at the aircraft was meant, in
large part, to not only boost morale but to also encourage the
feeling among Cubans that they could act constructively to
protect themselves and their homeland.
After giving the order to fire, Castro, convinced that
nothing else could be done to prepare for the U.S. invasion,
dictated a letter to Khruschev. In the letter, Castro warned
Khruschev of imminent "aggression" by the United States within
the next 24 to 72 hours. The aggression he described
consisted of "two possible variants: the first and likeliest
one was an air attack against certain targets with the limited
objective of destroying them; the second, less probable
although possible, was invasion."165 In that same letter,
Castro also urged the Soviet Premier to launch a nuclear
strike against the United States if American forces invaded
the island.
Midmorning on the 27th, Khruschev's second letter to
President Kennedy arrived in Washington. Although having
received Khruschev's first, re-dictated letter, the President
chose to ignore it and, instead, respond to the Soviet
Premier's more attractive second proposal.
As Washington prepared to respond to the Kremlin's
second, more favorable recommendation, then, Castro continued
to believe an U.S. invasion was forthcoming. Consequently, on
October 27th, Cuban antiaircraft batteries opened fire on an
American U-2, killing its pilot, Major Rudolph Anderson, Jr.
Although Castro was blamed for the incident, General Gribkov
later related that actually "... our [Soviet] commander ordered
that [Soviet] batteries be ready, that our radars be
operational. The order to shoot down the plane was given by
General Stepan Naumovich Grechko at the regiment commander's
headquarters. From there it was transferred to the regiments,
and then to the battery commander. Immediately after the
information arrived, the aircraft was shot down."166 Later
that afternoon, Cuban 57mm guns also open fire at a low flying
F8U-1P aircraft on a reconnaissance mission. 167
That afternoon, Khruschev, while determining his next
move against the Americans, was read the contents of Castro's
letter of January 26th. To Khruschev, Castro's letter was
interpreted to be an appeal to launch a preemptive nuclear
attack on the United States. Thus, responding to Castro's
recommendation to launch a nuclear strike, Khruschev stated,
In your [Castro's] cable of October 27, you proposed that
we be the first to launch a nuclear strike against the
territory of the enemy. You, of course, realize where
that would have led. Rather than a simple strike, it
would have been the start of a thermonuclear world war.
Dear Comrade Fidel Castro, I consider this proposal of
yours incorrect, although I understand your
motivation.168
Despite this response from Khruschev, Castro contended that
his letter to Khruschev was not meant to suggest that a strike
be launched, but only to bolster Khruschev's "resolve," to
convince him that he should under no circumstances succumb to
U.S. pressures on Cuba's behalf, and to make clear that Cuba
would stay until the end, to annihilation if necessary. "...I
dared to write a letter to Nikita, a letter aimed at
encouraging him. That was my intention. The aim was to
strengthen him morally, because I knew that he had to be
suffering greatly... I proposed some ideas as to what should be
done in the event, not of an air strike, but of an invasion of
Cuba in an attempt to occupy it."169
WITHDRAWING THE MISSILES
Following the shooting of the American U-2, a carefully-
worded letter was sent from President Kennedy to Khruschev on
October 24th. Potentially part of a settlement but more of an
U.S. ultimatum, the letter proposed that should Khruschev
agree to remove the missiles from Cuba under UN observation
and undertake measures to stop the further introduction of
such weapons into Cuba, the United States would agree to
remove the quarantine of Cuba and provide assurances against
an invasion of Cuba.
As Khruschev pondered the gravity of the correspondence
from President Kennedy, he also pondered with equal concern
the recent actions of his Cuban ally. To Khruschev, Castro
was clearly acting like a maniac. Holding Castro responsible
for the downing of the American U-2, Khruschev stated in an
October 28th letter (to Castro) that the "...Pentagon is
searching for a pretext to frustrate this agreement. This is
why it is organizing the provocative flights. Yesterday you
shot down one of these [the U-2], while earlier you didn't
shoot them down when they overflew your territory. The
aggressors will take advantage of such a step for their own
purposes."170
Consequently, it came as no surprise, then, that
Khruschev kept Castro out of the decision-making process
leading to the removal of the missiles from Cuba and an end to
the crisis. Not only were Castro and Khruschev experiencing
long delays in communicating with each other, but Khruschev
was also concerned that Castro's participation in the attempts
to resolve the conflict would only complicate the issue
further. Accordingly, Castro was neither consulted nor
advised concerning the withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba;
a fact Castro still has not forgotten.
