Soviet Space Organizational Administration
[The Soviet space organization and administration all worked under the same roof for the same employer organization, the central government during the Cold War. Not a lot of that has fully changed to this day since the 1991 revolution disillusionment of the former USSR -CPV]
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM
By Francis T. Miko*
1971-1975
I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE OF CHAPTER
Testifying before Congress, Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, Director of Defense Research and Engineering at the Department of Defense said:
The Soviet space program is a large, broadly oriented, stable program. In order to put this program in context, I would like to point out that the Soviets are continuing to expand their base of scientific manpower, the breadth and depth of technological investigations and the improvement of research and test facilities ... As I see it, the Soviet space program is an integral part of their evolving national posture and it is neither being "overemphasized nor starved relative to manpower, facilities or funds. (1)
The aim of this chapter is to determine the organizational and administrative structure of the Soviet space program on the basis of the open literature. An effort is made to describe key organizations and groups involved in the program and to assess their interrelationship. This chapter attempts to discover where decisions on space originate and to find the channels through which they pass to the operational level.
B. PROBLEMS OF SOVIET SECRECY AND INADEQUATE INFORMATION
Soviet secrecy is an obstacle to research on many facets of that country's development. Subject matter with any strategic implications or which is deemed sensitive is covered by all-pervasive secrecy.
Soviet officials regard the civilian and military aspects of their space program as sensitive. Thorough Government censorship extends to all areas related to the organization and administration of the program. The result is that very little information on organization can be gleaned from the available Soviet literature.
The open Western literature does not reveal a great deal more on the Soviet space organization. Since there exist no detailed conclusive studies on the organization and administration, one can at best try to piece together the fragments of information.
C. SPECULATIVE NATURE OF PRESENTATION
Since the available Western literature on the Soviet space program is largely speculative and sometimes contradictory, the effort here is to present the various views put forth and to synthesize them where possible. The arguments are viewed against what is known about Soviet organization for decision-making in general.
Clearly, the Soviet Union has a general organizational method. It seems a logical assumption that the administration of the space program should not diverge very far from the established Soviet pattern of doing things. Since a fair amount is known of Soviet operations in some less strategic areas, certain inferences can be made with respect to the space program from those operations. Caution must be exorcized, however, as there is often to be found an informal functional organization of Soviet endeavors which is different from, and at the same time more significant than, the formal organization.
II. GENERAL SKETCH OF SOVIET DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
A. THE COMMUNIST PARTY
1. The Party Congress
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the dominant force in all spheres of Soviet life. While formally outside the Government structure, the Party exercises control not only from the top, but at all levels through a centralized hierarchical organization that parallels the Government and social structure at all levels down to local enterprises and institutions. The Party Congress which meets at irregular intervals, every few years, is formally the highest Party organ. However, in practice the Congress has very little power and serves chiefly as a forum in which the leadership announces the launching of major policies.
2. The Central Committee
The Central Committee is elected by the delegates to the Party Congress to function between Congresses and act as the highest permanent party institution. Its membership (241 full members and 155 candidate members) is still too large for effective decision-making. One of its major functions is to elect the Politburo and Secretariat which are the real top decision-making bodies in the Soviet Union. It also ratifies Politburo decisions. Central Committee election of Politburo members and ratification of decisions are still primarily a pro forma function. In most instances, approval of Politburo decisions and changes is automatic and unanimous. Nevertheless, the Central Committee is significant in that its membership for the most part represents the political elite of the Soviet Union and it exorcizes control over policy implementation.
The Central Committee is divided into departments which for the most part parallel the Government structure at the ministry level. These departments have oversight duties over the corresponding ministries in the Government. The departments also provide information to the Politburo.
3. The Politburo
The Politburo, together with the Secretariat of the Party, exorcizes supreme power in the Soviet Union. Because of overlapping membership in these two highest bodies, their activities are well coordinated. (2) The Politburo presently has 14 full (voting) members and 7 candidate (non-voting) members. The Politburo selects and removes its own members and those of the Secretariat, even though formal authority for this function rests with the Central Committee. The Politburo establishes all major policy guidelines and acts as the final arbiter among the competing interest groups in the Soviet Union.
The power structure within the Politburo has varied over the years. Under Joseph Stalin, there was genuine one-man dictatorship, and the Politburo itself, became a virtual rubber stamp body. Since Stalin's death, there have been differing degrees of collective leadership. Both Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev were able to carve out dominant positions for themselves, but neither has been able to achieve absolute authority.
4. The Secretariat
The influence of the Secretariat parallels that of the Politburo. Among its duties are the appointment of major Party, Government, and other officials. The Secretariat chooses the candidates that are to run in elections (for the most part unopposed). It carries out oversight duties to assure that Party policy is being implemented at all levels. Despite the authority wielded by the Secretariat, it cannot be considered a separate power center, competing with the Politburo, due to the factor of overlapping membership. Some of the individuals who head key departments of the Central Committee are also members of the Secretariat.
5. Other Party Units
From the Central Committee down there is a vast network of Party organizations which assures the Communist Party of control over Soviet society. These organizations are to be found at the Union Republic, district and local levels. The close to 500,000 primary Party cells are at the bottom of the hierarchy. These are established in individual residential neighborhoods, factories, army units, schools, research institutions, and anywhere that there are three or more Communist Party members.
3. THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
1. The Supreme Soviet
In principle the Soviet Government is completely separate from the Communist Party apparatus. In fact, once again due to the phenomenon of overlapping membership, the Government leadership consists entirely of Party members and many key Government officials also hold major positions within the Party hierarchy. The Soviet Government has no independent authority, but is the mechanism through which Party policies are implemented.
The Supreme Soviet is the Soviet legislature and in theory the highest organ of the Soviet Government. It consists of two equal houses—the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. Elections to the Supreme Soviet are held every four years and a single list of candidates is nominated by the Communist Party. Between the infrequent sessions of the Supreme Soviet, its Presidium functions on its behalf. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium (presently Nikolay Podgorny) also acts as titular Chief of State. The Supreme Soviet plays no significant role in the actual Government of the country. Election to the body is sometimes a ceremonial honor bestowed on political figures, scientists, cosmonauts, artists and others.
2. The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers is the most significant organization of the Soviet Government. Its approximately 100 members are nominally appointed by the Supreme Soviet and theoretically they are responsible to that body. In practice the Council of Ministers is selected by and responsible directly to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers (presently, Alexey Kosygin) is also called the Premier or Prime Minister of the Soviet Union.
