1980-1987 Soviet Space Program Administration and Resource Burden
ADMINISTRATION OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM UNDER GORBACHEV 1
introduction
The Soviet Union traditionally has veiled its entire space pro gram in secrecy. Therefore, very little has been known in the West about the organization of either the military or civilian programs. Since Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to the leadership, the Soviet Union has made some of its space activities more accessible to Western observers. To date this greater openness has not extended to ques tions of structure and administration of the program. Therefore, any analysis remains somewhat speculative. This chapter is pieced together from bits of information provided in Soviet and Western open sources and from "educated speculation" by Western ex perts. 2
This chapter focuses on recent changes in the structure of the Soviet space program, as well as on the impact of Gorbachev's over all strategy on the program. The first section looks at elements of continuity and change in Gorbachev's approach to space. The second section looks at changes in the actors involved in top level decision-making in space. The final section examines the changes in the working level management of the space program, its civilian and military components. To date there has been more continuity than change in the Soviet space program under Gorbachev. But more far-reaching changes have been proposed by the leadership. With Soviet policy in a rare state of flux, further restructuring of the space program seems very possible.
Gorbachev's impact on the soviet space organization,
&
continuity of commitment under gorbachev
The Soviet space program is influenced by Mikhail Gorbachev's campaign to restructure the Soviet Union. Gorbachev appears to have established as his highest priority the restructuring and mod ernization of the Soviet economy. He has depicted this task first and foremost as a national security requirement without which the Soviet Union will find it difficult to keep pace with the West and ensure its place as a superpower in the 21st Century. 3 The alterna tive, from Gorbachev's perspective, is prolonged stagnation. To achieve his goals, Gorbachev will have to institute major economic reforms and reallocate resources among claimants. Any major transfer of resources within the economy is likely to be at least in part at the expense of military allocations. 4
Although the Soviet space program is closely tied to the military, few observers expect it to suffer serious cutbacks under Gorba chev's leadership. On the contrary, all evidence suggests that Gor bachev is very committed to the program. 5 Not only has there been no slackening of the pace of Soviet space activity, but the program seems to fit well with Gorbachev's priorities. Like other Soviet leaders before him, Gorbachev probably recognizes the military benefits and applications of space research. He is also likely to appreciate, even more than previous Soviet leaders, the domestic and international political benefits of the space program. Gorbachev is credited with being a master at public relations. The space pro gram generates domestic public support and pride in an endeavor clearly associated with the government. At the same time, space successes also enhance the Soviet Union's international prestige, as a leader in the most advanced fields of science and technology. The highly-visible involvement of other countries in joint space ven tures probably generates goodwill abroad. The continued inclusion of foreign cosmonauts on Soviet space flights provides the image of a Soviet Union willing to share the "glory" and tangible benefits of space exploration. If anything, the emphasis on international coop eration has been stepped up under Gorbachev. The Soviet leader ship may also be looking to international space cooperation as a way of breaking out of international isolation in the scientific and technological field, to use an area in which the Soviets themselves have a lot to offer to open the door to greater access to Western technology.
Most importantly, Gorbachev is likely to see in the Soviet space effort the kind of successful high technology program that can stimulate and provide a model for other sectors of the Soviet econo my, noted for their glaring inefficiencies and chronic shortfalls. His strong commitment to the space program might reassure the mili tary, at a time when they are uncertain about the future flow of resources to defense in general. Any cutbacks in Soviet military spending, Western experts believe, would be justified in terms of short term sacrifices in military hardware for long-term benefits in more sophisticated advanced weaponry. Continued allocations to military space programs would seem to support that argument.
CHANGES IN APPROACH
Despite the continuity of commitment, there have been and are likely to be changes in the structure of the space program in con junction with Gorbachev's reforms. Even if the space program were not directly targeted for change, it would be affected by the planned changes in Communist Party and government responsibilities.
