Stockpile Stewardship and Management
The DOE Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
The Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs is leading the Department, its three national security laboratories, and other sites in the weapons complex, in developing the DOE Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. This long-term plan, when completed, will provide a roadmap based on the requirements set forth by the DoD and will reflect stringent fiscal realities. Current capabilities and facilities, requirements, and cost efficiency combine to drive the overall architecture of the plan and to define necessary long-term investments. Additional efforts are required to complete the plan.The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan calls for radical changes in the way we do business, both to cut costs and to adjust to new circumstances: fewer weapons, fewer types of weapons, no production of new types of weapons, an aging stockpile, and no nuclear testing. It is organized around three major elements to support a small stockpile of weapons:
- An enhanced surveillance program to understand and predict the effects of aging. An enhanced surveillance program includes efforts to develop a modern nonnuclear experimental data base for stockpiled weapons and to make archival data more accessible and useful to stockpile stewards. It requires an expansion of current surveillance efforts, an active preventive maintenance program, a focused archival program, and strong supporting capabilities in physics, engineering, and chemistry and materials science.
- A small, efficient manufacturing capability to refurbish and replace aging and defective components. Since specific problems that may arise in warheads are difficult to predict, the production facilities of the future must be agile and highly capable, yet affordable. Choices of production technologies will emphasize flexibility and will utilize modern commercial methods wherever possible. Because the stockpile of the future will be much smaller, the focus will be on capability, not capacity.
- A revalidation process--backed by a set of new experimental tools--to support high-confidence assessment and certification when issues about stockpile performance occur. The technical staff at the national security laboratories will need to establish a revalidation process based on independent evaluations and judgments to provide additional confidence and mitigate the effects of the loss of nuclear testing. As the scientific underpinning of this process, they will have to rely on numerical simulation with advanced computer models and above-ground nonnuclear testing in more sophisticated experimental facilities. Science-based stewardship will have replaced nuclear testing as the means to assure confidence in the stockpile.
DOE's overall plan, which is still being developed, envisions a much smaller overall complex, operating in a more integrated fashion and drawing on the unique strengths of each site. The goal is to cut costs while preserving required capabilities. It will take over a decade to make the transformation to the very different configuration attuned to the needs of the post-Cold War world. It is anticipated that the three laboratories will take on a more challenging and diverse set of long-term roles as the production complex is further reduced.
Much consolidation has already occurred to achieve a leaner program. We have eliminated unnecessarily redundant facilities and capabilities amongst the laboratories. As further steps to consolidate are taken, necessary capabilities and skills must be preserved, in part by making efficient use of existing investments in facilities and people. It is incumbent on all of the laboratories to seek further cost-effective consolidation consistent with the needs of the program.
For example, I anticipate the process may eventually lead to cessation of plutonium work at the Livermore site with LLNL scientists conducting their research and development activities at user facilities elsewhere. Before such a transition can take place, however, it will be necessary to determine the required floor space to cost effectively support all of DOE's special nuclear materials missions--stockpile maintenance, clean-up, material disposition, and research. Then, a plan must be developed which demonstrates cost savings from further consolidation. Finally, there must be a method to provide mechanisms for continuation of LLNL's unique research and development activities. Only after these conditions have been met will it make economic and programmatic sense to seek such consolidation.
The LLNL role in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
LLNL has worked closely with Defense Programs to develop the DOE Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, and we are highly supportive of their efforts to create the necessary scientific and technical basis for stewardship in an era of no nuclear testing. We also agree with their efforts to manage the laboratories as a "diversified research system"--as recommended by the recent US General Accounting Office report National Laboratories Need Clearer Missions and Better Management.Livermore's core nuclear weapons program is a factor of two smaller than it was at the end of the Cold War. As a leaner element of the integrated program, we have sharpened our focus. We have preserved the core competencies necessary to support our broad national security mission and attend to LLNL-developed weapons in the stockpile or being dismantled. We also operate special user facilities that provide unique capabilities to the national program. In addition to a number of important but smaller science and engineering facilities, these include:
- the High Explosives Applications Facility (HEAF), which is the most modern facility for high explosives research in the world;
- the Nova laser facility, which--until construction of the National Ignition Facility--remains the premiere facility in the world for conducting high-energy density physics experiments essential to evaluation of important nuclear weapons issues;
- the Flash X-Ray facility at Site 300, which is currently the most capable hydrodynamic test facility in the world;
- the National Energy Research Supercomputer Center (NERSC), which serves the computing needs of over 150 energy-research sites throughout the US and serves as a testbed for development of high-performance computing hardware and software;
- the AVLIS facility and program, with most advanced capabilities in the world for conducting research and development on industrial-scale processes involving uranium; and
- the Superblock, which contains the most modern facilities in the complex for special nuclear materials research and engineering testing.
