Launch Vehicle 1981-1987
LAUNCH VEHICLES
In the Soviet Union as well as in the United States, the development of military long-range missiles was the essential source of most space launch vehicles until such time as space requirements for larger payloads began to exceed missile capabilities. Whereas the United States initially opted to develop the non-military Vanguard to orbit payloads for the International Geophysical Year (IGY), the Soviet Union, from the outset, took its original ICBM and applied it to space work for the flights from 1957 on. Even today, although with improved final stages, this vehicle is still in use in the Vostok, Soyuz and Molniya configurations and, with a successful launch total which surpassed 1,200 during 1987, far outstrips any other launch vehicle in the number launched.
Only after some years did the Soviet Union move down in size to use medium-range and intermediate-range missiles as the first stages for space launch vehicles. The medium-range missile is no longer used, but an improved ICBM has been adapted for space launches.
The first larger launch vehicle, dedicated solely to space launches, was introduced in 1965—the Proton. An even larger launch vehicle, called the "G" vehicle in the West and intended to support a piloted lunar exploration program, never flew successfully. This has been succeeded by the Energiya heavy-lift launch vehicle, which made its first test flight in 1987.
The Soviet Union has a broad range of launch vehicles from the small C vehicle to the relatively large D, or Proton, launch vehicle. Most of the vehicles have two or more variants of the basic design. Table 26 presents the record of orbital and escape launches by launch vehicle variant from 1981 through September 30, 1987, with class sub-totals for the period 1957 through 1980. The annual record of successful Soviet orbital and escape launches by basic first stage is presented in table 27. Of the 2,016 launches included in table 27, 1,216 are accounted for by use of the A-class launch vehicle.
DESIGNATORS
Until quite recently the Soviets have not identified a specific vehicle for a given launch. For many years no names at all were given, but the smallest of all launch vehicles was displayed in the space exhibition at the Museum of Economic Achievement in Moscow bearing the name "Cosmos" and the basic launch vehicle, bearing the name "Vostok," was displayed publicly for the first time at the 1967 Paris Air Show. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allocated code names, such as Sapwood, Sandal, Skean and Scarp to missiles with recognizable configurations.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) instituted its own system of identification by assigning them "SS" numbers and, when they were identified as space launch vehicles, gave the variants "SL numbers in chronological order of their appearance. An "X" suffix was used to denote that a particular variant was still in the experimental phase.
In 1968, in the absence of anything better in the open literature, the late Dr. Charles Sheldon devised the system which has been used in previous editions of these reports.(1) The scheme assigns a capital letter to each basic first stage and then uses a number for the principal upper stage. A final stage is indicated by a small letter showing its capability such as e—escape, m—maneuvering and r—reentry. A disadvantage of this system is that the number and small letter suffixes do not necessarily represent the same hardware when applied to different basic stages. However, the advantage of grouping variants by their basic first stages outweighs this disadvantage.
With the greater openness of the DOD and the appearance of new Soviet launch vehicles there is a growing tendency to use the DOD's SL-system. (2) This report continues to use the Sheldon system. Table 28, which lists Sheldon and DOD designators side by side with the Glavkosmos names, is provided for the reader's convenience.
New information on the design of certain Soviet rocket engines appeared in the 1985 Encyclopedia of Cosmonautics.(3) Table 29, which presents this information, differs in some respects from table 17 of Soviet Space Programs: 1976-80.(4)
LAUNCH FAILURES
The Soviet Union has been reluctant to admit to any failures in its space program. Launches which fail to reach orbit are rarely announced, but there are exceptions including the aborted Soyuz 18A and T-10A flights and the recent flight of the new heavy-lift launch vehicle, Energiya. Flights intended for the Moon or planets which failed to leave Earth parking-orbit were not acknowledged at one time. One result of Glasnost and the initiative to offer commercial launch services to foreign nations has been a new openness which acknowledged two failures of an improved fourth stage for the Proton launch vehicle in 1987.
A study by Phillip S. dark estimates that about 100 Soviet failures may have taken place during 1957-1985.(5) In two tables, the first of which is based on a document in the Lyndon B. Johnson Library at Austin, Texas,(6) covering the period 1957 through the early part of 1964, dark lists possible dates and missions, some of which can be confirmed from Soviet data. Table 30 combines these two tables and assigns probable launch vehicles to each possible failure. It can be seen that the greatest number of failures, half the total number, is for the A-class launch vehicle. However, expressed in terms of the total number of launch attempts for this class of vehicle (1,162 to the end of 1985), this represents a 96.3 percent success rate.
