INF Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty - American Perspectives
Article XIII of the INF Treaty established the Special Verification Commission (SVC). The SVC serves as a forum for discussing and resolving implementation and compliance issues, for considering additional procedures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, and for determining the characteristics and methods of use of inspection equipment as anticipated by Section VI of the Protocol on Inspection. The sides resolved many of those issues during the first SVC session and agreed to utilize the agreements reached until such time as a document embodying them was signed by the two sides.
In 2014, the United States declared the Russian Federation to be in violation of its INF Treaty obligations not to produce, possess, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile for development of the SSC-8 missile system, which the United States assesses corresponds to be designated by the Russian Federation as the 9M729. The United States pursued an Integrated Strategy to induce the Russian Federation to return to compliance with its obligations. Nevertheless, the United States remained committed to upholding its obligations under the INF Treaty. The United States continues to value the Treaty as a pillar of international security and stability, not only between the United States and Russia, but also to US allies and partners around the world.
Since declaring the Russian Federation in violation of the INF Treaty in July 2014 for the development of the SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile system, which the United States assessed to be designated by the Russian Federation as the 9M729, the United States pressed Russia to return to compliance with its obligations under the Treaty. The US provided detailed information to the Russian Federation, outlining U.S. concerns and engaged up to the highest levels of government. In spite of these efforts, Russian officials refused to discuss the information provided by the United States or even answer basic questions. Indeed, Russian officials had not even acknowledged the existence of the missile system in question. Nevertheless, the United States remained committed to upholding its obligations under the INF Treaty.
However, the Russian Federation’s continuing violation and refusal to engage constructively was an impediment to improving bilateral relations and created an untenable situation whereby the United States unilaterally complies with the INF Treaty while the Russian Federation violates it. Having concluded a policy review of the U.S. Government’s approach to the Treaty, the Administration was implementing an integrated strategy to respond to the Russian Federation’s violation. This USA began taking new diplomatic, military, and economic measures intended to induce the Russian Federation to return to compliance and to deny it any military advantage should it persist in its violation.
First, the United States continued to seek a diplomatic resolution through all viable channels, including the INF Treaty’s Special Verification Commission (SVC) established to “resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed.”
Second, the U.S. Department of Defense commenced INF Treaty-compliant research and development (R&D) by reviewing military concepts and options for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems. Should the Russia Federation’s actions result in the collapse of the Treaty, these efforts would prepare the United States to defend itself and its allies. The United States will not violate its INF Treaty obligations, which allow for R&D activities that fall short of possession, production, and flight-testing of prohibited systems. In addition, the United States was prepared to immediately cease this R&D if the Russian Federation returns to full and verifiable compliance with the Treaty.
Third, the United States took economic measures relating to the Russian Federation’s INF Treaty-violating ground-launched cruise missile program. Such measures were tied to entities involved in the development and manufacture of Russia’s prohibited cruise missile system. As with the military steps, these economic response measures would cease if Russia returns to full and verifiable compliance.
The Russian rationale for the 9M729 / SSC-8 GLCM seemed opaque, but there is not much doubt that it was a compliance problem. The RS-26 / Avanguard is more complicated. It seems to be a 2-stage derivative of the RS-24 Yars (SS-29) the trick is that the third stage is some sort of boost-glide MaRV, to under-fly US exo-atmospheric BMD interceptors the problem is that the first two stages of the ICBM do not fly an intercontinental trajectory, but rather to a range that falls under the INF upper limit.
Kay Bailey Hutchison, the US NATO Ambasaddor, said 02 October 2018 that " ... there will come a point in the future in which America will determine that it has to move forward with a development phase that is not allowed by the treaty right now. That's not imminent, but we are laying down the markers so that our allies will help us bring Russia to the table...... The countermeasures would be to take out the missiles that are in development by Russia in violation of the treaty. So that would be the countermeasure eventually. We are trying not to do anything that would violate the treaty on our side, which allows research, but not going forward into development ..... Getting them to withdraw would be our choice, of course. But I think the question was what would you do if this continues to a point where we know that they are capable of delivering. And at that point we would then be looking at a capability to take out a missile that could his any of our countries in Europe and hit America in Alaska. .... "
Hutchison later clarified her statement, saying she was not talking about preemptively striking Russia, but about the need for Moscow to return to INF Treaty compliance or otherwise the United States would need to match its capabilities to protect its and NATO’s interests.
Defense Secretary James Mattis previously suggested that a Trump administration proposal to add a sea-launched cruise missile to America's nuclear arsenal could provide the U.S. with leverage to try to persuade Russia to come back in line on the arms treaty.
The US Department of State refuted the possibility of launching cruise missiles with the Aegis Ashore. Under Article II of the Treaty, "The term "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.... The term "GLCM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM."
Another line of reasoning supporting Russian claims of INF Treaty compliance was the assertion that while the missiles in question may have been tested, they had not been deployed. But Article VI of the Treaty states that : Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall: (a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles."
In a Press Availability at NATO Headquarters December 4, 2018, US Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo said " Russia’s been flight-testing the SSC-8 cruise missile since the mid-2000s. They’ve been testing it in excess of ranges that the treaty permits. All the tests of the SSC-8 have originated from a Kapustin Yar site from both a fixed and mobile launcher. Its range makes it a direct menace to Europe.
"In 2017, General Selva of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Congress that Russia had deployed its missile, and I quote, “in order to pose a threat to NATO and to facilities within the NATO area of responsibility,” end of quote. Russia continues to press forward, and as of late 2018 has filled multiple battalions of the SSC-8 missiles.
"Russia’s reply has been consistent: deny any wrongdoing, demand more information, and issue baseless counter-accusations. For more than four years, Moscow has pretended that it didn’t know what missile or test the United States was even talking about, even when we provided extensive information about the missile’s characteristics and testing history. It was not until we chose to publicize the Russian name of the missile in November of 2017 that Russia finally acknowledged its existence. Then Russia changed its cover story from the missile that does not exist to the missile that exists but is treaty-compliant.
"These violations of the INF Treaty cannot be viewed in isolation from the larger pattern of Russian lawlessness on the world stage. The list of Russia’s infamous acts is long: Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, election meddling, Skripal, and now the Kerch Strait, to name just a few.
"In light of these facts, the United States today declares it has found Russia in material breach of the treaty and will suspend our obligations as a remedy effective in 60 days unless Russia returns to full and verifiable compliance.....
while Russia is responsible for the demise of the treaty, many other states – including China, North Korea, and Iran – are not parties to the INF Treaty. This leaves them free to build all the intermediate range missiles that they would like. There is no reason the United States should continue to cede this crucial military advantage to revisionist powers like China, in particular when these weapons are being used to threaten and coerce the United States and its allies in Asia. If you ask the question why the treaty wasn’t enlarged to include more nations, including China, keep in mind that it has been tried three times without any success already, and it has failed each time."
Following the news that the US would be pulling out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Russian Defence Ministry released satellite images of a Raytheon Corporation plant it said had been prepared for the production of missiles prohibited under the arms control agreement. Ruptly published exclusive footage of the Raytheon factory highlighted by the Russian MoD, located in Tucson, Arizona.
According to the Russian military, the US was preparing to start production of new missiles long before Washington announced its intention to withdraw from the INF. The plant was said to have undergone modernisation in mid-2017 for the production of short and medium-range missiles. As evidence, Moscow released an image dated December 3, 2018 showing a massive factory complex, including three production areas, plus one still under construction, along with a test area, power station, and semi-underground storage facilities.
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