Statement by Sergey Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the High Level Segment of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 2 March 2023
2 March 2023 17:40
395-02-03-2023
Unofficial translation
Ms. President,
Distinguished Colleagues,
I am pleased to address this distinguished forum. First of all, allow me to welcome you on behalf of Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, who hoped to attend the Conference on Disarmament in person in Geneva. However, it was made impossible by the European Union's unilateral illegitimate restrictions. We view this as an attempt of EU countries to evade an honest dialogue intended to facilitate the long-term improvement of global security and stability including by freeing the world from the burden of WMD-related threats. Such actions also reflect the fear that the real reasons for the rapid degradation of the international security architecture would be uncovered.
However, truth will anyway find its way, no matter how hard one tries to hide it. The current miserable state of the arms control system is the result of deliberate destructive actions of a well-known bloc of countries, constituting North Atlantic alliance that is obsessed with a drive to redistribute the balance of power to its benefit (and therefore to the detriment of the security of others) and to ensure its military-strategic superiority with an ambition of global dominance. We cannot stay indifferent and witness some countries compromise the fundamental interests of other States, conduct hybrid subversive activities against them and attempt to exert coercive pressure on them, by intentionally generating risks and spurring escalation with a view to controlling it in their best interests.
The most acute strategic threat is posed now by the US and NATO policy aimed at further fomenting the conflict in and around Ukraine. Their growing involvement in an armed confrontation is fraught with a direct military clash of nuclear powers with catastrophic consequences. We point out these risks to "the collective West". But our warnings are distorted and misrepresented for propaganda purposes. Meanwhile, absolutely outrageous statements are made in the capitals of Western countries threatening our entire State with reprisals. All this obviously runs counter to the Joint Statement of the Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War dated 3 January 2022, to which Russia remains unconditionally committed.
The situation has further degraded following the US attempts to "probe" the security of the Russian strategic facilities declared under the New START Treaty by assisting the Kiev regime in conducting armed attacks against them. Against this background, we perceived as highly cynical those demands by Washington to regain access to Russia's nuclear facilities for inspecting them under the Treaty. This is especially so in the current circumstances, when the US, together with other Western countries, including such nuclear weapon States as France and the United Kingdom, have set their course with a goal to "strategically defeat" Russia in a total hybrid war unleashed against us, which is contrary to the fundamental principles and general political understandings enshrined in the preamble of the New START. Under these circumstances, we were forced to announce the suspension of the Treaty. At the same time, as it was already stated, we will continue to comply with the quantitative limits on strategic offensive arms.
The destructive actions of the United States and its allies are not only sparking off an acute crisis in Euro-Atlantics, but also threatening to cause the most serious upheavals in the Asia-Pacific region. Other regions are also in turmoil. In fact, we can speak of a global struggle for a new world order that is gaining momentum. Some see it as an instrument to serve their narrow self-interests and to secure for themselves a leading and predominant position over others. But there are others - the majority - that seek a truly fair, equitable and polycentric system of international relations. As a result, the formation of such a system is accompanied by increased tensions and acute crises.
In this context, arms control as well as strategic risk reduction are becoming increasingly difficult to pursue. These tasks are directly related to the objective need for a serious renewal of the security architecture and making it more stress-resistant. We believe that a critical component of this work is a good-faith dialogue on such parameters of coexistence that on the basis of the principle of equal and indivisible security would minimize the accumulated conflict potential. Only then will arms control, which cannot exist separately from geopolitical and military-strategic realities, be truly viable and effective.
Distinguished Colleagues,
UN disarmament machinery has a defining role in strengthening the international security architecture and finding ways to bring the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation out of crisis. In the Conference's agenda we highlight the issue of developing a multilateral legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space. The need for such an agreement has significantly grown considering implementation by the United States and its allies of their military space programmes to conduct combat operations and achieve military supremacy in outer space. This is the only way to avoid weaponisation of outer space and, consequently, armed conflicts in Earth orbits.
The basis for this is already in place: the draft Treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space objects submitted by Russia and China for consideration by the Conference. In order to give impetus to the relevant international negotiations, together with like-minded counterparts we initiated the establishment of a specialized UN Group of Governmental Experts which is scheduled to begin its work in the second half of this year.
