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The Potential Crisis of Taiwan, The T Day

Taipei
CHIEN-TUAN K'E-CHI
[DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY MONTHLY]
No 122, 1 Oct 94 pp 28-39

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Chinese Communists, using a landing on Dongshan Island as a target, conducted the "Donghai Number Four" exercises in the middle of October, forty one years after July 16, 1953, when our shock brigades and parachute forces attacked Dongshan Island. Because Dongshan Island is located to the south of Jinmen, this has initiated a tense military situation, and any exercise conducted over the years by the Chinese Communists must receive attention.

The troops participating in this exercise belonged to the Nanjing Military Region's 31st Group Army, and this Group Army's other armored, infantry, and artillery troops also conducted land and air joint military exercises in November 1992 in Fujian's Liancheng and Longyan regions. The Nanjing MR's other First Group Army also conducted the "Success Number Three" landing operation exercises between July and November of 1993 near Hangzhou Bay.

Mainland Group Armies are normally composed of a mixture including infantry divisions, armored divisions, mechanized infantry divisions, field artillery divisions, anti-aircraft artillery divisions, engineering groups, communications battalions, radar battalions, chemical battalions and other troops, with a strength of roughly 150,000 troops. What is of value to note is that Taiwan belongs to the operational jurisdiction of the Nanjing Military Region.

In addition, the Dong Hai (East China Sea) Sea Fleet conducted an exercise codenamed "9305" in May 1993 in the sea region east of Zhejiang, using sea, land, and air combined operations, conducting a support fire assault landing type exercise. In May 1992, this fleet also conducted a Red and Blue Army resistance exercise in a sea region belt off Zhejiang and Fujian codenamed "923," and Taiwan is within the operational jurisdiction of the Dong Hai Sea Fleet.

In reality, amphibious landing exercises have been conducted by the mainland Chinese for many years without a break, for example, on August 1, 1976, the Chinese Communists, using the name "Army Day," conducted a three armed services joint landing exercise off Fujian's Pingtan, and in 1977 once more conducted exercises on the same scale. An occasion that left a deep impression on people occurred at the end of 1987, when the Chinese Communists conducted a landing exercise on Hainan Island, and Taiwan's Ministry of Defense through a routine reporter was able to use a tape to make this public within Taiwan, and retain the Chinese Communists' original background music, while on Taiwan the media broadly reported on this, and it attracted wide discussion from a variety of circles, as well as controversy over differing opinions. Until now, this tableau had not been seen for some time.

For some number of years, all the related reporting on the Chinese Communists' exercises, like the March 1992 edition of the Hong Kong "Trends" monthly, which published "The Military Liberation of Taiwan Province Requires the Ability to Send in Troops," has greatly shocked people. This article pointed out that a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan would have to utilize troops on the scale indicated below:

1. 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 Army, Navy, and Air Force troops, in addition, 3,000,000 reserve duty, civil defense, rear service (logistics), and local troops, including 1,000,000 to 1,200,000 as first line Army, Navy, and Air Force troops.

2. 180 warships and submarines, and 5000 transport vessels.

3. 2000 fighter aircraft and bombers.

4. 2000 armored vehicles, 8000 to 10,000 military vehicles.

5. Consumption of 400 to 500 billion RMB.

6. Campaign time table: 7 to 12 days, amd within 15 days

achieve the complete elimination of Taiwan's armed forces. Whether or not the Chinese Communists plan to use military power to resolve the Taiwan question, from the above series of facts it is clear that no one can dare to say that they do not have such a plan. But the question is: will this day really come? Like the landing at Normandy on D-Day during the Second World War, could T- Day occur with the Chinese Communists attacking Taiwan? If it occurs, in what manner will it be conducted? And in such a war for the future destiny of the Chinese people, how much assurance do we have of a winning strategy?

August 1995

The year 1994 is the 50th anniversary of the Normandy landing, and there have been various media reports disseminated around the world, allowing people to again review this historical page of the Second World War. D-Day one may well say is the media's pet topic of 1994.