Directly under the Council of Ministers are the ministries, State Committees, and other bodies which carry on the day-to-day tasks of Soviet Government. The Soviet Academy of Sciences also falls under the supervision of the Council of Ministers. Below the ministries are the industrial branches and the institutions which fall within the jurisdiction of each.
III. ORGANIZATION FOR DECISION-MAKING ON SPACE AFFAIRS
A. AN OVERVIEW
The Soviet Union has never released an organizational chart of its space program. Given the degree of official secrecy surrounding the program, certain logical assumptions cannot be documented. One such assumption is that the space organization follows basic Soviet administrative patterns. There may be as many as 600,000 people working directly on the space program or in space related activities. (3) Such a massive organization would appear to require a high degree of coordination. However, it cannot necessarily be concluded that Soviet space administration is a rational streamlined decision-making mechanism. In an earlier study of the program, Leonard N. Beck, in fact, found the opposite in some areas; namely, administrative anarchy. (4)
Western observers have occasionally wondered how the program can function effectively in view of the overlapping jurisdictions between Party and Government, the participation of a myriad of institutions with no clear hierarchical relationship, and differences that exist everywhere between formal organizational structures and the loose informal working structures. Yet the results show that while the space organization may not function with optimum efficiency, it at least functions reasonably well. Two aspects of the Soviet governmental system may help to explain the success of the space program.
The first such factor relates to the multiple responsibilities assigned to leading individuals. Where there is no clear link between organizations involved in the same program, a link may often be found in the person of their leadership. When two seemingly unrelated organizations are headed by the same individuals, coordination seems relatively simple. The outsider trying to understand Soviet organizations is faced with a difficulty arising from this factor. Once a person is identified as a key figure in a given program, it is still not always possible to identify the associated organization. Fallacious conclusions can be drawn about the importance of a specific institution in an organization such as space on the basis of its individual membership.
The second such factor is what Leon Trilling, in an earlier congressional study calls the principle of single responsibility, operating throughout the Soviet system. Where there is no clear institutional responsibility, there often exists, formally or informally, a leader who will be held accountable for the success or failure of the program at any level.(5) This factor of single responsibility would seem to imply a fairly strict chain of command operating in the Soviet space organization.
B. ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
As in all areas of Soviet policy, the Communist Party asserts its leadership over the space program. Top-level decisions on space are probably made in the Politburo. Control over implementation of the decisions is probably the responsibility of the appropriate departments in the Central Committee. Soviet leader Brezhnev underscored the leading role of the Party in science in a speech marking the 250 th anniversary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He said:
. . . Comrades, in the future you will have to work even more, more persistently and more effectively. We have no intention of dictating to you the details of research topics and the ways and means of research—that is a matter for the scientists themselves. But the main directions of the development of science, the main tasks that life poses, will be determined jointly. (6)
The Politburo in its capacity as the highest policy-making body in the Soviet Union is responsible for establishing goals and priorities, setting up the organizational framework and funding of the space program. It presumably seeks the advice of experts in the field, before arriving at decisions.
The main directions of Party policy on space can be publicized m a variety of ways. A platform sometimes used to launch major programs is the Party Congress, held at irregular intervals. At the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), convened in 1971, for example, directives were issued to organize scientific work in outer space "in the interest of development of long-distance telegraph and telephone communications, television, weather forecasting, the study of natural resources, geographical research, etc., with the help of automatic and piloted spacecraft".(7) The functions of the Party Congresses for the most part do not include the establishment of policy. They serve generally as a forum for unveiling policies that have already been decided by the leadership.
Final responsibility on space matters within the Politburo rests with the de facto Soviet leader. The degree of the Soviet leader's personal involvement in space decisions has probably varied over the years.
Observers have pointed out that at the time of the launching of the first Soviet Sputnik in 1957, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev may not have immediately grasped the full political significance of the achievement, although he certainly already supported space research. Upon the successful completion of the Sputnik mission, Khrushchev's initial statements seemed to lack a great degree of enthusiasm. A few weeks later Khrushchev's tone changed. He heaped praise on the individuals who accomplished the feat; he was boastful of Soviet leadership in the space field; and he took personal credit for the success of the Soviet space program. He was probably responding to the Western reaction of amazement and disbelief. (8) Khrushchev's level of personal participation in decision-making on space may have grown after his initial lesson in the propaganda value of space accomplishments. At the awards ceremony following Gagarin's successful mission as the first man in space in 1961, Khrushchev emphasized his personal role in the Soviet space program. He was presented the first and highest Medal of Honor for the successful flight. Also among those most prominently honored was Leonid Brezhnev, then the Soviet President, who may have had some responsibility in the administration of the space program within the Politburo. (9) Nikita Khrushchev allegedly took a very active part in formulating space policy decisions in 1963, when it was reportedly decided to accelerate the program in response to American successes. (10)
Following Khrushchev's ouster from the Politburo in 1964, his successor, Leonid Brezhnev, initially appeared to be moving in the direction of scaling-down or de-emphasizing the Soviet space program. In his statement welcoming back Cosmonaut Komarov and his crew from their successful Voskhod flight, Brezhnev said in an apparent criticism of his predecessor and of the United States:
We are pleased of course, that our country is ahead in the exploration of space. But we Soviet people do not regard our space exploration as some kind of race. The spirit of reckless gambling in the great and serious matter of exploring and mastering space is deeply alien to us. (11)
According to American intelligence estimates, the person within the Politburo today with primary responsibility for space matters is candidate member D. F. Ustinov. (12) It may be some indication of the thrust of the Soviet space program that Ustinov's other primary duties are in the areas of defense industry and foreign military aid. He also has secondary responsibilities in the field of security.
Ustinov is a graduate of the Professional Technical School and the Leningrad Military Mechanical Institute. He has been a candidate member of the Politburo since 1965 and a member of the Central Committee since 1952. He has served in the Government as a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and as Minister of Defense Industries. Earlier he held senior positions in research institutes and directed the "Bolshevik" plant in the armaments sector. (13)
While primary duties are assigned to individual Politburo members probably on the basis of background, interests, and prestige, each member of the ruling body shares responsibilities in all areas. More intensive participation in decisions on space could be expected from those Politburo members who have primary decision-making responsibilities in related areas. Among these would be Audrey Grechko, who is the Soviet Defense Minister and has defense responsibilities in the Politburo. Petr M. Masherov, who handles science, industrial administration, and education, could also be assumed to have close ties to the space field.