THE A-CLASS LAUNCH VEHICLES
Some of the figures published for the Soyuz launch vehicle in the 1985 encyclopedia (7) differ in some respects from those used previously. The maximum weight of the payload to LEO is said to be around 7 tonnes. Launch weight is approximately 310 tonnes and the length, together with the Soyuz spacecraft, is given as 39.3 meters. The maximum diameter, at the air vanes, is 10.3 meters. The first two stages are similar to those of the Vostok launch vehicle. The third stage has a four-chamber liquid-propellant rocket engine with one turbo-driven pump assembly, with four swiveling steering nozzles, developing a vacuum thrust of 298 kN. It has a length of 8.1 meters and a diameter of 2.66 meters. The flying time in powered flight is approximately 9 minutes. For Luna 4 through Luna 14, Zond 1 through Zond 3, Venera 1 through Venera 8 and some other early missions a fourth stage liquid-propellant rocket engine, with a vacuum thrust of 67 kN was used and, in this form, it is known as the Molniya launch vehicle.
A French journalist's report on preparations for the Soyuz T-6 mission gave the total weight as 315.5 tonnes, of which the liquid propellants accounted for 284 tonnes. (8)
THE B-l AND C-l LAUNCH VEHICLES
The basic Cosmos launch vehicle described in the 1985 encyclopedia is the B-l vehicle, which was retired from service in 1977. No new information was made available. The C-l vehicle is implied in references to modifications of the Cosmos launch vehicle. One of these has an RD-216 engine in the first stage instead of the RD-214 and another has an RD-219 second stage engine instead of an RD- 119. Strictly speaking, the implication is that at least three variants exist instead of the two used in both the Sheldon and DOD classifications but re-classification to reflect the fine structure of B-l, B-2, C-l and C-2, if all exist, must await further Soviet disclosures.(9)
The C-vehicle was used for the four launches from Kapustin Yar of the sub-scale spaceplane described in chapter 5 of the first part of this report.
THE D-CLASS LAUNCH VEHICLES
The first clear views of the Proton launch vehicle to be shown in the West were to be found in the television coverage of the launches of the two Vega spacecraft to Venus and Comet Halley at the end of 1984. (10) These included views of the interior of the flight control center and this gave the viewer the first sight of the booster on a black and white monitor adjacent to the large screen displaying the intended trajectory superimposed on a star atlas. Fears that this might be the only view one would have were quickly dispelled when the scene cut to an outdoor view of the white rocket, with its black conical nose-cap, standing vertically between lightning conductor masts and tall towers bearing banks of floodlights. Although the base of the rocket was obscured by a slight rise in the ground between the camera site and the launch pad, three of the cylindrical units, previously believed to be strap-on engines, could readily be seen. Flames and smoke billowed from the base of the rocket at the moment of ignition and the vehicle lifted-off almost immediately. The shock waves in the exhaust plume were clearly visible and, 12 seconds after lift-off, a black emission was seen in the center of the plume coming from the base of the rocket. As the rocket climbed away and began to pitch over it was possible to see the hexagonal array of burning engines end-on. From this it was not difficult to understand Western belief, current at that time, that a central core ignited at altitude.
Detailed color plates illustrating the Proton launch vehicle in differing configurations, erected on the launch pad, on the flat-bed rail transporter and during the assembly of Salyut 7, were published in a large-format book in 1986.(11) Introducing the new book on Soviet television, Academician Avduyevskiy remarked,
... In particular, it shows our beautiful Proton rocket, which has ensured the work of our cosmonauts on the Salyut stations—it put up the Salyut stations—and [launched probes to study] the whole of inter-planetary space and Venus and Mars. It is shown in a publication in such detail for the first time. It is important that it has been shown. . . . this Proton embodies the art of our 58 engineers who made such a perfect rocket which has been unequalled in the world for 20 years. . . . And it will serve for a long time yet and give an advantage to our space exploration, and the development of our space exploration, thanks to its qualities. (12)
Prior to the appearance of this book, the 1985 encyclopedia had carried entries for the Proton launch vehicle l3 and the Block "D," its fourth stage used for launching geosynchronous, semi-synchronous, and the later lunar and interplanetary payloads.14 It was stated to be a two to four-stage launch vehicle which had been in operation since 1965. The two-stage version was used to launch the first three Proton satellites in 1965 and 1966. Proton 4 was launched by the three-stage version in 1968 but, before then, a four-stage version had been used to launch Zond 4 through Zond 6. This was also used to launch the remaining two Zonds, Lunas from Luna 15 onward, Venera 9 through Venera 16, Mars 2 through Mars 7, Raduga, Ekran and Gorizont spacecraft and some satellites of the Cosmos series.