When D-Day was becoming a central issue of public attention, a book about T-Day, a day when military force would be used to attack Taiwan, and a day that would determine the future fate of Taiwan, called "August 1995--A White Paper on the Chinese Communist Armed Assault of Taiwan" was published by Mr. Zheng Langping [6774 3186 1627]. The book hit the market in August, and immediately attracted the attention of Taiwan citizens. The publication of the book, coupled with the recent Chinese Communist "Dong Hai Number Four" exercise, meant that when cabinet minister Sun Chen went to inspect Jinmen, its fame went straight up, and the market reaction was predictable.

According to the author's preface for this book, the 1991 Gulf War had a direct influence on the work. He believes that the Chinese Communists are most capable of outflanking our first line troops, and directly attacking Taiwan's command and communications system nerve centers, the so-called "attack Taiwan, penetrate to the center operation" strategy, and will not pursue a strategy of frontally forcing a landing on Taiwan's coast, or using a shipping blockade. He attacks the past views of many Chinese and outside military experts, and provides people much food for thought. This author also considers the idea repeatedly stressed in the book of a Chinese Communist "inverse" model, and not a military action done be putting up a sign, pointing out the most direct explanation.

Why is it necessary to highlight that 1995 is a year with a leap month in August? The reason is that in this century there are only four years with leap months in August, the first was 1900 (Eight-Power Allied Forces sent to suppress anti-imperialist movement), the second was 1957 (the Chinese Communists Anti-Rightist Rectification), and most recently in 1976 (the death of Mao Zedong). The final one will be in August 1995. Mr. Zheng intuitively feels that there should also be a historical prophecy and omen, and according to the following six pieces of evidence and observations of them, he infers that T-Day is approaching!

1. Since 1988, on the mainland, the huge defense budget has exceeded normal requirements, and if this is not for fighting a war, then what is it for?

2. Deng Xiaoping is getting on, and in order to avoid leadership turmoil after the Deng Xiaoping era, launching a war is often a way to turn attention from internal wrangles and contradictions. In addition, during President Clinton's term, the United States is incapable of reacting. In other words, it is an opportune moment.

3. The unification of China is a historical law.

4. Because the pattern of a future war will be changed and completely new, the possibility for the use of a sudden attack strategy and high tech weaponry to crush Taiwan has greatly increased.

5. The Republic of China's defensive forces, on the occasion of obtaining internationally supplied second generation weapons systems required by the armed forces, have been raised from the depths, and taking advantage of this period when Taiwan's military preparedness is not yet complete could allow the solution at one fell swoop of the problem of a divided China.

6. Taiwan controls the mainland's southeast sea coast, and controls its southern gateways, and if the two sides of the straights continue to be divided, the Chinese Communists will for a long time be unable to become an Asian superpower.

Mr. Zheng's T-Day prediction does not use Taiwan announcing its independence, and separating from the Chinese Communist "motherland" as the precondition, but rather predicts that the latest possible occurrence of T-Day is August 1995, this century's last August leap month, or around February 1996, when Taiwan holds its first presidential elections, and the political situation will be caught up in the chaos of an election. He predics that at the very latest it would occur around July 1997, when Beijing takes back Hong Kong. As a result, he calls on citizens to face up to the crisis, and confront the threat of T-Day, to take countermeasures, and transform their historically changed destiny.

Mr. Zheng warns the reader that the forecast events are not tantamount to historical events, and when it comes to the surgical operation type warfare of the "attack Taiwan, penetrate to the center operation," and for the simulated details described in this book, one must not take measures without regard to changing circumstances, and be limited to debating whether or not this would be the only method for the Chinese Communists to use military force to attack Taiwan.

This writer found that when it comes to Mr. Zheng's ability to use "T-Day," this simple but powerful wording, to bring up potential historical events that everyone is unwilling to believe or face squarely, using the space of 290 pages, and completely and repeatedly penetratingly analyzing and expressing his understanding of Han chauvinism and the Chinese Communists' nationalism, and the inevitability of a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan, his thesis has much to recommend itself. However, I have considerable reservations when it comes to many of Mr. Zheng's views on the nation's armed forces and combat abilities. These mistaken estimates of the enemy or our own combat ability and will to fight are frequently misguided accessories to the outbreak of war. One need not look far into the past for examples: Argentina in the Falklands, and Iraq in Kuwait.

