Sea Change: ROC Naval Modernization and the Defense of Taiwan
(Jackie Chen/tr. by Phil Newell)
Peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue is desired by Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. But in the process, there are tensions, such as the confrontation during last year's presidential elections in Taiwan.
How secure is Taiwan? Some say that island war can be summed up as a struggle for sea and air supremacy. With the ROC navy's modernization program, begun in the 1980s, virtually complete, the navy is seen by many as the best prepared of the three services. What role does it play in the defense of Taiwan? What aspects of naval defense are still inadequate?
Recently, Taiwan has been a hot topic overseas. The book Fatal Terrain reached the bestseller lists in the US right after publication. And The Next War by former US Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger listed Taiwan as a high-risk area.
Su Chin-chiang, formerly a researcher at the Institute for National Policy Research and currently chief staff writer at the Taiwan Times, describes the current situation in the Taiwan Strait as being "stable but not secure." That is, under the tranquil surface, the waters are turbulent. This is all because of Taiwan's strategic position.
Pivot of the Western Pacific
Rear Admiral Chang Chang-yung, former head of naval intelligence, notes that Taiwan lies along the shipping routes linking the Indian Ocean to the northwestern Pacific. To the west, a force based in Taiwan could control the coast of mainland China. To the south it could command the sea lanes around Luzon in the Philippines, while to the north it could dominate the sea lanes to Korea and southwest Japan. Thus Taiwan is in a strategically important position.
"The Asia-Pacific region accounts for 70% of the total trade of the US, while Japan depends on imports for 97% of its energy needs," notes Su. For both of those countries, Taiwan is important in securing their interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
Moreover, Taiwan is important because the political standoff with the PRC makes the Taiwan Strait one of the flashpoints in the Pacific, especially given the PRC's growing military might.
There is a broad international consensus hoping that negotiations can replace war as a means to resolve international disputes, and that regional frictions can be overcome through economic and trade cooperation. However, despite such hopes, mainland China remains a very serious potential threat to Taiwan. According to the 1996 ROC Report on National Defense, the ROC's strategy is to "pacify domestic enemies and resist outside attacks." The report sees the main external threat as invasion from the PRC.
To cope with the PRC, a fully prepared military is indispensable. "We want the PRC to know that we have a sting in our tail," says Dr. Chung Chien, a professor at the War College of the Armed Forces University of the ROC, and a professor of nuclear science at National Tsing Hua University. He adds, quoting an old axiom: "To preserve peace, prepare for war." Vice-Premier John Chang, who until only recently was the minister of foreign affairs, also recently noted the importance of "preventing war by military means." He unequivocally stated that the ROC cannot retreat one step from the resistance line of foreign affairs and defense.
Such statements may appear contradictory, but a look at the history of international conflict makes the logic clear: Those unprepared for war are often looked upon as easy targets, virtually inviting attack.
Today, military people advocate the idea: "Avoid war if possible, but do not fear war; prepare for war, but do not seek war." This is the highest principle guiding ROC strategy. It differs greatly from the past, when the emphasis was on initiating an attack against the PRC. Today the ROC is restructuring its military forces in line with the goals of "solid defense" and "effective deterrence." And the navy constitutes a major part of the defense line.
Lightning war, nibbling war
The Taiwan Strait is three times as wide as the English Channel. It is subject to bad weather, and is not easy sailing. Thus the PRC dares not undertake any cross-Strait operation lightly. Many US military analysts doubt that the PRC has the necessary amphibious capability to mount an invasion. Given that, based on historical experience, forces in an amphibious assault are only about one-third as effective as on land (i.e. effective fighting capability declines by two-thirds), unless the PRC develops transport and supply ships capable of carrying and supporting large numbers of troops, it would be very difficult to invade Taiwan.
But this does not mean Taiwan can rest easy.
One model of PRC strategy toward Taiwan suggests that the PRC would first invade Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu. From these islands it would seize air and sea superiority, and, supported by missiles, could mount attacks against Taiwan. Another scenario has the PRC bypassing the heavily fortified islands of Kinmen and Matsu, and directly attacking Penghu and/or Taiwan, using all three service arms simultaneously. A third possibility is a blockade of Taiwan. No matter which of these one considers, naval defense is vital.
Taiwan is a typical island state. More than 80% of its GNP is trade-related, and 99.6% of imported and exported raw materials and goods depend on maritime transport. "Most critically, every single drop of crude oil, our economic lifeblood, must be imported," says Professor Chung. This petroleum comes from the Middle East, North Africa, the North Sea, and Indonesia by sea routes that extend far from Taiwan. If the supply of oil is interrupted, Taiwan could quickly collapse. Thus, analysts say that a blockade is one of the most likely strategies the PRC would adopt to pressure Taiwan.
