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26 February 2002

CIA Report Says Russian Nuclear Security Improving but 'Risks Remain'

(Annual report to Congress warns of need to adapt to new threats)
(5370)
A new U.S. intelligence report says security at Russian nuclear
facilities is improving, but it also warns that Russian nuclear
authorities may not be adapting to meet newer security threats.
While secure from traditional threats, Russian nuclear facilities are
not designed to counter the "pre-eminent" threat faced currently --
insiders who steal weapons-grade materials, the report says.
Additionally "our concerns about possible circumvention of the
[Russian nuclear security] system would rise if central political
authority broke down," says the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
unclassified report released February 22. This scenario is considered
more likely under the current environment than an unauthorized or
accidental launch of a Russian nuclear weapon, the report said.
The National Intelligence Council, an analytical group that reports to
CIA Director George Tenet, prepared the annual report to Congress.
"Weapons-grade and weapons-usable nuclear materials have been stolen
from some Russian institutes," the CIA report says. "We assess that
undetected smuggling has occurred, although we do not know the extent
or magnitude of such thefts."
In the past six years Moscow has recognized the need for nuclear
security improvements, the report said, and with assistance from the
United States and other countries has taken steps to reduce the risk
of theft. The United States assists Russia through its Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program and the U.S. Department of Energy's Material
Protection, Control and Accounting Program.
Russia uses physical, procedural and technical measures to secure its
weapons against an external threat, the report said. "But many of
these measures date from the Soviet era and are not designed to
counter the pre-eminent threat faced today -- an insider who attempts
unauthorized actions," it said.
While Moscow has maintained adequate security and control over its
nuclear weapons, its security system is heavily stressed as a result
of declining military funding, the report said.
"Moscow will continue to devote scarce resources to maintaining its
nuclear forces. Nevertheless, the aging of Russia's strategic systems
and [Russian President Vladimir] Putin's military reform plan to shift
resources to the general purpose forces probably will result in Russia
having fewer than 2,000 strategic warheads by 2015," the report said.
It adds that Russia will continue to maintain several thousand
nonstrategic, or tactical, nuclear warheads because of concern over
its deteriorating conventional capabilities.
Following is the text of the CIA report:
(begin text)
Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian
Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces
February 2002
Scope Note
Congress has directed the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) to
submit to the Congressional leadership and intelligence committees an
annual, unclassified report assessing the safety and security of the
nuclear facilities and military forces in Russia. Congress further
asked that each report include a discussion of the following:
-- The ability of the Russian Government to maintain its nuclear
military forces.
-- The security arrangements at Russia's civilian and military nuclear
facilities.
-- The reliability of controls and safety systems at Russia's civilian
nuclear facilities.
-- The reliability of command and control systems and procedures of
the nuclear military forces in Russia.
This annual report is the third responding to this Congressional
request. The report addresses facilities and forces of the Russian
Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Atomic Energy, and other Russian
institutes. It updates the September 2000 report to Congress.
This paper has been prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs.
Key Points
Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian
Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces
Moscow will continue to devote scarce resources to maintaining its
nuclear forces. Nevertheless, the aging of Russia's strategic systems
and Putin's military reform plan to shift resources to the general
purpose forces probably will result in Russia having fewer than 2,000
strategic warheads by 2015. Even with ongoing reductions, Moscow
probably will retain several thousand nonstrategic nuclear warheads in
its inventory because of concerns over its deteriorating conventional
capabilities.
Russia employs physical, procedural, and technical measures to secure
its weapons against an external threat, but many of these measures
date from the Soviet era and are not designed to counter the
pre-eminent threat faced today -- an insider who attempts unauthorized
actions.
-- Moscow has maintained adequate security and control of its nuclear
weapons, but a decline in military funding has stressed the nuclear
security system. An unauthorized launch or accidental use of a Russian
nuclear weapon is highly unlikely as long as current technical and
procedural safeguards built into the command and control system remain
in place and are effectively enforced. Our concerns about possible
circumvention of the system would rise if central political authority
broke down.
Security varies widely among the different types of Ministry of Atomic
Energy (Minatom) facilities and other Russian institutes.