In addition, though he stresses details of the "attack Taiwan, penetrate to the center operation" plan, it is not necessary to painstakingly nitpick, moreover, this is another key to whether or not T-Day will really occur. If the operational plan drawn up cannot go forward, there is no assurance of success (in this book Mr. Zheng writes: From 6 to 10 June, at the Chinese Communist People's Liberation Army's combat command center, all those commanders taking part in the T-Day operation all participated in a T-Day attack Taiwan computer simulation operation, and during the computer simulation, the Chinese Communist forces had a success rate that exceeded 70 percent), and the possibility of launching a war is even lower.

What this writer has the most doubts about is how the Chinese Communists will take sufficient numbers of 8341 special guards troops, and other special type assault troops, and "penetrate" our country's tightly monitored and known Taiwan Strait and Taiwan's territorial waters and airspace, and reach Taipei and various places in the province as a whole, and be able in one night, and at all designated places, and for all designated targets, at one fell swoop complete a surround and hold mission?

With an infiltration operation on this scale, what are the possibilities that there will be a leak of intelligence and information?

The writer's other response to this type of operation is to mention the Second World War's "Market Garden Operation," which was also the subject of a book and movie about taking a bridge by force, with later regret. After the Normandy landing, in September 1944, several Allied paratroop divisions penetrated far behind enemy lines in an airborne landing, and prepared for an infantry and armored troops to open up and establish a bridge head stronghold. The result was that in Arnhem in Holland the Allied forces took a fall, pulling back, suffering a rout, and suffered twice as many as casualties as during the Normandy landing. The plan to attack the German army and retake Western European territory, was forced to follow a step by step order, and Allied forces vied for territory inch by inch. The operational plan was to penetrate the German Army, and the insufficient firepower of the lightly armed paratroop assault units, and their limited ammunition and food, with no way to sustain combat for a long period, were factors which contributed to the Allied defeat.

Arnhem Bridge, for the parachute troops carrying out the mission, was really a "Bridge Too Far." The Taiwan Strait is also perhaps like what Mr. Zheng terms a natural moat, but Taiwan, the island, only has lightly armed and equipped special operations troops to use against a Chinese Communist attack against Taiwan, and penetrate to the center operation. In seeking for this reason a clear operational plan, could it not become an "Island Too Far?"

Western Europe's U-Day Crisis

In addition to South Korea, Western Europe in the past experienced a long period under the shadow of the threat of the Warsaw Pact launching a war, and igniting a U-Day crisis. Right up to the 1990 fall of the Berlin Wall, and the 1991 breakup of the former Soviet Union, and after June 1994, when the Russian Foreign Minister and NATO signed a "Partnership for Peace" agreement, the U-Day crisis was completely eliminated. The Warsaw Pact's secret operational plans for attacking Western Europe during that time were discovered within the borders of East Germany in 1994, and after they had been published and brought to light, their content surprised NATO political leaders and high-ranking military officers, and even military observers could not believe what they read.

The operation for attacking Western Europe, indeed the Third World War, would start from U-Day U-Hour (a certain Sunday early in the early morning), with 1,000,000 Soviet, East German and Polish ground troops, and under the cover of a big and formidable Air Force, and a battle array of 12,000 military vehicles and 25,000 armored vehicles, after a thorough tactical nuclear missile attack against Western European cities and strategic points, and command facilities, a large-scale cross border attack would be launched into West Germany. On the third day they would occupy West Germany; on the 14th day the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Denmark would be captured, and on the 30th day, Warsaw Pact forces would reach the Atlantic Ocean coast, liberating France!

The comprehensive use of nuclear weapons at the start by the Warsaw Pact, using a complete surprise attack to gain the initiative and gain the upper hand, raising the curtain on World War Three, this was the worst case scenario that the Western camp dared not imagine and was unwilling to face. The operational conceptual plans produced by this "inverse" type thinking, I am afraid could have given rise to U-Day, and NATO, at the point of being badly shaken, and thrown into confusion, would have had no way to react in a timely manner, in the end resulting in the "final destiny" of the ruin of Western Europe. As for predictions concerning World War Three, former NATO Commander in Chief, Britain's Sir John Haikete, in 1978 in the book "WW III: A Future History," wrote that it would be start with a large-scale three-dimensional space traditional operation, and NATO and the Warsaw Pack would each launch in the other direction 1 missile armed with a nuclear warhead, destroying a city with a population of 1,000,000 on the other side, and then an end would be mediated, viewing nuclear weapons as the greatest thing to avoid in warfare.