The launch vehicle was described as being of a tandem design with the stages divided transversely. Six RD-253 engines are installed in the first stage producing a total thrust of 9 MN. Four single-chamber engines, each with a thrust of approximately 0.6 MN, are in installed in the second stage. The third stage employs another engine of the same type together with a steering engine, of approximately 30 kN thrust, possessing four swiveling chambers controlling the trajectory and attitude of this last stage. The overall length, minus the payload, was given as 44.3 meters and the maximum transverse dimension as 7.4 meters. Payload capability to LEO was said to be in excess of 20 tonnes.
This was the first official Soviet statement to call into question the Western concept of a central core with six strap-ons in the first stage with the core igniting at altitude.18 It later became clear that the "strap-ons" were, in reality, engines and fuel tanks surrounding a central tank of oxidizer. The second stage is connected to the top of the oxidizer tank by a lattice structure.
The Block-D fourth stage is adapted for prolonged presence space conditions and multiple re-starts of the propulsion unit. The maximum fueled weight is 17.3 tonnes. It is 5.5 meters long and 4 meters in diameter at the point of attachment to the third stage. The propellants are liquid oxygen and kerosene giving it a thrust of 85 kN with a specific impulse in excess of 300 seconds. The total operating time is greater than 600 seconds. Attitude control during unpowered flight is provided by self-contained propulsion units using nitrogen tetroxide (N204) and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH). Sensors, switching and coordinating equipment and power supplies are installed on the Block-D and control is effected by the spacecraft's control system. Telemetry from the Block-D is relayed to ground stations via the spacecrafts transmitters. The encyclopedia entry also identified Cosmos 146 as launched by Proton with a Block-D fourth stage.
The information which was revealed piecemeal as described above was confirmed by brochures produced by Glavkosmos when Proton was offered as a commercial launcher to the rest of the world. (16) These showed a cutaway diagram of the complete four- stage version with captions faithfully reflecting date previously announced The three- stage version was said to be aimed at injecting payloads of up to20 tonnes weight into LEO at 51.6 degrees inclination 200 km altitude. Payload capabilities with the added fourth stage were given as 5.7 tonnes toward the Moon, 5.3 tonnes toward Venus 4 6 tonnes toward Mars and 2 tonnes into geosynchronous orbit (GEO). In addition to the payloads mentioned above as having been orbited by the Proton launch vehicle it was noted that, since 1971 it had been used to place in orbit long-term orbital stations of the Salyut and Mir classes.
Data for the RD-253 rocket engine is the same as table 29. The height of the engine is given as 2.72 meters with the maximum diameter of the combustion chambers as 1.5 meters. Weight of the non-fueled engine is 1,280 kg and 1,460kg fueled.
Azimuthal guidance of the launch vehicle is provided by its control system which, in accordance with a pre-planned Program, can correct the rocket to the desired angle during the initial phase of flight.
Maximum static and dynamic g-loads for the spacecraft during its mission are provided as follows:
at launch in the longitudinal direction 1.2 _0.8g within the frequency range of 10-15 Hz. in the lateral direction ± 3.0g within the frequency range of 5-7 Hz.
during the mission in the longitudinal direction 4.0 g within the frequency range of 5-7 Hz. in the lateral direction ± 1.0 g within the frequency range of 5-7 Hz.
at the moment of stage's separation m the longitudinal direction 1.25 ± 4.75g within the frequency range of 10-15 Hz m the lateral direction ± 1.5g within the frequency range of 5-7
In each case the axial and lateral g-loads can act simultaneously upon &e spacecraft. Maximum vibrations affect the space vehicle during the first stage flight due to the acoustic field generated on the Shroud external surface both by the engine and the boundary layer turbulence.
The spacecraft-launch vehicle interface is provided by special connectors used for the transmission of commands from the launch vehicle and the telemetry from the spacecraft.
Monitoring of the spacecraft's parameters during the orbit injection phase is carried out in the direct transmission mode during communication sessions with the launch vehicle provided within radio coverage zones and in memorizing modes with subsequent playback. Information from the spacecraft is transmitted in 8-bit parallel code at a rate up to 1 kilobit/sec via one channel of the launch vehicle's telemetry system.
