Tracking Number: 339609
Title: Background information on US-North Korea relations, nuclear policy on the Korean peninsular, International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, and North Korea-South Korea
relations. (940412)
Date: 19940412
Text:
*PNK000 04/12/94 * POLICY NOTE
Policy Note on North Korea
The following Policy Note is intended for use by U.S. Government personnel at embassies abroad as a source of accurate, current information about significant U.S. foreign policy issues. It is not intended for publication. It seeks to update readers on recent and current USG policy on North Korea.
Index: The following sources have been used in writing this Policy Note.
1. April 7, 1994 Announcement of State Department Policy Steering Committee on Korea
2. April 11, 1993 State Department Statement as part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation depository states on DPRK's NPT withdrawal announcement.
3. February 28, 1994 State Department Announcement of Agreement from State Guidance Cable
4. March 3, 1994 State Department Announcement of Third-Round Talks
5. March 16, 1994 IAEA Press Release
6. March 24, 1994 State Department Announcement on Russian Proposal
7. UNSC President's Statement
8. Additional references suggested: Secretary of Defense Perry on NBC TV's "Meet the Press" April 3 Secretary Christopher on NBC TV's "Meet the Press" April 10
The following is a compilation of guidance organized and edited to provide context for the Policy Notes Package.
President Establishes New Policy Steering Group
President Clinton has directed the establishment of a Senior Policy Steering Group on Korea, chaired by Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. The establishment of the senior-level group reflects the importance that the Administration places on efforts to find a solution to this critical international issue. (doc. #1)
U.S. Support for Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula and IAEA Inspections
The United State supports a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, and believes that North Korea's (DPRK) adherence to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and implementation of the North-South Declaration of Denuclearization support that goal.
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty obligates North Korea to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect its nuclear facilities, unchallenged, to determine that it is maintaining mandatory safeguards and adhering to the NPT. As a United Nations agency, the IAEA has the authority to determine if a member state is adhering to the treaty requirements and decide upon what tests are necessary to make that determination. The IAEA reports to the UN and can make recommendations based upon its inspection finding.
In response to North Korea's March 1993 announcement that it was to withdraw from the NPT, the United States along with the Republic of Korea and other countries has sought to persuade North Korea to help achieve a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula through its full adherence to the NPT, acceptance of full scope safeguards, and implementation of the February, 1992 North-South Declaration of Denuclearization. (doc. #2)
A February 26, 1994 statement released by the State Department announced an agreement with North Korea which represented a significant move toward this end. The agreement specified that the announcement of a date for a third round of high-level U.S.-North Korea talks would take place when the IAEA inspection began on March 1. On March 1 announcements on the U.S.-Republic of Korea "Team Spirit" exercises were to take place. Also ROK-DPRK working level talks to arrange a dialogue on intra-Korean Issues, including the nuclear issue, through an exchange of special envoys were to begin on March 1. (doc. #3)
The U.S. undertakings regarding "Team Spirit '94" and the third round of U.S.-North Korean talks were based on the premise that IAEA inspections were to be fully implemented and the South-North Dialogue was to resume through the exchange of special envoys.
When IAEA inspections began, per the February 26 statement, the U.S. announced it would meet with North Korea, and South Korea announced that it and the U.S. had suspended "Team Spirit '94". (doc. #4)
The IAEA announced in its press release of March 16 that the North Koreans had not allowed it to complete the tests which they had agreed upon and scheduled to be carried out during an IAEA inspection visit, March 1-15, necessary to confirm that nuclear materials have not been diverted for other uses. (doc. #5)
North-South talks at Panmunjon, March 19, broke off without any agreement to exchange special envoys and without any agreement to meet again at the working level.
North Korea's refusal to implement the IAEA inspections and resume high-level dialogue with South Korea has resulted in a diplomatic impasse and increased tensions. North Korea has reacted with harsh language to possible U.N. actions meant to force it to fully comply with the IAEA inspection requirements and to carry out dialogue with the Republic of Korea.
U.S. Commitments to South Korea
The U.S. has a commitment to defend the ROK under the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. Together with our Korean allies, we are taking steps to be ready to meet any contingency. As part of our review of the security of our defensive forces in the Republic of Korea, we are deploying Patriot missiles, a defensive system which responds to North Korea's deployment of SCUD missiles. The U.S. is also reviewing with the Republic of Korea the status of the joint exercise, "Team Spirit '94."
U.S. Supports UN to Resolve North Korean Nuclear Issue
The U.S. believes that the U.N. is the most appropriate forum for the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. The U.S. has welcomed Russia's support for U.N. resolutions on this matter, and will consult with our allies--particularly the Republic of Korea and Japan-- as we consider a Russian proposal to hold an international conference to address the nuclear issue. (doc. #6)
The international community is determined to see North Korea fulfill its international non-proliferation obligations, and any measures adopted by the U.N. would be aimed at that objective. The U.S. welcomed the UN Security Council President's statement which called upon North Korea to allow completion of IAEA inspections that were interrupted in March, and to resume dialogue with the Republic of Korea. (doc. #7)
The U.S. will continue to consult with Seoul and Tokyo about possible next steps. According to an April 7 State Department Guidance, we currently have no plans for meetings with North Korea, but we are in informal contact by telephone.
The United States' objective is a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula. Any diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue should included the following essential elements:
1. Full North Korean adherence to the NPT. 2. North Korean acceptance of full-scope safeguards. 3. Full implementation of the North-South Declaration of Denuclearization. 4. Recognition that peace and security on the Korean peninsula are first and foremost a question for the Korean people to decide.
It is now time for North Korea to respond constructively to the Security Council President's statement by cooperating fully with the IAEA. North Korea can participate more fully in the international community if it resolves the nuclear issue.
The United States wants to be prepared for any eventuality, but it seeks to resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue and diplomacy, provided we have assurance that North Korea is not building its nuclear capacity as we pursue a settlement.
Requests for additional information should be directed by cable or FAX to P/G, attn. Bruce K. Byers
Prepared by: USIA, P/G, Bruce K. Byers, Senior Policy Officer EA, Thomas Carmichael, Assistant Policy Officer
P/G FAX No.: 202-205-0655 NNNN
File Identification: 04/12/94, PNK000
Product Name: Policy Note, North Korea
Product Code: PN
Keywords: KOREA (NORTH)-US RELATIONS; NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION;
KOREA (NORTH)-KOREA (SOUTH) RELATIONS; INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY; NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT); MILITARY CAPABILITIES
Thematic Codes: 1EA; 1AC
Target Areas: AF; AR; EA; EU; NE
PDQ Text
Link: 339609
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