Tracking Number: 350950
Title: "US Prepared to Move Back to UNSC on N Korea if They Delay." Portions of remarks of Secretary of State Christopher in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee saying that if North Korea does not engage sincerely in negotiations with the US, the US is prepared to take North Korea's nuclear intransigence back to the UN Security Council. (940630)
Date: 19940630
Text:
*EPF405
06/30/94 U.S. PREPARED TO MOVE BACK TO UNSC ON NKOREA IF THEY DELAY (Excerpts: Secretary of State before SFRC June 30) (7060) Washington -- Secretary of State Christopher told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee June 30 that should the North Koreans use the dialogue the United States is entering into with them, "we are prepared to move back to the (UN) Security Council to pursue sanctions and take whatever steps are appropriate to resolve this issue."
Christopher said the United States has "always preferred to address this North Korean problem through dialogue and negotiation. We now have a new opportunity to conduct on favorable terms a third round of discussions with the North Koreans.
"We look forward to broad and thorough discussions with the North on a full range of security, political and economic issues at the discussions starting in Geneva on the 8th of July," Christopher said. "And of course, we welcome the upcoming meeting between the presidents of North and South Korea.
"But I want to emphasize that our objectives remain the same as they have been over the months that we've been in office -- a nuclear- free Korean peninsula, a secure Asia and a strong non-proliferation regime. Our determination to secure these objectives is undiminished."
Following are excerpts from Legi-Slate: (begin excerpts from Legi-Slate) CHAIRMAN CLAIBORNE PELL: We're convening this morning to hear from our secretary of state. In this regard, I'd like to commend the president and the secretary for the steady hand they've exercised at the tiller of the foreign policy ship of state. Too often, conflicting voices urge immediate action of one sort or another. To heed this medley of contending choices would be a confusing course. The president and the secretary have wisely kept us on a single course.
As a result, we've not been goaded into an untimely, unwise use of force, whether in North Korea or Haiti or Bosnia that would have jeopardized American lives for an uncertain outcome. In North Korea, the administration has exploited the opportunity provided by the visit of former President Carter. His was a welcome intervention that I think deserves more credit that it has received, and which brought us back from the very brink of war. At the same time, the president remains vigilant, reinforcing our troops in the Korean peninsula while continuing diplomatic efforts to end this crisis peacefully. As Winston Churchill once said, "Joy, joy, is a lot preferable to war, war."
CHRISTOPHER: I know we'll spend much time today discussing the immediate crises that are before us. But in my own statement I want to focus on what I believe to be the most important contribution that I can make to American foreign policy. That is to help the president build and maintain long term relationships. To build and maintain lasting structures that will advance and America's enduring interest. We must, I believe, take advantage of a unique historical moment when none of the great powers views the other as a immediate military threat. The challenge requires us to manage effectively our relations with Russia, Western Europe, Japan -- and China in particular. And it requires strengthening, extending and creating the institutions that serve our over-arching strategic objectives.
When the president hosted the successful meeting of APEC leaders in Seattle, we deepened our economic integration with the dynamic Asian-Pacific region. Instability and conflict in Asia would undermine global economic growth, threaten democracies, and encourage proliferation. Our administration has consistently identified North Korea's nuclear program as a threat to America's vital security interests. North Korea's actions threaten peace on the Korean peninsula and endanger our treaty ally, South Korea. They threaten the strategic stability of the entire region, and they could spur a nuclear arms race in Asia. They threaten our efforts at global non- proliferation.
We've always preferred to address this North Korean problem through dialogue and negotiation. We now have a new opportunity to conduct on favorable terms a third round of discussions with the North Koreans. But should the North Koreans use dialogue for purpose of delay, let me emphasize that we are prepared to move back to the Security Council to pursue sanctions and take whatever steps are appropriate to resolve this issue.
We look forward to broad and thorough discussions with the North on a full range of security, political and economic issues at the discussions starting in Geneva on the 8th of July. And of course, we welcome the upcoming meeting between the presidents of North and South Korea. But I want to emphasize that our objectives remain the same as they have been over the months that we've been in office -- a nuclear- free Korean peninsula, a secure Asia and a strong non-proliferation regime. Our determination to secure these objectives is undiminished.