In one hypothetical situation, the PRC would not launch an all-out war, but would only blockade Taiwan. "They could blockade shipping routes used by Taiwanese merchantmen and declare certain waters to be in an area in a state of civil war, so that foreign ships would not dare enter, or so that shipping would become prohibitively expensive. That would be enough to undermine our economic existence," avers Kao Hsiung-po, a columnist specializing in military affairs. For the PRC, this approach would promise high returns with relatively little risk.
The PRC continues to keep open its military option against Taiwan, refusing to renounce the possible use of force. Many analysts suggest, however, that if there really is fighting across the Taiwan Strait, it is not likely to be large-scale, much less nuclear, since a major war would cause heavy loss of life, and thus would have a greater likelihood of drawing international intervention. Instead, avers Su, the PRC "might adopt a direct 'nibbling' strategy."
The "nibbling" strategy would entail bypassing strongpoints like Kinmen and Matsu, and instead attacking places like Tungting (near Kinmen) and Tungsha (in the South China Sea), which are more weakly defended and, being remote from Taiwan, would be difficult to reinforce and resupply. "Such targets would only require small-scale, lightning strikes. The purpose would not be to inflict serious damage on our military or civilian strength, but to force Taiwan to the table to negotiate from a position of weakness," emphasize Su. Of course, this would be complemented by a full range of economic pressures to force Taiwan to accede to the PRC's goals. Some call this "indirect war."
Whether the enemy adopts a strategy of island-hopping, blockade, or "nibbling," the key to future conflict will be high-tech missiles and electronic warfare. Rear Admiral Chang warns: "They will pursue their objectives with a high-tech assault, in coordination with seditious forces inside Taiwan."
A few good men
In military science, in determining how much of a particular type of military capability is enough, a vital consideration is the assessment of the threat posed by the enemy. That is, force structure and strategic concepts are based on the aphorism: To fight a given war, have a given type of equipment, organization, and training.
So how should we assess the PRC's naval capability?
According to last year's The Military Balance, an annual published by the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, besides having huge numbers of soldiers and ships, the PRC has recently been working hard to develop its submarine force. It possesses a large number of submarines already, the most worrisome of which are its nuclear attack subs, which are very difficult to detect, and its strategic nuclear missile sub (SSBN), which has massive destructive power. Moreover, intelligence reports indicate that the PRC has been developing aircraft carriers.
ROC naval planning assumes that the PRC is the most likely enemy. Considering Taiwan's defensive strategy and the limits on the tolerable defense budget burden, the ROC is aiming for a force that will be "small in numbers but high in quality." The maritime component of such a force must be able to deal with threats from the air or from the surface or sub-surface of the ocean; it is also responsible for maintaining a credible amphibious capability.
For example, the major combat ships Chengkung class and Lafayette class frigates all have anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters, sonar and radar search equipment, missiles, guns, and mines. They thus are equipped for air defense, ASW, anti-ship action, and shore bombardment.
Today, the ROC's sea power has already transcended surface combat alone, and has the ability to engage in warfare at three layers (air, sea, and below the ocean surface). Moreover, advances in electronics and communications have strengthened the ability to coordinate operations with the air force and army. For example, if enemy planes taking off from southeast China are detected by the national early warning system, the air force command network can quickly notify the navy's ships to take the appropriate countermeasures in minutes.
A military gap?
Professor Chung has considerable confidence in the current naval forces of the ROC. He says that, leaving aside nuclear weapons, Taiwan's maritime defense level, including ships, weapons systems, and personnel quality, is ahead of the PRC by 10 to 15 years.
This advantage was not created overnight, but is the product of a long period of naval modernization. About 15 years ago, the ROC navy experienced a worrisome "capability gap" transitional phase. At that time, Taiwan's first-generation warships were mainly US ships retired after WWII, then sold or transferred to Taiwan as military assistance. By the 1980s, most of these destroyers and frigates had been in service for over 35 years. (In general, the service life of a combat vessel is about 25 years.) They could no longer handle the rigors of naval operations such as being on station, patrol, or escort. Therefore, a naval modernization program was begun.
Second-generation replacement has been undertaken through three methods: purchase from abroad, lease from abroad, and domestic construction. Because of PRC obstruction and the ROC's weak diplomatic position, every step of the modernization program has been "very rough going," says Captain Shen Po-chih, commander of the submarine force.
