I would like to mention two points in this connection. Perhaps it is already late now. I personally wonder as to why in the actual negotiations the Government of India did not support the Chinese stand on the peaceful nuclear explosions. Unfortunately, China has now dropped the PNE requirement and has accepted the zero-yield CTBT, but it wants NPT to be mentioned in the draft, and to be taken up in a review conference. Perhaps, if India had supported the Chinese stand, China would not have dropped the requirement of peaceful nuclear explosions, and India could have maintained its right to develop nuclear weapons under the pretext of peaceful nuclear explosions, because what we carried out at Pokhran was a PNE. This is one area which somehow India opposed.
The second clause which India could have brought in - I do not know if it is possible to bring it now - is about prohibition against transfer of technology in any form, whether it is equipment, machinery, or weapons grade fissile material, from nuclear weapon States down to non-nuclear weapon States. It could have addressed the problem faced by India when China was supposed to have given to Pakistan nuclear technology, equipment, and centrifugals which are used for producing weapon grade fissile material. But perhaps to bring these new issues at this late stage will be difficult, if the treaty gets over soon. If it does not, these two new points should be brought in.
Finally, it boils down to India retaining its nuclear option. We want to retain the nuclear option because of two of our close neighbours, one is already a nuclear weapon State and the other is a threshold State which has declared that it has a stockpile of nuclear weapons. So, it is imperative that India maintains its nuclear option. But, actually going in for nuclear option, creating a credible stockpile of nuclear weapons, delivery systems, whether they are missile-based, or airborne delivery systems, or submarine based delivery systems, are going to be very expensive options. There are among us people who advocate that India should immediately take to the nuclear option and go in for making nuclear bombs. But, apparently, it is an option which is going to be very expensive. Perhaps, at this stage of our development going in for a fullfledged nuclear weapon capability may not be advisable. What would be required is that India retain its nuclear energy programme in its full swing, fund the nuclear research totally, even increasing the allocation substantially, particularly the new programmes like the fast-breeder test reactor programme, and develop its technology in the area of computer simulation, hydro-dynamic testing, subcritical low yield testing and thereafter, when required, if the political situation changes, go in for the actual nuclear weapon programme.
If we do not sign the CTBT, as planned, there is a possibility that the States such as Russia, UK, and China which, perhaps, do not want it to come into existence are going to blame India and single out India as a country which blocked the treaty. We have to launch a diplomatic offensive and tell the world, beginning with the non-aligned countries, the G-21 countries and the rest of the developing world about India's stand on this discriminatory treaty, and as to why India really should have been singled out not as a nuclear capable State but as a nuclear weapon State, because we have already demonstrated our nuclear weapon capability by Pokhran PNE.
But in spite of that, Sir, there would be a possibility of serious arm-twisting, perhaps, indirectly as we have seen in the case of action at WTO, or maybe even more directly by some sanctions voted in the Security Council and then India will have to tighten its belt that a country of continental proportions cannot be threatened, its arms cannot be twisted by people whose policy has all along been totally hypocritic.
This House should send a clear message that on this issue of CTBT, the entire country across the political party lines is united and behind the stand taken by the Government of India, the Foreign Ministry that the CTBT in its present context will not be signed by India no matter what consequences are.
Thank you.
(ends)
1746 hrs.
... (Interruptions)
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