With the particular aim of selling the Proton launch vehicle as a launcher of geosynchronous payloads, the brochure has a diagram outlining the procedure for injecting a satellite into such an orbit, making the point that injection is provided into any point of the geosynchronous orbit. It is gratifying to observe that the diagram bears a very close resemblance to that used in an earlier edition of this report. (17)
The 1987 International Space Future Forum in b c Moscow to celebrate the 30th anniversary of Sputnik produced a 36-page booklet on Proton giving further information. (18) The nose fairing, which has an inner coat of insulation to minimize acoustic load effects and internal and external coatings to ensure the required thermal characteristics, is jettisoned at T ± 370 sec at an altitude of 145.7 km, when the speed is 4.441 km/sec. Injection into LEO occurs approximately at T ± 600 sec.
Programmed maneuvers, which may last for 13 min, orient the longitudinal axis of the fourth stage in the direction necessary for departure into the transfer orbit. While in LEO, the fourth stage and attached payload are in passive flight with three axis orientation. Midway through this phase of the mission, at approximately T ± 50 min, the fourth stage is rolled 180" about its longitudinal axis to compensate for any drift of the control system gyroscopes, a process taking some 2.5 min. Free-flight coasting in the three-axis stabilized mode continues until approximately T ± 82 min when the fourth stage is ignited for the first time. This occurs at the first ascending node (northbound equator crossing) over the Gulf of Guinea. The duration of this first firing does not exceed 450 sec.
Programmed turns are made after shut-down to orient the longitudinal axis of the fourth stage and payload in the direction necessary for the second firing. A second gyro-compensation turn is made in the middle part of the free-flight, three-axis stabilized transfer orbit by rolling 180° around the longitudinal axis, again taking some 2.5 min. The free-flight coasting phase to apogee, which coincides with the descending node, lasts some 5.3 hours to approximately T + 6 hr 45 min. At this point the fourth stage ignites for the second time for up to 230 sec, applying a non-co-planar impulse to produce a GEO with injection accuracies of ± 20 min in orbital period, ± 1° in inclination and ±0.01 in eccentricity.
The command for separation is sent to the satellite at the instant of the second shut-down of the fourth stage and the satellite separates within 14.8 ± 0.05 sec after this. During that period of uncontrolled flight the angular rates of roll, pitch and yaw may reach 2°3'' per sec. The relative linear rate of separation is 1.5 ± 0.3 m/s.
Communications sessions with the launch vehicle and payload begin at T—25 min and last until T + 23 min at the end of the programmed turns following injection into LEO. Further sessions are scheduled for T + 64 min until after the first firing of the fourth stage to achieve the transfer orbit, from T + 96 min to T + 119 min to monitor the second set of programmed turns, for 10 min at T + 173 min for a routine status check, from T + 239 min to T + 261 min to monitor the second roll maneuver, and from T + 318 min until the payload has separated from the fourth stage and is safely in orbit.
EXPERIMENTAL FOURTH STAGE FAILURES
Cosmos 1817, launched at approximately 09:19 GMT on January 30, 1987, failed to leave LEO when the fourth stage failed to ignite at the first ascending node.(19) The successful launch, seven weeks later, of Raduga 20 suggested that the problem had been analyzed and overcome but, five weeks after that, on April 24, 1987, a second failure occurred when three Cosmos satellites, intended to be part of the test program for the GLONASS navigation system (analogous to the American GPS Navstar system), did not attain the desired orbits when the fourth stage shut down prematurely during its first burn and failed to ignite a second time at the apogee of the transfer orbit to circularize their orbits. (20, 21) S.F. Bogodyazht, director of the international department for Glavkosmos, initially denied that there had been a failure when asked for information by Space Commerce Corp., of Houston, Texas. (22) Arthur Dula, head of Space Commerce Corp. claimed that the reply was unacceptable and requested Glavkosmos to acknowledge the failure and describe details surrounding the accident. (23)
An explanation was offered by D. Poletayev, head of the launch department of Glavkosmos, at a meeting with Space Commerce Corp. representatives in Washington, D.C., on May 13. He said that the Soviets were using an experimental version of the fourth stage on some of its Proton boosters and that it had failed on two occasions this year. He went on to say that this version would not be used on Protons launching satellites for other countries. (24)
Some observers speculated that the experimental version of the fourth stage might employ cryogenic propellants, (25) but for the 100 kg additional payload that has been mentioned (26) that would not seem likely.