The main source of purchased ships and naval weaponry has always been the US. But the US, which has a global strategy and huge forces, has designed its ships to specialize in specific missions like air defense or ASW. For the ROC navy, which has far fewer ships and a smaller area of responsibility, highly specialized craft are not necessarily suitable. That is to say, even if Taiwan can procure US ships, it may be necessary to refit or supplement the weaponry. Take for example Chengkung class ships. These were built on the lines of the US Perry class guided-missile frigates, which were designed for surface-to-air defense of aircraft carrier battle groups. The Chengkung had to strengthen ASW and anti-ship capabilities.
There is a similar situation with the Lafayette class guided-missile frigates purchased from France. The Lafayette is particularly difficult to detect; the ship hull can "absorb" radar, and it runs very quietly. But when France sold the ships to Taiwan, though they did include radar, communications, electronics, and sonar systems, they did not carry onboard weapons systems. Thus Taiwan had to install its own systems, such as Oto Melara 76 mm rapid-fire guns, Sea Chaparral point-defense anti-air missiles, and Hsiungfeng-2 anti-ship missiles. But one wonders whether these systems, protruding from the ships, will ruin the "stealth" that makes them so hard to detect in the first place.
Moreover, because weapons systems are "multi-national," coming from the US, France, and Taiwan, integrating all these with the ship's own operation system is "a major challenge for our technological base and defense industry," says Su Chin-chiang.
The Great Wall of... water
Leaving aside short-range ballistic missiles which can be launched directly from southeast China (like those used in PRC maneuvers last March), any other PRC moves would naturally have to cross the waters that surround Taiwan. Still, there is considerable danger to Taiwan from both air and sea.
The main weaponry for surface warfare at sea is anti-ship missiles, which are superior to traditional shipboard guns in terms of precision, range, and firepower. Currently, all of the ROC's major warships are equipped with weapons to counter anti-ship missiles. For example, Chengkung class ships have the 20 mm Vulcan Phalanx CIWS gun, which can fire 3000 rounds per minute. "It's like an impenetrable steel net, which can intercept incoming missiles," explains Captain Liu Shiaw-jyh.
As for attacks from the air, ROC ships have search radar to counter these. "From Tsoying naval base in Kaohsiung, we can see all the way to the airspace beyond Penchia Yu [200 nautical miles away]," says Captain Liu. After being detected, incoming enemy aircraft can be locked on, tracked, and shot down.
The waters along Taiwan's west coast are relatively shallow, and the deep passages that do exist are not wide. This fact greatly limits the impact of that most feared hunter of naval warfare-the submarine. Although in recent years the PRC has been building its own craft, and has purchased subs from Russia, it is generally believed that these have limited value in the Taiwan Strait. "At most, you can only deploy ten or so submarines around Taiwan," states Rear Admiral Chang Chang-yung.
However, the PRC's subs are still a threat: There are many of them, they are difficult to detect, and they can attack sea or land targets without warning. According to an October story in the China Times, which was based on stories in Japanese newspapers, during the PRC's military maneuvers held in the Taiwan Strait last March, Japan detected activity by PRC nuclear subs. Thus ASW-anti-submarine warfare-remains a vital task for the ROC navy.
Faced with possible harassment from PRC subs, most of Taiwan's main fighting ships have ASW capabilities. The most important ships for ASW missions are the Knox class guided-missile frigates leased from the US. These have advanced ASW fire-control and sonar systems.
Other valuable weapons include the two submarines purchased from the Netherlands in the 1980s, which have an operational radius of more than 5000 nautical miles. "They can operate submerged for up to 60 days. They can be deployed outside of PRC ports, and fire torpedoes against surface ships," explains Captain Wang Chao-chu of the submarine Haihu (Sea Tiger).
The new submarines run very quiet, so they are not easily detectable. Their fire control, sonar, and underwater detecting systems are all linked automatically in real-time mode, so they can go operational very rapidly. "They are superior to any diesel submarine in the PRC fleet," says Sung Yu-ning, editor of Defense Technology Monthly and a long-time observer of military technology.
Submarine dream
In contrast to the large number of PRC subs, Taiwan has only four, of which only two are operational (two are for training). This is probably the greatest weakness in Taiwan's naval defenses. Professor Chung points out that during the ROC's Hankuang maneuvers in 1994, a PRC submarine was detected off of Makung, in Penghu. But one ROC sub was at Tsoying for resupply, and the other was in drydock for its scheduled overhaul. (A submarine requires a nine-month overhaul in every 45-month period of service).
