THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
______________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release June 16, 1994
PRESS BRIEFING BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS ROBERT GALLUCCI
The Briefing Room
4:52 P.M. EDT
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I'm going to begin by
first reading a statement.
The United States welcomes indications given to
President Carter that North Korea desires to find a constructive
solution to the very serious issues between North Korea and the
international community.
The United States has always been ready to engage in a
third round of talks under the proper circumstances. In this
connection, we note North Korea's assurances that IAEA inspectors and
IAEA monitoring equipment would be kept in place. We also note North
Korea's desire to replace its gas graphite fuel cycle with more
proliferation-resistant light water technology, and its willingness
to return to full compliance with the Nonproliferation Treaty and
IAEA safeguards, including special inspections, as part of an overall
settlement of this issue.
That could be a constructive step if it means that North
Korea is also committed to freezing the major elements of its nuclear
program while new talks took place. That is, not refueling the
reactor or reprocessing the spent fuel it has just removed, and
permitting the IAEA to maintain the continuity of safeguards.
After confirming this meaning of the message from North
Korea in diplomatic channels, we would be prepared to go a third
round, acting as we have before, pursuant to U.N. resolutions.
Meanwhile, we are continuing to consult on our sanctions resolution
at the Security Council.
Q Secretary Gallucci, why would we go to a third
round at this time when we still have not been satisfied about the
prior -- violations?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: We have, from the
beginning of the effort to engage the North Koreans bilaterally,
described a basis for these talks. And the basis for the talks
involve a number of elements. Among those elements was an element
that described the requirement that the North Koreans not discharge
fuel from their reactor without providing for adequate IAEA
safeguards.
The reason for that is because when the fuel is
discharged from the reactor, it is possible if the IAEA can do what
it wants to do, for the agency to figure out what happened in 1989,
to get at the cause of this problem in the first place.
The reason we are not talking to the North Koreans today
is because, although they met the other bases for our dialogue, at
the end of May and through early June, they did discharge fuel
without the adequate safeguards. What we said at that point is we
would return the matter to the Security Council. We also said that
if an adequate basis could be established, we would, of course,
always return to talk with the North Koreans.
Our objective in this matter is not to seek sanctions;
seeking sanctions is a means. The objective, of course, is to get
the North Koreans to the table to discuss this issue and resolve it.
And that's what we're aiming to do. The point today, I think for
you, is that there may be, in this message, a basis for returning to
talks with the North Koreans.
Q Should we delay the sanctions then? Should we
delay the resolution or should we proceed in trying to get support
for the resolution since it has its own built-in delay?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: As I indicated, we are at
the United Nations in New York today, continuing our consultations on
sanctions. At the same time, we plan to explore in diplomatic
channels the meaning of the message we received today.
Q Why do you need further explanation? Don't you
think President Carter is able to convey a message? You don't trust
his words?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: We listened very
carefully to President Carter today, and we understood his message, I
think in whatever detail President Carter conveyed it to us. This is
a complicated matter. There are elements, as I tried to indicate in
the statement, which remain to be clarified.
Our intention is, in fact, through diplomatic channels
to try to clarify those elements. If the message conveys the kind of
meaning that I indicated, namely that the North Koreans are prepared
to take particular steps to reestablish the basis for a dialogue --
and that is the suspension of reprocessing, suspension of refueling
of the reactor, and maintaining the continuity of of safeguards --
under those circumstances, we would find the basis adequate to resume
a dialogue.
Q Mr. Gallucci, in the past you've said that the
North Koreans should discuss these nuclear issues with the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and not with the United States,
that if they made progress with the IAEA, that would set the stage
for a higher level resumption of discussion with the United States.
Is the Clinton administration now backing away from that position and
opening up the door to direct technical negotiations with North
Korea, skirting the IAEA?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: No. All along, the
United States has made it clear that when it gets down to ultimately
what is acceptable in terms of international safeguards, it is going
to be a matter for the IAEA to set that standard. That's what it
does.
What we have been doing is undertaking a dialogue with
the North Koreans when the circumstances were right for such a
dialogue -- and they have not, I remind you, been right, since last
July -- in order to establish a basis for the IAEA to continue its
effort of the North Koreans to apply the correct safeguards. That
will still be the objective of a dialogue. It'll still be to create
circumstances in which the North Koreans can come into compliance
with IAEA safeguards.
The determination of when they're in compliance will not
be made by the United States, it will be made by the IAEA.
Q Mr. Carter seemed to think he had the breakthrough
today. I take it from what you're saying here today that it might
be, but you can't tell.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I think it's fair to say
that we've looked at the message, we see possibly some new elements
in the message, we will be exploring the meaning of the message in
diplomatic channels, and only after we're able to do that will we be
able to characterize it.
Q Will you also see, possibly, an attempt here to
create an atmosphere in which sanctions are less likely to buy more
time?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Our objective here is not
to buy more time.