At 10:00 a.m. EST on the morning of October 28th, Radio
Moscow announced the text of a message from Khruschev that
simply stated that "The Soviet Government...has given an order
to dismantle the weapons, which you [the United States]
describe as offensive, and to crate them and return them to
the Soviet Union." While President Kennedy hailed Khruschev's
decision as "an important and constructive contribution to
peace," Castro received the message with outrage and
humiliation that he had not been consulted by either the
Soviets or the United States on a course of action clearly
impacting the welfare of Cuba.171 The Soviets had
unilaterally agreed to remove Cuba's ultimate deterrent in
what appeared to be an imminent threat of American invasion.
In retaliation, Castro, within hours of hearing of the
agreement, broadcast the terms of "five conditions" under
which Cuba would consider to resolve the crisis. The five
conditions included: ending the U.S. economic blockade of
Cuba, ending all subversive activities against Cuba, halting
all "piratical attacks" against Cuba from U.S. bases,
respecting Cuban airspace and territorial waters, and
returning the naval base at Quantanamo Bay to Cuba. As Castro
anticipated, the United States ignored the five conditions.
In retaliation and as a public statement that the two world
superpowers had ignored Cuban interests in what ostensibly was
a very Cuban affair, Castro refused to allow on-site
inspections of any kind to verify the withdrawal of the Soviet
missiles and bombers unless Cuba was granted the right to
inspect American facilities in southern Florida at which the
CIA trained anti-Castro exiles.
Castro maintained his defiant stance until November 20th
when both United Nations Secretary-General U Thant and Anastas
Mikoyan traveled to Cuba to resolve the problem. Insistent
that any "formula adopted by the [UN] Security Council
... guarantee the full sovereignty of Cuba," Castro demanded
that the United States' pledge not to invade Cuba be verified.
Reporting to U Thant, Castro declared that the U.S. "...would
not give up their intention of launching another aggression."
Rejecting U Thant's offer of UN assistance, Cuban President
Dorticos declared that "the danger of war would renew itself,
because the conditions that propitiated North American [U.S.]
aggression against Cuba would endure."172 After continued
intervention by the United Nations and negotiations between
Moscow and Havana, Castro finally agreed to allow the
withdrawal of the missiles. On November 20th, President
Kennedy announced at a press conference that Castro had agreed
to permit the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba within thirty
days. The following day, the President of the United States
terminated the quarantine of Cuba and the Cuban Missile Crisis
officially came to a close.
Accordingly, Castro's most significant actions during the
crisis, that of ordering the shooting of American aircraft and
of writing to Khruschev were predicated on Castro's belief
that Cuba faced imminent attack by the United States. Of more
importance, however, was the impact Castro's letter had on the
tempo of the actions taken by Khruschev. As Oleg Troyanovsky,
a Soviet Special Assistant for International Affairs who
played a key role in the drafting of Khrushcev's letters to
President Kennedy and in the interpretation of Kennedy's
letter to Khrushcev, remembered,
... what particularly worried the leadership in the Soviet
Union in the letter from Fidel Castro was the information
that there might be a landing within the next twenty-four
hours. This jibed with other reports and...talks between
Robert Kennedy and Dobrynin.. .There were a number of
reports then coinciding, which helped accelerate the
final decision to accept the Kennedy proposal.173
In addition, the news of the U-2 downing also increased the
Kremlin's concern about what further action, if any, Castro
would take. Although the exchange of correspondence between
Kennedy and Khruschev had already begun, the "news of the U-2
shoot-down-particulary considering the fact that troops had
been forbidden to shoot down any aircraft-increased the
nervousness in Moscow."174
CHAPTER 6
CUBA AND THE CRISIS
Despite the resolution of the crisis, then, it was quite
apparent that Castro had merely "succumbed" to the agreement
worked out between the two superpowers. Humiliated by the
Soviet manuever that had not included him and furious that he
had not been consulted while the United States and the Soviet
Union decided the fate of Cuba, Castro was exceptionally
bitter at the perceived Soviet abandonment. Although Castro's
prestige within Latin America suffered significantly following
the crisis, it was also apparent that, as Mark Falcoff has
commented, "Castro was...cut down to size." And even more
importantly, it appeared that the Soviets had betrayed Cuba's
loyalty not only by leaving the island "defenseless" in the
face of an anticipated U.S. attack, but also that Castro's
five conditions, proposed after the deal with the U.S. was
struck, were not even addressed. Consequently, the "October
Crisis," for Castro and Cuba, still remains unresolved.
