U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
OCTOBER 25, 1994
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
I N D E X
Tuesday, October 25, 1994
Briefers: Robert Gallucci
Christine Shelly
ANNOUNCEMENT
Secretary's Visit to Asia November 8-19 .........1
NORTH KOREA
Opening Remarks by Ambassador Gallucci's ........1-4
Agreement with US/Timetable for Implementation ..4-6,11-12
Consultations with Congress .....................6-8
Nuclear Capability ..............................8-10
Assistance in Energy Transition .................10-11
..................
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPC #152
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1994, 1:01 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MS. SHELLY: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I'm
going to kick off with an announcement about the Secretary's
travel to Asia, and then after that I'll be happy to turn to
our star attraction for today's briefing, Robert Gallucci, who
is well and largely and favorably known to all of you and
certainly a frequent briefer here in this room. He is going to
give you just a bit of an update on the Korean nuclear issue.
After that, I'll be following the usual format, which is to
take questions from you on other subjects.
The Secretary's travel to Asia, November 8-19. He will be
traveling to Asia for the APEC meetings in Indonesia this
November. In addition, he will also be visiting the Republic
of Korea and Thailand, and he will be accompanying the
President on his official visit to the Philippines and the
state visit to Indonesia.
I'll be posting a note immediately after the briefing
which will give the exact dates of where he will be when and
what some of the topics are that will be discussed. He will
return to Washington on November 19.
A sign-up sheet has been posted in the Press Office for
those members of the press who might be interested in applying
for a seat to travel with the Secretary. Please note that
applications will close at noon on Friday, October 28.
Ambassador Gallucci, the floor is yours.
AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: Thanks Christine. Good afternoon.
I know most of you have had an opportunity to look at the
framework document that we negotiated with the DPRK. So I will
not try to bring you through it again in a presentation.
But I do want to make a couple of points about the agreed
framework, partly because I'm still reading stories which
misstate the terms or language of the agreement. I think it's
particularly important, as you write stories and describe that
which we think we have done that I ask you please you try to
put both sides of an agreement into a story instead of just one
side. I have no difficulty with recognizing that the agreement
does provide that the DPRK receive -- as it converts from its
gas-graphite nuclear technology to light-water reactor
technology that that is a substantial assistance. There is
substantial assistance envisioned in the document for the DPRK
on the order of 2000-megawatts of light-water reactor
generating capacity. That's certainly true.
The document also provides for interim energy to be
provided in the form of heavy oil to the DPRK to make up for
the lost energy for the reactors that will not be operated,
will not be completed.
I think it's very reasonable and appropriate that these
benefits to the DPRK be clearly laid out. I also ask that you
address the impact of the document on the non-proliferation
regime and non-proliferation benefits that fall to the people
who live in northeast Asia, to the United States and to the
rest of the world.
Again, let me just characterize that as benefits that we
derive with respect to the current DPRK-North Korean program,
the future North Korean program, and concerns about the past
North Korean program.
Immediately upon the signature, we begin to realize under
the terms of the agreement a freeze in the operation of the 5-
megawatt reactor that produced the spent fuel that's in the
pond. The spent fuel remains in the pond. The radio chemistry
lab processing facility is sealed and subject to safeguard.
These reactors -- this sealing of the radio chemistry lab,
this freeze, is all verified by the IAEA with whatever measures
the IAEA may deem necessary to conduct an inspection to monitor
that freeze. This is all provided in the agreement.
At the same time, as we look to the future, those large
reactors -- the 50-megawatt reactor, the 200-megawatt reactor -
- construction on both of these reactors that would have
produced hundreds of kilograms per year -- that is to say, over
a five-year period -- then hundreds of nuclear weapons worth of
material would have been produced by these reactors. These
reactors will be frozen now. Construction will cease on these
reactors.
Indeed, over the life of the framework document envisioned
to parallel the construction timeframe of the light-water
reactor project, all these facilities will be entirely
dismantled -- all three reactors. The radio chemistry lab will
be dismantled. The spent fuel that's in the pond will be
shipped out. Ultimately, the 25-to-30 kilograms of plutonium
will leave the DPRK.
The program will no longer exist. That's extremely
important from our perspective.
With respect to the past, we have said all along that we
would not reach an agreement with the DPRK that did not resolve
the question of their past nuclear activities. Indeed, the
agreement does provide for the DPRK, for the first time, to
come into full compliance with the safeguards obligations to
accept whatever inspection activity the IAEA may deem necessary
to resolve questions about the initial inventory.
