Soviet Space Resource Burden 1981-1987
[The Soviet space resources burden and the Soviet command economy were based on its allocation of its resources in the form of tons of material, equipment, personnel, and personnel human power as its currency for each Soviet “Five Year Plan” fiscal planning during the Cold War. -CPV]
RESOURCE BURDEN OF THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS
highlights military space has had a high priority since khrushchev
Resource commitments to the Soviet Space Program, represent ing the high priority of the Brezhnev period, will likely continue into the 1990s. Since the success of the Sputnik in the late 1950s, Soviet space programs have continuously had a high priority, as an important means of gaining strategic advantage and international prestige. Military space development designed to provide strategic advantage, dominated the Soviet space program since Khrushchev upgraded strategic military programs following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962; civilian space continued to be important for international prestige and technological advantage. During the Brezhnev years, space and related military programs rose in terms of abso lute and relative spending and economic burden.
SOVIET SPACE SPENDING IS HIGH, BUT HOW HIGH IS DIFFICULT TO DOCUMENT
All estimates of space spending in rubles or dollars are rough orders of magnitude due to Soviet secrecy, the lack of reliable ruble value measures, and the inability to accurately estimate U.S. dollar equivalents for Soviet programs. A statement that with a much smaller GNP than the United States (less than one-half) the Sovi ets probably spend on their space programs more than we do in equivalent resources, is probably a useful approximation. How much more is difficult to support from publically available assessments. U.S. space activities were estimated to cost $26.4 billion in 1988. Based on what little information has been released by U.S. intelligence agencies during the 1980s, conventional wisdom is that the Soviet spending rate is one and one half times that of the United States which would place the Soviet space spending in 1988 in the order of $40 billion.
These high estimates of spending are supported by a view that military space is a absolute, observable priority, in part, because the Soviet Union seeks superiority in space.
"GUNS" (MILITARY SPACE) MAY GIVE WAY TO ECONOMIC GROWTH (INVESTMENT ON PERESTROIKA MODERNIZATION) AND "NEW THINKING" UNDER GORBACHEV
Under Mikhail Gorbachev inquiry into the need for military space programs and the burden of continued military space priority may lead to a reexamination and reduced rate of space spending. The burden for new space programs would be onerous and unsus tainable if they were found to compete in an unacceptable way with high priority civilian modernization programs—the heart of Gorbachev's Perestroika restructuring program. Given the Gorbachev imperatives, as well as changes in military strategy, "new thinking" in international affairs, possible arms reduction and space cooperation agreements, continuation of the past trend in space spending could well impose an increasingly onerous or un justifiable burden on priority programs for modernizing the economy. These new factors together or separately might support a deci sion to reduce the claims of the space program on resources and lead to restructuring of the space budget. However, a second scenario might suggest that the continued high prestige value of inter national and other civilian space, modernization requirements of military space, and/or the economic utility of commercial space programs might lead the Soviet leadership to continue the trends of the past in spite of some costly tradeoffs. Modernization costs for military space may go up even if new programs are cut; the bene fits of expanding prestigious civilian space may likewise increase even if military space receives a diminished priority.
WITH CONTINUED SECRECY AND RELIANCE ON EVIDENCE OF DEPLOYED PROGRAMS, CHANGES IN SPACE PRIORITIES MAY BE DIFFICULT TO DETECT
Evidence of which course is chosen may not be available for some time if we rely primarily on observations of deployed space pro grams, since these generally have gestation periods of a decade or more. Although not yet visible, more timely evidence may come from indications of a change in the space program's claims as more resources are allocated to civilian economic programs, possibly as alternatives to new space ventures. Policy statements may reflect intent but are not hard evidence of changing future capabilities. If Gorbachev were to change priorities for military programs general ly and wish to have us believe that he had downgraded military space, he would do well to practice glasnost in all his space programs, e.g., to open the programs for objective assessment. We in the West would also do well to improve our objective measures of assessment open to public scrutiny.
space priority
Since its emergence to prominence in the 1950s, the Soviet space program has reflected an absolute priority derived from its correla tion to national political and military goals to a larger extent than the U.S. program. The correlation of Soviet national objectives for military and civilian space and effective implementation of the pri ority space programs have been facilitated by the apparent centralization of decision-making in the Politburo of the Communist Party. For most of the Stalinist period and the transitional rule of Nikita Khrushchev, resource allocations to military programs and the total space program (which is predominantly military) were largely fixed or stipulated for Soviet economic planners. The special per sonal relationship of academician Sergey Korolev and party leader Khrushchev doubtless contributed to the special priority space ac tivity received in the post-Sputnik, early 1960s period. With the passing of the two from the scene, the space priority probably became more institutionalized, less personalized, but no less imper ative.