Consequently, after reviewing the factors influencing Cuba's
participation in the Cuban Missile Crisis and analyzing the
events comprising that participation, Cuba's role can be
viewed as falling into three key areas.
First, Cuba as the location of the crisis. One of
Castro's chief goals for the Cuban Revolution was to correct
the island's problems. The main cause of those problems was,
in Castro's estimation, Cuba's dependence on the United
States. Subsequently, choosing to turn his back on the United
States and to seek Soviet support was an easy choice for
Castro to make. To Castro's satisfaction, the Soviet Union
provided Cuba with the economic subsidies, protection, and
international sponsorship the island needed. Castro, for his
part, provided Khrushchev with a key advantage in the Soviet
Cold War struggle with the United States. Accordingly, Castro
set the stage for the Cuban Missile Crisis by providing
Khruschev with the means with which to successfully challenge
U.S. missile dominance during the Cold War. That stage was
Cuba.
Second, Castro's influence on Khruschev's decisions
during the crisis. On October 26th, Castro wrote a letter to
Khruschev warning the Soviet Premier that U.S. "aggression"
was imminent. Of chief concern to the Soviets was Castro's
belief that the U.S. attack would occur within the next
twenty-four hours and that this information corresponded to
other reports the Soviets had received. Also contained in
Castro's letter was a recommendation that, should the
American's attack Cuba, that the Soviets launch a nuclear
strike against the United States. This recommendation coupled
with the shooting of the American U-2 on the 27th increased
Khruschev's concern regarding any future action Castro would
take. Subsequently, on October 28th a message was sent by
Khruschev to Kennedy indicating that the missiles were to be
dismantled and removed. Although it is clear that the
agreement to remove the missiles rested on negotiations
conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union, the
impact of Khruschev's concern for Castro's growing
restlessness cannot be overlooked. Tensions in the crisis
were growing at a rapid rate. Khruschev knew Castro expected
an American invasion, was willing to conduct a nuclear strike,
and was eager to strike back at the Americans. Armed with
this information, it is not surprising that he opted to end
the missile crisis peacefully before it escalated into a
nuclear war.
Finally, the third issue involves a "legitimate" motive.
As both Castro and General Gribkov testified, Khruschev's
stated objective for placing the missiles in Cuba was to
protect the island from U.S. attack. As previously discussed,
Castro had been concerned about Cuba's security since the Bay
of Pigs. Well aware of the United States' military
capability, any defense provided to Cuba would have to equal
the military strength of America if it was to be successful.
Consequently, the best method for providing such a defense was
to "do the same thing the Americans do...to use the same
methods." However, placing missiles in Cuba so as to
"protect Cuba" also provided Khruschev with a convenient
"cover" for his real intent, that of "repaying the Americans
in kind" and improving the Soviet Cold War position.
Accordingly, an examination of Cuba's role in the Missile
Crisis provides "lessons learned" that still have
applicability for today. First and foremost, the greatest
lesson that can be taken from the crisis is that the actions
of Third World countries do matter. Especially with Cuba,
whose history as President Kennedy stated over thirty years
ago, is closely shared with the United States, Castro and
Castro's Cuba still bear watching. Castro's ambitions for
Cuba and the "revolution" still remain strong. As a nation
committed to a national security policy of engagement and
enlargement, the lessons of U.S. relations with Castro and
Cuba's role in the Cuban Missile Crisis, need to be
remembered. Especially as the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction rises, it is necessary to remember and take
seriously the impact "Little Cuba" had, and will continue to
pose, for U.S. national security interests.