That's all very important. The timing of that is
important, too. That does not happen immediately. It can
happen immediately, but it must happen before any nuclear
equipment is delivered to the DPRK under the light-water
reactor project delivery schedule.
The document is a complicated one. It has a lot of
elements to it that are interrelated. I think it's best
understood as a series of steps that the DPRK would take and a
series of steps that the United States and other countries
would take.
They move in parallel. The agreement, as we've said often
enough, is not based on trust. It is certainly our hope that
it will build trust, but it is an agreement that is verified by
the IAEA in the first instance, and we're very comfortable with
it and believe it does meet our security interests and those of
the countries in the region.
We hope also over the longer term that it does truly
contribute to an atmosphere in which the North and South can
resume their discussions and reduce tensions so that other
security issues can be addressed, including, for example, the
conventional balance.
I'd like to stop here and maybe make one other point I
really should make. That is, we have said that there is, in
addition to the framework document, also a confidential
"Minute" associated with it. That is a document that is about
two and a half pages long. We will make every effort to keep
it confidential. We, of course, are sharing it with our
Congress.
We will, as I answer questions and as members of the
Administration answer questions, we will answer questions
consistent with the confidential "Minute." The "Minute"
contains some details which, as is often the case, parties
agree that they will, as I say, keep confidential. So we will
not explicitly refer to the document but we will not answer in
a way inconsistent with what the document provides for.
Your questions, please.
Q Can you talk to us a little bit about what's
happening on the ground now; what manifestations of this
agreement can we see? Have they started nailing the boards on
the reprocessing facility?
AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: I signed this document on Friday in
Geneva. I think this is Tuesday. I don't know whether they've
gotten out their nails and their hammer yet and exactly what's
happening on the ground.
I can tell you on the ground, certainly, the IAEA
inspectors that have been there are still there at Yongbyon to
assure that the reactor has not restarted, the fuel is in the
pond, and the radio chemistry lab is inoperative.
What should be happening -- if you give me a larger
timeframe than what's happening this morning, I can speak to
that perhaps a little better. What should be happening over
the next couple of weeks to the next month or so, is that the
DPRK will need to take steps to put a freeze in place at the
two larger reactors, or make arrangements with the IAEA for the
agency to do something which it normally doesn't do, which is
to go to facilities that are under construction. The agency
will be doing that as well as making special arrangements with
the agency to monitor a frozen facility like the radio
chemistry lab.
That facility is, under the terms of the framework
document, to be sealed with access by the IAEA as necessary to
ensure that it's entirely inoperable. The IAEA and the DPRK
have both said separately to us that they will be talking to
one another to work out those arrangements.
I can't tell you that between Friday night and today that
they've begun to have those discussions. I have not yet heard
what is happening at the facilities. But those are some
immediate things.
Let me say to what's happening immediately. There are a
series of activities that follow from the agreement that need
to be undertaken in the near term.
The DPRK and the United States must begin consultations
over the spent fuel that's in the pond, both to assure that it
is safely stored but also to assure that it is stored in a way
so that when the time comes in the delivery schedule of the
light-water reactor, the fuel will be in a condition such that
it may be shipped out of the DPRK. Those consultations have to
begin quite soon.
As I said, between Friday and today, they have not yet
begun. We need before too long to get together with the DPRK
to discuss the establishment of a liaison offices. There are a
lot of issues that were raised and identified in the initial
discussions that took place in the August-September timeframe,
and we need to follow up on that.
We need to meet also on the subject of interim energy.
How, in fact, the heavy oil will be provided to the DPRK. So
there are a lot of activities over the coming weeks that will
be taking place.
Q Do you have any dates or specific timetables for all
of these steps? Do you have a meeting scheduled for next week?
AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: If you look at the agreement, there
are some things in which there are some time schedules.
There's a month's period within which the DPRK is to have the
facilities frozen -- in other words, put in a condition so that
they can be frozen.
If you look in the agreement, you'll see that within three
months the United States, with others, is supposed to provide
for the first tranche of fuel delivery. So there are some
dates. But the other steps, which I said are near term, are
just clearly understood between us and the DPRK.
For example, there is language that refers to "as soon as
possible, as soon as practical" for these other steps.
Q On the question of spent fuel in the pond, you've
said frequently that the chemistry is very fragile there and it
can go -- you know, you don't how quickly it might go or that
you take steps -- you'd offered to help them change the
chemistry of the water to make those rods go longer before they
start blacking or something. What is the status of those rods
now? How long can they sit there before they need to be
stored? Is there real sensitive timing right now? Does that
have to be done immediately? You sort of alluded to it there,
the first thing --
AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: The technical question about the
condition of the water, the water chemistry -- I still don't
have a better answer than I've been giving you, because we
still haven't had our experts look at that water. I can say
that under the terms of the agreement and from a discussion I
had with Vice Foreign Minister Kang on Friday evening last in
Geneva, we expect to be getting together with the DPRK very
soon.