Chung says that ideally the submarine force should be able to maintain a tripartite distribution. To do this, there would be one ship on standby for each one on patrol, as well one sub in for its regular drydock overhaul. Calculating on this basis, the ROC could do with an additional eight "grey ladies" in order to have four subs actually on combat patrol at any time.
Currently Taiwan is not capable of manufacturing a sub, mainly because it cannot yet build a hull resistant to undersea pressures. Thus everything depends on foreign purchases. However, because submarines are such powerful weapons, source nations worry that sales could increase the likelihood of conflict. For example, when the ROC navy acquired two subs from the US in the 1970s for training purposes, the Americans deliberately sealed off the torpedo tubes to insure that the subs could only be used as the "enemy ships" for ASW training, but could not be used offensively.
When the Netherlands sold the ROC the Haihu and Hailong (Sea Dragon) back in the 1980s, the PRC protested by downgrading its ties with Holland. Ultimately the pressure was successful, and an additional four subs which the Dutch had originally agreed to build for Taiwan were aborted.
Taiwan has met obstructions every time it has tried to purchase submarines. The navy anticipates that, with no other choice, it may have to follow the example of the Ching-kuo Indigenous Defense Fighter, and manufacture a submarine with imported technology. It is hoped that other countries will see this as a business opportunity and sell Taiwan submarine parts and the necessary assembly technology.
Besides the lack of submarines, another weakness in ROC seapower is that the US has not supplied Taiwan with information on ASW or on mainland Chinese submarine acoustic profiles. However, many submarines from various nations have been detected passing through the waters around Taiwan. The navy has been continually collecting and collating this data. Captain Shen Po-chih adds that the submarine force routinely participates in ASW maneuvers with second-generation warships. "By knowing yourself, you can also know your enemy," says Shen. He is very confident about the navy's ASW capability.
Mend the Marines!
Besides the shortage of subs, Professor Chung feels that the navy should also strengthen its maritime patrol aircraft force, such as P-3 long-range ASW planes. Taiwan's sea transport routes are very extended, and such planes are needed to prevent a PRC blockade far from shore. The P-3 can stay on station over the ocean for 12-14 hours at a stretch, and carries both ASW weapons and anti-ship missiles. It can conduct searches, and coordinate with surface ships, strengthening the navy's capabilities to protect Taiwanese sea lanes of communication in the South China Sea.
Besides surface and submarine warfare, the third component of naval power is amphibious capability. As Taiwan's overall military posture has changed from an offensive to a defensive one, much attention has been given to how the navy's amphibious force-the Marines-should change in terms of organization and training.
Lin Yu-fang, former head of the Institute of Strategic Studies at Tamkang University and now a legislator, argues that the military objectives of the élite Marine force should be revised. It should no longer focus on seizing beachheads as the vanguard of an invasion force. Its main missions should be reinforcing the offshore islands and protecting Taiwan's coastline.
Lin also contends that the Marines should be streamlined, and cut back from their current size of two divisions. But other experts say that it is not easy to create an elite force like the Marines. It has taken 40 years to get this far, so their force structure should remain intact. It would be enough simply to revise their functions.
How secure is Taiwan? Some say that island warfare can be summed up as a struggle for air and sea supremacy. With the modernization program the navy has been undertaking since the 1980s, many now see it as the best prepared of the services. But how will the completion of the program affect strategic and tactical thinking?
A war fought with second-generation warships would be greatly different than in the past. Someone once quipped: "In the old days, when the fighting started, everyone would go on deck to man the guns. Today, if war starts, everyone will take cover inside the ship, each person facing a computer screen, just like playing a big video game." Yao Kai-yang of the Chinese Warships Museum says that this is indeed a joke-a real war would not be nearly so pleasant.
The second-generation challenge
With changes in equipment, doctrines of war must also change. "Leaving aside any other factors for the moment, second-generation ships are vastly different from older ships in terms of displacement, range, and cruising speed. All aspects, from strategy to tactics to logistics, must be adapted to the new situation," says Su Chin-chiang.
Both local citizens and foreign observers have taken note of the fact that the modernization program seems to be virtually complete. But beneath the gleaming exteriors, the challenges are only just beginning.