It is possible that an early use of the experimental fourth stage dates back to the change in the launch profile for triple GLONASS payloads at the end of 1985. Without definite pointers from the Soviets it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate between the use of the standard and improved fourth stages.
THE F-CLASS LAUNCH VEHICLES
The SS-9, NATO code-named Scarp, was paraded through Red Square for the first time in November 1967 and was described as having intercontinental and orbital capability. (27)
It was initially used for space launches in the F-l-r and F-l-m configurations for test flights in the FOBS and antisatellite (ASAT) programs. FOBS tests ended with Cosmos 433 in 1971 and there have been only three ASAT tests since 1980. These were the interceptions of Cosmos 1241 by Cosmos 1243 and Cosmos 1258 in 1981 and the interception of Cosmos 1375 by Cosmos 1379 on June 18 of the following year.
In the F-l-m configuration, it has continued to launch Radar Ocean Reconnaissance (RORSAT) and Electronic Ocean Reconnaissance (EORSAT) payloads for active and passive surveillance of Western fleet deployments and movements, a point emphasized by the DOD in support of its contention that the Soviet's ASAT capability is not being eroded by not having tested the warhead in space since 1982. As table 26 shows, there have been four or five launches of the F-l annually since 1984.
It had been speculated that the 82.3° recoverable Cosmos satellites, announced as performing Earth resources missions, were launched by an improved version, designated F-2, which was introduced in mid-1977. However, dark had expressed serious doubts based on his understanding that, without new second and third stages, the F-vehicle would lack the capability to orbit payloads in the 7-tonne category. (28)
It is now thought that the RORSATs and EORSATs are launched by the F-l-m (SL-11) and that the recoverable payloads are launched by the A-2 (SL-4). The improved F-2 (SL-14) launches heavy ELINT satellites, geodetic satellites, Meteor and oceanographic satellites and the new class of Cosmos satellites launched as sextuple payloads. All F-2 launches are made from Plesetsk at inclinations around 73.6° and 82.5°.
No photographs or film of an F-vehicle launch have been made available in the West. An inquiry made to a senior French scientist involved with the Oreol 3 project brought a reply that they did not have any photographs of the launch or preparations showing the launch vehicle.
The name "Tsyklon" (Cyclone) identified as part of the SL-11/SL- 14 class of medium booster, appeared in 1987. (29) This was the result of a Glavkosmos briefing which offered Tsyklon as a commercial launch vehicle for 4-tonne payloads into circular orbits at 200 km altitude. It was described as a 3-stage vehicle fueled by UDMH with NT2204 as oxidizer. A model was displayed at the Space Future Forum in Moscow and the caption to a photograph of the model in a trade magazine gave the overall height as 39.27 meters. (30)
space plane and space shuttle
By the end of 1983, the Soviets had conducted three tests of a small vehicle dubbed a "space plane" in the West. The first two tests, Cosmos 1374 on June 3, 1982 and Cosmos 1445 on March 15, 1983, landed in the Indian Ocean, while the third, Cosmos 1517 on December 27, 1983, landed in the Black Sea. 13 All were launched from Kapustin Yar using the smallest of the Soviet launch vehicles (the "C").
Photographs of the Cosmos 1445 test were released by the Aus tralian government, which apparently had at least one observation ship near the recovery site in the Indian Ocean. The photographs showed a small vehicle, probably a subscale prototype, in the water as well as being brought aboard the Soviet recovery ship. It had a cockpit, strongly suggesting that ultimately it would be used for crews, and an area near the front that appeared to be covered with thermal protection tiles similar to those used on the U.S. space shuttle. The Western press speculated that it would be approxi mately one-third the size of the U.S. space shuttle when fully de veloped for operational use.
Through the end of 1983, rumors continued in the West that the Soviets were developing a vehicle the same size and shape of the U.S. space shuttle in addition to the space plane, but the Soviets responded to questions about their shuttle program with customary obfuscation. 14
space life sciences initial uncertainty
As the Soviet and American space programs were getting under way in the late 1940s and early 1950s, there was considerable con troversy among aeromedical specialists as to whether humans could withstand the rigors of space flight. Indeed, many respected experts in medicine and biology held firmly to the belief that piloted spaceflight was impossible—that the human cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, and immune systems would simply fail in the mi- crogravity environment of space. Some also believed that it would not be possible to swallow food. However, other specialists were equally confident that piloted space flight was feasible. They made their case to their respective governments as well as to their doubt ing colleagues, basing their arguments on simulations, sounding rocket flights, and analyses of physiological system mechanics.
