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Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko's interview with Rossiya Segodnya, February 13, 2023

13 February 2023 11:50
253-13-02-2023

Question: President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and President of the PRC Xi Jinping had a videoconference at the end of 2022, during which the Russian President invited his Chinese counterpart to our country for a state visit. Are preparations for this visit underway? When can it take place? On a related note, at what stage are preparations for a visit to Russia by China's new Foreign Minister Qin Gang? Do you expect him to come to Russia in the near future?

Andrey Rudenko: Top-level bilateral dialogue is a foundation for the growing strategic linkage of our countries. The character of our relations determines the high frequency of contacts between the heads of state. Before the pandemic, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping met five times per year on average, both during exchanges of visits and on the sidelines of different events. Last year, due to the unstable Covid-19 situation, they met twice in person- in Olympic Beijing in February and at the SCO summit in Samarkand in September. On December 30, 2022, they held talks via video, during which they discussed the results of their joint work over the year and plans to strengthen the bilateral partnership, including the schedule of upcoming contacts. As soon as the sides make corresponding decisions, we will announce them officially.

Our foreign ministers are also working hard in a rapidly changing international environment. On January 9 of this year, Mr Lavrov had his first telephone conversation with Qin Gang during which he congratulated him on his appointment and invited him to visit our country at a convenient time for both parties. The Chinese Foreign Minister accepted the invitation with gratitude. At present, the foreign ministries of the two countries are looking at options for arranging the first in-person meeting.

There is a mutual desire to expand meetings at other levels as well. Deputy Foreign Minister of China Ma Zhaoxu had substantive consultations during his recent visit to Moscow.

Question: What is Moscow's forecast: Will Russia and China succeed in transferring all oil and gas settlements into yuans this year? What does Moscow think about Beijing's plans to create petroyuan? Will bilateral trade set a record this year?

Andrey Rudenko: The share of national currencies in bilateral transactions with China has been steadily growing in the past few years. This process gained more momentum last year. In the first half of 2022, almost half of our trade with China was conducted in roubles and yuans. In the second half of the past year, this method of settlements continued gaining popularity, in part, among energy companies. Considering the important role played by energy resources in bilateral ties, I have no doubt that the use of national currencies will continue growing, which will enhance the independence of bilateral settlements and, hence, will strengthen national economic security.

We believe both energy suppliers and consumers should have versatile options for trade from which they would be able to choose the most suitable and comfortable ones instead of dealing with a monopoly, for instance, of the dollar. Roubles, yuans and other currencies that are not trying to create artificial obstacles to other countries, can and are already used with success in energy transactions.

In the past few years, we have been setting record after record in our trade and economic cooperation with China. For two years running, our trade increased by one third. According to preliminary data of the Customs Service of Russia, in 2022 it amounted to $183.9 billion. China is solidly first among Russia's major trade partners. In the new year, we are planning to reach a record $200 billion ahead of schedule, our initial plan for 2024, and keep moving at an accelerated pace.

Question: Does Moscow believe that relations with China have gone to a fundamentally new level that should be sealed by a relevant agreement to replace the Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations, Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 2001 and extended until 2026? Has the work on the new document got underway?

Andrey Rudenko: The presidents of Russia and China share the view that relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction between our two countries have reached an unprecedentedly high level. They may be called a model of cooperation between major powers in the 21st century. Our ties are based on a ramified institutional and legal network of cooperation.

In July 2001, Russia and China signed a fundamental Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations, Friendship and Cooperation. This extensive document setting long-term guidelines for bilateral partnership was signed for a term of 20 years. Since then, the treaty played a decisive role in the formation and development of political, trade, economic and humanitarian cooperation between Russia and China.

The experience of the steady deepening of Russia-China cooperation shows that the treaty has stood the test of time. Key provisions of this international legal act laid a foundation for hundreds of bilateral documents. They influenced the development of the legal infrastructure of Russia-China relations with third countries and made a tangible contribution to drafting the conceptual foundations for such prestigious associations as the SCO and BRICS.

We are convinced that the treaty continues helping its signatories to respond to the challenges and threats that arise, creates new effective forms for our interaction and ensures full-scale development of our relations in the current geopolitical situation. We do not see any reason to replace it now. This is why, in celebrating its anniversary in 2021, our presidents unanimously supported the idea of its extension (for another five years).

Question: The DPRK has recently increased the frequency of its missile tests and its drones invaded the airspace of the Republic of Korea. Washington and Seoul are planning large-scale ground exercises. Do these steps increase the risks of armed clashes between North and South Koreas? Can Moscow qualify the actions of the US and South Korea as a transgression of all red lines earlier drawn by Pyongyang? Can North Korea go from threats to the use of tactical nuclear arms in this situation? How will Moscow react, if this scenario starts being implemented?

Andrey Rudenko: Any actions by the armed forces of either Korean state, which the other may qualify as hostile and running counter to the provisions of the inter-Korean military agreement of September 19, 2018, are fraught with response measures and, accordingly, an escalation of tensions. However, for the time being, despite demonstrations of strength and mutual accusations, and, in the case of Seoul, a threatened consideration of a possibility to withdraw from this crucial agreement, neither state is in a hurry to terminate its confidence-building commitments. The latter, specifically, envisage a minimisation of military activities in the buffer zone and the functioning of direct communications lines between the military of the two states.

I believe that in this situation it is inappropriate to fan panic and talk even hypothetically about the use of force on the Korean Peninsula, let alone the use of nuclear weapons. Nobody wants this.