As the military claims on investment funds began to be assessed more critically in the late 1960s, space claims may have come under some increasing scrutiny. There appeared to be an increas ing awareness through cost accounting (khozraschet) of the alterna tive uses of scarce resources; this greater attention to tradeoffs probably extended to the space program. The demands of civilian investment programs for projects such as industrial plants appear to have been given increasing attention. In considering these com peting demands for resources, the civilian and nonstrategic mili tary parts of the space budget were probably under more severe scrutiny. Yet, judging by the continued large and impressive pro grams during the Brezhnev era, such concerns apparently did not result in a lessening of space priority.
From Khrushchev through Brezhnev the requirements for space may have been viewed more as absolute than relative; therefore, economic tradeoffs relating to foregone civilian programs during the 1980s were not as relevant. In assessing the resource burden of the Soviet space program, we have in mind two rather different kinds of questions:
- Subjectively, how did the Soviet leadership appear to view the burden of space programs in terms of the options foregone in other endeavors—the opportunity costs? Was this burden con sidered onerous?
- Objectively, what were the quantity and quality of resources made available to the space programs?
From the former measurement of resources devoted to space, we might also be able to throw some light on the question of the value the Soviet leadership placed on the programs. Decision making on the space programs in the Soviet Union and the United States probably resulted from different subjective or leadership views with political and technological considerations dominating Soviet decisions while costs in resources were a more important factor in U.S. judgments. The Soviet leadership's subjective sense of lack of onerous burden—although difficult to assess—might help to ex plain why the Soviet Union supported programs requiring more re sources than those of the U.S. even though the objective cost or re source burden on their smaller economic base was greater.
The perception of objective resource costs may have influenced Soviet decisions on competing with the United States in the "race to the Moon," choosing between piloted and automated flights. While continuing to use Soyuz rather than developing the more ex pensive shuttle during the 1970s may have had the effect of choosing the less costly alternative, the more subjective political factors seemed to have weighed more heavily on Soviet decisions than al ternative resource costs. Moreover, if the combination of prestige and economic gains were deemed important, the political benefits of U.S.-Soviet civilian space cooperation may have made the costs more tolerable.
From Khrushchev through Brezhnev the requirements for mili tary space may have been viewed more as absolute than relative; therefore, the comparative burden of foregone civilian programs outside the space program were not relevant.
The objective question of resource cost is primarily a measure ment problem. Attempts to measure, in turn, are limited by the availability and accuracy of Soviet data and by problems of trans lating Soviet measurements—either in physical or monetary terms—into measurements amenable to international comparisons. If Soviet leaders have been increasingly interested in choices among space and other programs, the accuracy of in house measurements may be presumed to have improved. However, the limitation on disclosure of information in the Soviet system makes such a judgment difficult to document. Looking at the size of the Soviet space program over time by objective physical evidence indicates a large and impressive program, requiring substantial scarce, high quality resources. The characteristics of past programmatic commitments are chronicled in detail throughout these volumes. However, reliable information on economic cost of space spending has been very difficult to obtain. The secrecy system has been and con tinues to be so pervasive and restrictive that access to the kind of information normally available in the West is severely limited. Moreover, the access of many Soviet officials and professional ana lysts to Soviet data is also sharply restricted. This important infor mation is so crucial in influencing what an outsider may deduce or what most insiders may know, that a detailed discussion of the Soviet state secrecy laws, their current application, and impact is appropriate in some detail. Glasnost (openness) and a rule of law accepting a public need to know, have not as yet drawn away the veil of secrecy from the Soviet space budgets.
soviet secrecy system
For students of the Soviet economy, the strictures of official se crecy continue to be as formidable under Gorbachev as they were in the immediate post-Stalin years. Even in areas that have only marginal national security implications, such as crop forecasts, sta tistics on grain reserves, production of certain valuable minerals, and balance of payments accounts, economic data are closely guarded, and access is apparently still limited to a very small number of Soviets officials and specialists. The Western observer who wishes to learn about such matters from Soviet publications is required to piece together various bits of related data, make some assumptions about how the Soviet economic system functions, and derive estimates that are often very crude. In military-related ac tivities such as space spending, this task is even more complicated because the absence of even fragmentary published data is virtual ly absolute. For example, despite the obvious existence of a large
Soviet space program, no space expenditures are listed in the offi cially published Soviet budget. Soviet space officials add little to our knowledge of this subject, generally limiting themselves to qualitative generalizations about increasing space expenditures.
