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[Page: S13586]

Mr. MURKOWSKI (for himself, Mr. Robb, Mr. Brown, Mr. Pell, Mr. Helms, and Mr. Simon) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S.Res. 270

Whereas the Republic of China on Taiwan (known as Taiwan) is the United States' fifth largest trading partner and an economic powerhouse buying more than twice as much annually from the United States as do the 1.2 billion Chinese of the People's Republic of China;

Whereas European countries, with numerous ministerial visits to Taipei in support of their trade promotion efforts have been awarded over US$5 billion in contracts for Taiwan's Six Year National Development Plan, while U.S. companies have won only US$1.37 billion in contracts (1991-93);

Whereas Taiwan is a model emerging democracy, with a free press, free elections stable democratic institutions, and human rights protections;

Whereas United States interests are served by supporting democracy and human rights abroad;

Whereas United States interests are best served by policies that treat Taiwan's leaders with respect and dignity;

Whereas the results of the Executive branch review of the policy of the United States toward Taiwan were announced on September 7, 1994;

Whereas the adjustments made in United States policy toward Taiwan do not concretely or adequately upgrade relations.

Therefore it is the sense of the Senate that United States policy toward Taiwan should:

(1) welcome the President of the Republic of China on Taiwan and other high-level government officials to the United States;

(2) allow unrestricted office calls by all representatives of Taiwan in the United States to all United States departments and agencies, including the Departments of Defense and State and offices in the Old Executive Office Building;

(3) send cabinet-level officials, including officials from the Departments of State and Defense, to Taiwan on a regular basis;

(4) support a proposal in the 48th General Assembly of the United Nations for formal observer status for Taiwan as a first step toward full membership in the United Nations and its specialized agencies;

(5) support a proposal at the earliest possible time for full admission for Taiwan into a wide range of international organizations including, but not limited to:

(a) the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a developed country, irrespective of the timetable for the admission into GATT of the People's Republic of China;

(b) the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or the World Bank);

(c) the International Monetary Fund;

(d) the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna (CITES);

(e) the Montreal Protocol of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP);

(f) International Maritime Organization (IMO);

(g) International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and

(h) United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)

(6) change the name of Taiwan's representative office in the United States to the `Taipei Representative Office';

(7) approve defensive arms sales to Taiwan based solely on Taiwan's self-defense needs, without qualitive or quantitative restrictions;

(8) require advice and consent of the United States Senate for the highest level representative of the United States in Taiwan;

(9) upgrade the status of the existing American Institute in Taiwan (AIT);

(10) include a report by the Secretary of State to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee on U.S. economic, cultural, political and security relations with Taiwan on an annual basis;

(11) support participation of the President of the Republic of China on Taiwan in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum; and

(12) raise U.S. concerns about the People's Republic of China threat to forcefully reunify Taiwan and the People's Republic of China.

[Page: S13587]

• [Begin insert]

In July 1993, the administration indicated that it was involved in an interagency review of United States policy toward Taiwan. I was told on many occasions that an announcement about the policy review was imminent, but then something would come up to delay its release--and that something was usually the People's Republic of China. First there was the most-favored-nation debate, and then North Korea negotiations, and then Secretary Brown's trip to Beijing. Finally, on September 7, during the congressional recess, the policy was quietly announced.

It is often said that you have to crawl, before you walk, before you run--and the administration really took that adage to heart when it looked at United States policy toward Taiwan. It did not even make real changes to the policy, only adjustments. Let me make clear: I welcome the mere fact that the adjustments were made at all. A review of United States-Taiwan relations was long overdue, and at least the changes that were made are tentative steps toward making our policy more rational. But I think bolder and more substantive steps are necessary.

First, the policy review changed the name of the Coordination Council for North American Affairs to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office. At least it has a geographical reference, but why not identify Taiwan?

Second, higher-level U.S. Government officials from economic and technical agencies will be allowed to visit Taiwan under the revised policy. Of course, Carla Hills, U.S. Trade Representative during the Bush administration, visited Taiwan, so this adjustment is not breaking new ground. The key here is implementation.

Third, ROC officials meeting with some high-ranking U.S. officials will now be able to meet in official settings rather than hotels and restaurants. But the policy leaves the caveat that this excludes meetings at the State Department, Old Executive Office Building, or the White House, even though AIT officials are now allowed to go to the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Taipei, the equivalent of our State Department. So we can go into theirs, but they cannot visit ours. Does this make sense?

In those areas where adjustments were made, the administration at least acknowledged some inconsistencies. I am most concerned about those areas where the administration chose to keep the status quo intact. What did not change?

The arms sale policy still has the inconsistency of the bucket. The Taiwan Relations Act says we will provide for Taiwan's self-defense needs, but then we told the PRC we would limit the quality and quantity of our sales. In practice, the bucket is an anachronism because we broke it with the F-16's. But by pretending to still adhere to arbitrary limits, our defense exporters lose sales because there are no ground rules for when a system will or will not be approved.

In testimony submitted by the American League for Exporters and Security Assistance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing yesterday on United States relations with Taiwan it is estimated that past and present defense sales lost to the Taiwan defense sales policy could reach as high as $20 billion in revenue and 456,000 jobs.

In addition, these questions remain to be answered:

United States military planes cannot stay overnight, but must go to Japan. What purpose does this serve except to waste U.S. taxpayer dollars?

Visas are stamped with Hong Kong rather than Taipei. What happens in 1997?

Official visits to the United States by President Lee and other high-level Taiwanese officials are still prohibited.