The flight of the dog Laika aboard Sputnik 2 in 1957 broke this impasse. It gave strong evidence that a higher vertebrate physio logically similar to man could survive in space for at least a week. Laika's cabin was instrumented to monitor key biomedical param eters, and the onboard life support systems provided regenerated air and controlled temperature.
Soviet Commercial Launch Vehicles 1981-1987
The Soviet Union has a broad range of launch vehicles from the small C vehicle to the relatively large D, or Proton, launch vehicle. Most of the vehicles have two or more variants of the basic design. Table 26 presents the record of orbital and escape launches by launch vehicle variant from 1981 through September 30, 1987, with class sub-totals for the period 1957 through 1980. The annual record of successful Soviet orbital and escape launches by basic first stage is presented in table 27. Of the 2,016 launches included in table 27, 1,216 are accounted for by use of the A-class launch vehicle.
DESIGNATORS
Until quite recently the Soviets have not identified a specific vehicle for a given launch. For many years no names at all were given, but the smallest of all launch vehicles was displayed in the space exhibition at the Museum of Economic Achievement in Moscow bearing the name "Cosmos" and the basic launch vehicle, bearing the name "Vostok," was displayed publicly for the first time at the 1967 Paris Air Show. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allocated code names, such as Sapwood, Sandal, Skean and Scarp to missiles with recognizable configurations.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) instituted its own system of identification by assigning them "SS" numbers and, when they were identified as space launch vehicles, gave the variants "SL numbers in chronological order of their appearance. An "X" suffix was used to denote that a particular variant was still in the experimental phase.
In 1968, in the absence of anything better in the open literature, the late Dr. Charles Sheldon devised the system which has been used in previous editions of these reports.(1) The scheme assigns a capital letter to each basic first stage and then uses a number for the principal upper stage. A final stage is indicated by a small letter showing its capability such as e—escape, m—maneuvering and r—reentry. A disadvantage of this system is that the number and small letter suffixes do not necessarily represent the same hardware when applied to different basic stages. However, the advantage of grouping variants by their basic first stages outweighs this disadvantage.
With the greater openness of the DOD and the appearance of new Soviet launch vehicles there is a growing tendency to use the DOD's SL-system. (2) This report continues to use the Sheldon system. Table 28, which lists Sheldon and DOD designators side by side with the Glavkosmos names, is provided for the reader's convenience.
New information on the design of certain Soviet rocket engines appeared in the 1985 Encyclopedia of Cosmonautics.(3) Table 29, which presents this information, differs in some respects from table 17 of Soviet Space Programs: 1976-80.(4)
LAUNCH FAILURES
The Soviet Union has been reluctant to admit to any failures in its space program. Launches which fail to reach orbit are rarely announced, but there are exceptions including the aborted Soyuz 18A and T-10A flights and the recent flight of the new heavy-lift launch vehicle, Energiya. Flights intended for the Moon or planets which failed to leave Earth parking-orbit were not acknowledged at one time. One result of Glasnost and the initiative to offer commercial launch services to foreign nations has been a new openness which acknowledged two failures of an improved fourth stage for the Proton launch vehicle in 1987.
A study by Phillip S. dark estimates that about 100 Soviet failures may have taken place during 1957-1985.(5) In two tables, the first of which is based on a document in the Lyndon B. Johnson Library at Austin, Texas,(6) covering the period 1957 through the early part of 1964, dark lists possible dates and missions, some of which can be confirmed from Soviet data. Table 30 combines these two tables and assigns probable launch vehicles to each possible failure. It can be seen that the greatest number of failures, half the total number, is for the A-class launch vehicle. However, expressed in terms of the total number of launch attempts for this class of vehicle (1,162 to the end of 1985), this represents a 96.3 percent success rate.
COMMERCIALIZATION OF SOVIET LAUNCH VEHICLES
One of the important tasks of Glavkosmos (98) is marketing space hardware on a commercial basis. One of the main directions of these services is the launching of foreign satellites by Soviet launch vehicles.
In 1983 the Soviets had proposed that second-generation maritime communications satellites for the International Maritime Satellite Organization (Inmarsat), of which the Soviet Union was a founding member and is a major shareholder, be launched by Proton, (99) but no contracts were forthcoming.
