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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

V. Strict Control over the Transfer
of Sensitive Materials and
Military Equipment

The transfer of sensitive materials and military equipment is a majorissue in the field of international arms control and disarmament and onewhich China has consistently approached with the utmost gravity.

China supports the three major goals set forth in the Treaty on theNon-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): preventing the spread of nuclearweapons, accelerating nuclear disarmament, and promoting internationalcooperation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. China has consistentlystood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclearweapons, pursuing a policy of not supporting, encouraging or engaging inthe proliferation of nuclear weapons and not assisting any other countryin the development of such weapons. At the same time, China holds thatpreventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons should not proceed withoutdue regard for the just rights and interests of all countries in the peacefuluse of nuclear energy, particularly in the case of developing countries.There must not be a double standard whereby anti-nuclear proliferationis used as a pretext to limit or retard the peaceful use of nuclear energyby developing nations.

China holds that the safeguard regime of the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) is an important component of the efforts to assure the effectivenessof the NPT. Even prior to acceding to the treaty, China undertookto fulfill the obligations stipulated by the IAEA Statute, including theobligation to apply IAEA safeguard. Since 1992 when it became a party tothe treaty, it has strictly fulfilled all its obligations under the Treaty,including the obligation to cooperate fully with the IAEA in safeguardapplication. China follows three principles regarding nuclear exports:exports serving peaceful use only, accepting IAEA's safeguards and no retransfersto a third country without China's consent. Only specialized government-designatedcompanies can handle nuclear exports and in each instance they must applyfor approval from relevant governmental departments. All exports of nuclearmaterials and equipment will be subject to IAEA safeguard. China has neverexported sensitive technologies such as those for uranium enrichment, reprocessingand heavy water production.

With a view to supporting IAEA safeguard, in November, 1991, China officiallydeclared that on a continuing basis it would report to the IAEA any exportto or import from non-nuclear-weapon states involving nuclear materialsof one effective kilogramme or above. In July, 1993, China formally promisedthat it would voluntarily report to the agency any imports or exports ofnuclear materials, and all exports of nuclear equipment and related non-nuclearmaterials.

In 1985, China declared that it would of its own free will submit partof its civilian nuclear facilities to the IAEA for safeguards. In 1988China and the IAEA signed an agreement on voluntary safeguard, under whichChina provided the IAEA with a listing of facilities subject to such safeguardand established SSAC. The system is supervised, administered and operatedrespectively by the competent government department, the facility concernedand technological support unit. The competent government department isresponsible for organizing the implementation of the safeguard agreementbetween China and the IAEA. The nuclear facility management isresponsible for establishing measurement, recording and reporting regimesin line with the requirements of the agreement, as well as receiving on-siteinvestigations by IAEA inspectors.

China has consistently advocated the complete prohibition and thoroughdestruction of chemical weapons. It does not produce or possess chemicalweapons. China was in the first group of countries to sign the Conventionon the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Useof Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and joined in the work ofthe Preparatory Commission of the Organization for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons in a conscientious and constructive manner. China itself sufferedgreatly from chemical weapons in the past. Large quantities of chemicalweapons abandoned by Japanese aggressor troops are found in China to thisday, which still threaten the safety and lives and the living environmentof the local people. China demands that, in keeping with the stipulationsof the convention, the country leaving chemical weapons in another countrydestroy all such weapons as soon as possible. China hopes that the conventionwill go into effect at an early date and be thoroughly and effectivelyimplemented, so as to free mankind as soon as possible from the threatof chemical weapons and bring about a world free of such weapons.

China has a massive civilian chemical industry. It is, however, verycautious and responsible regards the export of chemicals that could beused to manufacture chemical weapons and related technologies and equipment,refusing such exports if they are to be used for the purpose of manufacturingchemical weapons. In order to ensure these items if exported not to beused in the production of chemical weapons, the Chinese government hasdrafted regulations and measures for the control of their exportation.A detailed list of chemicals subject to export control has been drawn upin accordance with the Verification Annex of the convention. Import andexport of chemicals on this list and technologies and equipmentused in their manufacture are under the centralized management of the Ministryof Chemical Industry (MCI). Business related to such imports and exportsis handled by specialized enterprises designated by MCI and the Ministryof Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC). MCI, MOFTEC and theGeneral Administration of Customs (GAC) take joint responsibility for examiningand approving imports and exports, issuing licenses and making inspections.China insists that the governments of importing countries provide assurancesthat the relevant goods imported from China not be used to manufacturechemical weapons or retransferred to a third country.

China has consistently advocated a complete prohibition and thoroughdestruction of biological weapons. It opposes the production of biologicalweapons by any country and their proliferation in any form by any country.In 1984 China acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weaponsand on Their Destruction, and since that date it has fully and conscientiouslyfulfilled its obligations under the convention. Since 1987 China has yearafter year reported to the United Nations on convention-related informationand data in accordance with the decisions of the Review Conferences ofthe convention. China supports measures that help strengthen the effectivenessof the convention. It will actively join in discussions of the Ad Hoc Groupon promoting international cooperation, enhancing trust, strengtheningverification, and other issues.

With regard to the transfer of military equipment and related technology,China respects the right of every country to self-defence aimed at safeguardingits own security in accordance with the relevant principles contained inthe Charter of the United Nations, but at the same time it is very concernedabout the adverse effects on world security and regional stability arisingfrom excessive accumulations of weaponry.

For many years until the early 1980s, China did not engage in weaponsexport trade, and since then the volume of such exports has been limited.In accordance with a resolution by the UN General Assembly, China participatesin the United Nations register of conventional arms transfers. As theserecords make clear, China's exports of conventional weapons are only asmall portion of those of the United States, Russia, Britain, France orGermany.

China consistently adheres to a series of principles on conventionalweapons transfers. The export of such weapons should help the recipientnation increase its appropriate defence capacity. The transfer must notimpair peace, safety or stability regionally or globally. China does notuse trade in weaponry to interfere in sovereign states' internal affairs.

China strictly controls transfers of military equipment and relatedtechnologies and has established an appropriate administrative organizationand operating mechanism to achieve this goal. The State AdministrativeCommittee on Military Products Trade (SACMPT), under the leadership ofthe State Council and the Central Military Commission, is responsible forthe centralized control of transfers of military equipment and relatedtechnologies. Its main function is drafting laws and policies governingsuch transfers. It is mainly comprised of leading personnel of the Ministryof Foreign Affairs, the Headquarters of the General Staff, the Commissionof Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence, MOFTEC and otherrelevant departments. As the administrative arm of the SACMPT, the StateBureau of Military Products Trade is responsible for handling day-to-dayaffairs.

Governmental departments and companies engaged in transfers of militaryequipment and technologies must be authorized, registered and approvedby the government. Their business activities must remain strictly withinthe scope of operation approved. Contracts for transfer of military equipmentand technologies require approval before gaining effect. Majortransfer items and contracts must be examined by the SACMPT and approvedby the State Council and the Central Military Commission. Stern legal sanctionsshall be taken against any company or individual who transfers militaryequipment and technologies without proper governmental examination andapproval.

The principles and measures to prevent the proliferation of weaponryand unwarranted transfers of military equipment that China has consistentlyupheld have helped preserve world peace and regional stability and promotethe healthy development of international arms control and disarmament.



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