Secondly, there are countries in the world who are looking forward to India to give the leadership. Here lies our criticism. The U.S. is putting pressure on the question of TRIPS and other things and on the floor of this House, the question was raised on 15th July. The Government of India might have received some communication from the Government of the United States saying: "If you do not fulfil such and such conditions vis-a-vis WTO within this timeframe, we shall be compelled to take such steps." What is this? This is simple armtwisting that if you do not react or act on that sphere, they would take such steps. They are all related to CTBT. CTBT and armtwisting in relation to Patents are never isolated. Such pressures are continuing. But this is a different world. Some people say that it is a unipolar world. We do not think like that. The United States of America cannot do whatever it likes to do today. What happened in Cuba? There have been sanctions. Day before yesterday, we found an account of their economic achievement in spite of the sanctions continuing for years. In the case of China, there have been so many threats saying: "We shall do this thing; we shall do that thing." But within 24 hours, China responded in an appropriate manner. What happened?
The American industrialists in their own interests put pressure on the Clinton Administration saying that it would not do. It is because in this new world scenario, there was nothing to be dismayed if only such a vast country like India can stand up unitedly. Hence it is unique that all the political parties are united and they are saying in one voice not to sign the CTBT. It is a rare sort of a political agreement which is strengthening the position of the Government.
I shall be brief. This is not the time to go into details. There are so many things to be said about what happened to nuclear options, what may happen and the technological and other developments that are taking place daily.
I will conclude with an appeal to the Government that the time is short and as early as possible and as effectively as possible, we should have the diplomatic offensive and not defensive, informing the whole world about the lacunae, about the loopholes in the CTBT and convince the world about the genuineness, sincerity and the correctness of the stand taken by the Government of India. The message should go that the Parliament of India has taken such a united stand and such is the national consensus. Thank you.
(ends)
1712 hours
I think, this is a very trying moment for India, but at the same time, in a way, an ennobling moment. We are a big and a vast country. We have so many inbuilt differences in so many ways. But when it comes to the question of the safety and security of this country, we always have stood as one. It is a good thing that Parliament by one voice, has said that we are not going to subscribe to the CTBT as it is now. However, we also need some education, some information. It is one thing to indulge in grave talking and another thing, in preparing ourselves and preparing the country for the situation. I had wished that the Minister of External Affairs had elucidated a number of things that you read in the media about what has been going on in Geneva. In his statement on the 15th, he had this to say, at page 2.
"We have also subsequently indicated that we will be constrained not to associate with the international monitoring system being set up to verify the CTBT."
I would like to know whether this international monitoring system exists even now when nuclear tests can be conducted or have been conducted underground or overground. I would like to know whether we have a number of these international monitoring stations in India. How many of them are there? I would like to know whether we are going to remove those international monitoring stations as a first step to register our resentment against this insensitivity of the nuclear weaponed countries and the other countries refusing to link up the CTBT with nuclear disarmament.
If I understood the Minister correctly, he said:
"Even now they do not want to commit themselves that they will do away with the nuclear weapons which they have in their hands which ultimately will mean subsequently disarmament, not to speak of the timeframe."
They do not even say that. I would like him to clarify whether that is the position which means that they would like to continue with the nuclear weaponed hegemony as in the case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by which they succeeded that the five of them would continue to keep the nuclear weapons and continue to improve the quality of the nuclear weapons in perpetuating and the only people who will be prevented from acquiring these nuclear weapons would be the non-nuclear weaponed States. I would like to know whether they continue with that position today.
The Minister has also spoken of the vertical proliferation of these weapons by which I understand a continuous improvement of the nuclear weapons even after the CTBT has come into force. I would like him to explain how this is to be done. It would be of great help, Mr. Deputy Speaker, because when we support a particular thing, we must do with our eyes open. We must be able to speak to the people of our country with knowledge and authority. We must be able to speak to the world forum with knowledge and authority. It is no good repeating the same thing taking a high moral tone that we are not going to do this. Of course we are not going to do this. I for one would endorse this decision wholeheartedly. But I would like to be able to talk to everybody in the world with some kind of information. The Minister in his statement has said that the treaty as it was drafted till the last session of the Conference of disarmament in Geneva concluded has been revised. This Conference has started again from the 29th of this month and a new treaty, a new text has been brought. I would like him to explain the position after all that had been going on in the last Conference for some time and we had reiterated our position in every possible way.