Q Them.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Oh, I see. you're talking
about the interpretation that the North Koreans -- yes, I don't --
Q Can we get that answer on camera, please?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: The question was, as I
understand it, might this be an effort by the North Koreans to stall
and buy more time. Is that correct?
I'm well past myself trying to interpret the motivation
of North Korea. And what I will tell you is, we will look at what
they say and what they are prepared to do, and we'll act on that
basis.
Q Sir, you sounded rather degrading of Mr. Carter.
Why don't you join us? Aren't you happy that he's gotten to some
conclusion? He's gone farther along than you all have.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Our reaction -- the
question is, why don't I have more joy, I guess, at what Mr. Carter
has accomplished. I think we're going to wait until we can actually
determine what the content of that message is before we respond with
any more joy than we now have.
Q There's one thing that President Carter clearly
accomplished that you all had not accomplished. Namely, he extracted
a commitment from North Korea not to eject the inspectors, and he did
so in an interesting way: he did so by speaking directly with the
senior leader of North Korea who he said was not well-informed about
the likelihood that they were about to be ejected.
It raises questions, does it not, about the American
strategy of declining to address these issues with senior North
Korean officials in the past? Here, you have a private citizen
going, or someone you have described as a private citizen repeatedly,
not as an official government emissary, making headway when, and not
as part of the government, but really outside of the government's
effort. Does that cause you to engage in any self-questioning about
the approach that you've taken over the past months?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Jeff, I always engage in
self-questioning, but not on this point. My feeling about this, as I
said before, is I don't really know what North Korean motivations
are. The proposition, I think, that underlies your question is that
somehow or other, because of a failure to communicate up until now.
Kim Il Sung did not understand that we wished the inspectors to be
there, and with Jimmy Carter in front of him, he was able to discern
that objective of ours.
That, to me, appears, with all due respect, ludicrous.
I do not know what the purpose of the decision of the North Koreans
at this point to make this offer. What is important is that you
have, I think, correctly identified an element which is
interesting -- namely, a commitment to leave the inspectors in place.
By the way, I would note to you that leaving the
inspectors in place is something the Security Council, by
presidential statement, required the North Koreans to do, but indeed
the commitment is new.
Q There are two things. The IAEA said earlier this
month that they lost continuity on those fuel rods. Is there some
way that genie can be put back in the bottle and you can regain them?
Secondly, what is the response to Mr. Carter's hope and suggestion
that Mr. Clinton speak directly to Kim?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Okay. The IAEA did not
say they lost continuity on the fuel rods. The question of
continuity of safeguards is, in fact, not a problem at the moment in
North Korea, and has not been now for about a month or so. It was
reaffirmed, the continuity of safeguards knowledge, with the last
inspection that occurred in May. And it was on the basis of that
inspection that we had announced our willingness to go to a third
round.
What happened with the discharge of fuel by the North
Koreans without proper IAEA safeguards, is that the agency lost the
ability to use that methodology, namely the analysis of the fuel, to
determine what happened in 1989. That loss is, by the agency's own
characterization, irrevocable. And that was an important method of
getting at the truth of what happened in 1989. There are some
others, including special inspections. Those are still open to the
agency when, and if, the North Koreans permit the agency to do such
inspections.
Q What about the other question about the possibility
of a direct conversation? Has Mr. Carter suggested that President
Clinton speak directly to President Kim?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: There were a number of
ideas and suggestions, I think, coming from President Carter, and I
think I'll let him speak to that.
Q Bob, what specifically do you need diplomatically
from North Korea in order to engage in a third round of talks? Do
you need a written message, or a written pledge or promise? And how
will you hold those talks? Will it be Mr. Hubbard and his Korean
counterpart in New York?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: What I anticipate without
going into overwhelming detail, Lee, is that we will probably use a
New York channel as the open diplomatic channel we have to the North
Koreans, to get at the meaning of today's message. And beyond that,
in terms of what we understand that they are prepared to do, and what
we will require to do, I think has to be a matter of consultation
within government, which, quite frankly, today we have not had time
to do.
Q Has there been come communication by the
administration of your willingness to provide the North Koreans with
the light water technology that they're after? Will that be part of
the third round, or have you communicated that, or did Carter
communicate it in some way?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: In the July round, the
second round, the North Koreans raised the subject of giving up
graphite moderated reactor technology if they could be provided with
a light water reactor. We, at the time, in a joint statement,
indicated that we are willing to commit ourselves to helping bring
that about as part of an ultimate settlement, and that is still our
position.
That does not mean that we would finance a light water
reactor. It does not mean that we would provide a light water
reactor or even provide any technology. It means that we are
prepared to be helpful in having the North Koreans obtain one. And
there are many countries that can provide that technology.
Q In what way would it be helpful?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Well, I think that would
be left to a third round discussion as we find out exactly what's on
their mind as well.