It is difficult to name the Central Committee departments most closely involved with the space program, as all have not been fully identified. The departments handling science and educational institutions (headed by Sergey P. Trapeznikov) and defense industries (headed by Ivan D. Serbin) probably have a role in the oversight of the space program. The Central Committee as a body is reported to have conducted intensive reviews after Soviet space setbacks such as Salyut 1 and Salyut 2 in 1973. (14)
At the lower levels, the Communist Party also has the capability to perform a "watchdog" function over space affairs. Basic Party units are present at research institutions, in the Soviet Academy of Sciences and its branches, in the relevant military sections and within the industries doing space work. While the main task of these units is probably the ideological training of the workers, they would seem to have other potential control capabilities and could provide a direct channel between the Central Committee and the individual institutions.
C. ROLE OF THE FORMAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE
1. The Council of Ministers
Central Committee policy guidelines on space, on the basis of established patterns, would pass directly to the Council of Ministers. Theoretically, the Council of Ministers is responsible to the Supreme Soviet, but in terms of the structure of the real decision-making process, the Supreme Soviet appears to play no role. The passing of directives from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to the Council of Ministers is simplified by the fact that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the ten Deputy Chairmen, and the heads of the subordinate ministries, State committees and other agencies all simultaneously hold high Party offices. Six of the 15 full members of the Politburo are also members of the Council of Ministers. For a period under Joseph Stalin and later Nikita Khrushchev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party also assumed the position of Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier). Those duties are now separated with Soviet leader Brezhnev acting as General Secretary of the Party and Alexey Kosygin acting as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. At the same time, Kosygin is a ranking member of the Politburo, although not a member of the Party Secretariat.
The Soviet Constitution refers to the Council of Ministers as the highest executive and administrative organ of the state. It is the Government's central coordinating, planning, and controlling body, and is accountable directly to the CPSU. While the Soviet Constitution
gives the Council no legislative authority, it does in fact issue orders and decisions that become law. Major Government policy decisions are made in the Presidium of the Council of Ministers on the basis of Party guidelines and directives. (15)
Members of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, aside from Chairman Kosygin and First Deputy Chairman Kirill T. Mazurov, who may play a significant role in the space organization are Vladimir A. Kirillin (Chairman of the State Committee on Science and Technology), Nikolay K. Baybakov (Chairman of the State Planning Committee), Veniamin E. Dymshits (Chairman of the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply), and Leonid V. Smirnov (Chairman of the Military Industrial Commission). Non-Presidium members who head ministries and other departments subordinate to the Council of Ministers with a probable input into the space program, include Andrey A. Grechko (Defense Minister), Sergey A. Zverev (Minister of Defense Industry), and Konstantin N. Rudnev (Minister of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control Systems). (16)
2. State Committee on Science and Technology
The State Committee on Science and Technology is the highest Government coordinating body for scientific work, at least in the civilian sector. There are differences of opinion among Western analysts regarding the role the Committee plays in the space organization. It is generally thought to have a significant role. Some analysts view it as the chief coordinating body of the space program. Still others see it as an intermediary between the central space institution and the Government and Party leadership. (17) On the other hand, its position may be limited to that of coordinating some of the associated research and development activity contributing to the space program.
The precursor of the Committee was the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research established in 1961 under Nikita Khrushchev for the purpose of adapting basic research to industrial development. It was created in conjunction with the reorganization of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Narrow engineering institutes were moved from under the jurisdiction of the Academy and placed under the corresponding industrial ministries. Henceforth, the State Committee for the Coordination of Scientific Research would replace the Academy as coordinator of Soviet science, leaving the latter as an institution of basic research. (18) The action by the Khrushchev leadership was at least in part politically motivated. On the one hand it appeased those pure scientists in the Academy who resented the growing intrusion of engineers in the membership and the redirecting of the Academy's work toward the industrial sector. On the other hand, it reversed the trend under which the Academy accumulated increasing authority as the central scientific organization of the Soviet Union. The diffusion of its responsibilities may have been undertaken to eliminate what the Party viewed as a potential threat to its paramount position in the field of science.
The Committee was renamed in 1965, reemerging as the State Committee for Science and Technology. Under its new name, the Committee continues to be responsible for coordinating Soviet research and development (primarily in the civilian sector); establishing priorities, and introducing new technology into the industrial areas. Furthermore, the Committee oversees the numerous research institutes and laboratories now under the industrial ministries. (19)
One feature of the Committee, since its birth, has been the preponderance of officials from the defense industrial sector among its ranks. The first two chairmen, M. V. Krunichev and K. N. Rudnev, both had defense related backgrounds. Indications are that the Committee does not coordinate activities of the defense industries. (20) The only seeming explanation for the presence of the defense people in its ranks is that the defense establishment has significant influence over the civilian scientific and technological establishment.
The State Committee on Science and Technology is presently headed by Vladimir A. Kirillin, who is also a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and a member of the Communist Party Central Committee.
3. The State Planning Committee
The State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN), under the direction of Nikolay K. Baybakov, is responsible for planning scientific, technological, and economic activities in the Soviet Union, as well as exercising budget control. It falls in the Ministerial and State Committee structure directly under the Council of Ministers. It has an input into most Soviet undertakings, especially those, such as the space program, in which numerous organizations and sectors of the economy are involved. Within the State Committee are a number of regional and functional departments. The Committee is also responsible for overseeing plan fulfillment. One of its most important duties is to participate in formulating the overall short and long term plans of the Soviet Union such as the Five-Year Plan. (21)
Very little is known of the relationship between the space organization and the State Planning Committee. It is generally assumed that the space program falls under the system of precise advance planning, prevalent throughout the Soviet Union. Integration of the space program with the other national undertakings would seem to require a considerable degree of involvement by the Committee.