But the program may be targeted for reform. Despite its level of accomplishments, the Soviet space program has not proven itself immune to criticism or above calls for restructuring.
Roald Sagdeyev, the Director of the Soviet Space Research Insti tute and a leading figures in the Soviet space program, as well as a reported close advisor to Gorbachev, has criticized Soviet science and space policy in a number of articles and interviews. According to Sagdeyev, the Soviet Union is contributing too little to the world's scientific knowledge and has only modest achievements, de spite one of the world's largest pools of scientists. He contrasts French, German, and American science which are "vibrant with new ideas" with Soviet science which he calls "stultifying." While he concedes that the Soviet Union has had some significant space achievements, he views these as rare flashes of brilliance. He argues that even the recent emphasis on "perestroika" has had little impact on Soviet science and space policy.
Sagdeyev identifies some key shortcomings of the Soviet system. He notes that barriers have been set up, compartmentalizing the different institutions and individuals engage.d in research and de velopment. The mobility and interaction of scientists which are taken for granted in other countries are virtually nonexistent in the Soviet Union. He sees the fact that so much research is classi fied because of supposed military importance as a major obstacle to Soviet scientific progress. Soviet scientists have little access to com puters, making their challenge like that of fighting a modern war with crossbows, in Sagdeyev's view. Even the major space research institutes which get preferential treatment suffer from this short coming. He sees the neglect of basic science in favor of applied sci ence, as a policy with serious negative implications for future Soviet capabilities.
Sagdeyev believes that scientists have too little influence over science related decisions. Politicians make the key decisions for po litical motives, with little understanding of scientific trends and realities. This results in misguided policies such as what he views as an overemphasis on piloted space flight at the expense of automat ed efforts that produce more scientific results at lower cost (a mis take he sees as being duplicated by the United States). 6 Many of the changes being proposed by Gorbachev in the fields of science and space policy suggest that he is aware of the weakness discussed by Sagdeyev. Gorbachev is seeking to revamp the planning and management system. He wants to centralize the strategic planning process and overall control by the Communist Party leadership. At the same time, he wants to decentralize management of the institu tions directly involved in research and development, increasing their local autonomy and initiative. 7 To do this he is trying to reduce the ability of the Party apparatus to interfere in their day- to-day work and also to streamline and decrease the role of the government's ministerial bureaucracies. Recently, Gorbachev has proposed the creation of new institutions in order to break down the compartmentalism that has plagued space and other scientific programs. At the 19th Communist Party Conference, he called for the creation of "intersectoral scientific-technological complexes, engineering centers and ad hoc collectives" for accomplishing specific tasks. 8 A new space agency "Glavkosmos" (discussed later) has been created, presumably to upgrade civilian programs and pursue international commercial opportunities for what remains a mili tary-dominated program.
Gorbachev's policy of "glasnost" or openness is also geared to breaking down compartmentalization and unleashing creativity in science and technology. He argues that a changed climate, allowing for a more open exchange of ideas and information, is essential to innovation and technological progress. He is calling for more unre stricted competition of scientific ideas within the whole Soviet system. 9 But as Sagdeyev has pointed out, these proposals have yet to be acted on and are facing stiff resistance among conservatives in the leadership, the mass bureaucracy, and even the public at large.
high level decision making and coordination
The Communist Party continues to assert its leadership over the space program, as in all areas of Soviet policy. Top level decisions on space are made in the Politburo. Control over implementation of the decisions is the responsibility of the appropriate departments in the Central Committee. If political reforms pressed by Soviet leader Gorbachev are implemented, this Party control is likely to be strengthened at the macro level, although Party meddling in the implementation of space decisions may be reduced. It is not clear how the top Party bodies will divide their responsibilities with a new State President and revamped Supreme Soviet, if these new institutions are established as proposed by Gorbachev. 1 °
The Politburo, in its capacity as the highest policy-making body in the Soviet Union, continues to be responsible for establishing goals and priorities, setting up the organizational framework and funding of the space program. Final responsibility on space matters within the Politburo rests with Party General Secretary Gorbachev and the other Politburo members on the Defense Council—the top level coordinating body on national security issues. Gorbachev's level of personal involvement in space decisions is not known but, in view of his strong interest in the advancement of Soviet high technology, it is likely to be considerable.
