US DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
JUNE 20, 1994
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
I N D E X
Monday, June 20, 1994
Briefer: Michael McCurry
...............
NORTH KOREA
Attempts to Confirm Kim Il-song's Offer .........11-13,16
Bases for Resuming U.S./DPRK Dialogue............11-14
Information from IAEA on Diversion of Material ..13
Status of Sanctions Resolution ..................13-14
Christopher/Kozyrev Discussions on Resolution ...14
MTCR and other Non-Proliferation Concerns........15
Possibility of North/South Summit ...............15
.................
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPC #95
Monday, June 20, 194, 1:25 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE
NOTED)
....................
Q Korea.
MR. McCURRY: Korea. I promised --
Q Could you bring us up to date on what
you're doing to try to nail down the veracity or
sincerity of the North Korea proposal? Are
there talks in New York today?
MR. McCURRY: I can only tell you that we
are going to move to confirm Kim Il-song's offer
through diplomatic channels this week. The
details on how we will do that, I just don't
have available.
Q Is the Secretary talking to anybody
about this? Have you made any phone calls about
this?
MR. McCURRY: The Secretary has discussed
North Korea with some of his foreign
counterparts. I don't believe he has had a
discussion following up the matters that were
discussed at the White House this weekend.
Q Was he there yesterday for that
briefing?
MR. McCURRY: No, he was not. He was
returning from California, I believe, yesterday.
Q Michael, what sort of manifestation
of this commitment from the North Koreans are
you looking for? Is it a piece of paper, a
meeting? What exactly is it you want from them?
Not what you'd ask for. How do you want them to
--
MR. McCURRY: We would like to see a basis
for resuming a dialogue with North Korea, and
that basis would be restored if North Korea
clarified certain things that had been said to
indicate that they are freezing major elements
of their nuclear program while these prospective
talks take place, and that they are not
refueling the reactor nor reprocessing any of
the spent fuel that has been removed from the
reactor; and that they are maintaining
continuity of IAEA safeguards at the facility.
Q But the reactor issues aside, do you
want a piece of paper from them? Do you want a
letter? Is their word good enough? What about
this --
MR. McCURRY: We want to seek, as you would
expect in diplomatic channels, the type of
confirmation that would satisfy the United
States and senior policy-makers in this
government that they are committed to doing
exactly those things that I just indicated.
Q What would satisfy the -- what is it
that would satisfy the U.S. Government. I mean,
I understand what -- I hear clearly what you're
saying, but what do you want to flow out of this
conversation?
MR. McCURRY: We want to see some very
specific things about some very specific points
I just made -- commitments on no reprocessing,
no refueling, and an IAEA continuity of
safeguards presence that would allow us to be
absolutely certain that those things are being
met.
Q Will the inspectors who are there be
able to do those things or confirm these things,
the freezing, the non-reprocessing?
MR. McCURRY: They should be. I mean,
that's a question I really must refer to the
IAEA, because they're in the best position to
tell you how they can technically verify things
that are within IAEA as a safeguards regime.
They should be in a position to be able to do
those things, I would think.
Q So that are we leaving it up to the
IAEA, as we have in the past, to decide whether
North Korea has lived up to what it has
apparently told Carter?
MR. McCURRY: No. As I indicated, the
United States will be moving through diplomatic
channels to seek confirmations from North Korea.
Q Is it at all possible that the United
States would send an official representative to
North Korea?
MR. McCURRY: I don't want to speculate
about diplomatic channels. I just don't have
those details available. I've told you all I
can tell you.
Q Is that a possibility that you're
considering?
MR. McCURRY: I don't want to speculate
that that will be a possibility or not a
possibility. I don't have any details.
Q But you're not ruling it out.
MR. McCURRY: I didn't say that. I said I
have no details that would allow me to speculate
on how that diplomatic channel might be pursued.
I just don't have any information that I can
share with you.
Q Do you have any information on
whether they mean the same thing -- North Korea
means the same thing by freezing as those steps
you laid out, or is that the thing you're
waiting to get confirmation on?
MR. McCURRY: Freezing major elements of
their program, which would include assurances
that there are no reprocessing and no refueling
of the reactor are specific commitments. We can
be assured in specific ways that that confirms
the substance of what was presented by President
Carter based on his discussions with Kim Il-
song.
Q Does the United States have any
independent ways, aside from the IAEA, of
determining that?
MR. McCURRY: I can't answer that without
discussing how. Again, you understand,
probably.
Q Can you say "yea" or "nay" on whether
the United States, short of sending somebody
over there to take a look --
MR. McCURRY: The best and, as we have
indicated, the proper way is to have an IAEA
safeguards presence that can assure continuity
of safeguards.
Q Let me follow up on this subject just
briefly, and then I have another question, Mike.
Is the United States Government confident at the
present time with the two inspectors and the
cameras and whatever else the IAEA has set up
and from the reports we're getting from them
that no fuel has been diverted from the cooling
pond, no rods have been taken out? Are we
satisfied about this?
MR. McCURRY: It is our understanding,
based on what we have heard from the IAEA, that
there's been no diversion of material subsequent
to the defueling of the five megawatt reactor.
Q And they are able to certify this?