Similarly, in Tom Clancy's military novel Red Storm Rising, from beginning to end the author uses traditional warfare as the backdrop, with no use of nuclear weapons. And in this Third World War conducted in Western Europe's heartland and the Atlantic Ocean, finally a struggle occurs within the Soviet Union, and the main combat troops lose their backing and power. Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, it had for a long time expanded its armaments, and not in the least controlled the use of national resources used for military development. Its leaders gave no consideration to the fact that economic development is the important thing, and for a long period of time the economy was in decline, and the people lived in destitution, and grain supply crises arose. In addition, the combination of multiple nationalities and cultural federations was an inducement for the loss of political cohesion, and the Soviet Union was unable to avoid its destiny of splitting up. According to Paul Ganxiyou in Surmounting the Century, in 1913, during the Russian imperial period, Russia's average productive forces were three times those of Japan, but, in fact, after 70 years of socialism, they are only one quarter of those of Japan; the former Soviet Union's economy, after a third of the 20th century, was already a spent force. The former Soviet Union was not beaten down by airplanes, but was dragged down by its economy, eliminating the U-Day threat for Western Europe. This historical event was a wakeup call to those admiring Communism.

Today's Chinese mainland is devoting itself to economic development, but the authorities continue a tight hold over politics, and are bound to create major contradictions and internal conflicts within the system. In the book A New Theory of War, the author Erwin Tuofuchin believes that the first, second, and third wave of civilization, exists simultaneously over the vast area and population of the Chinese hinterland, and in a number of coastal provinces, cities and different regions, but this contains even greater conflicts and war crises, and the result will be like the prediction in the book The Yellow Peril, the great possibility that eventually the Chinese mainland will experience civil war and division.

Mr. Zheng writes in "August 1995" about the fate of the mainland: "the author believes that even if the Chinese Communists are able to attack and occupy Taiwan, it will not be possible to destroy the Communist regime, or win a long period of deferment, on the contrary it will exacerbate the struggles and opposing forces within the Communists, and the fate of the Communists will be like the Qin Dynasty, the Jin Dynasty and the Sui Dynasty, which after completing a historical unification of China, all very quickly faced a successor crisis and came crashing down to defeat."

Will Taiwan share the same ultimate destiny as Western Europe?

Looking Back At the Taiwan-US Break in Diplomatic Relations In December 1978, the United States and Taiwan broke relations, and in April 1979, the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passed the "Taiwan Relations Act." In August 1981, the U.S. and Mainland China signed the "July 1981" Joint Communique.

In 1982 a special report of the Strategic Studies Center of the Georgetown University in the United States pointed out that though Beijing clearly had the capability to take military action and could be successful, it appeared that for five to seven years, the ROC would not be under a clear military threat. Therefore, after this period, the future was quite cloudy, and would clearly be comparatively dangerous for the ROC. That year, in the U.S. published magazine CHINA SPRING, it was also revealed that the Chinese Communist leadership strata had secretly planned in 1982 to use a lightning swift military maneuver, to cross the sea and attack Taiwan, and make a unified China a reality. Today, this deadline has passed, and it appears Taiwan has weathered the first crisis and T-Day with Beijing's military power threatening Taiwan, following the break in Taiwan-U.S. relations.

In the fifteen years since the break in U.S.-Taiwan relations, we can see that in the five year period from 1979 to 1984, and the ten year period from 1984 to 1994, the combat readiness of Taiwan's military has grown stronger.

In the period from 1979 to 1984, Taiwan's Air Force combat capability rapidly increased, primarily as a result of the fact that the F-5E/F replaced the F-5A/B and the F-100A fighters, in all 256 aircraft, arranged into 14 combat squadrons, and there were also 79 F-104A/G fighters at this time also, an increase of a 16 aircraft squadron compared to 1979. In addition, when added to other aircraft types, Taiwan's air force at that time totalled five fighter wings, with 453 combat aircraft.