-- Russian facilities housing weapons-usable nuclear material --
uranium enriched to 20 percent or greater in uranium-235 or
uranium-233 isotopes and any plutonium containing less than 80 percent
of the isotope plutonium-238 -- typically receive low funding, lack
trained security personnel, and do not have sufficient equipment for
securely storing such material.
Weapons-grade and weapons-usable nuclear materials have been stolen
from some Russian institutes. We assess that undetected smuggling has
occurred, although we do not know the extent or magnitude of such
thefts. Nevertheless, we are concerned about the total amount of
material that could have been diverted over the last 10 years.
-- In 1992, 1.5 kilograms of 90-percent-enriched weapons-grade uranium
were stolen from the Luch Production Association.
-- In 1994, 3.0 kilograms of 90-percent-enriched weapons-grade uranium
were stolen in Moscow.
-- In 1999, we confirmed that nuclear material seized in Bulgaria was
weapons-usable. The material-four grams of highly enriched
uranium-likely originated in Russia.
-- Although not independently confirmed, reports of a theft in 1998
from an unnamed enterprise in Chelyabinsk Oblast are of concern.
According to Viktor Yerastov, chief of Minatom's Nuclear Materials
Accounting and Control Department, the amount stolen was "quite
sufficient material to produce an atomic bomb" -- the only nuclear
theft that has been so described.
Over the last six years, Moscow has recognized the need for security
improvements and, with assistance from the United States and other
countries, has taken steps to reduce the risk of theft.
-- On their own initiative in 1999, 2000, and in mid-summer 2001,
Russian authorities ordered increased security at nuclear facilities
due to concerns about a reported increased terrorist threat as a
result of Moscow's campaign in Chechnya, according to official
statements and media reporting.
-- Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States,
Russian officials, including President Putin, have conducted a public
campaign to provide assurances that terrorists have not acquired
Russian nuclear weapons.
Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the U.S.
Department of Energy's Material Protection, Control, and Accounting
Program, the United States continues to assist Russia in improving
security at nuclear facilities. Russia's nuclear security has been
slowly improving over the last several years, but risks remain.
Russia has announced plans to more than double its capacity to
generate nuclear power over the next 20 years and to begin
construction of reactors with enhanced safety features. Since July
2001, Russian media have reported increased security measures at a
number of nuclear power plants. Even with increased security measures,
however, such plants almost certainly will remain vulnerable to a
well-planned and executed terrorist attack.
-- After the September terrorist attacks in the United States,
Minister of Atomic Energy Rumyantsev reported that Russian nuclear
power facilities are protected by special guards patrolling around the
clock in addition to national defense forces. An official of
Rosenergoatom reported on 12 September 2001 that security services at
the nuclear power plants already were working a "harsh regime" because
of the continuing military actions in Chechnya and that additional
security measures were not necessary.
Discussion
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the security environment
surrounding nuclear weapons and materials in Russia has changed
radically. Security measures in both the Ministries of Defense (MOD)
and Atomic Energy (Minatom) during the Soviet era were aimed at
preventing the external or outsider threat; it was virtually
unthinkable that an insider would attempt to steal a nuclear weapon or
nuclear material. In contrast, the deterioration of the Russian
economy, state security apparatus, and military has resulted in an
entirely new security environment -- one in which concern about an
insider threat predominates. The Russians have reacted to this new
threat by instituting some new security procedures at their nuclear
facilities, including instituting polygraph examinations.
Over the last three years, we have seen Moscow elevate its concern
about the security of its nuclear weapons and materials. Russian
authorities ordered increased security due to concerns over a growing
terrorist threat resulting from Moscow's campaign in Chechnya,
according to official statements and media reporting.
-- In November 2000, the Russian Government instructed Minatom and
other federal executive agencies to implement additional measures to
step up the physical security of nuclear installations, including
modernizing security systems. Minatom -- along with the MOD, the
Federal Security Service, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs -- was
to evaluate external and internal threats to nuclear installations and
develop physical security enhancements.
-- In addition, immediately following the September terrorist attacks
in the United States, Russian President Putin called for the Russian
military and security services to heighten security, according to
Russian media.