How exactly we will address the water chemistry, I'm not
yet sure, and I'll be able to tell you more after we have a
meeting with them. There is a time factor. Unfortunately,
what I cannot tell you technically is how much time there is.
Certainly, the sooner the water chemistry is adjusted, the
sooner the fuel is put into a condition, and I have to put it
in a vague way, because we have our own concept of what that
might be.
I understand that the DPRK technical people have some
ideas of their own, and we need to talk to them and figure out
what's the safest and most efficient way and perhaps even the
most economical way to store the fuel until the time comes for
it to be shipped. So I can't give you a time frame at this
point.
Q You say that it is critical, but you don't know how
critical, and you don't have a firm commitment as to when
you're going to start talking about it.
AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: So that it doesn't quite come out
sounding so silly, let me rephrase that for you. Certainly the
safety issue can become critical, and we said that from the
start. Also from the start, we've said that we, the United
States, cannot tell you at exactly what time frame is. Based
upon our consultations with other countries that have had
experience with gas graphite fuel, we know that it could be a
matter of months to a matter of years. But the simple
proposition is the sooner one addresses water chemistry, the
better. So we would like to have that discussion with the DPRK.
A second proposition is the fuel will not be left for
years in water safely, and we'd like to be talking to them
about what modality is about to store the fuel. I said that
there is no specific time frame provided for that discussion
except language such as "as soon as possible," "as soon as
practical" is there, and we have had discussions with the DPRK
-- I have with Vice Foreign Minister Kang about getting on with
that -- so I could tell you that I would expect within the next
couple of weeks that we will certainly be talking to them about
the spent fuel issue; and as soon as we know more about that,
I'd be happy to share that with you.
Q To what extent is cooperation of Congress required
in order for the United States to play its part? For example,
the Trading with the Enemy Act, does that have to be waived or
lifted? Does North Korea have to be given specific exemptions
by Congress or can the Executive Branch do that?
AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: As you know, the framework document
provides that the United States will take steps to reduce trade
barriers and also barriers of telecommunications contacts in
the context of moving to improve U.S.-DPRK relations.
We need early on probably to take those steps which we can
do via the Executive authority of the President, and as soon as
we determine how we're going to proceed, I'll be pleased to
share that with you.
Over time, there will be steps that would require
legislative action, and at an appropriate time we reach that
point, we will certainly go to the Congress. Beyond that, we
at this moment for the provision of a small amount of heavy oil
in the coming two/three months would not require new
authorities. That can be done, our judgment is, under the
authorities given to the Department of Energy. We do not need
new appropriations at this point for this either.
As we move down the line, if there are other connections
between us and the DPRK -- for example, if United States
companies were to become involved in the role of supplier of
any significant nuclear equipment, that would require an
agreement of cooperation with the DPRK and (inaudible)
cooperation is a treaty and would have to go to the Senate.
So the best way to answer your question is there are some
things which we can do -- the Executive Branch can do
unilaterally. In all cases, of course, we are consulting with
the Hill. That began some time ago. It has been a constant
process throughout our negotiations with the DPRK. As we moved
into the agreement phase, it became more intense, and we are
staying, I believe, in close contact with those members of both
the House and the Senate who have been interested in this
issue, and we'll continue to do so.
The extent to which we have to go further than that will
depend upon where exactly we are in the process of our
connections with the DPRK.
Q Just to follow up on the same point, in these
consultations with Congress which have already occurred, have
you come into any reservations on their part about the
confidential minute?
AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: I have not myself. Any number of
members of the Administration have had these contacts. I don't
believe the minute has been officially transmitted to the
Congress. That may well be happening today. I'm not precisely
certain of that. So if you mean as the confidential minute is
revealed to the Congress, has the Congress then -- or members
of Congress who have been briefed expressed any concerns about
that. That, to my knowledge, hasn't happened yet and could not
have happened.
But I will tell you, I don't expect that to happen. I
think the kinds of concerns you have heard from some members of
the Senate are the only concerns that I am made aware of at
this point.
Q Have we agreed to any kind of reassurances to the
North Koreans on what will happen to the spent fuel rods once
they are removed from North Korea? Do they want assurances
that the country where they eventually reside won't reprocess
the fuel, or have we agreed to anything?
AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: There is no provision in the
framework document for a DPRK oversight on the ultimate
disposition of the spent fuel once it leaves the DPRK. That is
something we would be concerned about and, while I think I have
responded to questions about where the spent fuel would go by
saying that I and others have consulted a number of other
governments and we believe we have two, three or four
possibilities, in all cases we would find a likely disposition
in the countries that are candidates now and perhaps in the
future not to be a problem in terms of proliferation.
So, in other words, that's something we would be concerned
about, independent of any DPRK concerns. But in any case,
there's nothing in the framework document that gives DPRK
oversight over the disposition of the fuel once it's removed.
Q Some Administration officials say that it is more
likely than not that North Korea has one or two nuclear
devices. As I read the agreement, I don't see it addressing
that particular problem. Do you see a way that this agreement
will get North Korea to get rid of those devices?
AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: Yes. First, what we know and what
we don't know. We know that there is an anomaly discovered by
the IAEA as a result of an inspection -- inspection process
actually -- and that anomaly suggests that the DPRK declaration
of how much plutonium it has was understated. The IAEA has not
put forth a proposition about how much it was understated.
Our own analysis of how much plutonium could have been
separated by the DPRK in excess of the gram quantities that
they have acknowledged and declared to the agency is that it
could be some kilograms less than ten. The assessment that we
have made is that the amount of material that they could
possibly have would be enough for the DPRK to manufacture one
and possibly two nuclear weapons.
We do not know whether the DPRK has enough plutonium to
manufacture one nuclear weapon. We do not know if they do have
that material whether they have done the work necessary to
design and manufacture the triggering package for a nuclear
explosive device. We do not know whether they have
manufactured such a device. We do not know whether they have
weaponized such a device. There is a possibility of this
because of the anomaly. That's sometimes referred to as the
problem of the past.
The agreement, as I described to you, massively goes at,
from our perspective, a current program where there's enough
plutonium for five or six nuclear weapons in the storage pond
to make sure that material is never separated and made
available, indeed is ultimately shipped out. It goes at the
concern that no more plutonium be produced in the reactor; that
the reactor not be finished.
So we have addressed the real concern about a massive
plutonium buildup. There is and will be until it's resolved
the question about how much plutonium they have and do they
have enough for one or two devices and did they in fact
manufacture one or possibly two devices.
The way that is addressed in the agreement is it provides
for the first time for the DPRK to say, as it does in the
agreement, that they will accept whatever safeguards measures
may be deemed necessary by the IAEA to resolve that question of
its initial inventory. That's a position they've never taken
before, and they take it in this document.
It is in the document required that the DPRK permit the
IAEA to do this before any significant nuclear equipment is
provided by the international community to the DPRK in the
course of the construction of the light-water reactor project.
We have estimated, in response to questions, if the
reactor project remains on schedule, that that could come as
much as five years down the road. The DPRK could agree or
decide that it is in their interests to settle this matter any
time between now and then, but they certainly know there will
be no nuclear equipment delivered to the DPRK until that issue
is resolved.
If, in the course of resolving it, there is a question
about nuclear weapons having been manufactured under the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, as in the case of South Africa, complete
dismantlement would be required. Any material that is
discovered or declared would have to be declared to the IAEA
and subject to safeguards. That's the way the agreement deals
with that issue.
From our perspective, it would certainly have been more
desirable to solve that issue immediately. That was not a
negotiable outcome. In terms of the risks, the security of
South Korea, Japan, the United States, the international
community, we do not believe there is any. There is no time
factor that bears upon the capability of the agency to resolve
the past, as a result of providing that this be resolved
somewhat later.
The radioactive waste sites are not going to disappear.
Those are the sites that need to be inspected. Inspections on
everything else begin immediately.
Q Financing question. This has sometimes been
characterized -- mischaracterized as a $4 billion sort of give-
away to the North Koreans. Can you discuss how much it will
cost and how the financing will be distributed among ourselves,
South Korea and Japan and others, if there are others?
AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: In a a general way I can. First of
all, about what this represents -- the light-water reactor
project -- and the number $4 billion has been used -- it was
first used -- I first heard it in Seoul, and it's a number that
I've adopted, and I'm told it's roughly right. It's a large
amount of money in any case to finance the project. There's no
question about that -- 2,000-megawatt reactors.
The theory of this assistance is, assistance that goes to
the DPRK, not because it's coming into compliance with its NPT
obligations its full-scope safeguards obligations, but because
it is giving up gas graphite technology and making a transition
to light-water reactor technology. Yes, you want to interrupt.