As the Politburo member and Party Secretary in charge of over seeing defense industry, Lev N. Zaykov may be directly responsible for the space program. 11 This would correspond with past Soviet practice.
The Central Committee is divided into departments, which for the most part parallel the government structure at the ministry level. These departments have oversight of the corresponding min istries in the government. The departments also provide information to the Politburo.
It is difficult to name all the Central Committee departments most closely involved with the space program, as all have not been fully identified. The departments handling defense industries (headed by Oleg S. Belyakov) and science and educational institu tions (headed by Valentin A. Grigoryev) probably have a key role in the oversight of the space program. * 2 From the Central Commit tee down, there is a vast network of Party organizations which assure Communist Party control over the space program at all levels. Basic Party units are present at research institutions, in the Soviet Academy of Sciences and its branches, in the relevant mili tary sections and within the industries doing space work. Party in volvement at lower level, however, may be curtailed if Gorbachev's political reforms are implemented because he has identified Party and government intrusion as a hindrance to success.
The Council of Ministers is the highest body of the Soviet govern ment. In practice the Council of Ministers is selected by and re sponsible directly to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers is Nikolay I. Ryzhkov.
Directly under the Council of Ministers are the ministries, state committees, and other bodies which carry on the day-to-day tasks of Soviet government. The Soviet Academy of Sciences also falls under the supervision of the Council of Ministers. Below the minis tries are the industrial branches and the institutions which they oversee.
Central Committee policy guidelines on space probably pass di rectly to the Council of Ministers. The passing of directives from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to the Council of Ministers is simplified by the fact that members of the Council of Ministers and the heads of the subordinate ministries, state committees and other agencies all simultaneously hold high Party of fices. Nikolay Ryzhkov and four other current members of the Council are full or candidate members of the Politburo.
Members of the Council of Ministers who may play a significant role in the space organization, are Dimitriy T. Yazov (Minister of Defense), Yuriy D. Maslyukov (Chairman of the Military Industrial Commission), Boris L. Tolstykh (Chairman of the State Committee on Science and Technology), Nikolay V. Talyzin (Chairman of the State Planning Committee), Vyacheslav V. Bakhirev (Minister of Machine Building), Lev A. Voronin (Chairman of the State Com mittee for Material and Technical Supply), Pavel V. Finogenov (Minister of Defense Industry) and Mikhail S. Shkabardnya (Minis ter of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control Systems). 13Others who may be involved include Apollon S. Systsov (Minister of Aviation Industry) and Gennadiy A. Yagodin (Minister of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education). 14
Attached to the Council of Ministers, according to one source, is the Coordinating Council for Space Research which has previously been headed by Sergey Korolov and other "Chief Designers" of the space program. The identity of these individuals are generally kept secret until after their death. Its duties are reportedly to coordi nate research and development, endorsing lines of production and proposing funding. This organization has not been mentioned in other recent sources. 1 s
The Military Industrial Commission (VPK) is reported to be re sponsible for actual management of the military space program and coordinating all of the elements involved in developing and producing space systems. 16 According to one source, the VPK is the main high level link between the Party, government, and mili tary complex. 17
The State Committee on Science and Technology is the highest government coordinating body for scientific work, at least in the ci vilian sector. There are differences of opinion among Western ana lysts regarding the role the committee plays in the space organiza tion. It is generally thought to have a significant role, although its position may be limited to that of coordinating some of the associ ated research and development activity contributing to the space program. 18 The State Committee is responsible for coordinating Soviet research and development (primarily in the civilian sector), establishing priorities, and introducing new technology into the in dustrial areas. Furthermore, the committee oversees the numerous research institutes and laboratories now under the industrial min istries. It includes in its ranks a preponderance of officials from the defense industry sector, suggesting that the defense establishment has significant influence over the civilian scientific and technologi cal establishment.