SEN. HELMS: We in the United States have a problem -- and I say we because I think it affects all Americans. The American people are confused about Bosnia and about Rwanda and North Korea. I have a long letter this morning from Billy Graham, who just went to North Korea -- a very interesting letter and I will share it with you.
CHRISTOPHER: Thank you. SEN LUGAR: I would likewise suggest that I have a problem with the negotiating policy -- maybe you can illuminate this more -- in the Korean business. Because you pointed out correctly our objectives are the same: a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, and nuclear-free means whatever has happened before is eradicated quite apart from freezing whatever might go from now on; a secure Asia, which certainly follows from getting rid of the nuclear threat in North Korea; and a strong nonproliferation regime, which is important for us worldwide.
I'm not certain, given the fact that President Carter's trip has apparently terminated pressure upon Japan, Russia, China others in the U.N. Security Council to think about economic sanctions, why we are not simply in a vacation period in which interesting talks may occur but it's not really clear how our agenda is likely to progress. And it appears to me very likely that we will come to another pass, and I suspect you may feel the same. But in any event, the building of the coalition of support for pressure and so forth that was there has pretty well been dissipated. And I hope that we're in the process of rebuilding it, even as we get into conversations.
CHRISTOPHER: On Korea, Senator, let me simply say this. If the North Koreans stall in those talks, if they delay, I think the United States will be able to recreate the same coalition that was existing before in a very effective way, and we won't delay in doing that. The two channels of talks, I think, give us an opportunity that we would be very foolish if we didn't pursue, the fact that there's going to be a summit meeting between North and South Korea and that the aim of that summit meeting, or one of them, will be a nuclear-free peninsula. That's an opportunity that neither North or South Korea would want us to abandon or to not take advantage of. The same thing is true of the talks in Geneva, between the United States and North Korea.
We have an opportunity here to try to ensure that there will be a nuclear-free peninsula, to make sure that the freeze is permanent and definite, and then to find out what's been done before.
As I say, I just think it would be irresponsible of us not to pursue those opportunities, but to do them without illusions. We don't -- I don't have any illusions about North Korea. I've read the history of North Korea, and we're going to be watching that situation very carefully. And if there is a deleteriness (sic) about what they do, if they're stalling, then I can be -- I can assure you that we will go back to the idea of going to the United Nations and sanctions, whatever else it takes to resolve that problem.
So I'm not sure that we have any real disagreement here. I don't think the fact that we've gone this route back to -- route of negotiations will attenuate the pressure or will hurt the coalition. Indeed, I would say, Senator, I think it will help the coalition, because the coalition will know that we've gone the last mile and that that was not successful. And then I think there will be an even stronger case for sanctions.
These issues are very closely interrelated, and I'm sure that the Japanese will be affected by developments in their region. China is already a nuclear power. So it may be that the Japanese have accepted that. But nevertheless, whatever happens to the Chinese nuclear program, but particularly what happens to the North Korean nuclear program, I think will be very carefully examined in Japan. That's one of the reasons why it's so important for us to hold this regime as it is and to prevent others from developing a nuclear capacity, because then other countries are caused to feel that they must compete.
SEN. PRESSLER: Well, China and Korea appear to me to be close allies in some ways. Their top leadership just had a meeting within the last month, their top military meeting -- leaders had sort of a seminar together. Is China helping us get the bomb out of North Korea sufficient?
CHRISTOPHER: I'm not positive about the premise of your question, Senator. The Chinese indicate that their relationship with North Korea is not as close as it once was, and that probably is true. The fact that they've had meetings with North Korea, I think, is probably a good sign for us rather than the contrary. I've talked to the Chinese about North Korea. They're very discreet in their comments about North Korea. We hope that they will be a useful supporter of the notion that there should be a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. I believe the Chinese have exactly the same interest we do in preventing the development of a nuclear capability in North Korea.