The United States is working cooperatively with Moscow to increase the
safety and security of nuclear-related facilities, infrastructure, and
personnel. The Russian MOD is responsible for the nuclear military
forces and its nuclear weapons storage system. Minatom operates the
national nuclear weapons complex, conducts weapons-related tests at
the MOD's nuclear test site, and controls most nuclear-related
institutes and industrial facilities. Minatom and Rosenergoatom
operate Russia's nuclear power reactors.
-- The U.S. Department of Defense, through the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) Program, is assisting MOD and Minatom.
-- The U.S. Department of Energy, through the Material Protection,
Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Program, exchanges between the U.S.
national laboratories and Russian components, and the Nuclear Cities
Initiative, is providing security assistance to Minatom;
Rosenergoatom; the Russian Navy; Gosatomnadzor (GAN); and the
Ministries of Interior, Education, and Economy.
Ministry of Defense
Nuclear Weapons Inventory
Moscow currently maintains fewer than 5,000 operational strategic
nuclear warheads in its strategic nuclear triad, which is composed of
ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers carrying nuclear-tipped
air-launched cruise missiles. Despite the emphasis on nuclear weapons
as Russia's primary means of deterrence, Russian strategic nuclear
forces are subject to the same significant budget constraints
affecting other portions of the government. The strategic forces will
face additional budget cuts, resulting in lower strategic warhead
levels, because Putin's military reform plan will shift resources to
the general purpose forces. Nevertheless, Moscow continues to devote
scarce resources to maintaining and modernizing its forces.
-- Russian officials have claimed publicly that the harsh economic
realities and aging of strategic systems will drive their strategic
forces down to fewer than 2,000 warheads. Russia has increased efforts
in recent years to extend the service lives of most strategic systems
in order to maintain as many warheads as possible.
-- Until recently, one of Russia's highest military priorities has
been the deployment of its most modern ICBM, the SS-27/Topol'-M.
Twenty single-warhead SS-27s were deployed by the end of 1999. Russia
planned to deploy ten additional missiles by the end of 2000, but only
half were deployed. Deputy Prime Minister Klebanov said last October
that Russia would deploy a minimum of six missiles annually over the
next decade.
Nuclear Warhead Security
The Russians have maintained security and control of their nuclear
warheads and weapons, although the economic crisis of the 1990s and
the consequent decline in military funding have stressed the country's
nuclear security system.
-- Russia currently uses essentially the same nuclear command and
control system built by the Soviet Union, whose military and political
leaders-concerned about the possibility of an unauthorized
launch-built a highly centralized system with technical and procedural
safeguards. We judge that an unauthorized launch or accidental use of
a Russian nuclear weapon is highly unlikely as long as those
safeguards remain in place. A breakdown of central political
authority, however, would raise our concerns about possible
circumvention of the system.
-- Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow has consolidated
all nuclear weapons of the former Soviet stockpile into storage sites
in Russia. We assess that by June 1992, the last of the former Soviet
tactical nuclear warheads were withdrawn to Russia, and that by the
end of 1996, the last of the strategic nuclear warheads had been
removed from Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus.
Russian officials have stated that thousands of nuclear warheads from
the former Soviet stockpile have been dismantled since 1991;
reportedly over 10,000 warheads have been eliminated.
-- Bilateral agreements between Ukraine and Russia called for the
elimination of some 4,500 nuclear warheads -- both nonstrategic and
strategic -- that were once stored on the territory of Ukraine.
Ukrainian officials reportedly monitored the disassembly of these
nuclear warheads at the Russian dismantlement facilities. Press
reports indicate that the Ukrainian nuclear warheads were eliminated
by 2000.
Moscow is significantly reducing its nonstrategic nuclear stockpile.
In October 1991, then-Soviet President Gorbachev, responding to a US
presidential initiative, announced that the Soviet Union would
unilaterally consolidate most of its nonstrategic nuclear warheads in
central depots and would eliminate a major portion of them. In January
1992, President [Boris] Yeltsin publicly reaffirmed Gorbachev's
announcement. Although Russia has taken some actions to fulfill these
pledges, Moscow-because of concerns over deteriorating conventional
capabilities-probably will retain several thousand nonstrategic
nuclear warheads through at least 2015.