A wide range of information of an economic nature is included on the Soviet secrecy list still current in 1988; examples of econom ic items on the list are indicative of the difficulties in analyzing sensitive economic activities such as space spending: 2
General information on the location of military-industri al enterprises, production capacities, plans for production of armaments, military equipment and ammunition and data on the fulfillment of the plans in concrete terms as a whole for the U.S.S.R. all-union and union-republic minis tries, chief administrations, and enterprises of all-union significance; discoveries and inventions of major scientific and national economic significance before the heads of ministries and departments have granted permission for their publication; such other information as may be added by the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to the list of matters subject to state secrecy. (Italics added)
An important feature of this list is its open-ended nature. In prac tice, the last item in the list has been used as the basis for keeping secret whatever the leadership believes advantageous. The applica tion of this provision may also be retroactive; all of which reinforces an environment of secrecy.
The penalties for disclosure of state secrets were specified in laws first enacted in 1958 as part of a general legal reform in the early post-Stalin period that are still current. Four articles in the Statute on State Crimes, Articles 1, 2, 12, and 13 and one article in the Law on Military Crimes, Article 23, provide for a variety of penal ties depending on the severity of the crime. Penalties range from death for treason and espionage to confinement for 2 to 5 years for smaller offenses, such as "disclosure of state secrets." 3
The effect of such penalties is to inhibit any Soviet official from speaking or writing on matters that are routinely publicized in the West, unless prior approval has been obtained from top party lead ers. One of the valuable aspects of U.S.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation has been the leadership's approval of release of certain kinds of in formation related to the Soviet space program. Such information, however, has not included data on Soviet space spending.
To be sure, an annual state budget is published with single line items for military and science. Space activities may be partially included in those categories. But there is no reason for confidence in any consistent interpretation of the comprehension, reliability, or comparative meaning of these figures. Likewise, the Soviet published information on space activities from which allocations might be derived are sketchy at best. Indeed, it seems fair to state that one of the intents of the Soviet state secrecy laws is to keep alloca tions to space strictly secret. For Soviet officials who might wish to obtain access to such information and release it in their published works, the criminal penalties of the legal system would seem to be an effective deterrent. Information on Soviet space efforts therefore comes from four sources:
- Soviet activities monitored in the West, especially by the United States;
- American intelligence estimates built largely on a complex aggregation of relevant but incomplete data;
- Selective data released by the Soviet authorities largely for prestige purposes; and
- Information obtained from scientific exchanges such as the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.
The last two sources are very selective and incomplete measures of the Soviet space program as a whole, especially over time. As a result, we have had to rely heavily on the general estimates of Soviet space spending made by the intelligence agencies in the United States, especially the Central Intelligence Agency and in the Department of Defense. Even though published information by Soviet authorities remains limited, the accuracy of Western esti mates on space programs may have improved somewhat over time due to the effective use of technical means such as satellite surveillance. Supplemented by comprehensive economic data, the process of setting parameters and estimating the scope and structure of Soviet space programs might become reasonably reliable, if glas nost were applied to space activities in a comprehensive and con sistent fashion. While Gorbachev spoke on the general secrecy problem at the Party Conference on June 28, 1988, saying "The quality of information on international affairs must be drastically improved," there is little implementation to date. 4
It should also be noted, however, that information on reports pre pared by U.S. agencies during the Reagan administration has often been second hand and undocumented, and primarily released through such unofficial sources as the trade press. Moreover, no publication of the methodology used, such as that released by the Central Intelligence Agency to support estimates of Soviet military spending, have been forthcoming in the 1980s. So Soviet secrecy on space spending has been compounded by secrecy in the United States.