Stockpile Responsibilities. Dismantlement, which will continue past the end of the decade, involves many systems for which Livermore retains technical responsibility. In particular, dismantlement of the W48 and W79 artillery projectiles, the W55 SUBROC, the W56 ICBM warheads, the W68 SLBM warheads, and the W71 ABM warheads require significant attention to ensure safe and timely dismantlement and disposition of excess materials.
Livermore's responsibilities for the enduring stockpile include the B83 bomb, the W84 cruise missile and the W87 ICBM warhead. These are the only systems in the inventory with all the modern safety features, and they are expected to endure past their originally anticipated lifetimes. In addition, LLNL retains responsibility for the W62 ICBM warhead which is expected to remain in the active inventory until START II is implemented at the beginning of the next decade. Significant effort is being expended on the surveillance, maintenance, and selective refurbishment of these systems.
As part of our archiving program, we are paying particular attention to these stockpile systems. In addition to archiving past data, we are developing a modern experimental database and computational understanding. Many of the nonnuclear experiments on the systems were done 10-15 years ago. Today, much better techniques are available: penetrating radiography with enhanced sensitivity from a gamma-ray camera, high speed laser illuminated photography, and multi-beam Fabry-Perot velocity measurements. These new data and the understanding which results will form the basis of joint LLNL/LANL revalidation of the safety, security and reliability of all important systems.
Surveillance. We are also working to improve the "science" of enhanced surveillance so that we can better understand and predict the effects of aging on weapons. These efforts are the key to an affordable manufacturing capability because they enable a more systematic refurbishment and "preventative maintenance" program rather than an expensive and high-production-rate replacement program when aging effects are found. Livermore is in the process of establishing an enhanced materials database (using surveillance and dismantlement data) and developing sophisticated computational techniques to better analyze these data. In addition, we are applying advanced techniques like scanning tunneling microscopes and atomic force microscopes to look at the effects of corrosion on an atomistic level.
Other advanced sensors and non-destructive techniques are also being developed--most with industrial collaboration--to enable continuous monitoring of key aging signatures within stockpiled weapons. As an example, we are working with several biomedical companies to develop endoscopic surgical tools and fiber optic visualization technologies. These technologies are being applied to inspect nuclear weapons parts and components in locations that are otherwise inaccessible.
Manufacturing and Refurbishment. LLNL is developing technologies to provide cost effective manufacturing capability to replace aging weapon components or refurbish them to extend their life. This is an urgent need. In the near-term we must be capable of replacing any questionable components to important weapon systems--even as the production complex is being restructured to be consistent with future stockpile needs. We also have ongoing activities to develop life extension options for the W87 so that it may remain part of the enduring stockpile well into the 21st century. In the longer-term we must be able to remanufacture weapons at a modest, but scalable production rate in a low-cost and environmentally benign manner.
In many of our manufacturing and refurbishment efforts, we are making effective use of industrial partnerships to pursue technologies and capabilities needed for nuclear weapons work. I will highlight just a few examples of these partnerships, which focus on agile manufacturing, materials processing, precision fabrication, and non-destructive evaluation. Our program is designed to implement cost-effective technologies developed through industrial partnerships in ongoing surveillance and refurbishment activities at the earliest possible date. In FY 1996 these development projects will continue as part of the nuclear weapons complex-wide Advanced Design and Production Technologies (ADaPT) initiative.
At LLNL we are pursuing the development of "modular" production (and refurbishment) capabilities that are not site specific in their characteristics and generate minimal amounts of waste. Once developed, a few units located at any preferred site in the complex provide an inherent capability to do production at a modest level. Timely development of modules for weapon refurbishment or remanufacture of critical weapon parts both support planned life extension programs and provide a hedge against loss of military capability in case of a discovered problem in a critical weapon system.