But as I say, they're very discreet in the comments they make about it. If we need to go back to the United Nations seeking sanctions against North Korea, we will be back in the same analysis where we were before, hoping to achieve the support of the Chinese or at least hoping that they will not block sanctions. But the underlying reality is that China should have the same interest we have in this, and I hope they're expressing their interest in an effective way even if it's a discreet way.
SEN. PRESSLER: Well, but in your judgment, Korea would have gotten the materials for their nuclear weapon from China in the first place, is that not a safe assumption?
CHRISTOPHER: No, I do not make that assumption. SEN. PRESSLER: Where did they get the materials from? CHRISTOPHER: I really don't want to comment on intelligence matters here in this open hearing, Senator. I just don't want to indulge in assumption as to where they -- as you know, they have an experimental reactor, a rather small experimental reactor, which produces material from which petroleum -- plutonium can be processed or reprocessed. And it is that that is creating the risk and danger we're facing today.
SEN. ROBB: Good morning, Mr. Secretary. I apologize. I've had several conflicting commitments this morning that precluded me from being here for all of your testimony, but I inquired as to whether or not there had been significant discussion relative to the upcoming talks in Geneva on July 8th regarding the Korean situation, and I understand that, except for the brief comment by Senator Pressler and maybe one by Senator Lugar earlier, that we have not -- that you had not said much more about that. And I'm curious if you could elaborate a bit on the scope of those particular talks.
Secretary Gallucci yesterday said that the nuclear issue would be the -- central element I think was the word that he used, but that would lead one to believe that other broader issues might be included.
And I'm curious to ascertain whether or not the relatively singular focus and concern that the United States has had with respect to the whole question of nuclear proliferation will be so central as to be the only point at this point; or in effect have we given the North Koreans an opportunity, through the various activities that have taken place in the last year and a half, to broaden the scope of those discussions, even though our interest is principally in resolving the nuclear issue at this point.
CHRISTOPHER: Senator, the talks between North Korea and the United States will commence in Geneva on the 8th. They will probably go for a couple of days and then they will recess and pick up for a couple of days the following week. That is, at least as I review it -- regard it, I think that's the first session of the third round.
Now, it has long been indicated that the third round would be a round of considerable expanse in terms of the issues to be discussed. The words that have been used, in talking with the North Koreans, are that the talks will be broad and thorough. We have indicated that the nuclear issue will be front and center, but by no means exclusive. And there's good for that, Senator Robb.
I think the best opportunity with the North Koreans is to let them see the opportunities that they might have if they rejoined the community of nations. So, there will be a discussion of economic issues, there will be a discussion of political issues. Certainly the nuclear problem is the principal problem that we have with North Korea right now. But there are many other problems: North Korea's resort to terrorism in the past, the way they've conducted themselves in international affairs, their isolation. There are a number of problems that we have with North Korea, none of them perhaps quite as urgent as the nuclear problem. But I think if we're going to have broad and thorough discussions, we need to air out various concerns we have about North Korea; and we also need to show them what the promise would be if they abandon this nuclear program and they abandon the other asocial things that they've done and join the community of nations.
So, I think the talks are properly broad and thorough but they will focus, at least initially, on the nuclear issues.
SEN. ROBB: Mr. Secretary, I don't quarrel with the need for a broader discussion. But my concern is that we had originally established as a condition precedent to that third round certain actions which were not fulfilled by the North Koreans, and we had, hopefully, maintained a position that until they satisfied those conditions -- now, admittedly, different circumstances have been introduced into the equation, but the third round was originally contentioned (means conditioned ?) upon meeting the conditions that had been laid down for those talks.
And I was trying to establish whether or not we had in effect taken a substitute, i.e., the freeze that has been proposed in terms that are more rhetorical than anything else at this point, as a basis for now getting into the talks which originally were only going to be available if they met those conditions that -- with respect to the special and general inspections.