D. ROLE OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT
1. General Role
Since the early history of Soviet space and rocket research there has been a close tie between the scientists and the military establishment. Scientists and inventors learned very early that under the Soviet system, the best way to get generous and quick funding for a project was to impress upon the military the defense or strategic value of the undertaking. The initial research institutions dealing- with rocketry such as the Leningrad Gas Dynamics Laboratory was established under the control of the armed forces. The secrecy cloaking Soviet space research can at least in part be explained by the military link. Soviet space scientists themselves are said to have a history of secrecy consciousness." On the whole, Soviet space scientists have not been "prolific recorders of their findings.” (22)
Western opinion varies on the military-civilian mix of the Soviet space organization today, and on the degree of separation between the military and civilian aspects of the program. The Soviets themselves claim that their entire space program is purely scientific and peaceful in purpose, which is known not to be the case. (23) In fact there appears to be general consensus among Western experts that the military is deeply involved in the program. Some analysts see the military establishment as controlling essentially only the military side of the space program with a large part remaining in civilian hands. (24) Other observers have expressed the opinion that the military shares, with the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the organizational control of the program (25) Foy D. Kohler has suggested that rather than a NASA-type central agency, existing organizations, "particularly within the military establishment," are primarily responsible for directing the program. (26) Dr. Thomas 0. Paine, the Administrator of NASA, in testimony before Congress m 1970, attributed a key role to the military in the space program. He said:
The Soviet space program is generally considered to be directed by the Soviet military, and public analyses indicate that a very considerable proportion of flights no doubt serve military purposes. (27)
2. The Ministry of Defense
The military establishment exerts general influence on policy at the ministerial level through the Defense Ministry with input from the five military branches. Perhaps more significantly the military has a direct input at the highest Party level through the membership in the Politburo of Defense Minister Audrey Grechko and the presence of numerous military officers in other high Party offices.28 This factor in itself would allow the military to have an influence over the space organization at the very top. It is generally believed, however, that the military establishment exercises more direct influence over the program.
The Soviet Defense Ministry which is directly under the Council of Ministers in the Government structure is charged with directing, administering, and supporting the military branches. The Defense Minister and his two or three deputies head the organization. At the next level are the other deputy ministers, including the commanders-in-chief of the major military branches and the most important support branches. Below this level are the General Staff and the Main Political Administration. The Main Political Administration which acts as the Party's "watch-dog" in the military is simultaneously a section of the Party Central Committee adding another significant link. The next level in the military hierarchy includes the operating commands. (29)
A striking difference between the Soviet defense structure and, for example, its American equivalent is that the Soviet establishment consists of military men from top to bottom. Upon the death of Marshal Malinovskiy in 1967, it was at first rumored in the West that he would be replaced by Dmitriy F. Ustinov (the Politburo member responsible for space and defense industries). If selected, he would have become the first civilian in that position. Reportedly, he was the Party choice but under stiff opposition from the military, Grechko was chosen in his place. (30)
In terms of the Soviet space program, an important characteristic of the Defense Ministry is its relationship with the strategic industries which manufacture the hardware. While structurally these industrial sectors are under the Defense Industries and other Ministries, directly under the Council of Ministers, they are in practice controlled by the military establishment, according to some analysts. (31)
Below the Ministry of Defense, the five coequal branches of the military are the Army, Navy, Air Force, Air Defense Command, and the Strategic Rocket Force. The Air Force and the Strategic Rocket Force have a direct operational role in the space program.
3. The Strategic Rocket Force
The Strategic Rocket Force conducts all space rocket launches whether for military or civilian purposes. It was established in 1960 and is the elite branch of the Soviet military. The primary mission of the force is to launch strategic nuclear missiles. The size of the force
has been estimated at 250,000 men. Very little is known of its organizational structure. It is commanded by General Vladimir F. Tolubko who replaced Nikolay I. Krylov upon his death in 1972. He is a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. (32)
The Strategic Rocket Force is thought to operate some tracking stations and tracking ships. It also may exercise some control over the launch facilities.
4- The Air Force
The Soviet Air Force is responsible for cosmonaut training at Star Village (Zvezdnyy Gorodok) near Moscow and for the recovery of spacecraft. The chief of cosmonaut training is Lieutenant General Vladimir A. Shatalov, himself a veteran cosmonaut. (33)
The Soviet Air Force, or long-range Air Force as it is sometimes called, is distinct from the Air Defense Command which is responsible for the defense of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries from foreign attack. The Air Force has been compared to the U.S. Strategic Air Command since its mission may be similarly limited. The advent of the missile age and the establishment of the Strategic Rocket Force to man the missiles has diminished the overall role of the Air Force. (34) The Air Force is presently commanded by Chief Marshal of Aviation Pavel S. Kutakhov, a full member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. (35)
E. BOLE OF THE SCIENTIFIC ESTABLISHMENT
1. Overview
Soviet Party leader Brezhnev in his speech marking the 250th anniversary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences said that the country had more than a million people working in various fields of science, calling it a "great force that must be used properly." (36) It is not definitely known what percentage of these people work on the Soviet space program, or how precisely they are organized. The Communist Party exercises varying degrees of control over the entire scientific establishment.
The National Science Foundation sponsored a study on Soviet research and development which concluded in part:
The cardinal aspect of Soviet organization for research and development stems from the fundamental nature of the Soviet State wherein the allocation and employment of natural resources are determined and enforced by the central government. As is true for all economic, cultural, and other functions of Soviet society, the lines of control over research and development progressively converge toward the apex of State power, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and its executive branch, the USSR Council of Ministers. All basic decisions on the scale, direction, and organization of research and development are made or are subject to confirmation at that uppermost level of authority as if by the directors of a giant, nationwide, all-inclusive holding corporation. (37)
The dependent relationship of the scientists to the Communist Party is just as emphatically underscored by Soviet leaders. On this subject Leonid Brezhnev said:
Socialism and science are indivisible, and this is the reason for the victory of socialism. Socialism alone makes possible the utilization of the gains of science in the interest of the people and makes it possible to bring to light the creative potential and talents that abound in every people. .
* * * I would like to pay special attention to a highly important problem—the Party spirit of our science. In whatever branch Soviet scientists work, they are always distinguished by one characteristic—a high level of Communist consciousness and Soviet patriotism. (38)
The scientists are said not always to welcome the Party's control over their work. Some analysts view the Party-science community relationship as one of chronic tension. This may be explained partially by the fact that Soviet science has been subjected to Party control without the scientists themselves having been integrated, to any significant degree, into the Government decision-making process. On the whole, analysts believe, American scientists have more influence on policy than their Soviet counterparts through institutions such as the President's Science Advisory Committee or the Special Assistant for Science and Technology. (Ironically, such American institutions were established in response to the Soviet Sputnik challenge). (39)
This is not to imply, however, that individual space scientists have no input into top-level decision-making. On the contrary their influence, at times, can be significant. It was reportedly Sergey Korolev, the former Chief Designer and major figure in the Soviet space program, who convinced Khrushchev to provide major support and funding for the Soviet space program by promising that, given the proper tools, he could beat the United States in sending up a sputnik for the International Geophysical Year in 1957. (40) However, Soviet scientists do not appear to be involved in the decision-making on an institutional or sustained basis.
