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1980-1987 Soviet Space Program Administration and Resource Burden

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - SOVIET SPACE ORGANIZATION AND FUNDING

Since the last edition of this report was published, the Soviet Union has increased its efforts in space science and space applica¬tions, learning from Western space programs about the potential profits to be made from the latter. The Soviets also have continued their strong program of military space activities, with evolutionary improvements in several systems.

Under General Secretary Gorbachev, much more information is now available about some aspects of the Soviet space program, no¬tably space science, but the program is far from open by Western standards. The organization of the Soviet government for determin¬ing space policy and implementing programs is just as unclear as ever. Although a new space agency was created, its position in the Soviet government and its relationship to other space-related orga¬nizations is not well understood. Western observers still have no clear understanding of how much the Soviets spend on space activi¬ties. Finally, although the Soviets admit that they conduct military space programs, no information has been forthcoming about them (although this is not surprising and is unlikely to change).

SOVIET SPACE ORGANIZATION AND FUNDING

Unfortunately, the greater Soviet openness about their space pro¬gram has not improved Western understanding of how the Soviet government is organized for space policy decision making and pro¬gram implementation. The creation of a new space agency, Glavkosmos, seems to have added another spoke to the wheel rather than consolidating authority. Where Glavkosmos fits in with other groups such as the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Defense, both of which are thought to play major roles in space policy and program decisions for civilian and military activities re¬spectively, is not known.

Nor have the Soviets yet revealed how much they spend on their space program. Unless they publicly reveal such information, it will be almost impossible to determine whether Gorbachev has in¬creased or decreased attention to space, since space programs have gestation periods of a decade or more and the results would not be seen for quite some time. More openness on the part of the Soviets, as well as U.S. intelligence agencies who make their own estimates of funding, would be required for useful measurements of Soviet spending. Until then, the conventional wisdom, or "rule of thumb," that the Soviets spend approximately one and a half times as much as the United States will have to suffice.

What changes to the space program might result from the emer¬gence of Gorbachev's perestroika remains a matter of great conjec¬ture. It is clear that military programs per se will not be exempt from Gorbachev's review of targets for reduced spending, but exist¬ing military space programs for verification and other reconnais¬sance, communications, and the military/civilian navigation and weather satellite programs will probably be safe from the budget¬ary axe. Whether civilian space programs like space science and the use of crews in orbit, and new military space programs, will enjoy any protection is less certain. The recent emphasis on com¬mercial profits to be gained from some space activities, and on international cooperation in space science, may be the first clear signal that budget pressures have begun to impact the civilian pro¬gram. Glavkosmos, the new Soviet space agency, has been directed to become "self-financing," and now will charge foreign cosmonauts $10 million to visit the space station Mir (previously this was done for free in the interests of international cooperation and prestige). Greater emphasis also may be placed on "spinning off technol¬ogies from military space programs to civilian activities (including, but not limited to civilian space).

CONCLUSION

It is too soon to tell what changes may result in Soviet space ac¬tivities from Gorbachev's perestroika. To Western observers, the most obvious, and welcome, change is increased access to informa¬tion about the Soviet space program. One could only hope for more. Certain parts of the program, particularly those for military sup¬port, seem likely to continue to be wrapped in security (as are U.S. military space programs), but strides could be made in clarifying the Soviet space policy and program implementation apparatus, quantifying Soviet space spending, and detailing future space appli¬cations programs.

One of the most interesting facets of the Soviet space applica¬tions programs will be watching the success or failure of commer¬cialization efforts. There is potential in both sales of remote sens¬ing data and materials processing flight opportunities on Photon spacecraft. How vigorously the Soviets pursue these areas, and what compromises they are willing to make (such as allowing for¬eign visitors at previously closed launch sites in order to attract customers for launch services) in order to succeed, may provide new clues as the future direction of the Soviet space program.

References:

A. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: 1981-87, SPACE SCIENCE, SPACE APPLICATIONS, MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS, ADMINISTRATION, RESOURCE BURDEN, AND MASTER LOG OF SPACEFLIGHTS, Part 2, April 1989, Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 1989, Committee print 1981-87- part-2