A pioneering example of this approach is the LLNL development of pit-reuse capability, which would permit the reuse of old plutonium components if necessary to upgrade safety or fix a problem in a stockpiled weapon primary. In addition, we are developing a precision casting process for plutonium to significantly reduce costs and the waste generation during the manufacture of primary components. This process, which could be transferred to LANL for full implementation, can be applied to rebuild pits destroyed in the current surveillance program. It also can be used for the remanufacture of weapon pits at the end of stockpile life of a system and for the production of new pit designs, should these be required.
We are also developing precision casting and spin-forming techniques to replace the current methods of rebuilding uranium parts destroyed in the surveillance program. Precision casting provides a simplified process that will reduce waste nuclear material and scrap in weapon component production. These efforts draw extensively on the uranium capability developed in the LLNL Uranium Atomic Vapor Isotope Separation (AVLIS) program. With our successful pilot demonstration of production-plant-scale enrichment of uranium for reactor fuel, AVLIS technology is being transferred to the US Enrichment Corporation, which will continue funding on-going research and development of AVLIS at LLNL. We have unique capabilities to pursue technology development of advanced fabrication processes for uranium parts and an experienced staff that has applied modern technologies to industrial-scale uranium operations.
These precision-casting efforts also make use of partnerships with industries, such as aerospace, that have similar production technology needs. Working with partners with considerable casting experience, LLNL has been developing a computer code that can predict, with accuracy, the final shape and strength of cast-metal parts, as well as problems (e.g., deformation, porosity) that might be encountered during manufacturing. We are also partnering with Alcoa to produce a computer code for simulation of the fundamental metal forming processes in casting, forging, extrusion and rolling. The code provides LLNL both an important tool for research and development of advanced manufacturing processes for weapon components and ideal simulation software for studying the response of weapon systems to severe abnormal environments (e.g., impacts, fuel fires).
LLNL has the capability to assume responsibility for synthesis and formulation of high explosive materials and fabrication of components to support enduring stockpile requirements. There is a unique combination of special facilities, equipment, capabilities, and experience present at LLNL. For the material quantities required to maintain the stockpile, no significant upgrades to facilities would be needed and operations could be carried out within existing environmental, health and safety regulations. The level and type of effort would fall within the scope of work that has been performed at the Laboratory.
The High Explosives Applications Facility (HEAF) and facilities at Site 300--15 miles east of the main LLNL site--are critically important. HEAF is the most modern facility for high explosives research in the world. It meets or exceeds all modern environmental, safety, and health requirements for explosives research, development and production support. At HEAF, we synthesize and formulate high explosives in small amounts, pursue small-scale process development work, carry out supporting theoretical and computer modeling efforts, and conduct experiments involving up to 10-kg detonations. Large-scale synthesis, formulation, and test firing of high explosives is done at Site 300.
Our weapon refurbishment activities are focused on the W87 to extend its life to approximately 2030 by enhancing the structural integrity of the warhead. The W87 warhead/Mk21 reentry vehicle (RV) is the leading candidate for a single RV option for the Minuteman III ICBM. Our Life Extension Program (LEP) activities have included flight testing, ground testing, and physics and engineering analysis. We expect the final design will be chosen this year, certified next year, and stockpile refurbishment could begin in 1997 or 1998.
LLNL is pursuing concepts for W87 LEP refurbishment processes and equipment that make use of work stations, modules, and/or transportable vans together with new technologies to reduce waste, floor space, and necessary equipment. This significant engineering program provides an early opportunity to bring together diverse aspects of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management program in a focused activity.
Science-Based Assessment and Certification. Decisions about the stockpile must be grounded in experimental reality and simulated successfully by detailed computer models. At LLNL we operate state-of-the-art experimental facilities for the integrated complex, including the High Explosives Applications Facility (HEAF), the Flash X-Ray facility at Site 300, and the Nova laser system. Additional tools are needed to develop an improved experimental database to enable technical judgments in the future without nuclear testing. Judgments and decisions will have to rely on the science of nuclear weapon performance to assure the safety, security, and reliability of the enduring nuclear stockpile.