space spending
During the 1980s the Reagan administration has estimated that Soviet space efforts have exceeded those of the United States and the trend of spending suggests a widening of the expenditure gap. In 1982, it was reported that the Defense Department estimated Soviet expenditures at $18 billion—a ratio close to 1.5 times that of the U.S. effort. The U.S. Defense Department was reported further to have estimated a quadrupling of the Soviet space effort by the year 2000 due to aggressive spending in a number of mission areas detailed in this report:
- Energiya , heavy-lift launch vehicle;
- Salyut and Mir Space Stations;
- Space Shuttle;
- Space Plane; and
- Possible Space-Based Weapons
This same 1982 classified defense intelligence study is said to have projected the Soviet space budget for the year 2000 to be approxi mately $72 billion. 5 The U.S. space budget for 1988 is estimated to be $26.4 billion by the Office of Management and Budget; there are no estimates for the U.S. space budget in the year 2000. According to a French specialist on Soviet space, Alain Dupas, other U.S. official sources have reported:
Every year about 100 space launches are carried out from the three Soviet launch bases. This situation explains the fact that Soviet space activities are far ahead of the rest of the world in terms of volume: over 600 tons of pay- load put into near-Earth orbit each year, i.e., three to four times that of the U.S. It also accounts for the importance of the Soviet space industry which according to U.S. sources employs 600,000 people (compared to 300,000 in the U.S.), and accounts for 1.5 percent of the Soviet GNP (com pared to 0.5 percent in the U.S.). These quantitative ad vantages, however, do not signify (or at least not yet) that the U.S.S.R. is ahead of the U.S. in space. 6
Dupas further cautions,
In an appraisal of the true situation it is impossible to trust completely either U.S. sources or Soviet claims. U.S. aerospace circles have too much vested interest in making it known that the U.S.S.R. is racing ahead towards space colonization to provide completely objective information. Moreover, this situation is not new, as the history of the 'bomber gap' of the 1950's, and of the 'missile gap' in the early 1960's bears witness—neither of which existed except in the minds of U.S. experts.
Nevertheless Soviet space activities are shrouded in an uneasy secrecy, and have a past laden with disguised failures and aborted programmes. Combining diverse informa tion from various U.S. and Soviet sources, independent Western observers have therefore come to the conclusion that the U.S.S.R., contrary to its claims, undertook in the 1960's a programme to send a man to the Moon, in response to the Apollo programme, and that it abandoned this programme after the U.S. success. This secrecy in space and military affairs is prejudicial to the U.S.S.R., which at any one time is credited with more potential than it actually has. 7
Soviet Military Power, 1984 released by the U.S. Department of Defense was bullish on the Soviet space program and its relevance to military capabilities,
By all measures, the Soviet level of effort devoted to space in the 1980s is increasing significantly over the ac tivities noted in the 1970's. The projected yearly rate of growth of the Soviet space program is expected to outpace both the annual rate of growth in overall Soviet military spending and that of the Soviet gross national product (GNP) for a number of years to come.
The Soviets have embarked upon a long-term, broad- based effort to expand their operational military capability in space. A major Soviet objective is to expand war fight ing capability in space and achieve a measure of superiori ty in that arena. Their technological base is strengthening and is being enhanced by technology transfer from the West. Their launch capability is increasing with the devel opment of new facilities and booster systems. They contin ue to operate the world's only operational antisatellite system, while they test and develop more sophisticated space weaponry. It is clear the Soviets are striving to inte grate their space systems with the rest of their armed forces to ensure superior military capabilities in all arenas. 8
The level of effort and incremental cost of Soviet space programs in the mid-1980s seem substantial. These represent decisions of the Brezhnev era of military and space dominance in government pri orities. The rising cost and objective burden did not appear to be a major issue in the Brezhnev period as the leadership apparently ac cepted space attainments as absolutely essential.
burden and opportunity costs of the soviet space program
A subjective measure of the economic burden of Soviet space spending is based on how Soviet decision makers value accomplish ments in space compared to allocation of resources to alternative economic goals that must have been foregone. An objective measure, as noted above, is the amount of resources, measured in rubles and dollars as well as the materials, machinery, scientists and tech nicians that must have been diverted from other sectors of the economy to the largely military space program. Western defense analysts have been long familiar with this distinction between subjective and objective evaluation of the burden. Andrew Marshall, Director of Net Assessment in the Defense Department, noted this problem in 1976 in assessing the burden of Soviet defense spending.