Physical Security. To secure their weapons, the Russians employ a
multi-layered approach that includes physical, procedural, and
technical measures. The security system was designed in the Soviet era
to protect weapons primarily against a threat from outside the country
and may not be sufficient to meet today's challenge of a knowledgeable
insider collaborating with a criminal or terrorist group.
General-Colonel Igor Valynkin, chief of the 12th Main Directorate of
the Ministry of Defense (12th GUMO) -- the organization responsible
for warhead storage, maintenance, and logistics -- stated in August
2000 that there have been no incidents of attempted theft, seizure, or
unauthorized actions involving nuclear weapons.
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States,
President Putin and Valynkin have conducted a public campaign to
provide assurances that terrorists have not acquired Russian nuclear
weapons.
-- Valynkin announced on 25 October that security had been stepped up
at Russian nuclear weapons storage sites since the attacks on the
United States. He also noted that security had been heightened earlier
in the year after Russian authorities had twice thwarted terrorist
efforts to reconnoiter nuclear weapons storage sites. Valynkin stated
that none of the terrorists entered the nuclear weapons sites.
-- At a subsequent press conference on 27 October, Valynkin was
adamant that no Russian nuclear weapons had been stolen and described
such allegations as "barking mad." He reiterated that nuclear warhead
personnel are subject to psychological, lie detector, drug, and
alcohol testing.
-- In a 10 November interview, President Putin said he was "absolutely
confident" that terrorists in Afghanistan do not have Soviet or
Russian weapons of mass destruction.
Over the last six years, Moscow has recognized the need for security
improvements and, with U.S. assistance, has taken steps to reduce the
risk of theft. We judge that nuclear security would improve over time
if Russia routinely implemented security upgrades and procedures under
U.S.-funded threat reduction programs. Some of the key U.S.-funded
security upgrade programs include:
-- Perimeter security upgrades around nuclear storage sites, including
fences, sensors, and alarms.
-- Computers to automate the warhead inventory management system.
-- Transportation upgrades to railcars and the provision of super
containers and Kevlar blankets for shipment of warheads to increase
their protection from small-arms fire.
-- Training and equipment for Emergency Response Teams for nuclear
accidents.
Valynkin has admitted that a lack of domestic funding has made Russia
dependent on foreign assistance for physical security upgrades.
Quoting Valynkin, an August 2000 press report stated that the United
States is financing the procurement of security systems for the MOD.
The newspaper also described Valynkin as troubled because only a third
of the new equipment had been put into service due to funding
shortages. Despite the lack of funds, however, the chief of the MOD's
Special Construction Troops reported in December 2000 that security
enhancements were being completed at dozens of nuclear facilities.
Even with the enhancements, security problems may still exist at the
nuclear weapons storage sites. In August 2001, an anonymous military
officer claimed in a Russian television program interview that
security was lax at 12th GUMO sites. The officer outlined a number of
problems at the storage sites, including charges that there are
personnel shortages and that alarms systems operate only 50 percent of
the time. The officer speculated that a terrorist organization could
seize a nuclear warhead.
Personnel Reliability. Much like other parts of the military, the
Strategic Rocket Forces and the 12th GUMO have also suffered from wage
arrears as well as shortages of food and housing allowances. In 1997,
the 12th GUMO closed a nuclear weapons storage site due to hunger
strikes by the workers; in 1998, families of several nuclear units
protested over wage and benefit arrears. According to Russian press,
the MOD addressed most of the arrears by early 1999, and wages are now
paid regularly. Even when paid, however, officers' wages rarely exceed
$70 a month and wives cannot earn a second income because the storage
sites are usually located far from cities, according to the anonymous
12th GUMO officer.
-- Housing for 12th GUMO personnel is of poor quality or nonexistent.
According to the Chief of Staff of the 12th GUMO, there are 9,500
homeless active duty and retired officers. The poor living conditions
of the officers -- who contend with lack of heating, leaky plumbing,
and deteriorating buildings -- have been reported by Russian press.
Moscow has acknowledged the potential vulnerability of its nuclear
security personnel. In October 1998, General Valynkin referenced
serious incidents that had occurred at some of his subordinate
facilities and stated that more stringent selection criteria for
nuclear warhead personnel would be used. Speaking at a press
conference concerning US CTR funding in February 1999, Valynkin
acknowledged, "the greatest problem is the person who works with
nuclear warheads. He knows the secrets, he has the access, he knows
the security system."
