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G-1e / N-1 / 11A52 - Origins

On 23 June 1960, the Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree “On the Creation of Powerful Launch Vehicles, Satellites, Spacecraft, and the Mastery of Cosmic Space in 1960–1967,” which had been coordinated with the Ministry of Defense and the ministers and State Committee chairmen of all the necessary defense industries, was issued. This was the first attempt to confirm the prospects for the development of cosmonautics at the very highest level in the form of a seven-year plan.

Such “top secret—of special importance” decrees contained specific deadlines and spelled out the names of the responsible administrators. Now they all signed their names to unrealistic promises. The decree called for the development from 1961 through 1963 of the new N-1 high-power launch vehicle with liquid-propellant rocket engines that would be capable of inserting into orbit a satellite with a mass of 40 to 50 tons and accelerating a payload with a mass of 10 to 20 tons to escape velocity. Next, on the basis of this rocket, from 1963 through 1967, the plan was to develop a launch vehicle that would insert into Earth orbit a payload with a mass of 60 to 80 tons and accelerate a 20- to 40-ton payload to escape velocity.

A meeting was held on September 23, 1960 at the cosmodrome with the participation of K.N. Rudneva, V.D. Kalmykova, S.P. Korolev, V.P. Glushko, M.V. Keldysh, L.A. Grishina, M.S. Ryazan, N.A. Pilyugina, V.I. Kuznetsova, V.P. Barmina, N.D. Kuznetsova, A.M. Isaeva, S.A. Kosberg, A.F. Bogomolov, A.G. Mrykina, S.M. Alekseeva, V.I. Yazdovskiy and others (total 87 people). The agenda was formulated as follows: "On the course of the conceptual design of an integrated missile system of the first stage (object HI)." The meeting was chaired by V.P. Glushko. In the discussion took part: V.P. Glushko, M.S. Ryazan, M.K. Tikhonravov, N.A. Pilyugin, V.P. Barmin, V.I. Kuznetsov, M.V. Keldysh, A.M. Isaev, N.D. Kuznetsov, L.A. Grishin, S.A. Kosberg, A.G. Mrykin, A.F. Bogomolov, S.M. Alekseev, N.N. Sheremetyevsky.

This was the first meeting with a discussion of the draft heavy carrier NI. A variant of a three-stage construction with a supporting frame and a set of overhead tanks having dimensions that allow transportation by rail was considered. Provided for the transverse division of the steps. It was proposed to develop a rocket in two stages. On the first stage - the creation of a three-stage carrier (N-I), on the second - a two-stage (N-N) using II and III stages N-I. Of particular interest is the position taken at the meeting of V.P. Glushko, who in the further work on the project became an implacable opponent S.P.Korolev and in many ways influenced the final result of the development of heavy carrier NI.

On the basis of stages of LV N1, it was possible to create a unified range of rockets:

1. For design studies of the carrier rocket (LV) N1, a useful cargo weighing 75 tons was used with the use of oxygen-kerosene at all stages of the LPRE on fuel components. This value of the payload mass corresponded to the starting mass of the PH 2200 tons,
2. N11 - with the use of II, III and IY stages PH N1 with a starting mass of 700 tons and a useful cargo of 20 tons weight on the OISZ with a height of 300 km
3. N111- with the use of the III and IY stages of the N1 and II stages of the R-9A rocket with a starting mass of 200 tons and a useful load of 5 tons on the OISZ with a height of 300 kilometers.

Despite the wealth of experience that Glushko and his design team had accumulated since 1946 in the production of oxygen-kerosene engines, and despite the creation in Khimki of a one-of-a-kind test rig facility for liquid-propellant rocket engines that used oxygen, Glushko stubbornly proposed using high-thrust liquid-propellant rocket engines operating on high-boiling components—nitrogen tetroxide and unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine—for the future heavy rocket. Glushko’s position can be explained by the fact that during this time he was developing high-boiling component engines for Yangel’s and Chelomey’s intercontinental ballistic missiles. A large experimental facility for these engines had been created in Khimki.

Two new chief designers — Yangel and Chelomey — joined the dispute between the two pillars of Soviet rocket technology. Korolev’s monopoly in heavy launch vehicles threatened their active participation in future space programs. A powerful attack began on the government bureaucracy from various sides, as did criticism of earlier decisions. Consequently, yet another decree appeared, signed by Khrushchev on 16 April 1962: “On the Creation of Models of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Global Rockets, and Launch Vehicles for Heavy Space Payloads.” This decree proposed limiting N-1 operations to the draft plan phase and a cost assessment of the rocket system. The decrees made no mention of organizing operations specifically oriented toward piloted flights to the Moon.

The draft plan proposed a three-stage N-1 launch vehicle with a launch mass of 2,200 tons capable of inserting a satellite with a mass of up to 75 tons into a circular orbit with an altitude of 300 kilometers. All three stages of the rocket were designed for Kuznetsov’s liquid-propellant rocket engines using liquid oxygen and kerosene. The first stage — Block A — would be equipped with 24 engines each with 150 tons of thrust at liftoff. The second stage — Block B— and the third — Block V— had eight and four engines, respectively.

The dimensions of the tanks of the first and second stages for the N-1 prevented them from being delivered from the Progress Factory in Kuybyshev to the firing range by rail, by ship, or by air. A factory for the welding of the tanks, and the manufacture and assembly of all three stages of the rocket, had to be built at the firing range. The thickness of the metal of the load-bearing tanks was selected taking into consideration the internal pressure and the static and dynamic loads on the structure of the entire rocket. The technology at that time could not ensure the weld reliability and strength on a shell of that thickness.

For this reason, after heated arguments, the designers persuaded Korolev to forgo what had become the traditional rocket technology design principle of integral tanks. The structural layout of the rocket was an external load-bearing shell with thinner-walled spherical fuel tanks, engines, and all the systems arranged inside it.