An important factor in viewing the Soviet space organization is the distinction that exists within the Soviet science establishment between what one analyst calls civilian scientists and defense scientists. There is a striking contrast between the scientific achievements to date of the defense sector on the one hand, and the civilian sector, on the other. The defense sector has had remarkable successes, while the civilian sector has had very mixed results, including stagnation in many areas, over recent years. Defense research and development receives preferential funding which in turn has the effect of providing the defense scientists with more favorable working conditions than their civilian counterparts. It has been estimated that the defense sector, in the broad sense, receives as much as 80 per cent of research and development allocations. (41) In this estimate, the entire space effort is included in the defense category, on the grounds that the space program has had the success, commitment of resources, and preferential treatment characteristic of that category.
Many analysts believe that funding alone does not explain the greater effectiveness of defense and space R&D. They see a more efficient organization in the strategic areas. The views of these analysts were reinforced in a 1962 speech by Premier Khrushchev. He attributed Soviet success in these areas to the "centralization and concentration of scientific and design forces in the appropriate committees" and admitted that this sort of efficiency did not yet exist in other areas. (42)
Despite the difference between the two scientific sectors (defense and civilian), they share many common problems. One factor that probably works against rapid progress in space research is the existing compartmentalization of scientific work. One scientist or group of scientists does not necessarily know what the other is doing. Scientists throughout the Soviet system are said to be plagued by an inability to gain from the free flow of ideas and information which Western scientists, for example, rely on heavily.
2.. The Soviet Academy of Science
a. General Organization—The Academy of Sciences is the most visible institution of the Soviet space organization. The Soviet Union presents it as the counterpart of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in its space role. In negotiations with NASA on space cooperation, the Soviet Union is represented by Academy officials. Some leading Western experts subscribe to this dominant position attributed to the organization by Soviet spokesmen. The-Dutch expert Peter Smolders maintains that under the control of the top Party and Government organizations the actual "coordination of all space activities, manned as well as unmanned flights, is in the hands of the Soviet Academy of Sciences." (43)
Other observers agree that the Academy is one of the institutions heavily involved in the space organization, providing research support consultation, and acting as spokesman for the program at home and abroad, but dispute the central role within the organization attributed to it. they do not deny that key figures in the Academy might actually be involved in the central coordination of the space effort in other capacities. For example, the former Academy President, Mstislav V. Keldysh, is recognized as a prominent space scientist. The Soviet press has associated the "successes of the U.S.S.R. in the exploration of space with his name and has referred to him as an organizer and initiator" of the space program.44 Furthermore, membership in the Academy is a form of recognition for which leading space scientists seem to be prime candidates.
The evidence generally used to support the arguments of those who doubt the central role of the Academy as an institution in the space organization is that (1) its scope of responsibility has become too limited as a result of the various reorganizations for the Academy to play the role of coordinator; and (2) the Soviet Communist Party leadership and the military establishment seem to have a historical mistrust toward the Academy (despite the esteem in which they hold it) that would make it unlikely for them to give the institution the central coordinating role.
Membership in the Soviet Academy of Sciences is one of the highest honors conferred by the Soviet State. The functions of the Academy encompass not only the natural sciences, but also the social sciences Jaw, and humanities. The academy is considered to be the leading center of basic and applied research in the Soviet Union. Under the Academy are fourteen Republic academies and seven branches It serves as coordinator for the pure scientific research carried on by the academies of the Soviet Union Republics and the specialized institutes. (45) In all, the Academy incorporates 250 scientific institutions and employs over 160,000 people, 40,000 of whom are highly trained researchers. (46)
The highest body of the Academy in the formal structure is the General Assembly which includes all the regular and honorary members. Real control is exercised by the Presidium of the Academy. The Presidium members for the most part hold high-level Party posts. They act as the channel for Party and Government directives. Below the Presidium is the Scientific Secretary. Under him are the councils, departments, and agencies. As elsewhere in the Soviet system, the Party exercises control from the top and at every level of the Academy. Political secretaries are assigned to every institute and department. The President of the Academy is A. P. Aleksandrov.
The Academy was reorganized in 1963, when reforms mentioned by Khrushchev as early as 1956 were instituted. On the basis of the reforms the Academy remained the central coordinator of theoretical research. Many organizations, such as the Institute for Metallurgy were transferred to the industrial ministries. The Academy continued to carry on some engineering research of fundamental importance, but it no longer worked on the practical applications.47 As a result of the reorganization, the Academy remains the single most important and prestigious scientific institution in the Soviet Union. However, it has lost its position in the overall administration of Soviet science and technology.
Within the structure of the Academy are to be found several commissions and sections directly involved in the space program. Other space commissions may fall under the jurisdiction of the Academy. Some of these units probably contribute significantly to the space effort while others may serve primarily as a front for the more secret space organization.
b. Space Institutions under the Academy.—Under the auspices of the Soviet Academy of Sciences are numerous commissions, institutes, and organizations which deal with various aspects of space research. In 1954, an organization was established under the title Interdepartmental Commission for the Coordination and Control of Scientific-Theoretical Work in the Field of Organization and Accomplishment of Interplanetary Communications. It was headed by Leonid I. Sedov and included, among others, Petr L. Kapitsa and Anatoliy A. Blagonravov. The main function of the Interdepartmental Commission was to coordinate scientific research aimed at launching a Soviet Sputnik. It was also reportedly responsible for developing experiments to be carried out in space, for publicizing Soviet space achievements, maintaining contacts with foreign space organizations, and sending scientists to represent the Soviet Union at international space con-
ferences.48 The Interdepartmental Commission was reportedly super-ceded by the Commission on the Exploration and Utilization of Space, headed by Blagonravov. (49) (Soviet sources refer to it as the Commission for the Study and Use of Outer Space). (50)
Another institution apparently under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences is the Commission for the Promotion of Interplanetary Flights, headed by Leonid I. Sedov (formerly with the Interdepartmental Commission and Vice President of the International Astro- nautical Federation). (51)
The organization is also referred to as the Commission for Space Travel. (52) At least one of its important duties seems to be as spokesman and representative internationally for the Soviet space program.
A major agency of the Academy of Sciences is the Council for International Cooperation in the Studies and Uses of Outer Space (Interkosmos). The Council is the coordinator for all cooperative space ventures with the countries of Eastern Europe, to which the Soviet Union attributes major political significance. Chairman of the Council is Boris N. Petrov, considered a foremost expert in cybernetics and the theory of automatic control. He is also the Director of the Department of Mechanics and Control Processes at the Academy and a professor at the Moscow Aviation Institute. Furthermore, he is another leading international spokesman for the Soviet space program. (63)
The Institute of Space Research, directed by R. Z. Sagdeyev is one of several advanced research centers operated by the Academy. (54) Some of these Institutes offer advanced university degrees.