Question: The DPRK reported preparations to launch a military satellite. Can this be regarded as a new step towards escalating the conflict in the region? Does Moscow think that so far there is still a chance to settle the situation in the Korean Peninsula by diplomatic means? Is Russia preparing any new initiatives in this context?

Andrey Rudenko: The DPRK's plans to strengthen its military capacity are a forced response to the unprecedented buildup of sanctions-and-power pressure on Pyongyang by Washington and Seoul. This is a cynical approach because all these attempts to force North Korea to accept a unilateral disarmament contradict the inter-Korean and North Korean-US agreements of 2018. Let me remind you that these agreements directly linked the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula with promoting mutual trust and providing firm security guarantees to Pyongyang.

We hope that strong-arm methods will fail just as they did during the 70 year-long history of the confrontation and that the current trend will inevitably give way to a search for methods of de-escalation and for mutually beneficial security solutions. A multilateral political and diplomatic process aimed at creating a system of peace in North-Eastern Asia remains the most reliable way of reaching strong agreements. This system should take into account the legitimate concerns of all stakeholders and provide reliable mutual security guarantees. We are ready to work toward the resumption of this dialogue as soon as possible.

Question: Although formally Japan has joined the nations supporting the introduction of a price ceiling for Russian oil, in practice Tokyo asked to make an exemption for Sakhalin 2 oil. This being so, is Russia planning to continue its energy supplies to Japan under the Sakhalin 2 project or will it reorient oil and LNG from this project to other markets?

Andrey Rudenko: The Foreign Ministry of Russia has followed closely the Fumio Kishida administration's unfriendly policy towards our country. Depending on Tokyo's further steps, we will recommend relevant countermeasures to the Government of the Russian Federation. As for the implementation of specific energy projects, this issue is being addressed by the related agencies and organisations.

Question: What is Moscow's view on Japan's plans, as reported by the Japanese media, to develop long-range hypersonic guided missiles and deploy them on the Hokkaido and Kyushu islands by 2026? Is this a direct threat to Russia and what could be Moscow's response?

AndreyRudenko: In fact, Japan has recently stepped up in a dramatic way the effort to upgrade its military capacity. It is intensifying dangerous military activities in the vicinity of Russian borders, including its involvement in large-scale military exercises staged jointly with the United States and other countries, and testing new types of missile and conventional weapons.

In this connection, we have repeatedly lodged resolute protests with Japan via diplomatic channels. We will continue to follow closely the events in the area of Japan's military organisational development and immediately retaliate in accordance with Russia's Defence Doctrine, if any potential security threats to the regions of the Russian Far East emerge.

Question: What is the progress on implementing the Soyuz Vostok gas pipeline project designed to run via Mongolia? Have the recent protests in Mongolia influenced the construction plans?

Andrey Rudenko: We attach much importance to implementing the initiative to build a transit pipeline from Russia to China via Mongolia. We proceed from the premise that this important project is mutually beneficial and meets the interests of the three states. The economic operators - Russia's Gazprom is one of them - are still engaged in feasibility studies.

The Mongolian Government has been giving comprehensive support to Russian specialists. The public rallies in December 2022, which were caused by purely domestic political reasons, have had no impact on our collaboration.

Question: Indonesia has invited Russian investors to participate in the construction of its new capital, which will be transferred from Jakarta to the Kalimantan Island. Is Russia ready to accept the offer? If it is, has the practical study of Russia's possible contribution to the project begun and in what areas is it likely? What Russian regions aside from Moscow have shown an interest?

Andrey Rudenko: Implementing the project to relocate the Indonesian capital from Jakarta to the Kalimantan Island, which is still at an early stage, is of much commercial interest. Prospectively, Russian companies and organisations from different sectors could take part in tenders to be announced by Indonesia. Specifically, Russian transport and information and communications contractors might become involved in creating comprehensive infrastructure in the city of Nusantara.

Question: Are the preparations for the annual Putin-Modi summit in progress? Where and when may it take place? Does Moscow hope that this year, the economic cooperation between the two countries will reach a new level? Is Russia planning to continue building up its oil exports to India? How accurate are some Western reports that the Indian market is glutted with Russian oil and that occasionally it sells below cost? When is Russia planning to finish delivering the S-400 systems to India?

Andrey Rudenko: The leaders of our two countries regularly discuss current issues on the bilateral and international agenda. This comparing of notes is held in different formats, when this is dictated by the logic of the special privileged strategic partnership between Russia and India. The two leaders do not need artificial demonstrations of the soundness of Russian-Indian relations - relations based on firm historical and cultural roots, mutual respect, and regard for each other's security interests.

Last year, bilateral trade and economic cooperation was given a powerful impetus. Mutual trade reached $30 billion. Western sanctions against Russia have served as a catalyst for trade with India, accelerating the transition to payments in national currencies and development of a self-reliant transport and financial infrastructure. I am confident that the growth trend will persist into this year as well.

We will continue to export to India as much oil as it needs for its own energy security. Russian energy companies meet these requests within the shortest possible timeframes.

India has not joined the West's "price ceiling" for Russian oil. Therefore, the formation of contract prices for Russian oil shipments to Indian companies is based on market methods, as it should in a civilised economic community. Besides, Russia has repeatedly stated that it will not sell its oil at a loss.

As for military supplies to India, this work follows the schedule and will be completed within the timeframes envisaged by the parties' contractual obligations.