As for the Navy, Yangzi number destroyers began to carry the Hughes 500MD anti-submarine helicopter, and the number of destroyers equipped with the ASROC anti-submarine missile increased from three in 1979, to eight in 1984, substantially strengthening the Navy's anti-submarine operational capability. The Hsiong Feng anti-ship missile deployment was also increased from two to six ships, and in addition there were also 26 Sea Gull (Hai-O) class missile speedboats and two Dragon River (Long-jiang) class missile speedboats added to the Navy's list of combat ready vessels, and the sea-based combat capability of the Navy versus the Chinese Communist's Navy was substantially increased.

As for the Army, two armored division were transformed and became six independent armored brigades and four armored vehicle regiments; the number of M4842 fighting vehicles was increased from 150 to 300, the number of M113 armored personnel carriers was substantially increased from 300 in 1979, to 1100, and 150 V-150 wheeled armored vehicles were also in succession put into active service. As for artillery, there were large increases in the numbers of guns including various diameter mortars, 105 mm howitzers, and 155 mm howitzers, of which 125 155 mm self-propelled howitzers and 75 203 mm self-propelled howitzers entered our Army's arsenal, letting the enemy know that it dare not pay little attention to this development.

When it came to surface-to-air missile battalions, the Hawk (Ying) type missile battalions increased from the original one to a total of three, and the Goddess of Victory Strength (Shengli Nushen Lishi) type air defense missile battalions remained the same as before, with two deployed. And the authorized strength of infantry divisions, during this five year period remained at 12 heavy-armored divisions and six lightly-armored divisions, and two Army airborne regiments deployed with 80 UH-1H helicopters.

Looking at the situation as a whole, in the five years after the break in relations with the United States, the U.S. military appraisals of Taiwan's three service combat capability consider that the personnel from the three services, though they are comparatively fewer in number, in terms of weaponry and training quality they have made progress compared to before, and conclude that "the three services' combat capabilities exceed those of before the 1980s' prior to the break in relations with the United States."

And in the most recent ten year period from 1984 to 1994, the increase in Taiwan's three service combat capability is in no way comparable to that of the five year period after the break in relations with the United States; looking from the point of view of the defense budget, in 1984 it was $3.4 billion, while in 1994 it is $9.7 billion, and the economic fund that could be used are even greater: the three service's personnel totalled 484,000 in 1984, while in 1994 the number is 425,000, as personnel are further reduced.

First of all, in terms of the Air Force, in 1994 Taiwan's Air Force expanded to six fighter wings, totalling 18 fighter squadrons, with five independent squadrons; of these, the F-5E/F also increased by a single squadron of 60 planes, and a 20 AT-3 plane night attack squadron officially came into service. The S-2E anti-submarine plane also started to be replaced by the S-2T, and the total number of aircraft was increased from 29 to 32. Twelve C-130H transport planes replaced the C-119s, and purchases will continue. Thirty-five air-defense rapid artillery units have bolstered the Air Force's low-altitude air-defense strength, increasing the total number of air-defense artillery battalions from 10 to 14. In this period, the F-104G/J, though there are also 66 aircraft, due to plane age considerations, the aircraft's safety is not very ideal, and its on duty time will on occasion be reduced. At present the Air Force is conducting comprehensive flight testing and reconditioning so that it is only possible to maintain three squadrons, and they will be replaced by second generation fighters.

As for the Navy, of the 24 Yangzi number destroyers, close to one third have already had their combat systems replaced, and been equipped with Hsiong Feng (improved Hsiong Feng (Drone)) type one and Hsiong Feng type two anti-submarine missiles and standard air defense missiles, greatly expanding their combat capability. And three Nuokesi class patrol defense boats, two Chengkung class patrol boats, two improved Chiyu class submarines, and an S-70 C(M) antisubmarine helicopter battalion have become operational, all adding to and pushing forward the capability of the ROC Navy to master the sea. In addition, the deployment of coastal defense Hsiong Feng model one and two antisubmarine missile battalions, and 52 missile speed boat units, has greatly increased the Navy's defensive operational capabilities for offshore and coastal defense. Two divisions of close to 40,000 naval marines provide a two pronged landing and anti-landing strategic capability.