The Soviet Academy of Sciences also operates some of the space tracking stations within the Soviet Union and ten of the tracking ships operating around the globe. Other space communications ships are operated by the Navy and the Strategic Rocket Force. The Coordination and Computing Center which analyzes communication received from space is also reportedly under Academy administration, as is Star Village (Zvezdny Gorodok), at least formally, where the cosmonauts are trained by the Air Force. (55)
3. Input from the Universities
Universities in the Soviet Union are thought to have less of an input into research and development than their American counterparts. The institutes of higher learning conduct much of their own research. But their work does not seem to be integrated with the research performed at the Academy and elsewhere. This departmentalization inhibits the exchange of technological information between the universities and the space organization and among the universities themselves. Further-more, it is said to work to the detriment of the ability to improvise in the space program. (56) The universities may constitute a large untapped or wasted resource in the Soviet space program.
F. THE QUESTION OF A CENTRALIZED SOVIET SPACE AGENCY
1. The Evidence
Over the years Western experts have been interested in the question of whether there exists a central coordinating agency for the Soviet space program. There is evidence and strong opinion on both sides, but no proof. Clearly, an undertaking of the scope of the space program needs high-level coordinating. While it is an accepted fact that the highest level oversight comes from the Communist Party leadership, it also stands to reason that this group does not conduct the day-to-day management of the program.
The specific questions involved in the space agency speculation are, (1) whether a, central agency, distinct from the institutions already discussed, exists at all; (2) if a separate coordinating mechanism exists, whether it is a formal agency rather than an informal grouping along "Manhattan Project" lines; and (3) the structure and membership of such an organization.
In 1963, the Aerospace and Technology Division of the Library of Congress released a study on the management of the Soviet space program, together with organizational charts, according to which the Soviet space program was headed by the State Commission for Space
Exploration, directly under the Council of Ministers. (57) The Soviet press on very rare occasions has referred to a "State Commission." In general, however, the Soviet media speak obliquely about the "collectives" of scientists and other talent. In 1972, an American reporter visiting " Star Village" near Moscow spoke of the "State Commission" clearing the spacecraft for launch, and said that while the identity and scope of the organization is not known, it is presumed to incorporate many of the functions of NASA. (58)
Another observer, Nicholas Daniloff, quotes one source as having identified the Soviet space agency as the "State Commission for the Organization and Execution of Space Flight." (59) He also attributes responsibility for all launches to the Commission.
Other analysts believe that the Soviet Union has no space agency which approximates America's NASA. (60) In place of such an organization, they perceive an elaborate system of coordination among participating institutions on an informal basis. One observer sees a "tendency to resort to ad hoc arrangements to override whatever barriers exist" in high priority fields of Soviet research and development. This he believes functions only because of the intimate participation by the Soviet leadership. Top officials can intercede quickly when stumbling blocks and jurisdictional bottlenecks, such as plague much of the civilian sector, develop. (61)
2. The Structure
The central coordinating mechanism of the Soviet space program probably includes representatives from the upper echelons of the Communist Party, the military establishment, the scientific establishment, and the industrial ministries and state committees that have an input into the space program. The top positions in the organization have been identified as including a Chairman, one or more Deputy Chairmen, a Launch Director, the Chief Designer, and the Chief Theoretician of Cosmonautics. (62) Other probable high-level members come from the military, including Air Force and Strategic Rocket Force representatives, and from the scientific and industrial sectors. (63)
3. Speculation on Individual Identities
The chief officials and scientists of the Soviet space program must bear the burden of working in complete anonymity. Nikita Khrushchev frequently explained that the secrecy surrounding their identities was necessary to protect them from the threat of assassination. As a result, guessing the identities of space officials has become a lively game in the West. The Russians only disclose the identities upon the deaths of space leaders. However, occasional clues do appear in the Soviet media inadvertently.
There were reportedly occasions in the past when impostors were actually paraded to conceal the real identities of space figures. According to one account, Sergey P. Korolev, who was the Chief Designer and leading scientist in the Soviet space program, became infuriated because L. I. Sedov was being presented at international congresses as the leading Soviet space scientist. When the Western press began to refer to Sedov as the father of the Sputnik, Korolev allegedly demanded of Khrushchev that the true identities of all the people involved in the launching of the first Sputnik be published. While Khrushchev did not comply with this demand, all further reference to Sedov as the man behind Sputnik were reportedly stopped. (64)
The position of chairman in any national coordinating commission on space would, at least formally, be the most important. Dmitriy F. Ustinov, previously referred to as the top Soviet official on space in his Politburo capacity, has been suggested as a possible chairman of a "State Commission." Whether Ustinov, as a Politburo member, would become involved in the day-to-day administration of the space program is open to question. Some of the speculation on the position is based on the perceived identity of the earlier chairman who was
thought by many to be Konstantin N. Rudnev, now the head of the Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control Systems (and probably still influential in the space program). He had been in charge of defense industries from 1958-1961 prior to becoming chairman of the precursor to the State Committee on Science and Technology while allegedly heading the "State Commission." He was also a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. A man who possesses a very similar background, and is, therefore, a logical subject of speculation regarding the chairmanship, is Vladimir A. Kirillin. (66) He is currently Chairman of the State Committee on Science and Technology and a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, as well as a member of the Party Central Committee.
Leonid V; Smirnov and Sergey A. Zverev are two other people who, on the basis of their present positions and backgrounds, in areas associated with the space and defense fields, could be considered possible candidates for the position of chief space coordinator. Smirnov is Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission and a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Zverev holds the important post of Minister of Defense Industries.
Korolev held the position of Chief Designer of the Soviet space program until his death in 1966. In this capacity he presumably worked under the direction of the Chairman. However, on frequent occasions he is said to have reported directly to Premier Khrushchev. He was responsible for the scientific and technological aspects of the Soviet space program. According to some sources, Korolev also held the positions of Launch Director and Deputy Chairman of the "State Commission".66 It is unlikely that one man replaced him in all three positions.