What is critical is a better understanding of how that opportunity cost is perceived by Soviet leadership and soci ety ... To understand the burden of defense in any useful sense we need to know much more about how such conflicting and reenforcing views work themselves out in the Soviet system. The answer to this sort of question depends upon an understanding of the internal bureaucratic and organizational politics of the decision process which deter mine the allocation of resources . . . the perceived burden of defense may be increasing over time even though defense takes but a constant or declining share of GNP. Therefore, it is impossible to address the problem of the burden, or the Soviet perception of the burden, without knowing how strongly the Soviet leadership in general, or subgroups of it, are attached to some alternative goals that could be obtained by diverting resources from defense even if the efficiency of the shift of resources is low. Until much more progress is made in these broader dimensions of the burden issue, statements to the effect that the burden of defense upon the Soviets is great or small will not be per suasive. 9
Thus, in estimating the economic burden of the Soviet space pro gram, ruble and dollar estimates are insufficient to evaluate leadership intent. Our knowledge of Soviet "internal and bureaucratic and organizational politics", various policy statements, and official economic plans give some insights, if not hard evidence, of what priorities are attached to competing economic goals.
Observers of Soviet behavior have made widely differing assess ments of the political utility to the Soviet leadership of expanding military space strategic systems in the Brezhnev through the Gor bachev periods. Among the widely differing assessments, one might characterize, as this author did in the earlier editions of this report one as the "Soviet superiority" school and another as the "diminishing marginal political utility" school, illustrating the range of opinion about options open to the Soviet leadership. The "Soviet superiority" school would contend that:
The Soviet Union has the capacity to expand military-space strategic systems to a level which assures strategic superiority over the United States in the near future. Such strategic superiority can be translated in Soviet political hegemony in various important geographical areas, includ ing West Europe, Asia, and the Mediterranean. Thus, large military-space expenditures may promise such great political benefits that they will be unconstrained by the demands of hard-pressed civilian sectors of the Soviet econ omy.
The 'diminishing marginal political utility' school would contend that: The incremental costs for new military and space programs have become so high and the political util ity so low that stabilization or reduction of those priority programs in military space and new civilian investment programs may even favor the latter. At least they would be considered as serious alternatives. 10
To be sure, these views are oversimplified to suggest the range in official U.S. political and intelligence assessments of Soviet leader ship perceptions. The former school of thought, for example, approximates the view of the Department of Defense observers:
Soviet Military Power 1983 and 1984 outlined the con tinuing expansion into space of the Soviet drive for mili tary superiority. In the past year, some 80 percent of Soviet space launches have been purely military in nature, with much of the remainder serving both military and civil functions. This is an increase from 70 percent in pre vious years. The Soviet military space program dominates the USSR's overall space effort. Soviet military doctrine establishes requirements for the military space program. J1
The latter view comes close to that earlier expressed by former Secretary of State Kissinger and more recently by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that both we and the Soviet Union have begun to find that each increment of power does not necessarily represent an increment of usable political strength. In July 1988 Shevardnadze noted:
Let us now take up a different but equally important question for national security, namely, the economic price of political decision. This is the economic profitability of foreign policy. Here each step has its price, in either adding something or subtracting something from the budget of national well-being. And at times it is too great a substraction. The rough, rash tossing of weights onto the political scales sharply turns the arrow toward a minus. 12
The current "New Thinking" in Soviet foreign policy under Mik hail Gorbachev suggests a shift in the relative weight of the mili tary factor in the decision making of the Soviet leadership.
Soviet global influence, and development of a more pragmatic foreign policy entails less risk and net cost. Official statements of military strategy stress defensive over offensive systems. This new policy would suggest less emphasis on attaining superiority and a reassessment of foreign commitments to validate their cost from concrete political benefits. The expansion of interest in cooperative programs in space would be consistent with this new policy line. 13 Gorbachev's new thinking in international affairs, if implement ed, 14 could affect the priority to space programs:
- The new military doctrine emphasizing a defensive posture and a revised view of "reasonable sufficiency" may reduce the need for future military space buildups;
- Strategic arms agreements that are verifiable may reduce Soviet strategic forces and weapons in existence and the re quirements for new military space programs to permit verification;
- and
- New thinking in international affairs calls for a more prag matic less military-centered foreign policy, ergo fewer forward deployed forces and less inclination to support programs such as space efforts solely for gaining technological prestige.