CHRISTOPHER: Senator, I think that the premise of your comments is not an accurate one. I believe they have fulfilled those conditions that can be fulfilled. They complied with the inspections that were asked for -- that is the regular inspections --
SEN. ROBB: To the extent that Hans Blix and the IAEA were able to guarantee the continuity and what have you in the terms that have been established earlier?
CHRISTOPHER: Yes. The IAEA found the inspections satisfactory. Now, that does not include the special inspections --
SEN. ROBB: That's what -- (inaudible.) CHRISTOPHER: The special inspections were -- have always been a possible subject of discussion in the third round, and, you know, coming out of the opening that President Carter's trip gave to us -- and I think we need to commend him for his trip there and providing a possible opening. We have built on that opening by getting not only a commitment not to reprocess but a commitment not to refuel, and also a commitment to live up to the IAEA standards -- no longer to claim a special status.
SEN. ROBB: But what about the sampling and the examination of the fuel rods?
CHRISTOPHER: Well, that was what was made impossible by the way they unloaded the fuel and that is certainly an issue that we'll have to address in the third round of discussions. We'll have to find an alternate way to determine the history of the reactor, but I think the conditions for going ahead with the third round have been satisfactorily met, but that does not make any less important trying to -- in the course of those negotiations -- establish a basis for determining the history of the reactor.
SEN. ROBB: Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your response and I understand the some of the semantic difficulties that are encountered when we're attempting to work our way through this particular thicket. I think you know my concern about what appears to be a flexibility, shall we say, in the U.S. position that I have some real concerns about, but I won't pursue that here. Let me ask a different question. I know that it has been now reported publicly that at one point a distinguished member of this body was on standby -- a matter of fact two distinguished members of this body at the suggestion of the one initially contacted -- to make a trip to Pyongyang to discuss some of these issues. I'm curious about any precedent for that approach, to use legislative as opposed to State Department personnel, and whether or not that is anticipated as a response to future situations that might develop.
CHRISTOPHER: Senator, I certainly would have welcomed a trip by the two leading senators that you mentioned. Senators frequently travel abroad in their capacity as members of the United States Senate, and I think they frequently provide a tremendous window on the attitudes of other countries. For reasons best known to themselves, the North Koreans chose President Carter through whom to deliver the message they wanted to deliver. It was not my choice, it was their choice. But as I say, I think there are many values to senators traveling abroad and giving us an insight into what other countries think and feel and believe. There are obvious problems if members of the Congress enter into a role of negotiator for the United States. There are obvious limitations as to the propriety of that. But I have certainly in the time I've been in office not encountered any problem along those lines. I've found members of the Senate scrupulous in understanding their role as leading members of Congress. I don't know whether this will be -- I don't know whether this might happen again in the future. We were, I think -- under all the circumstances, when the North Koreans decided they wanted to send a message, we were very pleased that they chose somebody who was deeply experienced in these matters. The choice of President Carter was their choice, but, as you know, the administration approved of that choice. When he decided to go as a private citizen, we briefed him very fully. And I want to make clear here in public our gratitude to both President Carter and Mrs. Carter for going there and for bringing back the message, taking the time they did. I think they rendered a public service. We were able to pick up on what they had done and to broaden the commitments from the North Koreans, and we're now back into these discussions.
As I said earlier, Senator, with the stakes that there are and with the options that are available to us, I think it would be -- would not have been responsible for us not to pursue these opportunities. And certainly I'm pleased that they're having the dual track of negotiations, the summit negotiations as well as these negotiations in Geneva. But I want to also emphasize that I have no illusions about the North Koreans, and we need to be on our guard. We need to recognize that these talks may not succeed, and we need to go back and rebuild the coalition that we were building for sanctions. I think it will be easier rather than harder to build that coalition because we will have convinced the countries in the region that we have taken every step we possibly could.
I hope the negotiations will succeed. SEN. ROBB: One final question with respect to the countries in the region, Mr. Secretary, there has been a new development in Japan in the last 24 hours or so.
