U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
JUNE 24, 1994
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
I N D E X
Friday, June 24, 1994
Briefer: Michael McCurry
NORTH KOREA
Remarks by ACDA Director John Holland
on Nuclear Program ............................. 1
Third Round of Talks ............................. 2-5,23
--U.S./DPRK Meeting in New York .................. 4-5
Update on Assistant Secretary Gallucci's Meetings. 4
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPC #98
FRIDAY, JUNE 24, 1994, 1:05 P. M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
MR. McCURRY: Good afternoon, everybody. I'd like to
start with something and pick up from yesterday's briefing a
little bit, because I got a question yesterday about some
remarks that John Holland, the Director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency had made. Unfortunately I described
the interpretation of his remarks as being "curious", and
after talking to John, I am now certain that it is curious.
He, I think, was characterized in some news accounts as
having suggested that the Administration is more interested
in freezing the program than in going back and looking at the
history of that program, and I have looked carefully at the
transcript of what he said, and I am satisfied, based on what
he said, that in several places he indicated in his remarks
and his discussion with some Defense writers that the United
States is unwilling to dismiss the past as water under the
bridge, that we are going to have to resolve the
discrepancies that have existed in the program in the past,
and, looking at what he said, I think he made it pretty
clear, and he did say, obviously, that right now the past is
not going to change, as we prepare for this third round of
discussions, so of immediate concern to us is making sure
that the freeze that has been offered in major elements of
the program of the DPRK remains in place. He did say that,
but I would not want anyone to suggest from those remarks
that somehow or other we don't attach great importance to
resolving some of the outstanding questions that we have
about the history of North Korea's nuclear program.
Q Mike, while you bring it up, when they mixed the
rods in, and when they denied access to the waste sites, it
was said -- and obviously you've got to leave a little room
for hyperbole -- but it was said that they had pretty well
destroyed or blocked or prevented the accumulation of the
evidence of reconstructing that past.
Now, Mr. Gallucci has said there were other
opportunities, but I don't think I have ever heard what those
opportunities are.
Do you happen to be able at this point to tell us what
resources remain and whether the monitors are getting there
or will be able to get to them?
MR. McCURRY: I don't want to tread too directly into an
area that is within the technical competence of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, because they are the ones
that determine that what we had lost when the reactor was
defueled was irretrievable, that the ability to reconstruct
certain aspects of the operating history had been lost. But
they did suggest that there are other methods of determining
things about the history of the program, and they pointed
specifically to some suspect nuclear waste sites, as I
believe many of you know. They also indicated that there are
things you could do in reconstructing records about the
history of the program. There may be other issues, as well,
but that is within the technical competence of the IAEA to
suggest, and they are the ones that we look to, being the
international agency that monitors this type of activity, to
provide answers to those very technical types of questions.
Certainly if there are any other ways in which one could
explore the questions of what is the history of that reactor,
especially in the critical period in 1989 when it was
defueled, it would be advisable, and indeed we would consider
it important to explore those types of questions.
That's the type of thing now that -- type of issue that
can be raised during the course of a third round of talks.
Q Mike, I went over the communiques from the last
two sessions in June and July of last year, and the United
States and North Korea agreed to discuss such things as a
light water reactor and economic assistance, and all of those
things that the United States is again prepared to talk
about.
Can you tell me why this -- these sets of talks should
succeed, where the other set -- where the other sets of talks
about these issues did not succeed?
MR. McCURRY: Well, they were -- no, my understanding,
my recollection of the first two rounds of high level talks
is that they engaged on a variety of issues, and within the
context of the second round of high level talks, they more or
less established an agenda that would be available, could
both sides reach an understanding that a third round of high
level talks would be -- that there would be a premise for a
third round of high level talks.
I think the discussion of the things that are there and
available for discussion, such as light water reactor
technology, in the communique at the end of the second round,
were suggested as avenues that could be explored in the
future, based on some of the continuing dialogue.
But there were some aspects, there were certain things
that had to happen, certain understandings that we had to
have in order for that type of dialogue to continue, and
resolving those has been very much a part of the discussion
around this issue over the past several months.
Q Well, some people like Donald Gregg, even James
Lilley and others, have suggested that the United States
should be more specific and more forthcoming rather than
general in stating to the North Koreans publicly, perhaps,
what they might expect as a result of their cooperation and
ending their nuclear program and coming clean on other
things.
Is the United States prepared to do that?
MR. McCURRY: I'm not prepared, here and now to outline
in the presentation we will make to the DPRK in a third round
of talks, no. But I think we are well aware of the advice of
the two people you mentioned. In fact, if I am not mistaken,
I believe that at least one of them has had an opportunity to
sit with the President of the United States and talk about
exactly that kind of issue. Sid.
Q Does the Administration now think there is a new
political will at the highest levels of the Pyongyang
Government to resolve these issues?
