Stemming the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
The New Proliferation Danger
The nuclear dangers now facing the United States are more varied and complicated than they were a decade ago. Rather than the monolithic threat posed by the Soviet Union in a bi-polar world, we now must hedge against possible reversal of reform in Russia and address the increasingly serious threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons. President Clinton has stated "A critical priority for the United States is to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems."Proliferation can occur through indigenous development programs that draw on the increasing availability of nuclear technology and the continuing spread of nuclear expertise. Alternatively, nation-states or rogue subnational units, such as terrorists, can acquire nuclear capability through the theft and subsequent sale of fissile materials or weapons.
To deal with these dangers, we continue to rely on the deterrence provided by the US nuclear arsenal and work to preserve and strengthen the international nonproliferation regime. Stemming proliferation is a challenge to the diplomatic corps, the arms control community, the military, the intelligence community, and the developers of supporting technology. It requires a multifaceted effort by the US Government with activities and programs coordinated among the various agencies that shoulder nonproliferation responsibilities.
DOE and its laboratories provide expertise and technology to support arms control policy development, arms control verification, intelligence assessments of nuclear weapons activities worldwide, efforts to facilitate nuclear weapons dismantlement in Russia and fissile material control, and other nonproliferation and counterproliferation initiatives. In many of these areas, progress is constrained by funding and important milestones could be achieved earlier if additional resources were available.
LLNL Programs in Nonproliferation and Arms Control
I welcome the recognition by the Galvin Task Force that the DOE national security laboratories--and LLNL in particular--have a major, growing mission responsibility in the areas of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, verification and intelligence support. For over two decades, Livermore has played a leading role in detecting, characterizing, and countering proliferation activities worldwide. In recognition of this fact, DOE focused its proliferation intelligence activities at LLNL in 1977. Since then our Z-Division has been one of the principal suppliers of broad-based proliferation assessments for the intelligence community. Livermore's past and continuing significant contributions to nonproliferation and our base of nuclear weapons expertise make us especially well qualified to address this emerging threat.Three years ago, we responded to growing concerns about proliferation by forming a new Directorate at LLNL--the Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and International Security (NAI) Directorate--to better utilize and coordinate the many relevant technical capabilities at the Laboratory. This summer we will co-locate the NAI and the Defense and Nuclear Technologies Directorates in a major new facility. These are synergistic programs and the move will enhance all of our national security efforts for DOE.
Our arms control and nonproliferation activities at LLNL are responsive to two troubling proliferation scenarios. In the first scenario, uncertain nuclear material control, combined with malevolent intent and diffusion of technical know-how, gives rise to a direct threat of terrorist groups or hostile nations smuggling nuclear devices into the United States. Because of the possibility of theft, purchase, or smuggling, political volatility in the former Soviet Union makes the large quantity of Russian-controlled nuclear material and weapons a concern. This threat is compounded by uncertain controls over the huge and growing amount of plutonium from civilian reactors world-wide.
Hence, there is a very real possibility that nuclear devices will be smuggled into the United States and detonated, or threatened to be detonated. Moreover, the prospect of terrorists fabricating a nuclear device from illicitly-obtained kilogram-scale quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials poses a serious threat. In Munich last August, police seized 350 g of plutonium arriving on a flight from Moscow. In December, Czech authorities intercepted a car transiting Prague with almost three kilograms of 88-percent enriched uranium hidden in its trunk. These incidents and others demonstrate that nuclear weapon materials are leaking out and being offered for sale.
In response to this first scenario, we are pursuing activities aimed at:
- Reducing the exposure of nuclear materials and know-how worldwide. Our principal activities relate to cooperative threat reduction in the Former Soviet Union, technical support to nuclear arms control negotiations, and technology development for treaty verification.
- Countering nuclear smuggling (because nuclear materials might be stolen). LLNL is responsible for operating the DOE Communicated Threat Credibility Center for tracking and evaluating nuclear smuggling incidents.
- Responding to nuclear incidents (because terrorists might obtain a nuclear device). LLNL is working on technologies to locate and render safe a terrorist nuclear device.