The FY 1996 Defense Programs budget submission includes three new initiatives that are very important to Livermore and this concept of science-based stockpile assessment and certification. These are the National Ignition Facility, the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative, and the Contained Firing Facility.
The National Ignition Facility
The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is identified by Victor Reis as being "the most important new facility" in the Defense Programs budget request for FY 1996. A total of $61 million is requested for the NIF for Title I design activities and related operating expenses. The NIF is a cornerstone of the science-based stockpile stewardship program. It is the only facility that will permit well-diagnosed experiments pertinent to fusion and high-energy-density physics processes which occur after the high explosive is detonated. The NIF is also the critical next step in the development of Inertial Confinement Fusion (ICF) as an environmentally attractive energy source, and it will serve as a user facility for a wide range of fundamental scientific research.The NIF will consist of the laser system and optical components, a target chamber, and computer control system all in an environmentally controlled building. The laser, consisting of 192 beams to deliver 1.8 million joules and "ignite" small fusion targets, will be the world's largest optical instrument. Its construction will allow America to retain world leadership in ICF. It will advance US high technology industries such as those in optics, lasers, materials, high-speed instrumentation, semiconductors, and precision manufacturing. Because of this impact, the NIF has been endorsed by every major laser and optics industrial organization. Initial operational capability is planned for late 2002.
A laser ignition facility was strongly recommended by the National Academy of Sciences and the DOE Fusion Policy Advisory Committee in their 1990 reports. More recently, the DOE ICF Advisory Committee and the JASON Review Committee, a prestigious academic-based DoD scientific advisory panel, endorsed the NIF. In their July 1994 report, the JASONs said that "The NIF is without question the most scientifically valuable of the programs proposed for the science-based stockpile stewardship program." The NIF was also endorsed by the Galvin Task Force.
In October 1994, Secretary O'Leary announced her approval of Key Decision 1 for the NIF. This followed completion of the Conceptual Design Report in April 1994 and the successful demonstration of Beamlet (a full-scale prototype of a NIF beam). Secretary O'Leary also established a Key Decision 1 Prime process whose goal is to evaluate the consistency of the facility with US arms control and nonproliferation objectives. This is to be completed by August 1995.
I expect the Key Decision 1 Prime outcome to be positive because the pursuit of ICF is very international--including a substantial effort in Japan--and should not impede establishment of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban. The key physical concepts are unclassified and much of the research at the Nova ICF facility at Livermore is conducted in the open with participation by scientists from throughout the world. The NIF will be an even stronger draw for international research projects.
As a user facility the NIF will support research on:
- National Security. The NIF will provide access to high-energy density physics regimes essential to evaluation of important nuclear weapons issues. Scientists from all the national security laboratories will be able to obtain nuclear-weapon-related physics data, particularly in the area of fusion and the high-energy-density physics which occurs after the high explosive is detonated for comparison with advanced numerical simulations. These include high-quality opacity data for partially ionized materials, valuable information about the mixing of layers of different materials during implosion, and data that can help us assess the impact of cracks and other abnormalities on weapon performance. The NIF will not enable LLNL or LANL to design new weapons per se, but it will help us evaluate issues for existing designs and improve and test computational models for those designs.
- Fusion Energy. The NIF is an essential element in the program for the development of inertial fusion energy for civilian power production. If net fusion energy gain is demonstrated, as anticipated, the NIF will constitute the crucial step towards the ultimate goal of providing energy security for the US in the 21st century.
- Science and Technology. The NIF will produce conditions in matter similar to those found at the center of the sun and other stars. New, well-characterized, high-energy-density regimes will be routinely accessible in the laboratory for the first time. The NIF will advance scientific and technical fields such as astrophysical sciences, plasma physics, atomic and radiative physics, hydrodynamics, materials science, advanced coherent and incoherent x-ray sources, nonlinear optics, and computational physics. Scientific progress in those fields will, in turn, provide enhanced understanding of the physical conditions in nuclear weapons.
Because multiple benefits will derive from a vigorous ICF program in the coming decades, the NIF will attract talented scientists and engineers to contribute to stockpile stewardship. As evidence, one needs to look no further than the selection of the E.O. Lawrence winners in 1995. Two researchers at LLNL, Michael Campbell and John Lindl, just received the Award for National Security for their distinguished leadership in laser-driven ICF--theoretical, computational, and experimental. World-class facilities clearly attract world-class scientists.