MR. McCURRY: They are able to provide us
information consistent with that.
Q Do you think President Carter's visit
to North Korea has made any difference in U.S.
effort to get consensus of the tensions against
North Korea at the Security Council?
MR. McCURRY: No. There's been no change
in our desire to consult with other members of
the Security Council and continue our efforts in
New York to build an international consensus on
a sanctions approach that would work in
convincing North Korea that it must live up to
its international obligations relating to non-
proliferation.
Q That's different from a sanctions
resolution?
MR. McCURRY: No. A sanctions resolution is
what is under discussion, and the text of that
remains a subject of diplomacy underway by
Ambassador Albright today, and I'm sure will be
part of the Secretary's meetings on Wednesday
with the Russian Foreign Minister.
Q Mike, the other day Gallucci said
that if the high-level U.S.-North Korean talks
were to resume, that would presumably suspend
the talks about sanctions. If there were to be
a North-South Korean summit, would that also
make the sanction resolution moot?
MR. McCURRY: I think we'd have to discuss
that at the point we actually see such a summit
take place. It's not profitable to speculate on
what might happen to a draft resolution until
such time as a summit of that nature actually
took place.
The premise for a U.S.-DPRK dialogue is the
one that I indicated to you earlier.
Q My question originally was on the
sanctions issue, and I'll just ask your comment
on this -- from the Wall Street Journal today.
It says that, "Pyongyang's conciliatory rhetoric
as transmitted by Carter has all but derailed
for now the U.S. effort to win U.N. Security
Council approval of a two-phase sanctions plan
against Pyongyang." Is that accurate?
MR. McCURRY: There's an interpretative
analysis written in the New York Times, and so
labeled, I believe, as "news analysis." I can't
comment on the --
Q The Wall Street Journal.
MR. McCURRY: The Wall Street Journal.
Q Today.
MR. McCURRY: Another learned publication.
I believe they're expressing that as an opinion
and not as a fact. I just am not in a position
to dissect it.
Q Just one other follow-up, if I might.
Will Mr. Kozyrev and our Secretary of State be
discussing the sanctions dispute in Brussels?
MR. McCURRY: I believe they will be
discussing the sanctions resolution when they
meet in Brussels, yes.
Q Can you explain why the Secretary
wasn't at the debrief yesterday by former
President Carter?
MR. McCURRY: He was out of town on a
personal trip to California, but he remained in
telephone contact, I believe, with all of the
principles, and certainly with Ambassador
Gallucci who was there. I believe Assistant
Secretary Lord was there as well, and he had
extensive conversations with them throughout the
day.
Q Mike, while all this is going on with
the IAEA, is the Administration at all concerned
about North Korean compliance with the Missile
Technology Control Regime?
MR. McCURRY: I'm sure we are, and we have
MTCR-related concerns in the past --
principally, arms transactions that involve Iran
and Syria. We've talked about those here before
in the past. That remains a fundamental concern
of ours as we discuss the North Korean nuclear
program. It's not only the acquisition of a
device or the enhancement of a program. It's
also the ability to proliferate weapons of mass
destruction through their own types of arms
sales and transfers.
Q Have these MTCR issues been
considered in planning for the possibility for
asking for sanctions at the U.N.? Or will it
solely be a nuclear issue?
MR. McCURRY: I'm not sure. Our concern in
raising a sanctions resolution, as it relates to
North Korea, extends to a range of non-
proliferation concerns. I'd say we are seeking
sanctions because we expect North Korea to abide
by certain non-proliferation norms that go
beyond a nuclear program and also get into the
proliferation of arms technologies.
Q Do you have any (inaudible) comment
on the agreement of a summit meeting between
South and North Korea?
MR. McCURRY: We would welcome the
convening of a summit between the Presidents of
South and North Korea. It would be a
constructive first step to resolve their
differences through dialogue.
Q I can't remember. Were you asked
specifically whether there were any meetings
scheduled this week in New York with North
Korea?
MR. McCURRY: I think I gave the answer
that I had to give on that.
Q You didn't say one way or the other.
MR. McCURRY: I just said we will move to
confirm the offer this week through diplomatic
channels that I don't have any details on.
Q I want to get this straight. You
have left open the possibility -- though you
didn't say -- that somebody might travel to
North Korea. You left them the possibility --
MR. McCURRY: No. I never even opened the
possibility. I just said I didn't have enough
information to even speculate on such a thing.
Q I want to ask you if you are
considering -- you said you're not going to
answer the question. How would --
MR. McCURRY: We could play the message in
a bottle. I told you, I'm not speculating on
the way in which we are going to conduct this.
I've got no details.
Q But you left open --
MR. McCURRY: I've no details for you how
we will do this. Don't think that this is not
painful for me. (Laughter)
Q Considering that the smart people who
write those guidance understands how the press
thinks, speculation is therefore left to us as
to whether the United States might be
considering direct contacts with the North
Koreans on a higher level than the New York
venue.
MR. McCURRY: I don't want to speculate on
that. I certainly understand you free to
speculate on it. When we give answers like
this, you speculate even more and maybe that's
something people will begin to understand a
little.
.............
(Press briefing concluded at 2:04 p.m.)
(###)
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