For the Army, the past 10 years have seen especially marked improvement. A new face has emerged as the Army's infantry divisions authorized strength at present is 10 infantry divisions, two mechanized divisions, seven reserve divisions, and three mobilization divisions. The six independent armored brigades have been remained unchanged, the four military vehicle battalions have become one vehicle group, the three paratroop brigades have been distilled into two paratroop brigades, the two helicopter battalions with 118 UH-1H helicopters have maintained deployment, but 450 M48H main force vehicles, AH-1W assault helicopters and OH-58D combat search helicopters are on active duty, making the combat capability of the relevant units rise in a straight line fashion. The Hawk missile units have once again been expanded, with the formation of five improved Hawk missile battalions, and the number of Shengli Nushen Lishi type surface-to-air missiles of the two battalions has been raised to more than 2000. In addition, what is also worth noting is that the first Tiankung missile company has also officially come into service, assuming combat readiness.

In sum, over the past decade, with the exception of the Air Force F-104 G/Js being reduced from the original six squadrons to three combat ready squadrons, the remaining Army, Navy, and Air Force three services combat strength and weapon systems, particularly missile systems, C3I (command, control, communication, and intelligence) and electronic warfare capabilities have all made considerable progress and achieved breakthroughs. Can Taiwan's three services overall combat capability be compared today to what it was at the time of the break in relations with the United States? If one does not look at facts and developments, and believes that "Taiwan has lost the U.S. protective umbrella embodied in the Taiwan-US Defense Treaty, suffered the difficulties of finding sources for weapons supply, and has seen the national defense preparedness suffer from enormous political interference; not only has the combat ability of the Navy and Air Force greatly declined, but the Army's war fighting ability has also fallen to a similar degree," then this is not in accord with the facts and is also quite a lamentable argument.

For this reason, the crux of the matter is then whether or not our present military power, the type of military power described above, could cope with the future possibility of the eruption of a T-Day. And related to this key point, will Taiwan be able to try to gradually move toward talks given the recent standpoints of the two sides of the straits?

Would China's Military Be Able To Win a War?

In June 1993, a book published by the Sichuan Southwest Normal University Publishing House, called Can the Chinese Army Win the Next War?, compiled by authors Xiao Bing and Qing Bo. It is a thin book of only around 80 pages, but the book, for the first time, very undisguisedly describes hypothetical situations involving the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, the China-India border, the China-Russia border, the China-Vietnam border and the South China Sea, and discusses the possible future outbreak of war, and the combat capability of the Chinese Communists to win such wars. The first printing of this book was banned by central authorities, but a Western diplomat living in Beijing began to circulate this book abroad, including the relevant section "Using Military Strength To Regain Taiwan," which is worthy of our conscientious scrutiny. First, the two authors believe that the next Jinmen war will perhaps not be worth mentioning, not worth fighting; but this in the final analysis is the first step to reaching Taiwan, and if the Chinese Communists were able to easily seize it, one should not be surprised.

As for an attack on Taiwan, the major battle will not be on the main island, but the greatest possibility is that it will be conducted at sea not far from Taiwan, they estimate that it will be fought in the sea region near the Penghu Islands. And finally then, the landing on the island itself, for which the Chinese Communists would conduct a fight for "each mountain, each river, each city, each piece of land," conducting traditional combat with bayonets running red. They will not use nuclear weapons, and will not use chemical weapons. In conducting this type of warfare, how sure of success would the Chinese Communist forces be?

This book believes that naval and air combat is the key to determining victory or defeat. The authors estimate that at present, Taiwan's Air Force F-5E/F and F-104G combat aircraft total 248, and their combat capability falls short of the Chinese Communists Jian 8 fighters, and overall combat capability is also not as good as that of the PLA Air Force. But they stress, Beijing, if it wants to capture and maintain air domination, at the least must deploy close to 2400 warplanes on the southeast coast, and the proportion of warplanes belonging to the Jian 8 performance category or third generation standard aircraft cannot be lower than 40 percent. They also must have at least 1000 of this type of warplane, including at least 400 Jian 8 (at present Beijing has 130 Jian 8, and 26 Su-27s). This book emphasizes that after Taiwan brings in 150 F-16A/B and 60 Mirage 2000-5 fighters, in addition to the indigenously designed and produced IDF fighter, the Air Force will have completed its entire upgrading and replacement program, and on this occasion will have made it even more difficult for the Chinese Communists to achieve air domination.