CHRISTOPHER: Yes. SEN. ROBB: The Socialists have historically not been very forthright in suggesting the use of pressure against the North Koreans. I think it would be and understatement. Our U.S. Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, has suggested that a number of matters are more difficult when the leadership and the coalition that is governing it at a given moment in Japan is somewhat in doubt. Would you simply comment on the respective role of the new government in Japan with respect to the situation in North Korea as it exists and is it, as we anticipate discussing it in the talks at Geneva and immediately thereafter.
CHRISTOPHER: Senator, it's a very unusual situation. The coalition there, parties from two different viewpoints, I think, presents a challenging situation for the analysts. I talk to the Japanese ambassador, I guess the Japanese charge last night, the ambassador is not here. And he assured me that their position in international matters would have a sense of continuity about it. And we'll just have to watch the situation very carefully, very closely. We'll be meeting, no doubt, with the Japanese in Naples at the G-7 summit. I assume that the new prime minister will be present representing his country. I assume the new foreign minister, who is Mr. Kono (sp), will probably be there. I look forward to getting acquainted with him but there has been a tremendous turnover in Japan. I think I'm probably on about my fourth foreign minister in the short time that I've been there. I hope there will be a continuity of there policy with respect to North Korea but we'll have to watch that with great care.
SEN. ROBB: And maybe that you're meeting in Naples is the appropriate place for that kind of turnover at the government level but I shall not speculate further.
SEN. FEINGOLD: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Let me turn to a different issue. Indonesia. Your administration has offered a fair amount of rhetoric about human rights, and in fact you've even adopted some positions which support human rights. But I am becoming increasingly concerned about the implementation of these policies. And I'd like some clarification about Indonesia. As you know, every human rights organization in the world, as well as the State Department's own annual report, has sharply criticized Indonesia for it's brutal occupation of East Timor. We all know about the bloody massacre by Indonesian armed forces in East Timor in 1991. And despite international pressure the Indonesians have still not accounted for the missing or properly punished the officers involved. They haven't reduced the troop levels, Mr. Secretary, the commander of East Timor is now the vice president of Indonesia.
Earlier this month the Indonesians tried to bully the Philippines to ban a private conference on East Timor, not even to let them talk about it in another venue, in another country. And the violations go beyond East Timor. The military regime in Indonesia is guilty of countless human rights abuses with Indonesia itself. Just this week, the minister of information closed down three major journals and prohibits them from publishing. Peaceful demonstrators who protested these closures were beaten just this past week.
Mr. Secretary, quite frankly, the administration's response to this has been weak. The statement I saw says the U.S. strongly supports freedom of press, we therefore regret the Indonesian government's decision. I don't think a statement of regret hardly suffices for a condemnation of what this administration considers to be a fundamental freedom.
But even more disturbing, Mr. Secretary, is the administration's very confusing position on arm sales to Indonesia for use in East Timor. Earlier this year, before this committee, Assistant Secretary Winston Lord articulated the administration's position on Indonesia. He said we decided that we should come up with an approach that both those very much concerned with human rights and those concerned with other elements of Indonesia, and so on, could hopefully unite behind an arms sales policy. And he went on to say that the administration had actually adopted a policy of denying license requests for sales of small and light arms and lethal crowd control items as an expression of our concern for the human rights situation in Indonesia, and especially East Timor. And many of us expressed support for that statement and for that reasonable position.
Then in the foreign operations appropriations bill, Senator Leahy included a requirement that any agreement for the sale of any lethal equipment on the munitions list to Indonesia should state that the equipment that we send them cannot be used in East Timor. This was passed in committee. Mr. Secretary, it is a simple expression of our respect for human rights, and it's consistent with the administration's stated concerns about arms sales and human rights to Indonesia.
Yet, Mr. Secretary, late last night you sent a letter to Chairman Leahy opposing his language as unnecessary and inconsistent. You know better than I do the importance of symbolism in this area. If we are trying to communicate to the Indonesian government that they should not be using arms to oppress and torment the people of East Timor, I find it very difficult to understand how we can move in both directions at the same time, and I would like some clarification of what exactly your policy is and what you think the letter from last night signals to the Indonesian government.