The State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN) is responsible for planning scientific, technological, and economic activities in the Soviet Union, as well as exercising budgetary control. It has an input into most Soviet undertakings, especially those such as the space program, in which numerous organizations and sectors of the economy are involved. The Committee is also responsible for over seeing plan fulfillment. One of its most important duties is to par ticipate in formulating the overall short- and long-term plans of the Soviet Union, such as the Five Year Plan. Integration of the space program with the other national undertakings would seem to require a considerable degree of involvement by the Committee.
Over the years Western experts have been interested in the question of how the roles of all these actors are coordinated. There has been much speculation but no conclusive evidence that there is a single coordinating agency or mechanism. Many analysts believe that the Soviet Union has no space agency which approximates the U.S. National Aeronautic and Space Administration. In place of such an organization, they perceive an elaborate system of coordi nation among participating institutions on an informal basis. When stumbling blocks and jurisdictional bottlenecks develop, as those that plague much of the civilian sector, high Soviet officials can and do intervene. Unlike systems where a strict hierarchical chain of command operates upward and downward, top Soviet leaders can deal directly with those responsible for programs at any level, even individual scientists at local research institutes. 19
Coordination is also facilitated by the multiple responsibilities as signed to leading individuals. Where there is no clear link between organizations involved in the same program, a link may often be found in the person of their leadership.
- 1. Central Committee Defense Industries Dept.
- 2. Central Committee Scientific and Educational Institutions Dept.
- 3. Military Industrial Commission.
- 4. Ministry of Defense Industries
- 5. Ministry of Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control Systems.
- 6. Ministry of the Chemical Industry.
- 7. Ministry of General Machine Buuilding.
- 8. Ministry of Defense.
- 9. Strategic Rocket Forces.
- 10. Air Force.
- 11. Air Defense Forces.
- 12. State Committee for Science and Technology.
- 13. State Committee tor Planning.
- 14. USSR Academy of Sciences.
- 15. Institute for Space Research.
Source: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Soviet Military Space Doctrine. Washington, Aug. 1, 1984 (DDB-1400-1684). p. 27.
operational management of the space program
Most Western experts agree that the military dominates the Soviet space program at the operational level. One observer has gone so far as to say "it's solely military from beginning to end with small civilian appendages." 20
This does not mean the military has ultimate power over the program. In fact the military establishment itself is firmly con trolled by the Communist Party, not only from the top but throughout the hierarchy. 21 The Communist Party has always retained ultimate control over the space program, as indicated in the previous section.
At least until Glavkosmos was created in 1985, operational re sponsibility for the space program, as a whole, seems to have been primarily in the hands of the military. Some Western experts be lieve that, directly or indirectly, military officers or officials with defense or defense industry backgrounds were in charge of all mili tary and civilian activities. 22 With the establishment of Glavkos mos, some observers believe that the Soviet Union may be moving in the direction of establishing a distinct civilian program or at least more clearly separating the military and civilian components.
ROLE OF THE MILITARY
The Defense Ministry which coordinates the military role in the space program has experienced major personnel changes at the top under Gorbachev. It is not yet clear how this might affect the space program. Presumably the new senior officers will be more support ive of Gorbachev's restructuring plans. Unlike the U.S. Defense De partment, the Soviet defense establishment consists of military men from top to bottom. Former Defense Minister Dimitriy F. Us tinov was the first and only civilian to occupy the position of de fense minister and even he had been associated with military-in dustrial affairs throughout his career. The Defense Ministry main tains strong influence over the strategic industries which manufac ture space systems even though these industrial sectors are under the Defense Industries and other ministries.