Recently, there have been active attempts not only to devalue previous achievements and developments in this area, but also to formulate some new rules governing, on the terms of the United States and its allies, possible military confrontation in outer space. The ineffective measures proposed by the Western countries within the concept of the so-called "responsible" behaviour in outer space are not capable of solving the main task - to preserve outer space as a zone of common security free from armed confrontation. On the contrary, they will serve as a veil for the accelerated creation of combat capabilities in outer space and their application.
Russia has consistently advocated strengthening of the NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 10th NPT Review Conference was held in August 2022. It resulted without the adoption of a final document. However, it is totally inappropriate to dramatize the situation, rush to pessimistic conclusions and speak of some kind of "NPT crisis". Regardless of the final report, the Treaty is still in force and remains one of the cornerstones of the global international security architecture and non-proliferation regime. The Review Conference clearly demonstrated that the States Parties are committed to preserving the NPT and continue to firmly rely on the principles laid down therein.
The impasse around the CTBT is increasingly worrisome. The responsibility for the fact that in the more than a quarter century of its existence the Treaty has never entered into force lies mainly with the United States, which defiantly refused to ratify it and are clearly intent on resuming testing. We cannot remain indifferent to what is happening. If the United States nevertheless decides to take such a step to be the first to conduct nuclear tests, we will be forced to respond adequately. No one should have the dangerous illusion that global strategic parity can be broken.
We positively assess the results of the three sessions of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Means of Delivery (WMDFZ). It is important that the States of the Middle East are taking the process into their own hands. We expect that Israel will join the process at an early date, as well as the United States, which co-sponsored the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. We are ready to further facilitate negotiations as an observer, to the extent possible.
We stress the need for immediate action to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, first and foremost by resuming work on a legally binding Protocol to the Convention with an effective verification mechanism. We are determined to work constructively within the framework of the new review cycle and mechanisms of the Convention, including in the specialized Working Group being set up.
The demand for these steps is confirmed with particular urgency by the facts of military-biological activities on Ukrainian territory in violation of the BWC with the support of the Pentagon and its affiliated structures, including private companies, which were uncovered during the special military operation. The relevant substantiated questions formally posed by Russia to the US and Ukrainian sides have still not been answered. Such issues remain open and require resolution.
We are deeply concerned about the situation in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Western countries have turned this once very authoritative and strictly technical international structure into a tool for implementing their geopolitical interests in the Middle East and beyond. This concerns, first of all, the West's contrived Syrian "chemical dossier" and the illegitimate "attribution" imposed to the OPCW in violation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC) to determine those responsible for the use of toxic chemicals and chemical warfare agents. The result of the "attribution" initiatives was the decision of the Euro-Atlantic allies at the Conference of States Parties to the CWC in April 2021 to defeat Syria's rights and privileges under the Convention.
The outcome of such destructive activities of the West is a split in the OPCW and the loss of its independent position and credibility as a universally recognized expert structure in the field of chemical disarmament and non-proliferation. We urge the States Parties to the CWC, which are not indifferent to the fate of this once successful disarmament mechanism, to prevent the final degradation of the OPCW.
Distinguished Colleagues,
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) remains a unique and indispensable venue for negotiating multilateral legally binding agreements in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. We believe that its agenda shaped many years ago remains relevant today. The urgency of starting negotiations on some of its items is ever more evident.
We have always supported efforts to seek consensus and make the Conference's work constructive. However, as the recent years have shown, delegations of Western countries are not interested in launching the substantive work of the forum and in fulfilling its negotiating mandate. They are making every effort to obstruct the adoption of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work under far-fetched pretexts, shifting the focus of the CD work to non-core, secondary issues.
Russia will not go along with those who are trying to use the Conference for political purposes and are forcing the consideration of issues that are not within its competence. Together with those States that share this position of principle, we shall continue to seek the adoption of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work that includes the resumption of the negotiations process.
The Russian initiative to draft an international convention to combat acts of chemical and biological terrorism is also aimed at resolving this problem. It is in the interests of all States to strengthen the international legal framework to counter WMD terrorism.
For the sake of the common interests of international security, participants in the Conference should demonstrate the political will to resume negotiating work with a view to strengthening international security.
Thank you.
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