CHRISTOPHER: Senator, let me assure you, or reassure you, that we are very concerned about the situation in East Timor. We raise it at the highest levels in our meetings. I raise it with the foreign minister every time I meet with him. It's a matter of deep concern to us. We're taking the steps that we think will be effective in trying to persuade them to adopt a more appropriate, a more pro- human rights policy in East Timor. We're also doing various things ourselves to try to be effective in that area.
Our AID program has tried to focus on the indigenous resources and indigenous people of East Timor. We have restricted the sale of light arms and crowd control equipment because we thought it was that kind of equipment that might be used in East Timor. I don't whether you've had access to the letter that I sent to Chairman Leahy last night, it's a two page letter, but it's a reflection of our point of view.
Now, one must always try to calculate what is most effective in the human rights field. That's an area where I've had a lot of experience, Mr. Feingold. It doesn't make me always right but it goes back a long ways in my life to the civil rights days and then in President Carter's administration to heading up the Interagency Committee on Human Rights. I know how difficult these questions are; to try to calibrate what will be most effective with a country; to try to assess what will be useful in dealing with a country of enormous pride and enormous importance to see if you can't move them in the right direction. My own judgment is that we're doing what is most useful in Indonesia with respect to East Timor, raising it constantly, trying to limit certain sales which might be used there inappropriately. I have to say that there is no absolute in this situation but from my experience, I think our policy is a pro-human rights policy and we'll continue to be pressing that with the leaders of Indonesia.
I'd like to talk to you about it some time in person, Senator, because trying to calibrate the right result in a human rights field is one of the real challenges of our time. We go through it with country after country and the progress is never -- I've never seen it be dramatic. I've seen it be incremental, move little by little by little. But what concerns me whether the trend is in the right direction. I think that there are some indications that the trend is in the right direction. There has been an accounting for some of the dead in East Timor. I think the degree of military presence is less than it's been in the past. But I'm certainly not satisfied with the result, Senator, and I'd look forward to coming up to your office sometime and talking about it.
SEN. FEINGOLD: I think that I agree with your view that we have to have a well calibrated approach but I -- and I have tried very hard to allow the administration to move forward some of the wise ideas you've had but to go forward and suddenly send forward a letter of this kind in effect triggering the United States Senate to take a position that is inconsistent with your own general tenor strikes me as not very well calibrated and undercut the cooperation that we had going on this issue. And I must say that to you because it was simply unnecessary.
The language was not grossly inconsistent with the policy that you have enunciated, and I think it sends a mixed signal to Indonesia and is not consistent with a well-calibrated approach to let them know that they've got to do a lot more before we're satisfied.
So I simply offer with respect my regret that that was done and hope that we can get back on track in terms of letting the government of Indonesia know that we will not as a country tolerate the kinds of abuse and repression of freedom of press not only in Indonesia but around the world that they are engaging in so that the story of East Timor cannot be told.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. PELL: Thank you very much. I can't resist saying that I was personally turned down from a trip to East Timor by the president at the time, Mr. Suharto, and I think that everything that Mr. Feingold has said is correct and share his views.
SEN. (R-SD): Let me turn to the issue of nuclear proliferation in Asia. It has been my concern that China is building a lot of nuclear weapons and has been proliferating. And China has a big military buildup. China doesn't seem to have any visible enemy, but I think at some point Japan will react if China continues to build more nuclear weapons. Also I think that India's nuclear program is fueled by China's. And in that regard, I know earlier this year the State Department proposed getting an agreement with Pakistan and India for a cap. But it would be my feeling that China would have to be involved in that agreement before India would agree to it.
Where do we stand on the China-India-Pakistan nuclear weapons? One country -- each country says the other one drives their need to have nuclear -- have more nuclear weapons.