Through Gorbachev's Perestroika program for modernization of the Soviet economy, the Soviet Union appears to be belatedly en tering the second industrial revolution, attempting through economic modernization to match the "economic miracles" achieved by Japan and the Western European countries during the 1950s and 1960s. If it is not to be left behind by the advanced industrial nations in the 21st century, the USSR must also try to initiate par ticipation in the current technological-information revolution.
Upgrading and modernizing Soviet plant and capacity and rais ing the technological level of the economy toward the Western level has become a top priority, some would say an overriding priority of Gorbachev. Sophisticated defense analysts such as Andrew Marshall note the rising objective burden of military (including military space) programs and estimate that by his, or Western, ob jective measures, defense and related programs claim 20-30 per cent of the value of material production rather than the 14-17 per cent estimated by CIA and DIA. However, his view is that the Soviet leadership perceptions under Gorbachev have not changed: "The Soviet military program is probably not seen as a cost or burden or diversion of resources from other more highly valued uses." 15 To others, the rhetoric of the Perestroika restructuring and modernization suggest that it is now a "highly valued use" of scarce resources. Moreover "new thinking" suggests the perceived need for military space programs have been reduced. Some believe a continuation of the past trend of space spending should be considered both an "onerous" subjective and objective burden under Gor bachev.
The cost of the space program in civilian non-space options fore gone for entering the third technological-industrial revolution is ac knowledged by DOD's Soviet Military Power 1987 in the following:
Quarterly, Summer 1988, for further discussion of the military's response to reasonable sufficiency, and references to Military Thought. MccGwire, Michael. Rethinking War: the Soviets and European Security. Brookings Review, Spring 1988. The Clash Between Civilian Specialists and the Soviet Military over Reasonable Sufficiency. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Dec. 4, 1987. Statement of Mikhail S. Gorbachev to Plenary Meeting of the United Nations Gen eral Assembly, Dec. 7, 1988.
The high priority the Soviets are giving to their space program is reflected in the rapid overall growth of the pro gram, a program that is absorbing a large share of the na tion's most advanced and productive technology since 1980. The estimated dollar costs of the Soviet space effort have more than doubled, owing largely to programs for the manned space stations, new launch vehicles, supporting fa cilities, and the shuttle orbiter. The projected rate of growth in the space program, driven by the ambitious space-based manned program and future communications satellites, is expected to outpace overall trends in both military spending and GNP well into the future. 16 (Italics added)
U.S. Air Force Secretary Edward C. Aldridge, Jr., after a visit with Soviet space officials in July 1988, noted the budget pressures expressed to him by those responsible for Soviet military space pro grams. Space cooperation was reportedly seen as a means to stabilize their funding for chosen programs by gaining access to U.S. technology. 17
Alexandr I. Dunayev, head of Glavkosmos, indicated civilian space programs were being put on a "self-financing" basis. Just how profitable commercial space will be is yet to be demonstrated. On the occasion of the completion of a long duration space station mission by two cosmonauts, Yuriy Romanenko and Alexsandr Alexsandov, Dunayev stressed the need to justify space outlays by economic gains. 18 Such comments stressing budgetary problems and the need to justify the economic burden of space programs by spin-off economic benefits were also reportedly reflected in Dun- ayev's comments to a Space Future Forum in Moscow in October 1987. Academician Roald Z. Sagdeyev, head of the Soviet Institute for Space Research is said to have reflected the same concerns. 19
Military space allocations may be more likely to be reduced in terms of the growth in military space rather than in absolute spending levels. Nevertheless, these increments are quite impor tant as, with slow growth and rising demand for quality products, materials, and skilled manpower, a deferral of new military space programs could release a margin of resources that might be critical to increased modernization and productivity under Perestroika. If, for example, new capacity for the next generation of space vehicles were deferred, the impact on resources available for civilian mod ernization could be substantial. Some analysts such as Jan Vanous and Bryan Roberts, using the Plan Econ Model, would argue that it is an "either-or" choice in conventional weaponry: Gorbachev can have tanks or tractors, not both. 20
Assuming that high marginal costs, and reduced political utility represent the current Soviet leadership perception of military and space programs we might consider what other options are at stake. In preparing for the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (1991-95), the requirements for increased investment may run well ahead of the an ticipated growth. The machine building needs for Gorbachev's re structuring may take the lion's share of new capacity. If so, this could draw resources away from Soviet programs that may be con sidered analogous to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.