In response to this second scenario, we are pursuing activities aimed at:
- Stemming emerging international nuclear weapons capabilities. LLNL is one of the principal suppliers of broad-based proliferation intelligence assessments. In addition, we support US activities in international arenas such as UNSCOM and the IAEA.
- Developing effective detection technologies (to provide necessary technical capability to assess foreign programs). LLNL develops both remote and unattended on-site sensors for early detection and assessment of proliferant activities, and we develop portable detectors for treaty inspection teams.
- Supporting DoD's Counterproliferation Program (because we may not be able to prevent proliferation in all cases). LLNL is pursuing technology activities to provide the DoD near-term deliverables to address chemical, biological, and nuclear weapon threats.
Reducing the Exposure of Nuclear Materials and Know-How Worldwide
Historically, the threat of the theft of nuclear weapons or materials has been contained because of satisfactory control mechanisms. As I mentioned, we are greatly concerned that the instability resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union could cause nuclear materials to become available for malevolent purposes. We strongly endorse DOE's efforts to ensure proper nuclear materials monitoring, material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) capabilities in Russia. We work closely with LANL and SNL in efforts to assist Russia in these areas.LLNL is also engaged in many additional cooperative-threat-reduction activities in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) aimed at lessening the likelihood that nuclear materials or know-how are misused. These include: Nunn-Lugar support; efforts to foster Russian warhead dismantlement; work on surplus fissile material disposition options; lab-to-lab cooperative non-weapons projects with Russian nuclear scientists; and support of the Russian highly-enriched uranium purchase agreement.
Countering Nuclear Smuggling
LLNL is responsible for operating DOE's Communicated Threat Credibility Center, which is a unique national resource for tracking and evaluating domestic and foreign nuclear smuggling incidents in support of law enforcement, intelligence, and other agencies. Established in 1978, the Center is linked to DOE's Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST). The program draws on trained assessors, laboratory nuclear weapons expertise, and a unique all-source database on illicit nuclear trafficking cases. In support of this effort, we recently initiated a research program to develop methods for forensic analysis of confiscated samples from trafficking incidents. By characterizing seized samples and packaging materials, we hope to be able to shed light on diversion points and transport routes.Moreover, the country needs a stronger program to counter nuclear smuggling; LLNL is helping DOE develop plans for an enhanced program in this area. Elements would include: better detection equipment at border crossings, airports, and other chokepoints where smuggled material might be interdicted; improved training and equipping of customs inspectors, police, and other officials; and intensified research on how to track down the sources and routes of smuggled material.
Responding to Nuclear Incidents
The US also needs to reduce the probability that terrorist groups can use a nuclear device should they obtain one or the materials to build one. The NEST program is DOE's program to address the nuclear terrorist threat. We are continuing to develop concepts and hardware that could significantly increase our capability to both intercept and render safe smuggled nuclear material or nuclear explosives. These efforts include:- A concept for operational procedures and detection equipment that provide for greatly increased protection for either a military base or a city. Such a capability would significantly complicate a smuggler's efforts to move nuclear material, even under conditions where it might be presumed that the background radiation would overwhelm the radiation of the threat nuclear material. A promising new concept, which is a spinoff of a warhead counting instrument developed for treaty verification, would provide NEST a much improved capability to use in the field to assess a nuclear threat.
- Rendering safe nuclear devices. LLNL has successfully designed and tested small-scale prototypes of a new disablement technique which may be capable of successfully rendering safe all types of nuclear devices. Also, we have invented a radically new device disablement concept which could safely disable explosive devices regardless of the sophistication of the threat.
Stemming Emerging International Nuclear Weapons Capabilities
To stem the efforts of a country attempting to develop nuclear weapons, we need an accurate intelligence-based assessment of its program to most effectively tailor a response. DOE national security intelligence programs executed at LLNL support long-term US government policies designed to discourage nuclear weapons proliferation and encourage the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Within the intelligence community, we provide unique insight on issues by applying our general weapons expertise and knowledge about specific nuclear weapons designs.I mentioned earlier the leading role played by LLNL for over a decade. I should also add that although the proliferation threat has increased greatly over the last five years, DOE's intelligence budget has been nearly flat. Many countries are being covered with only part-time analysts, and the possibility of missing something important is very real. I strongly recommend increased efforts in proliferation intelligence assessment. We are able to pursue projects in this area very cost-effectively because they leverage existing capabilities of the core weapons program.