In terms of sea-going combat strength, this book points out that the Taiwan Navy at present has 300 combat vessels, with an overall combat capability stronger than one of the mainland's fleets, but weaker than two fleets; hence, one should consider things from two angles, and at the same time take into account the North China Sea and South China Sea fleets. When added to the independent submarine squadron, this creates a total of 750 combat vessels, with 100,000 landing troops, and enables a two-pronged offensive to be carried out.

In the struggle to "restore" Taiwan, in addition to having the Navy and Air Force assume the primary attack mission, this book holds that the Second Artillery troops will be thrown into the fray at a certain strength level, and will use medium-range and intermediate-range surface-to-surface missiles to attack Taiwan, and support the war fighting effort.

If this war breaks out, to what degree will the U.S. military, playing the role of world policeman, lend a hand? The author of the book believes that the possibility of direct military intervention is quite high, in order to avoid having the Chinese Communists become an East Asian superpower and a strong adversary.

The books conclusions are: the key when it comes to the outcome of using military force to "restore" Taiwan will hinge on the result of the two sides of the strait facing each other, and will not depend on the intervention of the U.S. military. If Beijing is incapable, within a predetermined period of time, of routing or going so far as to annihilate Taiwan's Navy and Air Force, it cannot conduct a landing operation. This conclusion is consistent with the views of General Leonard, the U.S. military's Joint Defense Commander on Taiwan, who also believes that the success or failure of the air war will determine the outcome of the campaign.

The PLA Air Force at present only has barely 160 so-called third generation aircraft, 250 Jian 7 (same class as MiG-21s, and F-5Es), and 3000 Jian 6 (MiG-19), facing Taiwan's close to 300 F-5E/F, 3 squadrons of F-104G/J, and several dozen IDF fighters which can immediately be combat ready. In the Taiwan air region, the Chinese Communists are only able at one time to have 200 aircraft (we also can put up 200, and altogether have 400 in the air region's largest operational density), one day four times, 2400 military aircraft require three days to take turns once, and whether or not the PLA can maintain an appropriate rate for military aircraft after a war has begun is a very doubtful proposition.

In addition, when it comes to Taiwan, this would be a defensive war, and we already have 7 battalions with more than 2000 air defense missiles to guard the pass, using aircraft, missiles, and artillery in an in depth air defense deployment and tactics, and each time the Chinese Communist aircraft would launch a raid, they would be hit with a 15 to 25 percent loss rate, and could not avoid it. Though a country's air force normally would to be able to sustain this type of losses, and would have to call a halt, as the Georgetown University Strategic Studies Center reminds us: "The outcome of a struggle between these two governments very probably hinges on Beijing's determination to carry out a war, and not the real competition of military superiority."

If the outcome of an air war attack on Taiwan is not favorable to Beijing, and air dominance of the strait is impossible to achieve, then the so-called "attack Taiwan penetrate to the center operation" will have nothing to stand on. In the Gulf War, the allied ground troops were able to reverse fronts, and outflank and attack the Iraqi Army's side and back, primarily because they achieved complete air superiority. But what is worth noting is that even under this condition of having absolute air dominance, the United States also did not dare to allow General Schwartzkopf to lead his army north, to directly attack the heart of Iraq--Baghdad, and only won what US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT called a "triumph," and not a "victory."

Using August 1995 as the first T-Day deadline, if the Chinese Communists really attack Taiwan, how much preparation do Taiwan's Air Force and Army missile forces have, and can they handle an air defense war for Taiwan, on which the entire war outcome would depend? First, the Air Force altogether has close to 400 air defense intercept combat aircraft it can utilize, 15 squadrons with close to 300 F-5E/F, 3 squadrons of F-104G/J, and most importantly it also has 2 squadrons of IDF production model fighters, plus an additional single seed instructor squadron of 10 prototype model IDF fighters, in all 50 second generation aircraft, with an overall strength of 20 fighter squadrons which can be used to launch an attack. And these 50 second generation aircraft, because when each plan is fully equipped with weaponry, can carry 4 Tian-chien model one and 2 Tian-chien model two air-to-air missiles (a total of 6 missiles), its intercept capability is multiplied over existing active duty aircraft.