One of the first Western organizations to show an interest was the Space Commerce Corporation of Houston, Texas. This is a privately-held corporation devoted to selling Proton services for U.S. manufactured communications satellites. With the grounding of the U.S. space shuttle in January 1986 and suspension of launches by Arianespace following the loss of the first Ariane 2 in May, Western satellite owners began to look seriously at the Soviet initiative.
In July 1986, a spokesman for Glavkosmos said that using a Proton rocket to launch a satellite would cost any country 50 percent less than if a rocket of the European Space Agency's Ariane type were used. (100) This estimate was revised in the following month to "20 percent less than what is charged for putting a spacecraft in orbit by the Ariane rocket." (101)
The 20 percent less than the European Space Agency's estimate was repeated by Poletayev, department head of the Soviet State Committee for Space in an interview for Moscow News, with specific reference to the use of the "Proton" to launch a satellite for Inmarsat.102 Poletayev went on to claim that the real reason for the American embargo on technology transfer (see below) was the desire to monopolize the market at any price and in all circumstances.
The U.S. Government, fearing possible technology transfer, had raised objections and invoked restrictions preventing most Western satellites from being launched on Soviet launch vehicles. At the 1986 IAF Congress in Innsbruck, Aleksandr I. Dunayev, Glavkosmos chairman, called for an end to such restrictions and said that Western spacecraft booked for commercial missions on Proton or other vehicles launched from the Soviet Union could be surveyed continuously by the customer to ensure that there was no unauthorized technology transfer.(103) He said that, if the contract specified that a visiting team could accompany the satellite, then that team would be allowed onto the launch site. However, he acknowledged that their launch sites did not have, at that time, the infrastructure to support large- scale commercial operations, but claimed that the necessary facilities could be built in response to customer demand. (104)
Dunayev reiterated Poletayev's claim about the U.S. embargo blocking international cooperation in space in a full-page interview for the Economic Gazette. (105)
While in Geneva to deliver a lecture at the International Research Institute, Dunayev met representatives of 20 firms and companies from leading Western countries, including the United States, Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, and gave the approximate costs and conditions of providing the services of Soviet space technology commercially for launching satellites.(106)
At a press conference he noted that the chief obstacle to the development of cooperation remained the U.S. ban on exporting technology to the socialist countries since Western space equipment usually contained American components. He said that the removal of the barrier would open the doors to broad development of mutually advantageous and useful contacts and to the expanded access for other countries to the peaceful conquest of space. (107)
A Glavkosmos/Licensintorg briefing was held in Washington, D.C., on May 14, 1987, under the auspices of the Commercial Space Group of the law firm Heron, Burchette, Ruckert and Rothwell, which specializes in Soviet trade.
The British insurance brokers, Jardines, at a meeting for representatives of industry and the media (108) announced that Jardine Glanvill (Interplanetary) Ltd. had entered into a consultancy agreement in September 1987 with Licensintorg to market Soviet launch vehicles to commercial communications companies in Europe and newly industrialized countries. The partnership had developed from initial discussions on insurance.
On each of these occasions, seven different launch vehicles were on offer. Table 32 presents the specifications for technical performance using the exact wording of a document included in the press kit for the meeting.
The document laid down the general conditions on marketing of the Soviet launch-vehicle services for the foreign customers as follows:
1. Transportation of the spacecraft and necessary test equipment is performed by customers in two ways:
(a) by the "Aeroflot" charter flight from the manufacturer directly to the Baikonur airport and then by special motor transport to the launching site.
(b) delivery of the satellite by the customer's means of transport to Moscow, then by "Aeroflot" plane to the Baikonur launching site.
In both versions the satellite and test equipment are free from customs examination and duty.
2. Spacecraft and special equipment would be accompanied by the customer's staff.
During transportation the right to participate at all stages of activities on a 24-hour basis would be guaranteed for specialists accompanying the satellite and test equipment.
3. Insurance.
The question of satellite insurance would be decided under a private contract between the customer and the Soviet joint-stock company "Ingosstrach." It is noted that the Soviet insurance rates will be lower than that of the world market.
In an interview following the launch of Energiya, Dunayev stated that, when it was fully developed, it also could be supplied on a commercial basis to foreign partners. (109) In light of this it is pertinent to note that the only Soviet launch vehicle not being offered for commercialization is the J-vehicle.