MR. McCURRY: That is unknown. That's the type of --
that will be explored and determined in the course of the
coming discussions.
Q If I could follow up, so we are entering these
talks even though we don't see signs? We aren't sure whether
there are signs that Pyongyang is willing to actually settle
the issue?
MR. McCURRY: No. We are entering these talks based on
some very specific assurances that have been communicated to
us by the DPRK, including our understanding that they would
be willing to discuss fully implementing the requirements of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and their existing safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Those are very important understandings that serve as a
premise for a talk, as well as their specific indications to
us that they would freeze major elements of their program.
Carol.
Q Can you tell us about the meeting in New York
today?
MR. McCURRY: I can. It's not entirely conclusive, but
it should be very shortly. At the working level in our New
York channel, the United States met today with the DPRK.
They discussed logistical arrangements for the coming third
round of high level talks, which we expect to be held in
early July. We expect some further -- some follow-up
conversations after the meeting today, probably by telephone,
and we expect that both governments very shortly in each
capital will announce the formal date of the high level
talks.
Q Does "logistical arrangements" mean an agenda as
well? That sounds like agreement on what should be --
MR. McCURRY: My understanding is that there was no
extensive discussion of agenda, because I think both sides
are in large agreement already on the nature of the agenda.
We have suggested that there should be a broad and thorough
dialogue. The DPRK has suggested that they are interested in
what they often term a "package solution." I think both
sides have a common understanding of the elements that could
be included in that type of dialogue.
Yes.
Q Where is Bob Gallucci, and what has he reported?
MR. McCURRY: He is returning now from Vienna. He had
very productive meetings at the International Atomic Energy
Agency in Vienna, consulted with IAEA officials, including
Director General Blix, on aspects of the current effort by
the IAEA to assure continuity of safeguards at the Yongbyon
facility, and he also had a chance to explore with IAEA
officials aspects of the coming third round of high level
talks.
Q On the logistics side, it seems unlikely that all
these issues can be worked out in a very short period of
time. Are you expecting that there will be a series of
meetings? And how long is Gallucci going to go and meet for
in this first meeting?
MR. McCURRY: I think he is willing to tack for an
extended stay in.
Q Is the idea to try to do it all in one
negotiation, or to start a process where he would come back
here?
MR. McCURRY: It is not known. I think that they will,
as they have in the past, set out the arrangements for the
first sessions, and then they will see during the course of
those first sessions where the dialogue goes.
Q Is there any thought being given to bringing in at
some point representatives of other interested governments
into the talks? Are these going to be strictly bilateral?
MR. McCURRY: I haven't heard anything of that nature.
This is a bilateral discussion, as I understand it, but I
haven't seen a complete report on how the dialogue might
proceed. But, as I say, I understand that the discussion
today was logistic and was very positive and didn't seem to
be very complicated. They were just working out procedural
matters so that they could formally announce the date of the
third round very shortly.
Q Will it include anybody else on Gallucci's rank or
higher?
MR. McCURRY: He has been our lead negotiator --
Q Continuing?
MR. McCURRY: -- and my understanding is that he would
be expected to be the head of the U.S. delegation.
Q Will anybody else from the U.S. Government of an
equal rank or higher take part at any point that you know?
MR. McCURRY: Not that I understand at this point, no.
Q So you're expecting an announcement today?
MR. McCURRY: It depends on how -- both sides are
checking back on just some purely logistical things. It's
not too complicated, and in fact it's as mundane as questions
like, "Since they might meet over a weekend, which side stays
open over a weekend?" It's that type of question, so I think
that they're going to get into who gets to pay overtime, I
guess. But that type of thing, they need to check back and
forth, and if they can be in a position to announce that
today, they will, but the announcement will coincide in both
capitals.
...............
Q There's a question back there he's been trying to
get in.
MR. McCURRY: Yes.
Q Quickly on Korea --
MR. McCURRY: Thank you, Barry.
Q -- I have been waiting for a long time. Judging
from your remarks in the opening, could we interpret that
this Administration is placing exactly the equal importance
on the past as the placing on the future and the present?
That means that both of these are conditional on the overall
resolution of (inaudible)?
I ask this because if North Korea tries to put these two
things on the trade-off situations, what should be the United
States' position?
MR. McCURRY: It's an interesting question, but it takes
you straight into the type of dialogue that might occur in
the third round, which I can't do and won't do. But there is
something behind the question, I think, which I can address.
Our goal has been and will remain a non-nuclear Korean
peninsula. And I think in achieving that goal, understanding
the past history of the program, and making good on the
commitments that the DPRK has given us for a basis for the
current dialogue, are both important in reaching that goal.
So I guess the best way to say it is that you, in
resolving those questions in the past, is certainly the only
way we can know that we have achieved our goal for a non-
nuclear peninsula.
Q Thank you.,
MR. McCURRY: You're welcome.
(The briefing concluded at l:55 p.m.)
(###)
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