There have been a series of training accidents involving second-generation ships. For example, during the 1996 Hankuang exercises, because of faulty communication between air and sea, rapid-fire CIWS guns on one Chengkung class frigate accidentally shot down a target-towing plane, killing all four crew members. On another occasion, due to carelessness, a Chengkung class frigate suffered serious damage while docking. Then last April it came out that a Knox class frigate on maneuvers, the Fenyang, had rammed the destroyer Laiyang. Though it might be said that "naval maneuvers are by nature dangerous," and that accidents are also due in part to weather and sea conditions, nevertheless, officers and men cannot escape responsibility.
With the second-generation renovation, personnel must be, like the overall force structure, "more sophisticated." Not as many crew members will be needed as on old-time ships; what is important is that they be of high quality. In particular, the newer the vessel, the greater the need for people knowledgeable in high-tech and machinery. Unfortunately, the main pillars of any ship-regular non-commissioned officers (NCOs)-are lacking in both quality and quantity.
"In peacetime," says one naval officer, "most people don't even want to hear about military affairs, much less serve. If you were to ask on the street who would be willing to attend the naval academy, you would get very few positive responses indeed. So you can imagine how few want to enter NCO school to become a lower-ranking non-commissioned officer."
As for the problem of NCO quality, the government is currently trying to remedy the problem by raising navy salaries. An NCO can earn as much as NT$50-60,000 per month (including sea pay). But some point out that in this profession one is usually at sea, where life is hard and it is difficult to look after one's family, so more pay alone is unlikely to solve the problem.
"Unless there is a broad public consensus that defending the nation is important and something to be proud of," says Vice-Admiral Ho Ping-jui, formerly a vice-commandant of the naval academy, things will not improve. The government must reassess many aspects of military life, such as the regulations governing the lives of those in the service and retirement provisions. In this way people in society will have some expectations of the military profession, and the social status and dignity of professional soldiers can be raised. Otherwise, even if the ships get better, if the people don't, then it will all be for naught.
It was only after the Qing dynasty was forced to open China's doors in the mid-19th century that modern naval studies began in China. For more than a century, there has been no easy way. Each step has required deep learning, and has been made only at heavy cost.
The naval modernization program is in its final stages. But it seems like everything is just beginning.
p.7
With the military's modernization program, the navy is now considered the best prepared of the three services. It can fight on three levels-air, sea, and undersea. Among the most important vessels are Kangting class ships, with "stealth" design. (courtesy of the ROC Navy)
p.8
The electronics and communications equipment on second-generation ships will be the decisive weapons of the next conflict.
A Comparison of Naval Forces Across the Taiwan Strait
ROC
PRC
Naval personnel
75,000
362,000
Warships (destroyers, frigates, cruisers, etc)
43
54
Submarines
4
46 (4 nuclear, 3 Kirov class, and 39 operational diesel subs)
Other military craft (missile patrol boats, etc)
60
818
Amphibious and transport ships
100
408
Source: 1996 Jane's Fighting Ships, statistics from the Institute of Strategic Studies (London), the ROC Defense White Paper, and various media reports; collated by Su Chin-chiang
p.9
Short-range guns are no longer so frequently used in naval warfare naval weapons, but they still have destructive power. They can be used to bombard shore targets.
p.10
In peacetime, why prepare for war? "To protect the democratic way of life, and defend the nation and people," says one navy officer.
p.11
The ROC navy formerly relied mainly on US ships decommissioned after WWII. At-sea refuelling and resupply keep our ships in operation.
p.12
Beginning in the 1990s Taiwan has been leasing Knox class frigates from the US. Equipped with advanced ASW (anti-submarine warfare) capabilities, they are Taiwan's main ASW weapon. (photo courtesy of the ROC Navy)
p.13
The Lafayette class frigate's "stealth" design makes it hard to detect on radar.
Chengkung class ships have anti-air, anti-ship, and ASW capabilities. Captain Liu Shiaw-jyh, skipper of the Tzu Yi, calls them "good men to have around in a fight." (photo courtesy of the ROC Navy)
p.14
Shipboard ASW helicopters can greatly expand a ship's search radius; they are an indispensable weapon for the new generation of warships.
p.15
Weapons systems from second-generation ROC warships include rapid-fire CIWS guns (above) to shoot down incoming missiles, Harpoon anti-ship missiles (below left), and torpedoes (below right).
p.16
Submarines, hard to detect and armed with torpedoes, are the hunter-killers of the ocean. (photo courtesy of the ROC Navy)
p.17
Many people are now closely watching how the elite Marine force will be restructured. (photo by Pu Hua-chih)
p.19
With changes in weaponry under the modernization program, doctrine must also change to match. Much depends on whether the navy can attract talented people to join.
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