Boris Pyadyshev, first deputy head of the Soviet foreign ministry information directorate, also commented on the American embargo at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists. He said that the Soviets were prepared to guarantee that customers' interests would not suffer either in terms of money or from the viewpoint of the preservation of technological or other secrets. The U.S. companies General Motors and General Electric were reported to have shown interest in the Soviet proposal. (110)
References:
A. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: 1981-87, PILOTED SPACE ACTIVITIES, LAUNCH VEHICLES, LAUNCH SITES, AND TRACKING SUPPORT PREPARED AT THE REQUEST OF Hon. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, Chairman, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, UNITED STATES SENATE, Part 1, MAY 1988, printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 1988
A’. Sheldon, C. S. The Soviet Space Program: A Growing Enterprise, TRW Space Log, no. 4, Winter 1968-69, pp. 2-23.
1. Source: Kosmonavtika Entsiklopediya, Moscow, 1985. pp. 327-331.
2. Johnson, N. L. The Soviet Year in Space: 1986. Colorado Springs, Colo., Teledyne Brown Engineering, 1986.
3. Kosmonavtika Entsiklopediya, op. cit., pp. 327-331.
4. Soviet Space Programs: 1976-80, Pt. 1. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Washington, 1982, pp. 67-69.
5. Clark, P. S. Journal of the British Interplanetary Society, 1987, pp 527-529
6. Peebles, C. Spaceflight, April 29, 1987, pp. 163-166.
7. Kosmonavtika Entsiklopediya, op. cit., p. 373.
8. Langereux, P., op. cit.
9. Kosmonavtika Entisiklopediya, op. cit., p. 202.
10. Personal observation
11.Kosmonavtika CCCP. Moscow, Machinostroyeniye, Planeta, 1986. pp. 112, 147, 148-149, 216, 349, 415, 426, 433, 439 and 479.
12. Soviet television, 1800 GMT, February 19, 1986.
13. Kosmonavtika Entsiklopediya, op. cit., p. 307.
14. Ibid., p. 48.
15. Soviet Space Programs: 1976-80, Pt. 1. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982, pp. 95-98.
16. See section on Glavkosmos in volume 2 of this report.
17. Soviet Space Programs: 1976-80, Pt. 3. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1985, p. 936.
18. Soviet launch vehicle Proton for injecting satellite in geostationary orbit. Moscow, Vneshtoryizdat, Izd. No. 5644M, VTI zak.7287, (n.d.).
19. Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 9, 1987, p. 26.
20. Aerospace Daily, April 29, 1987, p. 163.
21. Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 4, 1987, p. 24.
22. Aerospace Daily, May 1, 1987, pp. 178-179.
23. Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 11,1987, p. 34.
24. Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 18,1987, p. 22.
25. Aerospace Daily, May 15, 1987, p. 259.
26. Personal conversation with Art Dula, President of Space Commerce Corp., Houston, Texas (marketing agent for Proton in the U.S.).
27. TASS, 0710 GMT, November 7, 1967.
28. Soviet Space Programs: 1976-80, Pt. 1. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1982, pp. 112-113.
29. Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 1, 1987, p. 13.
30. Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 12, 1987, pp. 26-27.
Space Planes & Space Shuttle:
13 Another orbital test, Cosmos 1614, was made on Dec. 19, 1984 and it landed in the Black Sea. No more orbital tests occurred through the end of November 1987, although the trade press reported that suborbital tests have been conducted. See Chapter 5.
14 In 1987, the Soviets finally admitted that they were developing a full scale space shuttle (see chapter 5).
Soviet Commercial Launch Vehicles
95. Soviet Military Power 1986, op. cit., p. 58.
96. AP News, October 5, 1987.
97. Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 15, 1987, pp. 22-24.
98. See volume 2 of this report.
99. Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 20, 1983, p. 18.
100. Radio Moscow World Service, 1500 GMT, July 28, 1986.
101. Radio Moscow World Service, 1000 GMT, August 27, 1986.
102. Moscow News, September 1986, p. 10.
103. Aviation Week and Space Technology, October 20, 1986, p. 104.
104. Ibid.
105. Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, March 1987, p. 20.
106. TASS, 1517 GMT, May 22, 1987.
107. Ibid.
108. Hadlington, S. Nature, November 12, 1987, p. 98.
109. TASS, 1558 GMT, June 1, 1987.
110. Novosti Press Agency, op. cit., p. 9.
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