Analysis: Mixed Signals on an Atomic Iran
Council on Foreign Relations
February 11, 2008
Author: Greg Bruno
David Kay, a veteran weapons inspector who led the Iraq Survey Group in 2003, sees the NIE as an irresponsible document with contradictory conclusions. “I came away from this really, deeply concerned about the process of writing national intelligence assessments,” Kay tells CFR.org in a new interview. He says the “high confidence” determination that Iran “halted its nuclear-weapons program” was “frightening” and poorly conceived. Equally confounding for experts has been the intelligence community’s unwillingness to back away from its assertions. Testifying to the Senate Intelligence Committee on February 5, Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell defended the intelligence estimate but acknowledged that, if given the chance, he “would change the way that we described nuclear program.” The Wall Street Journal termed the admission “a reversal of the previous judgment”; Israeli and British press have been equally dumbfounded.
The administration’s careful diplomatic language stands in stark contrast to the depiction by some reporters, like the New Yorker’s Seymour M. Hersh, that it has been gearing up for a military strike on Iranian nuclear facilities.
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Copyright 2008 by the Council on Foreign Relations. This material is republished on GlobalSecurity.org with specific permission from the cfr.org. Reprint and republication queries for this article should be directed to cfr.org.
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