CHRISTOPHER: Senator, we've identified that as one of the major proliferation problems that we face. We're trying to work with both countries. Deputy Secretary Talbott made a recent trip to the region in which he talked to both nations about capping their nuclear program as a first step. It's an unresolved problem but one that has a very high priority. I think it affects the broader issues that we've been talking about. Whether we can negotiate a comprehensive test ban and whether we can achieve an unlimited extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty I think will affect the attitudes in the subcontinent. But we're going to continue to work on that problem, trying to persuade both India and Pakistan that their nuclear programs are not a useful aspect of their security. You're right that China is related to that situation, and whether or not China needs to be -- is an essential part of any agreement is something that'll have to be addressed, because certainly the countries in the region tend to feel it has to be broader than simply bilateral.
SEN. PRESSLER: Well, have you concluded that the -- regarding Pakistan, what is the department's position presently on the -- on our limitation on aid and the sale of arms there so long as they are deemed to have a weapon?
Earlier this year the department was going to seek a repeal of that. I don't know if they ever proposed that, but what is the present position?
CHRISTOPHER: Well, our position at the present time, Senator, is certainly to enforce the law as it now exists, as we go forward with our negotiation, there may be some need to ask for an attenuation of the law of some kind, but at the present time we are enforcing the law that bears your name, but we also are trying to put it in a broader setting to see if we can't find some way to bring into a satisfactory regime the nuclear programs of both countries.
SEN. PRESSLER: Yes, the department seems to continue to nibble away at the edges. If you want to repeal it, then I think you should come up and seek repeal of it.
There is a project which was just sent over to me from the State Department involving completing a seismic facility in Pakistan that I believe would probably be -- fly in the face of that amendment. You may not be specifically acquainted with that, and I wouldn't expect you to be, but -- (inaudible due to background noise) -- for the record, or if you are familiar with it --
CHRISTOPHER: Senator, I am familiar with it, and I'm really quite mystified by your position on it. That is a seismic station which would help the world -- help the United States and help the world determine whether or not there had been a seismic event. This is a seismic monitoring facility. It's a -- it is really part of the non-proliferation regime. It's to try to achieve exactly the kind of things you are achieving, and I think -- I would think you would welcome that device to be stationed in Pakistan.
Whether or not it might technically violate the amendment because it contains some military hardware, the purpose of it is overwhelmingly favorable from the standpoint of limiting proliferation.
SEN. PRESSLER: Yes, well, it may require a change in the law is what I'm saying -- is my opinion, and I haven't taken a final position on it, but I've been looking at it very closely.
Well, let me ask you this: do you believe that India's nuclear program is driven by China's nuclear program?
CHRISTOPHER: I think that there is an interrelationship between all the programs. I wouldn't want to select out a particular driving force, but these force elements always are interrelated, and none of them is likely to be viewed in isolation.
SEN. PRESSLER: What do you view China's motive is in building up such a -- so much nuclear hardware as well as so much military? They have no apparent enemy.
CHRISTOPHER: I really can't speak for the -- for what the Chinese motive is. What they say their motive is is that they are far behind other countries. I can -- the most recent indication is their explanation of their test, which we strongly oppose.
But you really would have to try to get from the Chinese what their motive is. They clearly want to improve the quality of their nuclear arsenal. They claim that they're behind. We hope that they will not conduct further tests, and we thought the test they conducted was unwise and unnecessary.
SEN. PRESSLER: Well, I sense that the administration is very hesitant to criticize China very much, because I've raised these questions with Frank Wisner, who is a very able public servant, our ambassador to India presently. But he was -- when he was before the committee, he seemed -- or at least he made one statement that -- I asked him what the administration's view of China's military build-up was, and he indicated that he did not consider it a build-up. But that's contrary to a lot of the reports.
And it seems that the administration -- maybe it's so delicate, to keep things on a peaceful basis with MFN and so forth, but I think that what's being overlooked in the world military situation is the huge build-up, not only of nuclear weapons but of long-range missiles, of an intelligence system that's going throughout the world. It's really strange behavior on the part of China, with no apparent motive. Would you agree?
CHRISTOPHER: Senator, once again, I would not try to define for you the motive of the Chinese, but if you are looking for somebody to criticize the Chinese nuclear test, I'm here to do so. I think that was a very unfortunate thing for them to do. We've had a long period of moratorium. The first nation that breaks the moratorium tends to cause others to feel they have a license to do so, so I think that was a very unfortunate event.