-- Valynkin emphasized that personnel are thoroughly screened for
links to the crime world and for their suitability to work with
warheads.
-- He added that the 12th GUMO would be using U.S. CTR-provided
polygraph equipment and drug and alcohol tests to monitor the
reliability of its personnel. In May 2000, Valynkin stated that two
students at the 12th GUMO's Security Assessment Training Center were
expelled as a result of the drug tests.
-- Valynkin also reported in May 2000 that the MOD is changing warhead
transport security operations by using officers rather than enlisted
personnel because across the entire MOD, during that month alone,
seven sentries had left their posts.
Ministry of Atomic Energy
Nuclear Materials Security
Russian officials recognize the need to improve the security of
weapons-usable nuclear materials that we assess are stored in over 300
buildings at over 40 facilities across the country. After a cabinet
meeting on the topic in September 2000, Prime Minister Kasyanov stated
publicly that protection of fissile materials varies from place to
place and that in some cases the material is endangered. At the same
press conference, a Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy noted that
reported attempts to steal fissile materials had dropped significantly
in recent years. He said that whereas there were 21 such reports from
1991 to 1994, there were only two from 1995 to 1999. The Deputy
Minister also criticized Western press reports for exaggerating the
problem.
-- Minatom officials provided no details about the incidents and have
not subsequently provided updated data for 2000 and 2001. There have
been, however, a number of press reports about materials seized in
Russia about which we have no further information because Russia
typically does not reveal the results of its investigations.
Press reports, in fact, generally overstate the impact of stolen
material, often referring to or implying that depleted, natural, or
low-enriched uranium are weapons-grade or weapons-usable material.[1]
-- Weapons-usable material is defined as uranium enriched to 20
percent or greater in the uranium-235 or uranium-233 isotopes (highly
enriched uranium-HEU) and any plutonium containing less than 80
percent of the isotope plutonium-238.
-- Weapons-grade material is typically defined as uranium enriched to
greater than 90 percent uranium-235 or uranium-233, or plutonium-239
containing less than 6 percent plutonium-240.
Russian institutes have lost weapons-grade and weapons-usable nuclear
materials in thefts.
-- In 1992, 1.5 kilograms of 90-percent-enriched weapons-grade uranium
were stolen from the Luch Production Association.
-- In 1994, 3.0 kilograms of 90-percent-enriched weapons-grade uranium
were stolen in Moscow.
-- In 1999, we confirmed that a Bulgarian seizure of nuclear material
was weapons-usable. The material-four grams of HEU-likely originated
in Russia.
-- Although not independently confirmed, reports of a theft in 1998
from an unnamed enterprise in Chelyabinsk Oblast are of concern.
According to Viktor Yerastov, chief of Minatom's Nuclear Materials
Accounting and Control Department, the amount stolen was "quite
sufficient material to produce an atomic bomb" -- the only nuclear
theft that has been so described.
The reduction in seizures of stolen material and in reported theft
attempts may be due to several factors: U.S. assistance to improve
security at Russian facilities, a possible decrease in smuggling, or
smugglers becoming more knowledgeable about evading detection. We
assess that undetected smuggling has occurred, although we do not know
the extent or magnitude of undetected thefts. Nevertheless, we are
concerned about the total amount of material that could have been
diverted over the last 10 years.
Efforts To Improve Physical Security and Safeguards. Prior to DOE
assistance to enhance safeguards and security, Russian MPC&A practices
did not meet internationally accepted standards. Russian facilities
housing nuclear materials typically receive low funding, lack trained
security personnel, and do not have sufficient equipment for securely
storing nuclear materials. The DOE-administered MPC&A program, as well
as other programs, is assisting the former Soviet states to upgrade
safeguards (accountability and control) over nuclear materials and
physical security at a wide range of nuclear facilities. For example:
-- A U.S.-funded computer system to handle inventory reporting to
Minatom headquarters began to come on-line at pilot facilities in
mid-2001 and will require officials to track materials closely to
better assure timely detection in the event of a loss or diversion.