The need for the NIF is independent of any siting decisions. However, Secretary O'Leary has voiced her preference for Livermore. LLNL is the natural siting choice because of the large contribution we have made to the advancement of ICF and the development of the laser system to be part of the NIF. LLNL has built six large laser systems since 1974 and each has been completed on budget and performed as designed. The facility would greatly benefit from and contribute to LLNL's existing unique capabilities in lasers, and the NIF would play a key role in the future evolution of the Laboratory.
The Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative
The objective of the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) is to vastly improve the high-performance computing capability at the national security laboratories. Numerical simulation and computer models, benchmarked with historical nuclear test data and results from laboratory experiments, will be the principal tools for assuring stockpile performance in the future. In the absence of nuclear testing, we need more realism in the computer simulations--improved models of physical effects, greater resolution, and use of three spatial dimensions (some problems with no symmetries). To simulate more realistically all of the complex physical phenomena that occur in a nuclear weapon, we need over a thousand-fold increase in computer speed and data storage capacity.Orders-of-magnitude improvement in capability requires computers with multiple processors working together to rapidly solve a single problem. The use of a machine with more than 100 processors is called massively parallel processing (MPP). To date, massively parallel computing has not advanced as rapidly as it might because of the difficulty in creating efficient, high-performance parallel programs. Obstacles arise from deficiencies in computer (hardware) design and in the development of applications software. To advance the state of the art, the national security laboratories must work with the developers of MPP computers in a multi-year cooperative effort. In addition, information management systems, data storage systems, computer networks, and computer graphics systems all must be improved. These efforts comprise the ASCI, and $45 million in the Defense Programs FY 1996 budget submission supports this important initiative.
High-performance computing has always been central to scientific programs at Livermore so the ASCI is vital to our future. In addition to the classified Livermore Computer Center, LLNL is home for the National Energy Research Supercomputer Center (NERSC). Overall, nearly 10% of the Laboratory's annual budget is invested in the development of applications and systems software. We have acquired two MPP computers--a Meiko CS-2 and a CRAY T3D, and we are working on a prototype high-speed network which will interconnect LLNL and LANL to access the resources of both sites. There is a second CRAY T3D and a Thinking Machines Corporation CM-5 at LANL.
We are using the MPP computers to develop three dimensional simulations which include a wide range of structural, high explosive and plasma physics phenomena present in a nuclear device. These efforts require new numerical algorithms and programming techniques to efficiently use the capability of the new machines.
The ASCI is augmented by the Industrial Computing Initiative (ICI), a $52 million CRADA involving LLNL, LANL, and sixteen industrial partners. In the three-year ICI effort, three code development systems will be developed and thirteen scientific application programs will be transformed into efficient massively parallel models for use by DOE programs and by US industry to improve productivity and competitiveness. As an example, one of the projects being pursued is environmental modeling of subsurface contamination beneath the Laboratory, a capability which has many other important DOE and commercial environmental applications. These ICI software development activities are breaking the trail for the future of the ASCI.
In addition, LLNL, SNL and LANL are teamed with preeminent industrial organizations like the Semiconductor Industry Association and the National Storage Industry Consortium as participants in both the DOE and DoD programs in advanced information storage systems and advanced lithography for the manufacture of computer chips. This teaming provides efficient leverage of resources from both Departments to provide the high-performance computing capability needed for all national security programs. LLNL's special expertise in technologies pertinent to advanced lithography and information storage enable us to make important contributions to the overall effort.
An example contribution is the National Storage Laboratory (NSL), an effort based at LLNL's NERSC to research and commercialize technologies for high-performance computer storage of large amounts and diverse types of information. This government/industry partnership has achieved over a hundred-fold improvement in storage-system performance and significant improvements in storage-system functionality. NSL efforts have benefited US commercial vendors of high-performance storage systems, provided capabilities for the national information infrastructure, and helped guide the efforts of the national storage-system standards group.