Second, dealing with Castro and Cuba means understanding
Castro and Cuba. Previous analysis has reflected the chain of
events by which Cuba became the site of the missile crisis.
Important to that analysis was Castro's decision to break ties
with the United States. It has already been shown that U.S.
policy did not drive Castro to the Soviets, but was
influential in determining the evolution of the Cuban
Revolution and the tempo and direction of Castro's Russian
policy. Key to that U.S. influence was a basic
misunderstanding of Castro and the causes of the revolution.
An important part of this misunderstanding was underestimating
or not comprehending the real reasons why the Cubans initially
supported Castro and the Cuban revolution.
As previously stated in this thesis, the revolution was
successful because Cubans simply wanted to get rid of Batista
and the Batista government. The reasons why the Cubans were
anxious to remove Batista centered on social, political, and
economic problems within Cuba. However, when Castro
eventually came to power and proved to be opposed to the
United States, any U.S. attempts to "eliminate the Cuban
problem" appeared to be more of a vendetta against Castro then
a realization of the longstanding problems existent within
Cuba. Consequently, future policy decisions concerning Cuba,
with or without Castro, must be based on an understanding of
Cuba rather than on an emotional, "knee jerk" reaction to an
irrational dictator or government.
And third, for the United States and Cuba, history will
continue to repeat itself. As this thesis has consistently
shown, the relationship between the United States and Cuba is
based on a history of U.S. intervention. During the Cuban
Missile Crisis, that policy was tested to the breaking point
as the United States worked to prevent Cuba from becoming an
arsenal of Soviet nuclear weapons. As with U.S. actions
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the history of U.S.
intervention in Cuba still continues today. Cuba's strategic
proximity to the United States, the presence of the U.S. Naval
Base at Quantanemo Bay, as well as the large Cuban-American
contingent within the United States still makes it necessary
to consider the island when pursuing policies affecting
national security interests.
Especially for military professionals, however, the
pursuit of U.S. national security interests implies that
continued involvement and/or intervention in Cuba remains
necessary. Should that involvement dictate the use of
military force, it is most likely that with the history of
U.S. intervention in Cuba, this force will be in support of
operations that can most likely be classified as Operations
Other Than War (OOTW).
Consequently, should the use of OOTW be required, it will
be necessary to accurately evaluate the threat. As previously
discussed in this thesis, however, one of the United States'
greatest failures when intervening in Cuba was not
understanding Cuba. In OOTW operations, this key inability
will prevent success unless the larger political-military
aspects of a crisis in Cuba are evaluated in terms of Cuba's
political, judicial, administrative, diplomatic, economic, and
social aspects. Subsequently, any such evaluation should
include not only an analysis of the type of insurgent
strategies used, but also what methods should be followed to
counter an OOTW threat. For the United States and its allies,
the methods to be used can only be determined by understanding
past Cuban reactions which must include an evaluation of
Cuba's historical relationship with the United States. Key to
understanding this relationship must be an awareness of
Castro's belief that the Cuban Missile Crisis still remains an
unresolved chapter in Cuban history and that Cuba still
continues to wage a "Cold War" struggle with the United
States. Most especially, the essence of that struggle needs
to be analyzed and understood for what it means to Cuba and
how it relates to a new, post-Cold War order focusing on the
"humanitarian" use of force and "humanitarian" intervention
rather than old, Cold War conflicts.
The essence of Castro's post Cuban Missile Crisis
struggle with the United States needs also to be considered in
light of the type of operations that will, most likely, be
conducted in Cuba in the future. As history repeats itself,
it is most likely that these struggles will be either
peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, or peacemaking. Conditional
to the type of operation used will be the amount of control
exerted by the opposing forces. Thus, still reminescent of
the Cuban Missile Crisis is the amount of control exerted by
Castro which, to a large extent, still exists within Cuba
today. Consequently, the obvious form a military operation
may take in Cuba will depend on the existence of Castro.
Should Castro not be alive or if he is unable to maintain
control, such operations must also consider the strength of
his designated successor and/or the strength of competing
factions. Also of consequence is the level of support
provided by the Cuban Communist Party, its ability to continue
the "Cuban Revolution" after Castro ceases to be a force in
Cuba, and the strength of any alternative parties. All of
these scenarios, however, require an understanding of Cuba and
its past, of which the Cuban Missile Crisis forms an integral
part.