The technologies under development to support the U.S. Strate gic Defense Initiative (SDI) are creating a pool of innovative concepts which will have potential applicability to the U.S. defense in dustry in strong interaction with the civilian sector; for example, Battle Management/Command, Control and Communications requires the development of computer hardware and software on an unprecedented scale; kinetic energy weapon systems require re search on microelectronic controls, advanced infrared and radar sensors, compact chemical propulsion devices, and electro-magnetic launchers which could lead to advanced anti-tactical weapons and propulsion systems; directed energy weapon systems create a focal point for laser research, particle beam concepts, and large space structures. Relevant systems analysis involves studies of large space transportation systems paving the way for space exploration in the 21st century. Finally, SDI countermeasure studies are evaluating the vulnerability of defense systems to possible offensive re sponses which could drive improvements in technologies such as nuclear radiation hardened electronic means to counter a Soviet maneuvering missile threat. The scale of the U.S. SDI effort will probably incline the Soviets to restructure their efforts in the reform of research and development planning. Assuming the same would be true in the Soviet Union, the dual military-civilian char acter of SDI technology may require Gorbachev to coordinate technological reforms for both civilian and military needs; for example, investment in computer technology has a military and civilian commonality. Or civilian demands of Perestroika may be more "highly valued" than military space programs. 21
It should be emphasized that the specialized, high-technology inputs of the Soviet space program are not easily convertible to ci vilian investment needs in the short run. If Soviet space and military programs are to be slowed down, one might expect the military space share to retain or expand its portion of the total space budget compared to civilian space programs, as has been the case in the past. However, if the U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperative programs expand, their focus on civilian programs may provide an incentive for the Soviets to maintain a strong civilian program and to keep the prestige of a proud scientific community intact; Soviet leaders may show a preference for the visible, civilian program. If, then, the Soviet leaders were to move toward a cooperative U.S.-U.S.S.R. program for Mars exploration, for example, the civilian space pro gram might be among the higher priority claimants.
The priority accorded Soviet space programs in the planning period ahead will probably depend primarily on the leadership's perception of the economic costs and political benefits of new pro grams. If considerable political gain is possible in the world arena, the high priority for space will continue and even increase. If the gains are perceived as of questionable value, the pressing claims of alternative civilian investment programs may be expected to increase in weight.
If the "Soviet superiority" view is in fact accurate, the notion of burden, opportunity costs or tradeoffs between military and space programs versus civilian (non-space) investment would not seem very relevant. If military superiority were attainable and its fruits could be translated in meaningful political shifts in power relation ships, the Soviet leadership priorities would probably be in favor of the traditional "guns" or military and military space programs. However, if the perception of rising-cost, diminishing-utility proves dominant, a reduction of relative military and military space claims on resources would be eminently logical.
Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient knowledge of the Soviet leadership's motivations to determine which of these views is clos est to what Soviet leaders are not only thinking but implementing. Moreover, even a reduced priority to military space expansion may lead to larger space spending and burden, if modernization of mili tary space is required in a process of defense reduction due to changed policy and/or arms agreements.
A continuation of Soviet priority toward space, albeit costly in the face of civilian restructuring and modernization needs, would appear to have been retained if deployed vehicles are the sole or primary test of policy. With gestation periods of a decade or more for sophisticated programs from initial resource commitment to de ployment, current evidence may glow like long dead stars as re sults of Brezhnev-period decisions which are only now reaching us. If we are to take seriously Gorbachev's statements on changed pri orities we must have much more openness about Soviet programs from resource commitment to space vehicle deployment, and this increased openness must be accompanied by greater openness of in telligence information on these programs in the United States to permit public understanding and informed debate.
References:
A . SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: 1981-87, SPACE SCIENCE, SPACE APPLICATIONS, MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS, ADMINISTRATION, RESOURCE BURDEN, AND MASTER LOG OF SPACEFLIGHTS, Part 2, April 1989, Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 1989, Committee print 1981-87- part-2
1. This chapter updates similar chapters appearing on Soviet Space Programs 1971-75, v. II, p. 85-98, and Soviet Space Programs: 1976-80, Part I, p. 329-342. Dr. George D. Holliday was co author of the earlier chapters.