Now, he speaks of the new text being discussed. We would like to know whether there is any kind of a difference between the text as concluded in the last session of the Conference and the text being discussed now. He has said that we will continue with the discussion. On what basis has he said that?
I sometimes feel that it would be a good thing if, instead of a bare broad statement as this and the one he has made just now, he explains to us in simple words - maybe, a kind of a statement - in what different ways can the vertical proliferation take place, even after the CTBT. We hear talks of such things as hydro-dynamics; we hear talks of subcritical hydro testing; we hear talks of computer simulations; and different kinds of things. These are all very high technical expressions which we do not understand. It would be a good thing if he organises some kind of a meeting with our nuclear scientists who can explain to us how these things are done.
I would ask him to explain in particular this expression: `national technical means', which the Americans are very keen should be a part of the Treaty. I am told that the Chinese are very sore about it. They are very sore about this because it would mean snooping by the Americans on whatever the Chinese do. It may not be an overground or an underground explosion any more, which could be monitored. But how do the Americans snoop on whatever the Chinese do for vertical proliferation of their weapons, even by these different means? We would like this to be explained to us.
Then, we hear a good deal about provisions relating to the `entry into force' of this Treaty. We were told that the European Union countries have strong reservations to the provisions with regard to the `entry into force' of this Treaty. We would like to be enlightened on what those provisions in this "entry into force' of the Treaty are that the European nations have objected to and with what result because I feel that in these kinds of differences, the mistrust that seems to take place between these different countries who are unanimous otherwise on the CTBT, we would be able to drive a wedge or to win friends for us.
I would like the Minister of External Affairs to explain whether these countries have been trying to paint India as a spoiler. There was a time when America took the position and said that this Treaty would be ratified, would be taken to the United Nations General Assembly for ratification and adoption only if the nuclear weapon countries sign it and the nuclear weapon threshold countries also sign it. Among the nuclear weapon threshold countries, we have Pakistan, India and Israel. They have been reported to say that unless India signs this, well, Britain is not going to sign it, Russia is not going to sign it, China is not going to sign it and the CTBT would be a non-starter. I would like to know whether that position was, at that time, to paint India as a spoiler.
I am finishing. I know that my time is very limited.
Another thing that we hear is that these countries will go ahead with the CTBT regardless of India. The latest position is that America will organise over 100 countries to sign this treaty. And these 100 countries will go to the United Nations Assembly and present it and have a vote taken by the United Nations Assembly in support of the CTBT by which the CTBT will become a document of the United Nations. What stand do we take in a position like that? Dr. Mallikarjun has said the correct thing that this is not the time to make the bomb. I would support him there. It would be the most stupid thing for us to say that we make the bomb. Nobody makes that kind of an announcement. If we want to do something, do it. We do not have to proclaim to speak it to the wide world. Prepare it only when the time comes. You speak it with action. We are speaking of keeping our option in view of our security concern and so on and so forth. Nobody disturbs you on that. But we would like some action. At the same time, we should prepare the people of this country for the consequences. America will not take it just lying down. The most important foreign policy of the American administration and of President Clinton - this is the election year for President Clinton - is to see that this non-proliferation and that CTBT are there. And, therefore, we should be prepared for the Americans. Now they have the Russians as their allies and they have the European Union as their allies. We should be prepared for stringent action.
What form of "stringent action", I do not know. We have heard of such expressions as `nuclear castration'. See that our nuclear preparation is castrated right at the beginning. Is such a measure possible? In what way can it be possible? We should even prepare for some kind of sanctions which will have a more dangerous fallout on the economy of this country and we should prepare our people for that. These are the few things that they would like to pose to the hon. Minister. There is no use just reiterating the same thing: "We agree on it. We agree on it. We agree on it."
Let us understand it. Let us be able to speak with some intelligence. Let us tell our people what it means. Let us prepare them for that situation.
(ends)
SHRI JASWANT SINGH (CHITTORGARH): Sir, I do not want to make a speech. I do have five or six queries without any preamble. I would pose them to the hon. Minister. I will request him that when he comes to replying, it would be so good as to answer them.
The first one I would really repeat what my colleague Lt. General Prakash Mani Tripathi has said. I would request the hon. Minister to explain as to how he reconciles both his statement that nuclear weapons are not necessary for the country's defence and yet base the entire argument, that we are putting forward in the Conference on Disarmament and on CTBT, on this very basis that we need it for our security.