Mikhail K. Yangel is believed by some observers to have replaced Korolev in the position of Chief Designer. When Yangel died in 1971, a TASS Soviet news agency obituary called him the "outstanding scientist and designer in space technology" and the "man who raised a galaxy of outstanding designers and scientists". It said that he had made a unique contribution to the unmanned lunar program and the Venus and Mars programs. He was also said to have had a major role in the area of manned space flights. Yangel was a full member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and of the Supreme Soviet. He had received the highest Soviet honors during his life. After World War II he is known to have worked on Soviet aviation and rocketry and is said to have directed a top national rocket design bureau. 67)
Since Yangel's death, speculation on the identity of the Chief Designer has involved Vladimir N. Chelomei. He is known to be a prominent figure in the Soviet space program. He is thought by some observers to have had a position rivaling that of Korolev under Khrushchev. Chelomei graduated from the Kiev Aviation Institute and designed jet aircraft engines during World War II. After the war he began to work in the rocket field. He became a Bauman Engineering School professor in 1952. He, too, is a Supreme Soviet Deputy. (68)
Other names have been mentioned from time to time as possible members of the "State Commission". Valentin P. Glushko is known to have been a designer of rocket engines. In early Soviet space literature his name was linked with that of Korolev and Tikhonravov. He has been suggested as the possible Chief Designer of Rocket Engines. (69)
In his obituary, Aleksey Isayev was identified by TASS as the chief designer of the rocket engines for the Vostok, Voskhod, Soyuz and Mars spacecraft. Very little was revealed about his background other than that he was a university graduate who worked in the field of aviation and rocket engine development. He was called one of the main creators of the first Soviet jet in 1942. In his lifetime he had received the highest Government honors and awards. (70)
Leonid I. Sedov, as a specialist in mechanics and aerodynamics, is also thought to have an important role in the program, even though he may not be "the father of Sputnik" as the Western press at one time suggested.
A final point which has interested Western observers concerns the true identities of leading space scientists who write articles in the Soviet Union under pseudonyms. Key figures in the space program are known to have used this approach to maintain their anonymity in the past. Korolev allegedly used more than one pseudonym in his life time. A former Soviet journalist who at one time wrote about the space program said that Korolev regularly wrote articles for Pravda under the pseudonym "Konstantinov". (71) He is also thought to have been the author of articles under the name Professor K. Sergeyev. These articles were generally New Year's reports on the Soviet space program. If he indeed wrote the articles, he merely reversed his names. This has led to speculation that the articles which started to appear in the late 1950s by Professor G. V. Petrovich may have been written by Valentin P. Glushko, the rocket engine designer. (72) Without speculating on pseudonyms used by other leading space scientists, it can be guessed that some of the signatures appearing on articles today may be pseudonyms for key space figures.
4. Some Concluding Generalizations
Few conclusions can be drawn on the organization of the Soviet space program with any degree of certainty. It is known that the Communist Party exorcizes overall control from the top through its Central Committee and ruling Politburo and at every level through an elaborate network of "political secretariats". The top decision maker on space is the General Secretary of the Party whose degree of personal involvement depends on his own discretion. (There are indications that Nikita Khrushchev, as a space enthusiast, involved himself intimately. It is possible that Leonid Brezhnev participates less directly.) The Politburo member charged with directing the space program is thought to be Dmitriy F. Ustinov. This position would appear to make him the top space official.
At the Government level, the directives of the Communist Party leadership are received by the Council of Ministers. The coordination is simple because the Council includes several of the Party leaders. The Council of Ministers has under it the ministries and state committees which oversee many of the elements going into the space program. The most important are the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Defense Industries, the State Committee on Science and Technology, the State Committee on Planning, the Military-Industrial Commission, and the Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment, and Control Systems. Among them, they control the industries and the research and development involved in the space program.
The military establishment plays a large, possibly dominant, role in the space program. Military influence may be exercised directly or through outside organizations on which it is heavily represented. In this context, it seems revealing that most of the individuals who are mentioned as probable high functionaries in the space organization have strong military or defense industry backgrounds. The military participates directly in the space program at another level. The Air Force is responsible for cosmonaut training and vehicle recovery. The Strategic Rocket Force conducts all space launches. The three major launch sites are administered by the military.
The Soviet Academy of Sciences and its subsidiary organizations are extensively involved in the space program, but possibly not in the m central role sometimes attributed to them. The Academy and its members are held in the highest esteem in the Soviet Union, but there appears simultaneously to be an element of mistrust toward the scientific establishment and its chief organ among the Party and State hierarchy. Furthermore, since its reorganizations, the Academy docs not seem to be set up in a manner that would allow the most effective coordination of the space effort.
Therefore, it would appear that there is a central coordinating mechanism which lies outside the Science Academy structure and which includes high-level representatives from the major participating groups; namely, the Communist Party, the military, the scientists, and the sectors of the Soviet economy involved in the space program. Whether this mechanism is a formal agency such as the much discussed "State Commission" or just an informal grouping of key individuals remains an open question. There is strong opinion, but there seems to be no conclusive evidence on either side. Regarding the membership of this coordinating mechanism, speculation by various Western observers has been included as a point of interest. However, due to the tight veil of secrecy that surrounds key Soviet space figures, their identification remains a highly conjectural exercise.
References:
(A) SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, 1971-75, OVERVIEW, FACILITIES AND HARDWARE MANNED AND UNMANNED FLIGHT PROGRAMS, BIOASTRONAUTICS CIVIL AND MILITARY APPLICATIONS PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE PLANS, STAFF REPORT , THE COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE .SCIENCES, UNITED STATES SENATE, BY THE SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, VOLUME – II, AUGUST 30, 1976, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON : 1976,
SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, 1971-75 GOALS AND PURPOSES, ORGANIZATION, RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS, ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND SPACE LAW, Vol. II
1. U.S. Congress. Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1975. Hearings . . . March 18 and 20, 1975: Part 2. Washington, Govt. Print. OB., 1975, p. 788.
2. Currently, there are six members of the ten-man Secretariat who are also members or candidate-members of the Politburo. They are General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, P. N. Demichev, A. P. Kirilenko, F. D. Kulakov, M. A. Suslov and D. F. Ustinov.
3 Sheldon, Charles S. II. United States and Soviet Progress in Space: Summary Data through 1974 and a Forward Look, Washington, U>S. Library of Congress-January 13, 1975, P. 21 (Congressional Research Service multilith no. 75-18 SP).
4. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Soviet Space Programs 1962-1965: Goals and Purpose, Achievements, Plans, and International Implications, Staff report, Washington, Gov’t Print. Off., 1966, p. 158.
5. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences,. Soviet Space Programs: Organization, Plans, Goals, and International Implications. Staff Report. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1962, p. 62.
6. Academy of Sciences' 250th Birthday, Speech by L. I. Brezhnev, Current Digest o( the Soviet Press, v. 27, October 29,1975: 3.