In addition, at the appointed time, four airborne early warning and control squadrons made up of E-2T aircraft will also enter service, with a coordination system capacity that is 500 times greater than that of the "Tian-wang" system, and can operate 60 times faster, while its combat information capacity has been increased by 50 percent over the "Chiang-wang" automatic early warning ground radar air defense system, and it entered combat readiness on 14 August of this year. It also has a landscape ground conversion which Air Force base's have begun using, and at one time can have 200 aircraft going against 200 other aircraft; hence, Taiwan's Air Force definitely has combat strength. This, let alone the fact that the Army's air defense missile forces can, under "Chiang-wang" command coordination, can wait at their ease until the enemy is exhausted, and assist Taiwan's Air Force in fighting a war for domination of Taiwan's sea and air regions.

As for the second T-Day, and third T-Day, and even more T-Days, Taiwan's air defense strength will only become more and more solid, and for the Chinese Communists, massively and urgently doing a thorough reoutfitting of their Air Force, even with this type of great leap forward, achieving the operational goal of seizing air superiority over a narrow air region of not quite 40,000 square kilometers, will only become more and more distant.

We must be prepared for an attack on Taiwan at any time In November 1989, at an enlarged meeting of the Military Affairs Commission, Deng Xiaoping pointed out: "the issue of the liberation of Taiwan, cannot drag on indefinitely, and we must prepare dual tactics, one tactic is peace talks, and the other tactic is using military strength to resolve the issue, we cannot give up either of these tactics." "You (indicating Jiang Zemin and Li Peng) must think of a way to resolve this issue within five years, if the issue is not resolved, I will not sleep, and in five years it will be necessary to cast off this millstone." If we take five years as the time limit, then in November of this year the time will have arrived, and T-Day should have occurred before this date or should occur in November.

Since 1949, the two sides of the strait have both drawn lessons from battles such as Guningtou, Dongshan Island, Yijiang Shan, and the Baersan artillery engagement, and when it comes to stressing military buildup and war preparation, in the Falklands War, and the Gulf War both sides also did a lot of thinking and research. Moreover, in these past 45 years, the Taiwan Strait has retained it strategic position as a natural moat, this has not changed. On D-Day, in order to transport 156,000 troops and the necessary equipment to shore (including paratroopers), Allied forces in all used 5333 boats and ships, 11,000 aircraft and 50,000 military vehicles, traversing a 160 km wide strait, and landing at the Normandy beach, which was weakly defended by the German Army.

Today, high technology equipment and weapons systems have not yet provided notable breakthroughs when it comes to transport capabilities for supporting a two-pronged landing operation, and in talking about an oversea attack on Taiwan, it would be necessary to conduct repeated practice exercises. This also explains why Beijing in January 1993 began to change the direction of to its military tactics, the inevitable result after the changing of the order from the original South China Sea, China-India border, and southeast seacoast, to the southeast seacoast, South China Sea, and China-India border. The southeast coast only has one operational target: Taiwan. Through the investigations in the book, whether or not DTM has a comparatively insightful understanding of the T-Day crisis, he has a comparatively objective knowledge of the military strength of the two sides of the strait, and in perusing "August, 1995," has his own judgments to accept or reject.

The T-Day crisis has existed throughout the past 45 years, and this writer also once in a while at midnight dreams back, and in the dream sees a scene where a MiG fighter group suddenly emerges over the air space of Taipei City. However, if we rationally face this latent crisis, and do not run away from it, courageously accepting the possible occurrence of a worst case situation, each day and each year we devote real time to preparation for war and meeting an enemy attack, as the outcome of T-Day we are not likely to see those fears conjured up by our imagination.

As long as we are prepared at any time to handle an attack by the Chinese Communists on Taiwan, look at each day as a T-Day, then the T-Day crisis is one that can be eliminated. In the long run, for the sake of the Chinese nation, all Chinese do not want to see T-Day occur.