Below the Defense Ministry, the General Staff and the Main Political Administration of the armed forces, all have an influence on the space program. The Main Political Administration acts as the party's "watch dog" in the military and is simultaneously a section of the Party Central Committee. At the next level in the military space hierarchy are the relevant operating commands, and the five branches of the military: the Army, Navy, Air Force, Air Defense Command, and the Strategic Rocket Force. The Strategic Rocket Force and the Air Force are the two branches with a direct operational role in the space program.
The Strategic Rocket Force is most directly involved in the actual operations of the space program. It conducts all space rocket launches whether for military or civilian purposes. The Strategic Rocket Force is also thought to operate some tracking stations and tracking ships and may exercise control over the launch facilities. It was established in 1960 and is the elite branch of the Soviet mili tary. The primary mission of the force is to launch strategic nucle ar missiles. The size of the force has been estimated at 250,000 men. It is commanded by Army General Yuriy P. Maksimov, who is a member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. 28
The Soviet Air Force is responsible for cosmonaut training at Star City (Zvyezdniy Gorodok) near Moscow and for the recovery of spacecraft. The Soviet Air Force, or long-range Air Force as it is sometimes called, is distinct from the Air Defense Command. The Air Force is presently commanded by Marshal of Aviation Alek- sander N. Yefimov, also a full member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. 24
ROLE OF CIVILIAN INSTITUTIONS
In October 1985, the Soviet Union announced the establishment of a new civilian space agency, identified as the Main Directorate for the Creation and Use of Space Technology for the Economy and for Scientific Research or Glavkosmos for short. This has been the biggest organizational change under Gorbachev to date. The Director of the new agency is A. I. Dunayev. In announcing the establishment of the new agency, Izvestiya stated that because the use of space technology was of interest to so many government ministries, agencies and scientific organizations, and had acquired such broad scope, it was necessary to create a coordinating agency. Glavkos mos considers proposals for projects, works out long-term plans, and administers programs. It is responsible for the design, con struction, and use of spacecraft for scientific research, remote sens ing applications, and joint space programs with other countries. It also has reportedly been charged with administering the Interkos-mos program. 25 It is not clear whether Glavkosmos comes under the supervision of one of the ministries, as its name "Main Administration. . . ." would normally imply or whether it is an independent agency under the general supervision of the Council of Minis ters. The latter is suggested by the fact that Glavkosmos has not been identified with any single ministry but works with several ministries. 26
Some Western observers who have had firsthand experience with Glavkosmos are favorably impressed. 27 It seems to be acting as a high-level body with the power to make program decisions, as a contact between Soviet industries and scientific institutes, as well as the main contact for international cooperation and commercial ventures. 28
Under the Gorbachev reform program, the Soviets have sought to gain more of an economic return for their space investments. 29 The Soviet government has decided to market its space services abroad. A foreign trade entity, Licensintorg, has been tasked with selling launch vehicle services to foreign countries. Licensintorg op erates in coordination with Glavkosmos. 30
Another Soviet organization, Soyuzkarta, has responsibility for marketing Soviet remote sensing data abroad. According to reports, foreign governments and businesses have shown considerable inter est in this service, even though the Soviets reportedly restrict sales to photographs of the purchasers own national territory. 31
The Soviet Academy of Science's role in the Soviet space organization has been most visible and highly publicized by the Soviets. Prior to the creation of Glavkosmos, the Soviet Union presented it at various times as the counterpart of the U.S. National Aeronauti cal and Space Administration, in terms of its space role. Outside observers have agreed that the Academy is one of the institutions playing a role, providing research support, consultation, and acting as spokesman for the program at home and abroad, but have been skeptical of the claims of its central role.