Q (Inaudible) How much do you estimate in what
they're giving up? How much have they sunk into what they are
giving up, if you can put any --
AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: I'm glad you asked that question.
The first point to make is, however you evaluate the size of
the assistance package, it is assistance for a transition from
one energy technology to another, not for simply doing what it
is obligated to do. It is not obligated to give up that gas
graphite system. It is certainly in our non-proliferation
interests that it do that, however.
Before we provided -- and I did on Friday -- a letter from
the President of the United States to the leader of the DPRK --
Kim Jong-Il -- assuring him that the United States would seek
to put together the necessary consortium, and the President
would do what was necessary to try to bring about this
assistance in the form of a light-water reactor project, to the
extent he was able to do that and as long as the DPRK acted in
conformance with the framework document. That assurance
followed assurances that we first received from the Japanese
and from the South Koreans of their assistance and their
support of this project.
So certainly we expect the South Koreans, as they said
they wished to do, to take on the central role or the lion's
share of the burden of financing and constructing the light-
water reactor project. We expect the Japanese to help in that
connection and others under the concept of creating a Korean
Energy Development Organization.
Just one more word, Christine, and that was with respect
to the cost of the program that the DPRK is giving up. The
reason I was enthusiastic about telling you this -- because I
don't know the answer to that -- I was enthusiastic about
telling you that because you may recall at the Berlin meeting
that the North Koreans had some concept in mind that we and the
international community would compensate the DPRK for reactors
that they did not begin to construct but were thinking of
constructing and also for the investment.
What we learned from that is that it was a lot more money,
and I believe we have called that absurd, ridiculous and
ludicrous on various occasions, and all those words apply, and
there's no thought to doing that. But we are and we have said
that we would assist them in the transition, and that's the
light-water reactor project and the interim energy.
MS. SHELLY: Last question, Charlie.
Q A non-technical question.
AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: Please.
Q Can you give us some flavor of what the negotiations
were like? How the North Koreans negotiated in light of the
change in leadership, with the confidence with which they
negotiated? What your impression is of what they're looking to
gain out of all of this?
AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: I have been unable to do justice to
the question that I've received about the impact of the death
of Kim Il-Sung on the negotiations, and I have not been able to
because I have not directly been able to discern in the course
of many intense hours of negotiations that impact. I just
could not say that what I was seeing was the result of a
change.
I do believe that -- to go back for a moment to the Berlin
meeting -- that that was a bit bizarre what we experienced in
Berlin. I was not there. Gary Seymour represented the United
States at that meeting, but that presentation was a little odd,
and I wondered at the time whether there wasn't a looser
decision-making apparatus at work at that moment.
I couldn't quite explain why we were confronting positions
in Berlin which were quite inconsistent with understandings
which we so recently reached in Geneva. But I did not see that
again when we were back in Geneva, and I saw a much more
coherent presentation on the part of the North.
You may not be surprised to find out that I have some
thoughts about what it's been like negotiating with the DPRK
over those days, and I think I'm going to mostly have to keep
those to myself for at least some period of time. And I'm
sorry to say that, but I think that's the only thing I could
say.
Q Just one follow up, Bob. Did Kim Jong-Il respond to
Clinton's letter?
AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: Let me take that, Christine. To my
knowledge, the answer to that is no, but there's also no
anticipation. You'll note at the bottom of the letter, when
you see it, and you will, and it does not say, "Hope to hear
from you soon." (Laughter) There's nothing like that, and the
letter is linked to the framework document. In other words, as
long as there's compliance with, and we did not seek either
verbally or in writing any response. We're not rejecting one
if we should get one, but what we wanted was a package which
was coherent on the terms in which we laid them out, and that's
what we have. So we weren't looking for language to come back
to us.
Q Just one: How did you address the letter? To the
President, Dear Leader -- what -- how did he send it?
(Laughter)
AMBASSADOR GALLUCCI: The DPRK, as is often the case with
other governments, has their own way of referring to their
leader, and they gave us the address and how they would like
their leader to be addressed, and we addressed it precisely as
they asked. I in fact do not have it in front of me, but you
will soon. I mean, this is not part of the -- it's not
confidential, and it's not secret, so I believe it was to the
Supreme Leader of the DPRK, but you'll have an opportunity to
see that for yourself. Thank you all very much.
MS. SHELLY: Thanks, Bob.
(Ambassador Gallucci concluded his briefing at 1:32 p.m.,
after which Ms. Shelly immediately began her briefing.)
................
(Press briefing concluded at 1:47 p.m.)
(###)
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