2 Valerian, A. and Semen S. Studenkin. Sovetskoe Administrativnoe Pravo (Soviet Adminis trative Law). Moscow, Gosiurizdat, 1959, cited in Zigurd L. Zile, Robert Sharlet and Jean C. Love. The Soviet Legal System and Arms Inspection. New York, Praeger, 1972. p. 223-224. The 1956 list of state secrets was renewed by decree of Sept. 15, 1966. F. J. M. Feldbrugge (editor) Encyclopedia of Soviet Law, Leiden: Oceans Publishers, 1973. p. 600.
3. Osnovy ugolovnogo zakonodatel'stva Soiuza SSR i Soiuznykh Resublik, Zakon ob ugolovnoi otvetsvennosti za gosudarstvennye prestupleniia (Basic Criminal Law of the Union of Soviet So cialist Republics). Articles 1, 2, 12, and 13 and Zakonob ugolovnoi otvetsvennosti za voinskie prestupleniia. Article 23, of Dec. 25, 1958; also cited in Ginsburgs and Rusis, op. cit. p. 32-35.
4 Report by Mikhail Gorbachev to the 19th all-Union Conference of the CPSU, June 28, 1988. Moscow: Novosti Press Documents and Materials, p. 34. While more data have been released under Gorbachev the available data is poorly documented and methodologically flawed. Moreover, the State Committee on statistics (Goskomstat) has considerable leeway to restrict informa tion released that may be detrimental to the State. Apparently that still covers much of the economic data traditionally covered by the Secrecy Acts and certainly space budgets. CIA Direc torate of Intelligence. The Impact of Gorbachev's Policies on Soviet Economic Statistics—A Conference Report, SOV-88-10049, July 1988. p. 27, 35.
5. Aviation Week and Space Technology, July 19, 1982, p. 28.
6. Dupas, Alain. The U.S.S.R.'s Prudent Space Policy. Space Policy, Aug. 1987. p. 241.
7. Ibid, p. 239f.
8. Soviet Military Power 1984, p. 47.
9. U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Gov ernment Allocations of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1975. p. 164-165
10. Soviet Space Programs: 1976-80, Part I, p. 335.
11. Soviet Military Power, 1985, p. 43.
12. Kissinger briefing to congressional leaders. Congressional Record, June 19, 1972. p. S9600; Abridged version of a report given by Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze on 25 July at a conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference: For eign Policy and Diplomacy, FBIS-SOV-88-18, Annex, Sept. 22, 1988.
13. Speech of Gorbachev to Party Conference, op. cit., p. 28-30; Primakov, Evgeni. PRAVDA, Mar. 20, 1988. See Garthoff, Raymond. New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine. Washington
14. Civilian space may receive increased emphasis due to prestige and desired international image, (cf. previous chapter). The offer by Secretary Gorbachev to convert the Krasnoyarsk radar station to civilian space, may be a case in point. Washington Post, Sept. 16, 1988. p. 1; U.N. speech, op. cit.
15 . . Marshall, Andrew W. Commentary in Defense Industry and Economy Section. Gorbachev's Economic Plans Volume 1. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off, Nov. 23, 1987. p. 481.
16. Soviet Military Power 1987, p. 58. Underline added.
17. Aerospace Daily, July 19, 1988, p. 90.
18. FBIS, Jan. 21, 1988, Sov-88-013 from Moscow Tass, Jan. 20, 1988.
19. Aerospace Daily, Oct. 20, 1987, p. 101.
20. Vanous, Jan and Bryan Roberts. Time to Choose Between Tanks and Tractors: Why Gorba chev Must come to the Negotiating Table or Face a Collapse of His Ambitious Modernization Program. Plan Econ Report, June 27, 1986. C1A/DIA report, Gorbachev's Economic Program: Problems Emerge, to the Subcommittee on National Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, Apr. 13, 1988.
21 Hardt, John. Soviet Economic Constraints on Defense to Year 2000. U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union Atlantic Council, University Press of America. New York-London, p. 225-239; Cooper, Julian. The Elite of the Defence Industry Complex. In Elites and Political Power in the USSR, edited by David Lane. Aldershot, Hants, England, Elgar Brookfield, VT. USA, 1988. Hardt, John and Boone, Jean. Computer-Assisted Third Industrial Revolution in the USSR: Policy Implication for the Soviet Union and the United States. In Staar, Richard. The Future Information Revolution in the USSR. New York, Crane Russak and Company, 1988.