The Contained Firing Facility at Site 300
Hydrodynamic testing is the only currently available way of experimentally testing the implosion phase of a nuclear detonation. These are critical experiments for understanding weapon safety, assessing the performance of weapon primaries, and evaluating the feasibility of approaches for safely disabling a nuclear device. The Defense Programs budget submission includes $16 million in FY 1996 for construction of the Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility (DARHT) at LANL and $6.6 million for enhancement of the Flash X-Ray facility (FXR) at LLNL's Site 300 to make it a Contained Firing Facility. Containment of the FXR test bed will preserve this important national capability and is a preventive measure to protect against future environmental restrictions.The investment in the Contained Firing Facility is important because of uncertainties associated with future environmental restrictions and the near-term future of DARHT. Construction of DARHT has been halted by court action until completion of an environmental impact statement and the issuance of a record of decision by DOE. Until DARHT comes on line--Autumn of 1998 at the earliest--the FXR facility is the most capable hydrodynamic test facility in the world. It is the best diagnostic tool available for measuring integrated performance of nuclear weapon primaries by nonnuclear testing.
In addition, we are currently upgrading our flash x-radiography capability and making modest investments in the FXR accelerator. The development and use of a gamma-ray camera (replacing the use of film) provides greater sensitivity and resolution at modest cost. It paves the way for being able to obtain a time-sequenced set of images, which would be an important capability for a future more-advanced hydrodynamic test facility.
Industrial Partnerships
LLNL is using partnerships with industry as a process by which we execute our program responsibilities. This is a winning strategy. It benefits the Department of Energy by accessing industrial skills, processes and advanced technology; reducing development costs; and opening up potential commercial sources for needed technologies. This strategy also benefits US industries by providing them a competitive advantage in the global economy through joint public-private development of leading-edge products, materials, and/or manufacturing processes.We have used Defense Programs Technology Transfer funding at LLNL to establish with industry Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) that directly support our stockpile stewardship and management activities. A large fraction of our industrial partnering efforts either support the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative (ASCI) or are part of our Advanced Design and Production Technologies (ADaPT) initiative, which enables us to pursue timely development of needed weapons remanufacturing capabilities. I have previously highlighted some of these activities. Important weapons efforts have been enhanced through such partnership arrangements.
The Importance of Independent Evaluation
Stockpile assurance very critically depends on the process of validation and certification of weapons performance. In the past, validation and certification was greatly assisted by nuclear testing--the final arbiter. In the future it will depend on the judgment of personnel in the program supported by the nonnuclear testing they will be able to perform. It is not surprising that the Galvin Task Force identified "attracting and retaining skilled scientists, engineers, and managers over the years ahead" as the highest priority in stockpile stewardship. The assessments of these scientists must be folded into a management process that will make use of independent evaluations to provide the required confidence in the stockpile.I strongly believe that such confidence in the performance and safety of the US nuclear stockpile can only result from the independent judgments and evaluations provided by the expertise and capabilities of all of the laboratories in the absence of nuclear testing. We are heading into uncharted territory and must take full advantage of the knowledge and commitment of trained people at each of the laboratories.
Judgments about nuclear weapons issues are particularly complicated because of the uniqueness of the enterprise. For security reasons, only a small community of people have the necessary expertise and access to tools to deal with the intricate classified details of the modern nuclear weapons in the stockpile. In addition, many physics and engineering issues are special to the discipline, such as material properties at extreme pressures and temperatures. Furthermore, we will not have an accurate calibration on how well the new system is working until a few critical decisions have been made, and our customer, the Department of Defense, is satisfied with the results.
Sidney Drell (as Chairman of the National Security Panel of the University of California's President's Council on the National Laboratories) wrote:
"Livermore's excellence is of great importance, in particular for peer review purposes, as we enter into a comprehensive test ban era and address new challenges to maintaining long-term confidence in the safety, reliability, and effectiveness of our stockpile. ...We believe there is a need for strong support to maintain LLNL's excellent design and diagnostic capabilities at this time. ...Gradual consolidation of the two laboratories' weapons activities is entirely appropriate with reduced stockpile needs, but we urge caution in assessing more fully their impact before taking specific actions lest we lose important peer review capabilities while they are still needed."I strongly believe that we must carefully define the process that will be needed, recognizing that it will need to function effectively for the foreseeable future. And we must avoid irreversible decisions before the process is adequately tested.
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