SEN. PRESSLER: Now, what about Japan in this whole -- if China continues to build up her military and her nuclear weapons, will Japan sit still and allow that to happen, or will Japan get into the arms race? Are we facing, potentially in the next 10 years, a huge new arms race in Asia?
SEN. HELMS: They really worked you over regarding your pre-MFN -- I guess you could call it that -- trip to China, and that didn't turn out just as you and I and many others had hoped, but you conducted yourself admirably.
CHRISTOPHER: Senator, I've had quite a long connection with the Taiwan issue. I was the first American who went there after the normalization of relations with China and had a difficult time. But I think the progress under the Taiwan Relations Act, which I worked on when I was in government before, has been really quite stunning. Taiwan has been really a miracle in the economic progress they've made and their progress toward democracy is very commendable, too. They're now, I believe, our fifth largest trading partner, which is incredible, even more trade than with China. And so the relationship that we built in the Taiwan Relations Act and the Coordinating Council has certainly worked to the benefit of both nations.
And I think it's desirable that we have had a broad and deep review. I hope that will be released very soon. It will make some adjustments, I hope, in the direction that you want to achieve, Senator. I think they're well deserved.
As far as the high-level visits, I believe the minister of justice from Taiwan is in this country right now. So it isn't as if there has been a total absence of high-level visits.
SEN. HELMS: I'm talking about the other way. CHRISTOPHER: I understand. I don't want to try to foreshadow or guess at the results of the review, but all I can say, I think, is -- all I can safely say, Senator, is that there will be adjustments in the direction that you'd like to see them made. And I certainly would be very uncomfortable in a situation where the United States did not recognize the great progress that Taiwan has made. As you know, Taiwan has been represented at the APEC summit in Seattle, and I presume they would be represented again this year at the summit in Indonesia.
SEN. HELMS: There's nothing to the speculation that you are going to Vietnam later this year? Do you have any plans to go to Vietnam, North Vietnam?
CHRISTOPHER: Senator, I have no plans to go to Vietnam. At this very moment, I believe, Senator, Assistant Secretary Winston Lord is there, together with a delegation of veterans from all the major veterans organizations, to see what progress is being made in this period in which we have a liaison office about ready to open to see whether we're continuing to make progress on the POW and MIA front. The reports I've had in the last few days from veterans organizations is that they believe that progress continues and that we have managed our relationships in a way to encourage the Vietnamese to cooperate with us.
I don't have any plans at the present time. I can imagine that sometime in the future, if the progress is sufficient, if we feel that we're making real progress on the POWs and MIAs, that high ranking American officials should visit Vietnam. But as I say, I have no plans along those lines now.
SEN. HELMS: But that would be -- if, as and when, that would be after formal diplomatic relations are established?
CHRISTOPHER: Probably, Senator Helms. Although with a liaison office there I would not want to exclude my travel or the travel of some of my senior colleagues if it served the American purpose, if it served the purpose of greater progress on the POW and MIA front. President Clinton has made it clear that that is our policy with respect to Vietnam at the present time, and I'd want to do anything that I could or that my senior colleagues could to serve that purpose.
(end excerpts from Legi-Slate) NNNN
File Identification: 06/30/94, EPF405
Product Name: Wireless File
Product Code: WF
Keywords: CHRISTOPHER, WARREN/Speaker; KOREA (NORTH)-US RELATIONS; NEGOTIATIONS;
KOREA (NORTH)/Defense & Military; MILITARY CAPABILITIES; NUCLEAR WEAPONS; UNITED NATIONS-SECURITY COUNCIL; KOREA (SOUTH)-US RELATIONS; KOREA (NORTH)-KOREA
Document Type: TRA; EXC
Thematic Codes: 1AC; 1EA; 2FP; 1UN
Target Areas: EA
PDQ Text Link: 350950
USIA Notes: *94063005.EPF
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