Roald Sagdeyev recently charged that the Academy has evolved from being a center for fundamental research to becoming just an other bureaucratic "ministry" with a political rather than a scien tific agenda. And in that role it is seen as a weak partner to the real ministries. The research institutes under the Academy are said to have swollen to the point where they are now inefficient bureaucracies with staffs of thousands. 32
According to one Western analysis, the Academy has been "mili tarized" and "industrialized" to the point where it is now primarily involved in applied research and military R&D. It is reportedly linked to the military in a number of ways, coordinated through its Section on Applied Problems. Top positions at the Academy are held by people with close ties to the military. All of the presidents of the Academy since 1945 have reportedly been directly involved in weapons R&D as has Academician Velikhov, the only Vice President for Science and Technology since that post was estab lished in 1977. 33
Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev has moved to restructure the Academy of Sciences. Under new President Guriy Marchuk, half of the members of its ruling Presidium have been removed be cause of old age. Their replacements are being chosen through a series of ballots of Academy members, with multiple candidates put forward for each position. 34
It remains to be seen whether the changes address the chronic tensions that some analysts see in relations between the Commu nist Party and the science community. Soviet science has been sub jected to Party control without the scientists themselves having been integrated, to any significant degree, into the government decision-making process, although individual space scientists have at times had significant decision-making influence.
Within the structure of the Academy, several commissions and sections have been directly involved in the space program. It is not clear which of these organizations has been superseded or come under the administration of Glavkosmos.
One source indicates that under the Academy's Presidium is a Council for New Technology which deals with questions of space re search and rocket construction. 35
A major agency of the Academy of Sciences is the Council for International Cooperation in the Studies and Uses of Outer Space (Interkosmos). The Council is the coordinator for all cooperative space ventures with other Communist countries.
The Institute of Space Research, directed by Sagdeyev, is one of the main advanced research centers operated by the Academy. It was reportedly founded in 1965, to coordinate and centralize civilian space programs.
The Commission on the Exploration and Utilization of Space is another space institution under the Academy, reportedly estab lished to develop experiments to be carried out in space, publicize Soviet space achievements, maintain contacts with foreign space organizations, and send scientists to represent the Soviet Union at international space conferences. Another institution apparently under the auspices of the Academy of Sciences is the Commission for the Promotion of Interplanetary Flights. At least one of its im portant duties seems to be as spokesman and representative inter nationally for the Soviet space program. A number of other depart ments and institutes of the Academy contribute to the space pro gram.
The Soviet Academy of Sciences allegedly also operates some of the space tracking stations within the Soviet Union and 10 of the tracking ships operating around the globe. Other space communica tions ships are operated by the Navy and the Strategic Rocket Force. The Coordination and Computing Center, which analyzes communications received from space, is also reportedly under the Academy.
Universities in the Soviet Union are thought to have little input to research and development. Their work does not seem to be inte grated with the research performed at the Academy and elsewhere. This compartmentalization inhibits the exchange of technological information between the universities and the space organization and among the universities themselves. The universities may con stitute a large untapped resource for the Soviet space program which Gorbachev may seek to better integrate into space research.
References:
A . SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: 1981-87, SPACE SCIENCE, SPACE APPLICATIONS, MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS, ADMINISTRATION, RESOURCE BURDEN, AND MASTER LOG OF SPACEFLIGHTS, Part 2, April 1989, Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 1989, Committee print 1981-87- part-2
1. This section updates a chapter appearing in the earlier volume: Soviet Space Programs,
1976-1980.
2. See also U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space: A Technical Memorandum. Washington, July 1985, 113 p.
3. Gorbachev, Mikhail S. Political Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 27th CPSU Congress. Feb. 25, 1986. Carried in Pravda, Feb. 26, 1986. p. 2-10. (FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, Feb. 26, 1986. p. O1-42.) 4. For a discussion of trade-offs between military and economic allocations, see: Hardt, John P. Soviet Economic Constraints on Defense to the Year 2000. Appears as appendix in: Stanley, Tim othy W. Western and Eastern Economic Constraints on Defense. (Atlantic Council Occasional Paper, Fall 1986.)
