Statement by Konstantin Vorontsov, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, Deputy Director of the Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons on Agenda Item 6 "General Exchange of Views", Geneva, 16 November 2022
16 November 2022 21:41
2372-16-11-2022
Unofficial translation
Mr. Chairperson,
We congratulate you on your appointment to this responsible position and wish you success in your work. You can count on the support of the Russian delegation in your constructive endeavours.
Mr. Chairman, dear colleagues,
In today's world, continued to fever by conflicts, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) is crucial. Its unique place within the entire body of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) cannot be underestimated. The CCW contributes to a significant reduction in civilian casualties by prohibiting the use of weapons that are indiscriminate and cause excessive injury or unnecessary suffering.
The Convention embodies one of the fundamental rules of IHL, namely that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. The scope of the CCW is broad: this international instrument imposes restrictions on the use or bans of a range of conventional weapons. These include mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPMs), incendiary weapons and explosive weapons.
The uniqueness of the Convention consists in the balance between humanitarian concerns and legitimate national security interests, which is ensured through the adoption of consensus decisions. Proper implementation of the provisions of the CCW and its protocols allows us to remove the "concerns" that we regularly hear about in this fora.
We presume that the solution of problems related to the use of conventional weapon can be resolved through good-faith compliance with the provisions of the Convention and its protocols, as well as the wide use of political and diplomatic means of settlement conflict.
The Russian Federation confirms its unwavering commitment to its international obligations. We stand for the full, without any exceptions, implementation of the provisions of the CCW and its annexed protocols. In this context, the goal of its universalization is of particular importance. We note the Chairman's efforts in this field. We propose to maintain a constructive spirit and make every effort to strengthen this unique instrument of IHL. We welcome the finalisation of the intergovernmental procedures by the Philippines for the ratification of Protocol V to the CCW and the accession of Malawi to the Convention as a whole. We urge all states that have not yet done so to join the CCW, including all its protocols.
We have been strictly following the existing Compliance Mechanism of the Convention and its Protocols, including the decision on its consolidation adopted at the Convention's Review Conference (RC) in 2011 (CCW-2011 RC) and reaffirmed at the CCW-2016 RC. We submit our annual reports under the Convention, both in general and under the Amended Protocol II (AP-II) and Protocol V (P-V), in a timely manner.
We strictly comply with CCW Protocol I on Non-Detectable Fragments. We emphasize the need for all UN Member States to join it.
The Russian Federation considers Amended Protocol II (AP-2) as an important element of the CCW that establishes an effective mechanism against the inadequate use of landmines, which for many states are a legitimate and necessary means of ensuring national security. We continue to promote this tool in every possible way and draw attention to the importance of expanding participation in it. We emphasize the strict compliance with the prohibitive and restrictive provisions of this Protocol by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Protocol V (P-5) remains one of the most successfully implemented documents under the Convention.
A tangible contribution to the implementation of AP-2 and P-5 was made by the Russian Armed Forces for mine clearance and clearance from any explosive objects both on our territory and regions abroad, including in Syria, Laos and Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Russian Federation remains open to cooperation in humanitarian mine clearance. Since 2014, the Russian Ministry of Defence has been holding activities for international exchange of military and technical information, as well as international mine action conferences at the International Mine Action Centre. We invite interested States and relevant organizations to participate therein.
The Russian Federation reaffirms its commitment to the obligations under Protocol 3 (P-3) on incendiary weapons. We consider appeals to revise the provisions of this document to be counterproductive, despite the fact that P-3 does not establish a complete ban on the use of this type of weapon, but only severely restricts its use, taking into account the imperative compliance with specific IHL norms. We presume that its «opening» do not help consolidate the Convention. Therefore, we see no reason to single out P-3 in a separate discussion within the CCW.
In order to achieve greater efficiency in the implementation of the Convention and strengthening of its regime, the Sixth Review Conference of the CCW (RC; December 13-17, 2021) confirmed the prioritization of our work in the framework of the review cycle in 2022-2026. Thus, the absence of a separate agenda item for MOTAPM under the Convention reflects the real state of affairs. We also consider untenable the calls for to introduce the issues of the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA) within the CCW, since their application is already sufficiently regulated by the norms of IHL, primarily Additional Protocol I of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Besides, we also have doubts concerning the EWIPA complying with the subject of the Convention. This topic rather needs to be discussed on the venues where the implementation of IHL provisions is considered.
At the same time, the issue of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) apparently seems to be elaborated further on. We support the consideration thereof under AP-II in accordance with objectives and purposes of the CCW.
We reaffirm our readiness to continue discussions on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) within the relevant Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) as an optimal platform based on the mandate adopted by the Sixth CCW RC and the principle of consensus. We believe that the existing rules of international law can be fully applied to LAWS and do not need to be adapted to take into account the specific features of these weapons systems. We stand for 10 days in in-person format for the GGE sessions in 2023. We believe it will be enough because this sufficiency was clearly confirmed by the discussions of previous years.
We welcome the adoption by the Sixth CCW RC of consolidated financial measures designed to ensure the long-term and sustainable functioning of the Convention. We are still in a position that the full timely contributions made by all States Parties to the Convention would address best the CCW financial problems. We call upon all countries to fulfil their relevant commitments. We note with satisfaction that the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) is completely formed in accordance with the relevant decision of the CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties in 2009.We are in favour of ensuring priority financing for the staff contracts of the ISU. We are open to substantive discussions on further possible ways to improve the financial situation of the Convention.
Thank you for your attention.
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