Q How long ago did you speak to President Carter and
how long did the conversation last?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Hours. More than five
hours ago is the last time I spoke with him.
Q How many times?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I spoke to him, myself,
once.
Q Did he tell you -- did he talk to the President?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I'm going to go this far:
He did not talk to the President of the United States, and I would
rather not go into who else he talked to. I'm certainly prepared to
tell you I talked to him, though.
Q Did he tell you he was going to do an interview
with CNN right after he spoke with you?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: Yes, he did.
Q Did you have any problem with his going public like
that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I did not express a view.
Q There were some critical words from Moscow today
about the way the U.S. is going about pursuing sanctions. Has there
been a kind of breach with Moscow, and to get any contact with
Russian officials today?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I think as you know, the
Russians have had a view, particularly, about the role a conference
might play in sanctions resolution, and ultimately a resolution of
the issue. Since we have, I believe as of yesterday, began to
consult in detail with the Permanent Five members of the Security
Council over our sanctions resolution. Those consultations are
ongoing and certainly they're ongoing with the Russians. I really
can't go into the detail of those consultations.
Q A new problem with Russia?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: What I think is that
Russia and other states both the permanent and non-permanent members
are going to have their own views about what ought to be in that
resolution. And that is normal and usual at the United Nations when
there is a resolution on the table, particularly of this type.
Q What is your understanding about what the North
Koreans said about the idea of freezing their nuclear activities, the
ones in dispute -- the refueling. In a way that is something they
can do on an interim basis because it's not really an issue yet? The
rods are in a cooling pool for the next period of weeks or months, so
it is a no-cost give-up for them? What is their position on that?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: It's indeed, as I think I
indicated in my opening statement, exactly what their position is, is
of real interest to us. If, as I indicated, for example, we can
understand by that, and they are prepared to confirm that they will
not engage in reprocessing, that is, the separation of plutonium from
the fuel rods that are not in the pond, and they will not refuel the
reactor and they will continue to accept IAEA continuity of
safeguards inspections, then that's an interpretation that would
provide a basis for a third round. But it is precisely that, that we
need -- is one of the issues we need to discern.
Q You're not -- the President -- that that is
specifically what President Carter was told, or were you essentially
coming back to them with an additional request for --
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: We took -- we understood
from the message that President Carter passed to us that they were
prepared to take certain steps, such as leaving the inspectors in
place, allowing them to stay, and they also described their
willingness in the course of a third round to address other issues
that we are very interested in.
We do not yet know, cannot at this point, confirm that
the elements I described to you they also meant to convey or are
prepared to convey at some point in the future. It is that point,
among others, that we still need to clarify.
Q In effect, you will come back with an additional
condition for a third round -- the additional condition that they
explicitly agree to freeze these activities?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: I would discourage you
from that interpretation. What I would say is that we have, all
along for a year, had a basis for a dialogue, that very recently,
they undercut that basis in such a way that we were forced to return
the issue to the Security Council, while telling them that it was
always possible, and it must always be possible to reestablish a
basis for a dialogue.
What I was doing at this point was describing to you a
way in which the dialogue could be reconvened, in which we could
restart it, a way that draws from, possibly, the message we received
today, but not in such a way that I could say that it was part of the
message, and therefore something we wished to follow up through
further diplomatic contacts.
Q You were asked earlier whether you thought they
were stalling, and you said you couldn't tell what their motivations
were. At what point in time, though, does continuing this dialogue
or this debate become hazardous in terms of their nuclear program?
At what point in time are you concerned that they change the status
quo?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GALLUCCI: That's a very important
question. Because as we engage in a dialogue with North Korea, that
is bound to come up as we have passed the one year mark in our effort
to do that. But I would draw your attention to the bases for the
dialogue once again. And that is that there be no separation of
plutonium, that they maintain the continuity of safeguards, and as I
indicated, they not refuel the reactor.
What I'm telling you is, over the last year, as this
administration has tried to pursue a dialogue with the North Koreans,
we have had a basis for the dialogue which assured that not a single
additional gram of plutonium would be separated. It is our intent,
if we resume that dialogue now, that there not be a single additional
gram of plutonium produced. That's what happens when you don't
refuel the reactor.
So I'm -- at this moment, depending upon, again, what
the meaning of the message is today, I'm not concerned about a
stalling tactic that disadvantages us. I think over the longer term,
certainly we do insist, as we said last year, on achieving some
progress, because they are right now in violation of IAEA safeguards
commitments, they're in violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty
commitments. The Security Council can expect to take up that issue
unless there is an ongoing diplomatic effort aimed at its resolution.
We are moving to the Security Council now because that diplomatic
effort was put aside because of what the North Koreans did.
What may be happening now is there may be a basis to
reengage. That's what we'll have to explore. Thank you very much.
END 5:05 P.M. EDT
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