EPILOGUE
At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was
believed that the United States had achieved a great
victory. The Soviets were forced to remove their missiles
from Cuba and the United States achieved greater position
inits Cold War competition with the Soviets. Cuba was
forced to comply with the terms of the deal struck between
the U.S. and the Soviets, while Castro's prestige within
Latin America suffered greatly.
However, when commenting on the Cuban Missile Crisis
twenty-three years later, Dr. Henry Kissinger stated that
the U.S. victory so significant in 1962, may now not be so
much a victory as a defeat. For although the missiles had
been removed from Cuba, Castro was still in power.175
Now, approximately 35 years following the end of the
Cuban Missile Crisis, Dr. Kissinger's comments still ring
true. The United States still enforces an embargo on Cuba
while Castro still continues to be an irritant to U.S
efforts in the Caribbean.
Consequently, although Cuba no longer enjoys Soviet
economic subsidies and military support, the struggle
between U.S. democratic ideals and Castro's communism
continues. While U.S. efforts regarding Cuba have borne
little success, it is obvious that Castro's feet are still
planted in Cuba, and that socialism and an inherent distrust
of the United States linger.
However, as the results of a recent poll conducted in
Cuba by a group of Mexican television reporters reflects,
Castro may still be in power, but the strength of his power
is now in question. As the poll shows, 66% of Cubans
indicated they were against Castro, while only 22% indicated
that they favored him. In addition, 77% said he was a
dictator whose greatest weaknesses were arrogance (43%) and
oppressiveness (35%). While 64% of the population stated
that the greatest successes of the Cuban revolution were
health and education, only 17% stated that freedom and
equality were successes. Key to this poll was the analysis
that the percent of Cubans who indicated they favored Castro
versus those who did not (22% and 66% respectfully) matched
the current demographic makeup of Cuba. In short, sixty
percent of the Cubans living in Cuba today were not born
when the Cuban Revolution took place.176 Although a 1991
Cuban nationwide poll revealed strong support for Castro,
with 95% of Cubans favoring Cuba's one party rule while 98%
believed Castro to be the most "important political
personality of the world," the divergence between the two
polls clearly reflects Cuba's new vulnerability as the lone
keeper of the Communist faith.177
For the Cubans now experiencing the revolution's
economic survival, the single most important question is
"Where does this leave Cuba?" As Cuba's Fourth Congress of
the Communist Party attempted to deal with this question in
October 1991, the grim realities of Cuba's future under
communism surfaced. Deep division within the party centered
on exactly what course of action should be taken. Young
reformers, concerned about their future if the party
collapsed, pressed for political and economic reform that
would breathe new life into the party. Leaders of the
party's old guard argued that, at a time when the revolution
was facing its worst crisis ever, any reforms - whether free
legislative elections or greater-autonomy for state
enterprises - could spin out of control and destroy the
revolution and Cuba.178
In addition to Cuban Communist Party concerns, Cuba now
also seems to be facing the apathy of its young. The youth
of Cuba who did not experience the birth of the revolution
are reportedly more intent on obtaining the benefits of the
"West" and of captialism then on maintaining revolutionary
fervor.
Accordingly, as Cuba continues its economic spiral
downward, the "revolution" and its social causes appear to
be the only thing Castro has left. Reduced to its barebones
ideologically, Castro attempts to explain away Cuba's
current state of economic survival by identifying it as a
"Special Period" for Cuba.
The question, then, of where this leaves Cuba is
difficult to answer. Castro, shrouded in the thick veil of
an archaic revolution, continues to address Cuba's problems
with antiquated remedies. Failing to respond imaginatively
and boldly to the extraordinary events that shook Cuba
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Castro may,
in effect, be causing the demise of his own revolution.
Unwilling to institute reform or begin a peaceful transition
to capitalism or even democratic socialism, the future of
Cuba and of Castro's revolution remains in doubt. Will the
revolution survive Castro? Will Castro seek repproachment
with the United States in order to save Cuba? Or, will Cuba
succumb to civil war until a new Castro or Batista assumes
control? Only Cuba can answer that question, and most
assuredly the United States must be prepared to deal with
the outcome.