The second query is: Are we or are we not blocking? And if we are blocking, how are we doing it?
Thirdly, what exactly is it that the Government intends to block? Are you blocking the Test Ban Treaty? Are you interested only in blocking its Entry into Force? I would thereafter wish to know from the hon. Minister that if we fail to block, then what have you thought out as to what the policy would be?
From this, a logical question which arises is this. If he succeeds to block, is that the end of our policy or only a beginning of our policy? Please elucidate on this point. I would be grateful if the hon. Minister also explains as to whether it is possible for this Test Ban Treaty to enter into force even without an endorsement by the Conference on Disarmament from which the next question that arises is; Can the UN General Assembly endorse that which the Conference on Disarmament has rejected? What is the Government doing to ensure that that does not happen?
The final clarification that I wish to seek is this. From all this, I find that it is really the Conference on Disarmament that is the venue at which the Government has to pro-actively take whatever action that it has to. Would the hon. Minister share with us what they intend doing now in the Conference on Disarmament, not simply in the Test Ban Treaty and what does the Government intend doing to ensure that an UN General Assembly vote - a straight and simple vote on this particular matter - is prevented and how will you attempt to achieve it?
Thank you, Sir, for calling my name. I had no intention to participate but since you called my name, I asked for certain clarifications.
MR. DEPUTY-SPEAKER: Your name is there in the list.
SHRI JASWANT SINGH: Thank you, Sir.
(ends)
1732 hours
Sir, while the US position is as it is, there are two misconceptions which are being bandied about. The first is that CTBT is a complete nuclear disarmament measure. Sir, it is not because the present Treaty as it is drafted will allow new qualitative research to take place and it will also allow weapons to be built based on old technology. So, it will definitely lead us to nuclear disarmament by itself. Secondly, absence of nuclear testing itself does not prevent development of new weapons because sub-critical test as planned by the US and advance computer simulation technology will allow the US particularly and France to develop new weapons even based on newer technology.
Our demand that there should be a positive and a firm linkage between complete nuclear disarmament and CTBT is not likely to be accepted by the United States. The United States has no intention of giving up their nuclear capability. They are only interested in maintaining the status quo. The US Defence Secretary has very clearly stated before the Senate Committee that the United States will require to maintain the nuclear deterrence for at least 50 years or perhaps more. The second thing is about no testing at all, even zero-yield testing, that is computer simulation testing against which India has very clearly taken a stand. The stand of the nuclear weapon States is, verification of such testing will be impossible as computers simulation can be done in any environment, in any laboratory. No verification system will be able to detect it. Therefore, it is impossible to include such a thing in the Treaty.
Therefore, the most likely scenario is, we will have to go into the next phase, that is, the entry into forced state, as to without our concerns being addressed to, the Treaty will have to be signed. India has taken a very clear stand, that it will not sign the Treaty in its present form and the present form is not likely to be changed. Therefore, the whole issue now comes down to the area of coming into force. When does the Treaty come into force? There are various situations here. The position of the United Kingdom, Russia, China and Pakistan is, unless the five nuclear weapon States and three threshold States sign the Treaty, it will not come into force. But there are various new formulae being worked out, particularly in view of the Indian stand. India is in a position to block the Treaty because being a threshold State if it does not sign, the Treaty may not come into force - as per the stand of the three or four major nations. But the so called waiver or provisional EIF, if India does not sign the Treaty, would come into force is now being talked about.
The Chairman's draft as of 20th June, is definitely based on the combination of the Members of the Conference on Disarmament and the nuclear capability of the States. Two other concepts that have been floated around are, the positive conference to be held three years after the Treaty is open for signature and the annual review after that. This positive conference will keep on furthering the progress of ratification of the States which have already ratified and wait till all the States required signed the Treaty or ratified the Treaty. Only then will it come into force.
India will have to be very careful because the negotiations now are entirely hinging on the forced requirement. We have to see that our interests are not jeopardized. We will not sign the Treaty but also see, as the Pakistani delegate has proposed, it should come into force with a simple vote in the Security Council hinting indirectly that the Security Council should also impose certain economic sanctions against India if India try to block the Treaty. India also has made it very clear that it will withdraw from the seismic international monitoring system if its views are not adhered to and that is the stand which we will have to maintain.
[NEXT PAGE]
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
