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    CMAT NUMBER 1998159-0000031
    --------------------------- 
    SERIAL: DSA 129-90
    BODY
    SUBJ: IRAQ: NAVAL THREAT TO US FORCES.
    D01: 13 AUG 90
    MAJOR POINTS
    1. THE PRIMARY THREAT POSED TO US FORCES BY THE IRAQI NAVY
    COMES FROM ITS EXTENSIVE INVENTORY OF NAVAL MINES.
    2. IRAQI MISSILE-ARMED PATROL BOATS, INCLUDING THOSE
    CAPTURED FROM KUWAIT, MISSILE-EQUIPPED NAVAL HELICOPTERS, AND
    COASTAL DEFENSE MISSILES PRESENT A LESSER THREAT.
    3. STYX, EXOCET, AND SILKWORM MISSILES CURRENTLY CONSTITUTE
    THE INVENTORY AVAILABLE TO IRAQI NAVAL FORCES.
    DISCUSSION
    4.  IRAQ HAS A DIVERSE INVENTORY OF MOORED-CONTACT AND
    BOTTOM-INFLUENCE MINES ACQUIRED FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES. IT
    ADDITIONALLY MAY INDIGENOUSLY PRODUCE BOTH TYPES OF MINES, BY
    REVERSE ENGINEERING THEM FROM FOREIGN MODELS. ALTHOUGH THE IRAQI
    NAVY DOES NOT HAVE A SOPHISTICATED MINE WARFARE DOCTRINE OR
    DEDICATED MINELAYING PLATFORMS, PRACTICALLY ANY SHIP CAN CARRY AND
    DEPLOY MINES. IRAQ CAN ALSO USE HELICOPTERS IN THIS ROLE. THE
    IRAQI LEADERSHIP UNDOUBTEDLY RECOGNIZED THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IRANIAN
    MINING DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, AND IT MAY MINE GCC PORTS,
    SHIPPING LANES, OR OPERATING AREAS OF US NAVAL FORCES IF HOSTILITIES
    ERUPT. WHILE THE CRUDE IRANIAN MOORED-CONTACT MINES WERE EASILY
    NEUTRALIZED ONCE LOCATED, IRAQI BOTTOM-INFLUENCE MINES PRESENT A FAR
    MORE DIFFICULT PROBLEM FOR US AND ALLIED MINE COUNTERMEASURE (MCM)
    FORCES.
    5.     THE IRAQI SURFACE THREAT CONSISTS OF NINE AGING OSA I/II 
    PATROL BOATS ARMED WITH THE SSN-2A/B (STYX) MISSILE; THE MISSILE HAS
    A RANGE 25 NM. THESE BOATS ARE POORLY MAINTAINED, AND THE NUMBER OF
    MISSION-CAPABLE UNITS IS UNKNOWN.
    6.     IRAQI OSA'S DO NOT TRAIN FOR ANY TYPE OF TACTICAL
    SCENARIO AND HAVE NOT FIRED A STYX MISSILE SINCE THE EARLY 1980'S.
    THEIR ABILITY TO CLOSE AND SUCCESSFULLY ENGAGE US WARSHIPS IS
    SUSPECT.
                           HOWEVER, EVEN IF IRAQ HAS ACQUIRED THE
    MORE ADVANCED STYX, THE NAVY HAS NEVER PRACTICED OVER-THE-HORIZON
    TARGETING AND WILL PROBABLY BE LIMITED TO LINE-OF-SIGHT ENGAGEMENTS.
    7.     DURING THE FIRST DAYS OF ITS INVASION, IRAQ CAPTURED 6
    EXOCET-EQUIPPED KUWAITI PATROL BOATS (1 LURSSEN FPB-57 AND 5 LURSSEN
    TNC-45'S), AND A CACHE OF MORE THAN 100 MM-40 EXCOCET MISSILES. THE
    NAVY IS APPARENTLY OPERATING AT LEAST ONE OF THE TNC-45'S, BUT ITS
    ABILITY TO SUCCESSFULLY FIRE AN EXOCET IN COMBAT IS DOUBTFUL, GIVEN
    THE NAVY'S GENERAL LACK OF PROFICIENCY AND ITS UNFAMILIARITY WITH
    THE SYSTEM. NONETHELESS, THE THREAT POSED BY THE CAPTURED KUWAITI
    BOATS SHOULD NOT BE DISCOUNTED.
    8.     IRAQ CURRENTLY HAS CSSC-3 SILKWORM COASTAL DEFENSE
    MISSILES DEPLOYED TO TWO SITES, AL FAW IN EASTERN IRAQ AND RAS AL
    QULAYAH NAVAL BASE IN KUWAIT. THESE SITES COVER BOTH THE IRAQI AND
    KUWAITI COASTLINES AND ARE INTENDED TO DEFEND AGAINST THE APPROACH
    OF ALLIED WARSHIPS AND A US AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT.    

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