-- The U.S. Department of Defense is helping Russia to build a
state-of-the-art storage facility for long-term secure storage of
plutonium and HEU from dismantled nuclear weapons.
-- Russia and the United States have broadened their cooperative work
to include securing Russian Navy highly enriched uranium reactor fuel
at three naval land-based storage sites.
-- The United States is purchasing 500 MT of HEU -- $12 billion
[$12,000 million] over a 20-year period -- which Russia is blending
down into low-enriched uranium suitable for use in nuclear power
reactors.
-- A new DOE/Minatom effort seeks to convert highly enriched uranium
to low enriched uranium under the MPC&A Program's Material
Consolidation and Conversion initiative.
-- DOE has implemented a sustainability program to assist with
maintenance, training, and operation of the upgraded physical security
systems in response to Russian budgetary problems and potential
neglect of equipment.
In mid-2001 DOE reported that by the end of FY 2001 "comprehensive"
security upgrades would have expanded to cover an estimated 21 percent
of Russia's weapons-usable nuclear material, and that if facilities
protected by "rapid upgrades" were added, the percentage would
increase to 48.[2] When the upgrades currently underway are completed,
the portion of material with improved security will increase to
approximately 65 percent. Progress is most advanced at civilian
institutes and Russian Navy sites, and lags at Minatom facilities
within the nuclear weapons complex -- which contain most of the
material of proliferation interest -- because Russian security
concerns prevent direct U.S. access to sensitive materials.
-- The progress at civilian and naval sites addresses key
vulnerabilities because seizures involving HEU and separated plutonium
have been linked to these locations rather than nuclear weapons
assembly/disassembly plants.
-- Russia's nuclear MPC&A has been slowly improving over the last
several years, but risks remain.
Economics and Personnel Reliability. Even after technical
modernization, security for weapons-usable nuclear material depends
largely on the diligence, competence, and morale of personnel who
monitor systems and guard material and facilities and on managers who
must emphasize security over production. Programs to improve physical
security, accountability, and training could be undermined by
disgruntled Russian personnel or unreceptive managers and employees.
Because of improvements in the national economy, Russia and Minatom
are now able to pay personnel on time. Thus, for now, compensation and
benefits appear adequate, and personnel no longer face the financial
pressures of the late 1990s that might have led some to permit or
actively participate in weapons-usable nuclear material theft.
Convenience and pressure to produce also can contribute to lapses in
security. U.S. Government Accounting Office auditors noted in their
February 2001 report that, at one facility, a gate in a fence emplaced
with U.S. aid around a weapons-usable nuclear material storage
building was routinely left open and unguarded during the day. Russian
officials explained that it was simply too much trouble for the
employees to open and close the combination lock repeatedly as they
entered and left the building. This practice, however, undermined
control of access and meant that the only security measures in effect
were the perimeter fence and guards at the facility.
Safety at Russian Nuclear Material Processing Facilities
Russian HEU facilities have at least three levels of contamination
control.
-- Level one denotes an area of essentially no contamination.
-- Level two denotes an area of lower contamination where personnel
are required to wear protective clothing and masks, but extensive
monitoring is not required. Such areas include oxide purification,
calcining, container storage, and fluorination.
-- Level three denotes an area of high contamination that requires
protective clothing and masks, and requires extensive monitoring to
reduce the spread of contamination. Such areas include metal machining
and oxidation.
The monitoring of personnel radiation safety is also a multi-layered
process.
-- Workers and visitors are required to wear the standard Russian
particulate control mask while in nuclear facilities. In addition,
shoes and protective clothing (hats, gloves, lab coats, and in the
chemical metallurgical areas full body protective clothing) are
provided.
-- Radiation dosimeters are available and generally are used by
Russians and visitors to their plants. Radiation- monitoring devices
mounted along the walls are present in areas of HEU operations, along
with air-sampling ports.
-- Personnel and visitors are required to wash their hands when
leaving contaminated areas; then both hands and feet are checked by an
alpha radiation detector.
Another safety program is criticality safety -- the process
established to prevent the initiation of self-sustaining nuclear chain
reaction. There are two main types of controls used to prevent
criticality accidents: administrative controls and physical controls.
-- Administrative controls refer to a series of rules and regulations
that limit how much material may be in a specific type of container or
location to prevent a critical mass from forming.