NOTES
1.U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "The
U.S. Response to Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba, "President
Kennedy's Report to the People, delivered on 22 October 1962,
Inter-American Series 80 (Washington, DC: Dept. of State
Publication 7449, 1962), 2.
2.Ibid., 2.
3.Central Intellligence Agency, The Secret Cuban Missile
Crisis Documents (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1994), 8 and 10.
4.Ibid., 2.
5.Department of State, "The U.S. Response to Soviet Military
Buildup in Cuba," 6.
6.Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, Cuba on
the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse
(New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1193), 468.
7.U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "U.S.
Charges of Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba," Statements by Adlai E.
Stevenson, U.S. Representative in the Security Council, delivered
23 and 25 October 1962, Inter-American Series 82 (Washington, DC:
Dept. of State Publication 7458, 1962), 55.
8.Ibid., 70.
9.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 470.
10.Ibid., 470-471.
11.Center for Strategic and International Affairs (CSIA), Back
to the Brink: Proceedings of the Moscow Conference on the Cuban
Missile Crisis, Cambridge, MA: University Press of America, 1992,
xviii.
12.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 20.
13.Ibid., 43.
14.Cuba: A Country Study, 3d ed., by James D. Rudolph,
Foreign Area Studies, The American University, DA Pam. No. 550-152
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 10.
15.Lester D. Langley, The Cuban Policy of the United States:
A Brief History (New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968),
3.
16.Ibid., 11.
17.Ibid., 5.
18.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 323-324.
19.Ibid., 59.
20.Jaime Suchlicki, Cuba: From Columbus to Castro, (McLean,
VA: Brassey's, Inc., 1990), 66.
21.Elbert J. Benton, International Law and Diplomacy of the
Spanish-American War (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Press,
1908), 14.
22.Ibid., 16.
23.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 326.
24.Suchlicki, 73.
25.Langley, 62.
26.Cuba: A Country Study, 50.
27.Suchlicki, 77.
28.Ibid., 18.
29.Allyn, Blight, Welch, 327.
30.Ibid., 80.
31.Benton, 42.
32.Ibid., 79.
33.Suchlicki, 80.
34.Cuba: A Country Study, 65.
35.Benton, 98.
36.Allan Reed Millett, The Politics of Intervention, the
Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State
University Press, 1968), 29.
37.Suchlicki, 83.
38.Millett, 41.
39.Ibid., 41.
40.Suchlicki, 88.
41.Ibid., 89.
42.Henry Maximilian Pachter, Collision Course; the Cuban
Missile Crisis and Coexistence (New York, NY: Frederick A.
Praeger, Inc., 1963), 145.
43.Millett, 102.
44.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 332.
45.Suchlicki, 90.
46.Ibid., 90.
47.Pachter, 146.
48.Suchlicki, 93.
49.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 333.
50.Cuba: A Country Study, 24.
51.Ibid., 28.
52.Ibid., 29.
53.Ibid., 95.
54.Ibid., 97.
55.Ibid., 97.
56.Ibid., 97
57.Ibid., 99.
58.Suchlicki, 102.
59.Ibid., 105.
60.Langley, 156.
61.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 333.
62.Suchlicki, 108.
63.Langley, 157.
64.Cuba: A Country Study, 31.
65.Langley, 158.
66.Suchlicki, 112.
67.Langley, 159.
68.Suchlicki, 116.
69.Ibid., 116.
70.Ibid., 119.
71.Cuba: A Country Study, 31.
72.Ibid., 32.
73.Suchlicki, 121.
74.Cuba: A Country Study, 33.
75.Suchlicki, 123.
76.Ibid., 125.
77.Ibid., 130.
78.Ibid., 130.
79.Ibid., 132.
80.Langley, 168.
81.Cuba: A Country Study, 36.
82.Ibid., 36.
83.Ibid., 37.
84.Suchlicki, 150.
85.Langley, 172.
86.Cuba: A Country Study, 38.
87.Richard E. Welch, Jr., Response to Revolution, The United
States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961 (Chapel Hill, NC: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 9.
88.Dr. Gregorio DelReal, PhD, former Professor of Law and
Economics, University of Havana, interview by author, 10 February
1995.