7. Sevastyanov, V. and Y. Faddeyev. Soviet Cosmonautics and Scientific and Technical Progress. Space World, v. 1, September 1972:21.
8. For an account of Khrushchev's reactions see Daniloff, Nicholas, The Kremlin and the Cosmos. NewYork, Alfred A. Knopt, 1972, p. 66.
9. Ibid., p. 74. See also: Dornberg, John. Brezhnev: The Mask of Power. New York, Basic Books, Inc., p.163.
10. Oberg, James E. The Voskhod Programme: Khrushchev's Folly. Spaceflight v 16 April 1974- 147
11. Dornberg, op. cit., p. 186.
12. U. S. Central Intelligence Agency. Reference Aid: CPSU Politburo and Secretariat, September 15, 1974. (A (C R) 74—25).
13. Crowley Edward L. (et al) eds. Prominent Personalities in the USSR: A Biographical Directory, Compiled by the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Metuchen, N.J., Scarecrow Press 1968, p. 652;
14. White Sarah and Grigori Tohall. Green Light for Soviet Space? New Scientist, v. 65, February 1975: 439.
15. See American University. Foreign Area Studies. Area Handbook for the Soviet Union. Washington, Govt. Pint. Off. , 1970, pp. 390-393.
16. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, op. cit.
17. Smolders, Peter L., Soviets in Space: The Story of the Salyut and the Soviet Approach to Present and Future Space Travel. Gulldford, Lutterworth Press, 1973, p. 29.
18. Juviler, op. cit., p. 153-154.
19. American University, op. cit., p. 354-358.
20. Gallagher, op. cit., p. 68.
21. American University, op. cit., p. 609-611
22. Daniloff, op. cit., p. 30-32.
23. U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Science and Astronautics. Review of the Soviet Space Program; with Comparative United States Data, Pared by Charles S. Sheldon II. Washington, Gov’t Print, Off., 1967, p. 81
24. See for example: U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Soviet space programs, 1962-1965, op. cit., p. 147.
25. See Ulsamer, Edgar. The Soviet Space Effort: Still Increasing. Air Force Magazine, v. 56, October 1973: 56.
26. Kohler, Foy D. and Dodd L. Harvey. Administering and Managing the United States and Soviet Space Programs. Science, v. 169, September 11, 1970:1060.
27. US Congress. House, Committee on Science and Astronautics. 1971 NASA Authorization. Vol. 1. Hearings held February 17, 19, 20, 24, 25, and 26, 1970. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1970. p. 13.
28. American University, op. cit., p. 580-581.
29. Gallagher, Mathew P. and Karl F. Spielmann. Soviet Decision-making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race. New York, Praeser, 1972. p. 38-39.
30. Ibid., p. 41.
31. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Soviet Space Programs, 1966-1970. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1971, p. 85.
32. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Reference Aid: Directory of USSR Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Officials. April 1975, p. 13. (A-CR-75-14).
33. Smolders, op. cit. p. 30.
34. American University, op. cit., p. 586.
35. U. S Central Intelligence Agency, Reference Aid: Directory of USSR Ministry of Defense and ArmedOfficials, op. cit. p. 9.
36. Academy of Sciences' 250th birthday, op. cit., p. 4
37. Korol, Alexander G. Soviet Research and Development: Its Organization, Personnel, and Funds, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1965, p. 3.
38 Academy of Sciences' 250th birthday, op. cit., p. 2,
39. Juviler, Peter H. and Henry W. Morton, eds. Soviet Policy-making: Studies of Communism in Transition. New York, Praeger, 1967, p. 58.
40. Gallagher, Matthew P. and Karl F. Splelmann. Soviet Decision-making for Defense: A Critique of U.S. Perspectives on the Arms Race. New York, Praeger Pub., 1972, p. 72-73.
41. Ibid., p. 55, 66.
42. Pravda, November 20, 1962; cited in Gallagher, op. cit., p. 68.
43. Smolders, op. cit., p. 29.
44. The New York Times, May 31,1971: 32.
45. Juviler, op. cit., p. 134.
46. Academy of Sciences 250th Birthday, op. cit., p. 4.
47. Juviler, op. cit., p. 155.
48. Daniloff, op. cit., p. 56, 76-77.
49. Beck, op. cil., p. 148.
50. Lebedev, Lev. Soviet Space Research. Space World, v. k-11-131, November 1974: 22.
51. Gwertzman. Bernard. High Space Costs Backed in Soviet. New York Times, February W, 1971: 20'
52. Smolders, op- cit., p. 29.
53. Pond, Elizabeth. Soviets Plan to Land on Venus. Christian Science Monitor, June 17,1975:1, 9.
54. The Soyuz-13 flight. New York Times, no. 52, December 1973:12-13.
55. Smolders, op. cit., p. 30.
56. Coexistence in Space? Swiss Review of World Affairs, v. 25, August 1975: 3.
57. U.S. Library of Congress, Aerospace Technology Division. Management of the Soviet Space Program, Washington, October 19G3. (ITS: AID Report P-63-117).
58. Wilford, John Noble, Soviet Space Center: Hope Amid Expansion. New York Times, March 22, 1972:
59. Daniloff, op. cit.. p. 76-77.
60. See for example: Ulsamer, op. cit., p. 56.
61. Gallagher. op. cit., p. 70.
62. All mention of the Chief Theoretician has been dropped and the position probably no longer exists.
63. U.S. Library of Congress, op. cit., figure 3, and Daniloff, op. cit., p. 78.
64. "Vladlmirov, Leonid. The Russian Space Bluff. London, Tom Stacey; Ltd., 1971, p. 19.
65. Danilofl, op. cit., p. 81.
66. Danilofl, op. cit., P. 78.
67. Mikhail Yangel Dies; Soviet Space Scientist. Washington Star, October 27,1971: B8.
68. Shabad, Theodore. Russians indicate rocket specialist heads space program. New York Times, July 14, 1974.
69. Dainloff, op. cit., p. 84-86.
70. Soviet Rocket Designer Identified. Washington Star, June 27, 1971: A11.
71. Ibid.
72. Damloff, op. cit., p. 84.
*Mr Miko is an analyst in Soviet and East European affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Library of Congress
SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: 1976-80,
SUPPORTING FACILITIES AND LAUNCH VEHICLES, POLITICAL GOALS AND PURPOSES, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE, ADMINISTRATION, RESOURCE BURDEN, FUTURE OUTLOOK PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF HON. BOB PACKWOOD, Chairman, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, UNITED STATES SENATE, Part 1, Dec. 1982.
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