-- Physical controls -- such as the use of specially sized and
configured pipes or designated storage locations that ensure proper
spacing -- are designed to separate fissile material and prevent a
critical mass.
Russian nuclear facilities predominantly use physical controls, which
are the more stringent and secure of the two types of controls,
although we question whether they routinely follow their own rules.
Safety and Security at Russian Civilian Nuclear Power Plants
Russia has announced plans to more than double its capacity to
generate nuclear power over the next 20 years, to begin construction
of reactors with enhanced safety features, and to restart its
long-dormant fast breeder reactor program. The funding has not yet
been allocated. To fulfill the plan, Russia will have to extend the
lives of the first-generation plants, which presents some risk to the
safety of individuals living near them.
-- Russian RBMK and VVER-440 and -1000 reactors are aging and seven
first-generation Russian nuclear power reactors will reach the end of
their service lives within the next five years.
-- A major continuing problem for the Russian nuclear power industry
is the failure of its customers to pay for electricity, which has
contributed to a lack of resources for maintenance, spare parts, and
salaries.
Western assistance has been improving the safety systems and operating
procedures at Soviet-designed nuclear reactors. However, inherent
design deficiencies in RBMK and older model VVER reactors will prevent
them from ever meeting Western safety standards.
-- The Most notable design flaw is the lack of Western-style
containment structure to prevent the release of fission products in
the event of a serious accident.
-- Other serious design shortcomings include poor fire safety and
undersized emergency core cooling systems.
-- Another potential disastrous flaw in the VVER reactors is the
susceptibility of its reactor pressure vessels to become brittle
because of radiation, thermal changes, and mechanical vibrations. This
gradual loss of malleability, which particularly affects the welds,
could cause the container to crack and rupture, especially during an
emergency shutdown when the vessel is suddenly filled with
comparatively cold water.
After the September terrorist attacks in the United States, Minister
of Atomic Energy Aleksandr Rumyantsev reported that Russian nuclear
power facilities are protected by special guards patrolling around the
clock in addition to national defense forces. A Rosenergoatom official
reported on 12 September 2001 that security services at the nuclear
power plants are already working a "harsh regime" because of the
continuing military actions in Chechnya and that additional security
measures were not necessary. Since July, Russian media have reported
increased security measures at a number of plants:
-- The Voronezh Oblast decided to reinforce security at the
Novovoronezh nuclear power plant. The Main Directorate of Internal
Affairs of the Oblast was to coordinate with the Federal Security
Service to ensure adequate protection of the plant's perimeter, and
trees and vegetation around the plant were to be cut down.
-- An exercise was conducted at the Volgodonsk nuclear power plant to
practice preventing a terrorist act. The exercise involved plant
personnel and units from the power ministries.
-- The Kola nuclear power station stepped up security. Internal troops
were continually patrolling the perimeter, additional checkpoints had
been set up, and armored personnel carriers were available to respond
to a call.
-- In Rostov, an FSB spokesman said his agency and other law
enforcement officials had learned of possible extremist threats to
nuclear installations in the region and were enhancing protection of
the nuclear power plant.
Even with increased security, however, Russian nuclear power plants
almost certainly will remain vulnerable to a well-planned and executed
terrorist attack.
[1] In contrast, non-weapons-grade nuclear material thefts,
particularly containers of radionuclides such as cesium-137 or
strontium-90, have been frequent and well documented. Terrorists could
use these radionuclides to build a radiological dispersal device
(RDD). An RDD is defined as a device designed to disperse radioactive
material to cause injury and contamination by means of the radiation.
Reportedly, Chechen terrorists placed a container holding a small
amount of cesium-137 in a Moscow Park in November 1995. Remarking on
this event, General Dudayev, the former leader of the Chechen
independence movement, stated "[this] is just a scant portion of the
radioactive substances which we have at our disposal."
[2] "Rapid upgrades" include items such as baseline item inventories,
locks, delay blocks, steel cages, limiting access, and hardening
windows. "Comprehensive upgrades" include rapid upgrades plus
detection systems, closed-circuit television monitoring and assessment
systems, material measurement equipment, and computerized accounting
systems.
(end text)
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