Government officials are still prohibited from visiting the State Department, the White House, and the Old Executive Office Building.

Taiwan membership in the United Nations is not supported.

I know that the administration will likely defend the lack of change as a signal that the policy has been working in the past--if it's not broke, don't fix it. But Mr. President, I disagree.

This new policy might suit diplomacy 101, but it does not suit fairness 101. This is not a just policy for the 21 million people on Taiwan who lack representation in the multilateral institutions that want

Taiwan's money and Taiwan's compliance but not their input. It is not a just policy for the ROC Government officials who act with great dignity and respect, but are not treated to the same.

This is not a just policy for a country like the United States that claims to stand for democracy and human rights. This is not a just policy for President Clinton who made democracy a cornerstone of his foreign policy. This is the President who said: `We need new leadership that will stand with the forces of democratic change . . . a President who will utilize our economic, political and cultural resources to assist the new forces of freedom emerging around the world.' Why does this apply to Haiti, but not Taiwan?

Mr. President, I find it ironic and sad that this administration is willing to risk the lives of American soldiers to restore Aristide to power in Haiti under the guise of democracy, but is not willing to ruffle the PRC's feathers by rewarding democracy and human rights in Taiwan. The United States continues to turn a cold shoulder toward Taiwan, even as the world itself is warming up. Our Taiwan policy is a relic of the cold war.

Back in 1978, when the United States broke off diplomatic relations with the ROC and recognized the PRC we lived in a very different world. A wall still divided the two Germanys, the Soviet Union was the `evil empire' and the people of Taiwan lived under martial law. This was the state of the world when the United States passed the Taiwan Relations Act. Although the world has changed dramatically since then, our policy has not.

Taiwan has emerged as a model democracy: martial law was lifted, press curbs were lifted, and opposition parties were made legal. Popular presidential elections are scheduled for 1996.

Taiwan has emerged as an economic powerhouse: the world's 13th largest trading economy with the largest foreign reserves, our 5th largest trading partner, despite power buying trips led by Secretary of Commerce Brown, Taiwan still buys twice as much from the United States as the PRC.

Taiwan and the PRC have allowed economic and social contact. In 1993, the ROC became the second largest investor in the PRC. 1.5 million residents of Taiwan traveled to the mainland last year.

But rather than reward Taiwan for the enormous, positive changes it has undertaken, the United States has chosen to treat it like an international pariah. We are all familiar with the unfortunate incident when President Lee's request for an overnight stay in Hawaii en route to Costa Rica was denied after protests from the PRC Embassy. There are many of us in Congress who feel very strongly that not only should President Lee be permitted to stay overnight on U.S. soil, he should be welcomed as a guest.

After all, this administration has seen the benefit to having Yasser Arafat, head of the PLO and not a recognized government leader, visit the White House. Similarly, Gerry Adams, head of Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, visited the United States. In each of these cases, there were certainly objections. In fact, I am told that the United States has recently granted Gerry Adams a 2-week visa to visit several cities, over the objections of the U.K. Similarly, Tibet's exiled leader, the Dalai Lama called on Vice-President Gore at the White House. The PRC strongly objected to this visit. But the administration rightly went ahead with the visit. Why not President Lee?

The administration's new policy explicitly states that it will not support Taiwan's bid to enter the United Nations, presumably because the PRC would object. I disagree with this rationale. With organizations like the GATT, the United States looked for ways where both Taiwan and China could join. Taiwan agreed to call itself a customs territory and the GATT members, under United States leadership, have worked out an arrangement where the two will likely enter the GATT together. Certainly the United States could be a leader for creative diplomacy in the U.N. arena as well. Other countries would follow our lead, but if the United States does not take the moral high ground, other countries will not want to be bold.

We saw a recent example of this when the Japanese, under intense pressure from Beijing, asked President Lee not to attend the Asian Games, even after the invitation was extended. If the United States were to allow President Lee to visit the United States for an event such as accepting an honorary degree from Cornell, however, Japan may find the backbone to allow President Lee to attend international sports events.

However, the United States must be willing to risk a little PRC bellowing. The PRC has grown arrogant because every time they yell, we back down. This appeasement only compels them to seek greater concessions. This must stop. We all look forward to the day that the PRC is important because it is governed freely and that it uses its long tradition and culture, not just its immense size, to garner respect. But

the PRC is not there yet. Clearly, the United States has important interests in maintaining relations with the mainland, but that does not mean that our foreign policy can be held hostage by the PRC. The United States stands for democracy and freedom. We must not turn our backs on the people of Taiwan. If the administration will not turn United States-Taiwan relations loose, the United States Congress must.

Therefore, Mr. President, along with Senators Robb, Brown, Pell, Helms, and Simon, I am introducing this resolution to express the sense of the Senate concerning United States relations with Taiwan. It states that it is the sense of the Senate that United States policy toward Taiwan should include 12 policy changes to improve United States-Taiwan relations, many of which I have just mentioned.

Specifically, the United States should welcome the President of the Republic of China on Taiwan and other high-level government officials to visit the United States. Reciprocally, the United States should send cabinet-level officials, including officials from the Departments of State and Defense, to Taiwan on a regular basis. The United States should support a proposal for observer status at the United Nations for Taiwan, and membership in other international organizations.

If the United States takes these and the other steps listed in this resolution, United States policy toward Taiwan will head in the right direction. I urge my colleagues to fully support this resolution.

• [End insert]

[Page: S13588]

END