LLNL also supports US officials in international arenas such as the IAEA and UNSCOM, for example, in the post-Gulf-War inspections in Iraq; in direct negotiations with countries like India, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Russia, South Africa, and Ukraine; and in daily efforts to manage US exports in compliance with federal law and international commitments. DOE nuclear supplier assessments examine the flow of hardware and technology across international and regional boundaries. They help to assure that countries like Iraq comply with UN resolutions, meet treaty obligations, and use nuclear technology peacefully. Supplier assessments also improve nuclear-related export compliance in Japan and other nuclear suppliers in Europe.
Developing Effective Detection Technologies
LLNL contributes directly to the assessment of foreign nuclear weapon research and production capabilities through development of detectors and remote sensors for early detection of proliferant activities and other signatures. LLNL's efforts, often pursued jointly with other laboratories, rely on our understanding of the target nuclear production processes. The research spans a wide range of sensor technologies, applying the best commercially available capabilities while developing more advanced systems that are needed to better address the problem. Programs are focused on developing the following capabilities, for use in both cooperative monitoring and intelligence collection scenarios:- Intelligent, unattended, multi-sensor systems to monitor nuclear materials production, transport and storage. Much of our sensor development is also applicable to law enforcement, counternarcotics, and environmental protection. One example is an application of our unattended ground sensors for controlling illegal immigration. We have designed a new sensor system for the Border Patrol to use over the next decade.
- Active and passive multi-spectral imagers and exploitation tools to remotely detect and characterize nuclear production activities. Our activities in multi-spectral imagery leverage our success in the Clementine program. As you may recall, Clementine was a program to map the moon using very light-weight and cost-effective state of the art instrumentation. The next generation of this "light-sat" program can be used for a wide-range of civilian and military missions. The potential nonproliferation application is particularly exciting, but the details cannot be discussed in open session. I would be pleased to brief you on the details during a future closed session.
- Robust, reliable techniques for collection and analysis of environmental samples. LLNL's Forensic Science Center, a new national analytical asset able to characterize ultratrace quantities of almost any organic or inorganic sample, developed and turned over to industry a suitcase-size 50-lb instrument for use by on-site inspection teams supporting the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It uses a light-weight gas chromatograph-mass spectrometer (GC-MS) that can analyze samples extracted from soil, water, or any surface using appropriate chemical solvents. Its long operational lifetime and portability should make it a useful tool for many other applications, including emergency response personnel trying to identify an unknown chemical spill and firefighters identifying potentially hazardous emissions from warehouse fires. Our studies of possible follow-on instruments show that a unit of about half the size of the existing suitcase unit is possible.
Supporting DoD's Counterproliferation Program
Counterproliferation deals with technologies that aid the US military in projecting force in the face of an adversary that possesses weapons of mass destruction. The 1994 DOE/DoD Counterproliferation Memorandum of Understanding designates DoD to have the principal responsibility of addressing the biological weapon and chemical weapon (BW/CW) threat and DOE to have principal responsibility for the long-term technology base needed to address the nuclear threat. LLNL has many technology activities that can lead to near-term deliverables to the DoD to address all three types of threats. For example, LLNL is researching: laser technology to locate and identify specific BW/CW agents on the battlefield; several sensor technologies to locate and characterize hardened targets; and advanced laser and electronic technology to enable satellite sensors to rapidly and accurately locate mobile missile launchers in the battlefield.Planning for an Expanded Effort
We are in the process of updating our strategic plan for the NAI Directorate, aiming at a more comprehensive program to combat proliferation and terrorist activities, using the full range of capabilities extant at LLNL. We are also examining whether our core competencies in biotechnology and chemistry can constructively contribute support to programs designed to counter other weapons of mass destruction. In the very near future I would like to share our vision of a broader technology program that can leverage our current strengths, capitalize on the collaborative arrangements with our sister laboratories, and provide technology options in this very important area.
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