5. Soviet leader Gorbachev's commitment to space was underlined in his speech at the Bay konur Cosmodrome on May 13, 1987. Pravda, May 14, 1987. p. 1-2. (FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, May 14, 1987, p. Rl-8.)
6. Sagdeyev, Roald Z. Science and Perestroika: A Way to Go. Issues in Science and Technology, Summer 1988. p. 43.
7. Soviet Science under Gorbachev. A meeting report on a presentation by John Thomas given at the Kennan Institute of the Wilson Center. Oct. 15, 1986.
8. CPSU Central Committee Report delivered by Mikhail S. Gorbachev at the 19th All-Union
Conference, June 28, 1988. (FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, June 29, 1988, Supplement, p. 8- 10.)
9. Ibid., p. 9.
10. CPSU Central Committee Report delivered by Mikhail S. Gorbachev at the 19th All-Union
Conference, June 28, 1988. (FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, June 29, 1988, Supplement, p. 19- 20.)
11. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Party of the Soviet Union Politburo and Sec retariat. Oct. 1987. (LDA-87-14838)
12 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Executive and Administrative Apparatus. Nov. 1987. (LDA 87-14611).
13. Kraus, Herwig and Alexander Rahr. The Government of the U.S.S.R. Radio Liberty Re search Bulletin, May 5, 1987. (RL Supplement 3/87).
14. Yevsikov, Victor. Re-entry Technology and the Soviet Space Program; Some Personal Ob servations. Falls Church, Delphic Associates, Dec. 1982. p. 14. The author identifies many of
these same ministries and committees as playing a role.
15. Ibid., p. 17.
16. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Soviet Military Space Doctrine, Aug. 1, 1984. p. 26.
17. Thomas, John R. Militarization of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Survey, v. 29, Spring 1985. p. 38.
18. Smolders, Peter L. Soviets in Space: The Story of the Salyut and the Soviet Approach to Present and Future Space Travel. Guildford, Lutterworth Press, 1973. p. 29.
19. Yevsikov, op. cit., p. 16.
Source: U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Soviet Military Space Doctrine. Washington, Aug. 1, 1984 (DDB-1400-1684). p. 27.
20. Redden, Jack. The Sky's no Limit for Soviets' Ambitious Space Program. Chicago Tribune,
Section 5, Dec. 15, 1985. p.1.
21. Soviet Military Policy under Gorbachev. Meeting Report on a Presentation by Condoleezza
Rice on May 13, 1987, at the Kennan Institute, Wilson Center.
22. Linville, Ray P. Space and Soviet Military Planning. Space Policy, v. 2, Aug. 1986. p. 234-
239.
23. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Directorate of Intelligence. USSR Ministry of Defense, Mar. 1988. (LDA 88-10905).
24. Ibid.
25. New York THnes, Oct. 31, 1985, p. B13.
26. Shabad, Theodore. Civilian Space Agency Announced by Moscow. New York Times, Oct. 31, 1985.
27. See Gibson, Melinda. The Selling of the Soviet Space Program. The . World and I, Mar. 1987, p. 94.
28. See: Lenorovitz, Jeffrey M. Soviet Aims Include Expanding International Space Participa tion and Streamlining Management. Commercial Space, Spring 1986. p. 37-38.
29. West, Bren. U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space. Radio Liberty Research, July 13, 1988. p. 6.
(RL 332/88).
30. Proton Marketing Team Finds U.S. Interest, Opposition. Aviation Week and Space Technol ogy, May 25, 1987. p. 20.
31. Soviet Firm Sells Sells Satellite Photographs Abroad. Trud, Jan. 20, 1988. p. 4. (FBIS Daily Report: Soviet Union, Jan. 26, 1988, p. 76.)
32. Sagdeyev, op. cit., p. 10.
33. Thomas, John R., op. cit., p. 37-38.
34. Mass Retirement in the Leadership of the Soviet Academy. Science, June 24, 1988. p. 1728.
35 Yevsikov, op. cit., p. 26
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