89.Earl E. T. Smith, The Fourth Floor, An Account of the
Castro Communist Revolution (New York, NY: Random House, 1962),
198-199.
90.Dr. Gregorio DelReal.
91.Georges A Fauriol, Hugh S. Thomas, and Juan Carlos Weiss,
The Cuban Revolution 25 Years Later (Bolder, CO: Westview Press,
1984), 2-3.
92.Earl E. T. Smith, 199.
93.Wayne S. Smith, The Closest of Enemies (New York, NY: W.
W. Norton, 1987), 43.
94.Andres Suarez, Cuba: Castroism and Communism. 1959-1966
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1967), 38.
95.Ibid., 38.
96.Dr. DelReal.
97.Mark Falcoff, "Cuba and the United States: Back to the
Beginning," World Affairs, vol 156, No. 3, 114.
98.Wayne S. Smith, The Closest of Enemies (New York, NY: W.
W. Norton, 1987), 16.
99.Langley, 174.
1OO.Ibid., 175.
101.Ibid., 176.
102. Ibid., 338.
103.James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink:
Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York,
NY: Hill and Wang, 1989), 249.
104.CIA, The Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Documents, 319.
105.Falcoff, "Cuba and the United States: Back to the
Beginning," 114-115.
106.Ibid., 115.
107.Wayne S. Smith, 44.
108."Calm Down," Time magazine, 8 February 1960, 34.
109.Central Intelligence Agency National Intelligence
Estimate, No. 85-2-62, Subject: "The Situation and Prospects in
Cuba," 1 August 1962, 1.
110.Welch, 14.
111.Wayne S. Smith, 52.
112.Ibid., 52.
113.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 460.
114.Ibid., 460.
115.Suarez, 142.
116.Welch, 13.
117.Ibid., 20.
118.Ibid., 24-25.
119.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 178-180.
120.Ibid., 180.
121.Wayne S. Smith, 48.
122.Welch, 23.
123.Ibid., 20.
124.Ibid., 26.
125.Suarez, x.
126.Wayne S. Smith, 50.
127.Ibid., 50.
128.Gabriel Marcella and Daneil S. Papp, The Soviet-Cuban
Relationship: Symbiotic or Parasitic? (U.S. Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1980), 3.
129.Department of State, Bulletin, No. 1098, Subject:
"International Communism in Latin America," 11 July 1960, 62.
130.Suarez, 127.
131.Ibid., 132.
132.Suarez, 131.
133.Ibid., 133.
134.Welch, 21.
135.Ibid., 21.
136.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 87.
137.Marcella and Papp, 4.
138.CIA, The Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Documents, 1.
139.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 65.
140.Ibid., 62.
141.Suarez, 163.
142.Ibid., 161.
143.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 55.
144.Ibid., 57.
145.Ibid., 77.
146.Raymond Gartoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1989), 15.
147.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 79.
148.Vyacheslav V. Luchkov and Jerold L. Scheter, Khruschev
Remembers: The Glasnost Takes (Boston, MA: Little Brown and
Company, 1990), 174.
149.Suarez, 164.
150.Ibid., 161.
151.Gartoff, 11.
152.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 242.
153.Suarez, 93.
154.Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision; Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company,
1971), 48.
155.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 78.
156.Ibid, 78.
157.CSIA, 51.
158.Ibid., 53.
159.Philip Brenner, "Thirteen Months," from The Cuban Missile
Crisis Revisited edited by James Nathan, (New York, NY: St.
Martin's Press, 1992), 197.
160.CSIA, 106.
161.Brenner, 198.
162.Ibid., 198.
163.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 468.
164.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 107.
165.Ibid., 481.
166.Ibid., 114.
167.Brenner, 198.
168.Ibid., 486.
169.Ibid., 109.
170.Ibid., 483.
171.Allyn, Blight, and Welch, 472.
172.Brenner, 202.
173.Ibid., 115.
174.Ibid., 116.
175.Mark Falcoff, resident scholar at American Enterprise
Institute, interview by author, on 30 December 1994.
176. Ibid.
177.Andres Oppenheimer, Castro's Final Hour (New York, NY:
Simon and Schuster, 1992), 411.
178.Ibid., 379.
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